Reducing the waste in nuclear weapons modernization

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Reducing the waste in nuclear weapons modernization Frank von Hippel, Program on Science and Global Security and International Panel on Fissile Materials, Princeton University Coalition for Peace Action Senate Staff Briefings, 6 December 2016 Proposed Senate Resolution to be submitted by Senators Franken, Baldwin, Boxer, Markey, Merkley, Sanders, Schatz, Warren, Whitehouse and Wyden (contact Dr. Ali Nouri in Franken s office ASAP: X4-1043) it is the sense of the Senate that the President should (1) take action to ensure the affordability and feasibility of the plan of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy for modernizing the nuclear weapons of the United States by reevaluating, and modifying accordingly, proposals for programs to modernize United States nuclear weapons and delivery systems. (2) prioritize among any programs that are planned so that the United States retains a nuclear arsenal robust enough to meet deterrence needs and so that such programs do not jeopardize other economic investments and other security expenditures. 1

The public and most of Congress are no longer informed on nuclear-weapons issues. They think that the dangers went away with the end of the Cold War Questions and Answers in a 2004 Poll (no recent polls) Q1. How many nuclear weapons do you think the US has in the US, or on submarines, that are ready to be used on short notice? A. ~200 Q2. How many nuclear weapons do you think the US needs to have to make sure other countries are deterred from attacking it? A. ~100 http://www.pipa.org/onlinereports/wmdproliferation/wmd_prolif_apr04/wmdprolif_apr04_quaire.pdf The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Currently Has (a non-governmental estimate based on New START declarations, U.S. declarations at the 2015 NPT Review Conference and other public information) ~ 4700 operational warheads ~ 2600 reserve + --------------------------------------------------- ~ 2100 deployed on: ~ 440 ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) with one warhead ~1150 on 12 Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) with 24 missiles ea. ~ 200 nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles for B52 bombers ~ 100 nuclear bombs for B-2 bombers ~180 nuclear bombs for fighter-bombers in West Europe and Turkey Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, United States nuclear forces, 2016, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2

Plan is to modernize (replace) everything by ~ 2040 400 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles ~ $85 billion 1 12 ballistic missile submarines ~$97 billion 2 100 long-range nuclear bombers ~ $89 billion 3 1000 long-range nuclear cruise missiles ~$25 billion 4 ~ 4000 life-extended warheads (2017-2041) ~ $167 billion 5 Nuclear command and control ~ $90 billion 6 Total: ~ $550 billion (~$1000 billion including operational costs over 20 years 7 ) 1. http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-09-06/new-nuclear-armed-missile-seen-costing-u-s-85-billion-up-36 2. http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676281.pdf 3. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/20/how-much-does-the-pentagons-secretive-bomber-really-cost-and-should-you-be-allowed-toknow/?utm_term=.348cb2793c63 4. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2016/05/26/lrso-does-not-make-sense-nor-do-its-proposed-numbers/84969298/ 5. https://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/fy17ssmp%20final_033116.pdf 6. http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-16-23 (for 10-year cost) x2.5 7. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-nuclear-cost-debate-gets-even-uglier-17507 8. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states DoD nuclear modernization funding hump What will the tradeoffs be? Is is all necessary? Kennedy (Minuteman ICBM, B-52s, Polaris SSBNs) Reagan (MX missile, B-1, B-2, Trident SSBNs) Projected ~$25 years ~$25 billion ~$400 billion 3

Billions of 2016$ 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 NNSA nuclear warhead program (including R&D) for all those ~ 4,000 warheads* Are they all needed? Manhattan Project End of the Soviet Union Projection Cold War average 0 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 *Atomic Audit through FY1996; DOE Budget Requests through FY2016; NNSA, Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, FY2017 projections thereafter. Is it time to reduce the Triad to a Diad, removing the land-based missiles? This would reduce the false alarm danger. --Gen. James Mattis, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 27 Jan. 2015 400 vulnerable U.S. ICBMs would only carry about 400 of U.S. 1500 missile warheads. Also ~ 700 invulnerable warheads on submarines at sea. Would a 700-warhead survivable deterrent be enough? ICBM vulnerability to attack used to justify keeping ICBMs on launch-on-warning hair-trigger, creating the danger of launch on false warning or hacking. 30-minute flight time of a Russian ICBM would give only minutes to decide whether or not a warning is correct, what is being attacked and how to respond. We must clearly establish the role of our nuclear weapons: do they serve solely to deter nuclear war? If so we should say so, and the resulting clarity will help to determine the number we need. --Gen. James Mattis, testimony, 27 Jan. 2015 4

The high costs of ineffective Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Billions of 2010 $ 10 8 6 4 2 1972 ABM Treaty 1983: Reagan Star Wars speech 2002: G.W. Bush takes U.S. out of ABM Treaty 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Interceptors easily neutralized with low-cost, light-weight decoys Make balloons look like warheads or (here) put warheads in balloons with small battery heaters in empty balloons to give them the same infrared signature. Decoy balloons Antisimulation balloon Hidden warhead Kill vehicles 5

U.S. missile defense program hinders nuclear reductions and increases risk of mistaken Russian and Chinese launch we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty. --2013 Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States BUT: China and Russia worry that US BMD might become good enough to stop a weak retaliatory strike after a U.S. first strike. Russia therefore refuses further bilateral reductions, and China refuses to even talk about limiting its slow nuclear buildup; and Russia maintains a hair-trigger alert while China is moving in that direction, increasing the risk of accidental launch. Public supportive of deeper cuts Would you favor or oppose the United States signing a treaty with other nations to reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons, including our own? YouGov poll, July 2015 Total Dems Ind Rep. Favor strongly 33% 49% 29 % 17% Favor somewhat 29% 30% 29 % 28% Oppose somewhat 12% 9% 11 % 20% Oppose strongly 12% 2% 31 % 26% Not sure 13% 10% 18 % 9% https://today.yougov.com/news/2015/07/22/a-bomb-legacy/ 6