1st Session Mr. LUGAR, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following REPORT. [To accompany Treaty Doc.

108TH CONGRESS EXEC. RPT. " SENATE! 1st Session 108 1 TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC OF- FENSIVE REDUCTIONS, SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON MAY 24, 2002 ( THE MOSCOW TREATY ) FEBRUARY 20, 2003. Ordered to be printed Mr. LUGAR, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany Treaty Doc. 107 8] The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (hereafter, the Moscow Treaty or the Treaty ), having considered the same, reports favorably thereon subject to two conditions and six declarations set forth in this report and the accompanying resolution of ratification and recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification thereof. CONTENTS Page I. Purpose... 1 II. Summary of the Treaty... 8 III. Background... 9 IV. Views of the Armed Services Committee... 10 V. Committee Action... 17 VI. Resolution of Ratification... 23 VII. Article-by-Article Analysis... 26 VIII. CBO Cost Estimate... 30 19 115 I. PURPOSE Since the end of the Cold War the United States and Russia have had an opportunity for a new approach to arms control. The distrust and suspicion that resulted in years of acrimonious negotiation, lengthy agreements and accountability which rested on doubt, not trust, has given way to a new relationship with the Russian Federation that is based on more friendship and trust than in the VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

2 past. The Moscow Treaty represents a new approach to strategic arms control, based on the changed relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, in testimony to the Committee on July 17, 2002, held up the Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) of 1991 and the Moscow Treaty. START, he said, is 700 pages long, and took 9 years to negotiate. The Moscow Treaty, concluded this summer by President Bush and President Putin, is three pages long, and took 6 months to negotiate. 1 At the height of the Cold War, arms control agreements such as SALT I, the ABM Treaty, and the Limited and Threshold Test-Ban Treaties were negotiated to manage the arms race in ways that would increase stability during times of potential crisis. These agreements were written with an eye toward the terrible prospect that U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would be used against each other. Agreements were limited by deep and mutual distrust that led to an emphasis on detailed drafting and extensive verification measures. Today, our countries are no longer mortal enemies engaged in a global ideological and military struggle. The Russian Federation and the United States work to build a strong military and security partnership on issues ranging from the war on terrorism to keeping the peace in the Balkans. The Moscow Treaty reflects the changed nature of our relationship. In the early post-cold War years, arms control agreements were drafted to eliminate or reduce strategic nuclear weapons, to limit conventional forces in Europe and open them to international observation, and to lead other nations by example in the pursuit of peace. The range of agreements that could be reached was significantly broadened in these years, but the decades long legacy of distrust resulted in continued concern for far-reaching provisions, definitions and increasingly intrusive methods of verification. The price of such agreements was the lengthy negotiations and dense texts to which Secretary Rumsfeld referred. The Committee received testimony from the Administration suggesting that the Moscow Treaty is a product of the new U.S.-Russian relationship. The world has become more unpredictable, not the least because of the intersecting threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Officials explained that such an unpredictable world requires flexibility in U.S. and Russian force structure and options that allow adaptability in the face of these new and shared threats. Our new foes do not need armies, air forces, or navies, nor do they intend to adhere to a rule-governed international system. Given the threats it faces, and the greatly improved relationship with Moscow, the United States sought to move beyond agreements that tightly constrained U.S. and Russian strategic forces. Accordingly, the President stated his intention to reduce to 1,700 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads before the Moscow Treaty was negotiated, regardless of what the Russians opted 1 Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, July 17, 2002, Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions: The Moscow Treaty, S. Hrg. 107 622, p. 86. Hereafter, Hearings. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

3 to do. 2 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell testified to the Committee on July 9, 2002, that President Bush had told Russian President Putin: This is where we are going. We are going there unilaterally. Come with us or not. Stay where you are or not. This is what the United States needs and it does not need it because you are an enemy; it needs this because of the nature of the world we live in, and we see you as a partner. 3 The Treaty resulted from this atmosphere of cooperation and is a legally binding text that reflects U.S. and Russian intent to reduce strategic nuclear warheads to the level of 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. The Treaty is meant to be representative of the new U.S.-Russian relationship. The U.S. objective in concluding the Treaty was to provide maximum flexibility in achieving strategic offensive reductions consistent with what the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, issued in 2002, had determined to be the lowest levels possible, consistent with U.S. national security requirements and given current uncertainties about future strategic trends. The Treaty creates neither a new verification regime nor accounting rules. The Administration explained that verification under the Treaty does not reflect Cold War animosity. During the Cold War, such measures were seen as necessary for the purpose of providing confidence between two sides that sought further means to verify compliance with obligations under agreements. A decade after the Cold War, such measures do not necessarily provide more trust or further verification, but rather become ends unto themselves instead of a means by which obligations might be verified and, if maintained from the standpoint of the Cold War, could be seen as stressing process over results. As the Moscow Treaty codifies the intent of each Party to make reductions in force levels that it had already decided upon, irrespective of the other Party s force levels, it was determined that there was no need to codify the units of account or modes of reduction. Each Party may determine for itself what are its strategic nuclear warheads and how they are to be reduced. This absence of accounting or verification provisions does not, from the standpoint of a new relationship with the Russian Federation, represent an abandonment of U.S. leadership, but rather signifies productive change in U.S.-Russian relations. Additionally, verification under the START Treaty will continue at least through 2009. The Committee believes that the absence of verification provisions in the Moscow Treaty makes confidence and transparency a high-priority issue. The Committee commends the statements made by Administration officials in its hearings that negotiators were mindful of this fact, and that there will be efforts aimed at increasing verification measures if the Parties decide not to extend the START verification regime beyond 2009, when that treaty is scheduled to expire. The United States should not only practice transparency, but also promote it, in close coordination with the Russian Federation. This principle is in keeping with the new relationship 2 Written answer of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the Committee s question for the record, July 9, 2002, Hearings, p. 52. 3 Hearings, p. 10. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

4 that Presidents Bush and Putin are forging. Greater transparency regarding Moscow Treaty implementation may lead, moreover, to similar advances in other areas of great concern to the United States, such as compliance with nonproliferation regimes. The Committee urges the President to use implementation of the Moscow Treaty as a means to foster greater U.S.-Russian interaction and mutual confidence in the national security field. The Treaty does not provide for the destruction of withdrawn warheads or delivery systems. In the briefings and hearings provided to the Senate, the Administration pointed out that while the Moscow Treaty does not mandate the destruction of withdrawn warheads, neither did previous arms control agreements with the Russian Federation or the Soviet Union. As Secretary Rumsfeld stated in testimony on the Treaty before the Committee on July 17, 2002, no previous arms control agreement, not SALT, not START, not the INF [Treaty], has required the destruction of warheads, and no one offered objections to those treaties on the basis that they did not require... the destruction of warheads. 4 The Treaty does not place restrictions on either Party s force structure before December 31, 2012. The Committee was assured that the United States will continue to implement strategic force reductions along the path outlined in the Defense Department s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. Specifically, that the United States will: retire 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, remove four Trident submarines from strategic service, and no longer maintain the ability to return the B 1 to nuclear service. This will reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by about 1,100 warheads by the end of Fiscal Year 2007 in a manner that as a practical matter would be very difficult to reverse.... Some warheads that are to be removed will be used as spares, some will be stored, and others will be destroyed or dismantled. 5 Thus, although the Treaty does not require the destruction or dismantlement of any strategic delivery vehicles or warheads, some of the U.S. forces to be reduced by 2007 are, in fact, slated for destruction or dismantlement. The Russian Federation, for its part, may revamp its force planning in light of the flexibility afforded by this Treaty. Equally important, Moscow has expressed its intention to continue to reduce various weapons platforms and warhead levels, and to continue dismantling weapons systems with U.S. assistance under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Unlike the START II treaty, which would have required that the Russian Federation no longer deploy land-based ICBMs with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), the Moscow Treaty would permit Russia to retain such systems. START II was received by the Senate on January 15, 1993, and approved by the Senate on January 26, 1996. But START II never entered into 4 Hearings, p. 79. 5 Hearings, p. 51. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

6 Hearings, p. 52. 7 Hearings, p. 140. 5 force because the Russian Duma, in its April 14, 2000 Federal Law on Ratification, linked the agreement s entry into force with retention of the ABM Treaty by the United States and the modifications of that treaty signed in 1997. The ABM Treaty modifications were never submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, and thus instruments of ratification were never exchanged. The Administration noted the concern that allowing the Russian Federation to maintain multiple-warhead ICBMs had the potential to undermine crisis stability and increase the risk of war due to miscalculation, but stated that this view is based on Cold War deterrence calculations that are no longer relevant. Secretary of State Powell stated in response to a Committee question for the record from its July 9, 2002 hearing: Our new strategic relationship with Russia is no longer based on a nuclear balance of terror. Because of this new relationship, we cannot conceive of any credible scenario in which we would threaten to launch our strategic forces at Russia. The scenario... of Russia believing it faced a use it or lose it situation with its force of MIRVed ICBMs is therefore not a credible concern. 6 The Administration points to the profoundly close and friendly relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin and their continued statements that the United States and the Russian Federation are no longer enemies as a further proof that Russia s weapons do not necessarily threaten the United States. Furthermore, Russian actions in the past year on issues ranging from the war against terrorism in Afghanistan to NATO enlargement and last summer s joint operation to repatriate Russian-supplied weapons-usable uranium in a Yugoslavian research reactor are viewed by Administration officials as demonstrations of this new relationship. Despite the reassurance provided by Administration witnesses, former Senator Sam Nunn and other outside witnesses urged continued attention beyond the Treaty to improving crisis stability, notably by giving U.S. and Russian leaders more decision time in a crisis. In testimony before the Committee, General Eugene E. Habiger, USAF (Ret.), the former Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command, made a suggestion in this regard: In the past, we have relied on the military establishment and arms control community for ways to reduce the alert status, and they have not provided viable options. I would strongly recommend that the teams working on this matter be led in large measure by the people who build the weapons systems. They built them; they understand them, and they are the key to designing a system that moves weapons off alert status in ways that make sense, are transparent but non-intrusive, and do not compromise our security. 7 Members of the Committee do not know whether any ideas for increasing decision time are, in fact, practicable, and share General Habiger s view that options for reducing alert status should be VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

6 evaluated by those with significant expertise on the specific weapons systems in question. If the President does not order the preparation of such analyses, Congress could require the analyses or establish a commission of weapons systems experts to undertake this task. Such commissions have been created before, some under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, and have proven useful in considering issues of such a technical nature. The Administration has allowed that the Treaty will not be verifiable under the standards imposed during the Cold War. Instead, the START verification regime will be utilized and continue to operate through December 2009, when it expires unless extended by mutual agreement of the Parties. The Bilateral Implementation Commission created in Article III of the Treaty will provide a forum in which each Party can discuss its implementation plans and activities and raise any concerns about the other Party s forces. The Administration pointed out that the United States and the Russian Federation could always adopt additional verification or transparency measures. A U.S.-Russian working group did discuss a possible verification regime during negotiations on the Treaty, and a transparency committee has been created by the Consultative Group for Strategic Security established pursuant to the Joint Declaration of May 24, 2002, on the New Strategic Relationship. The Administration said additional verification could be added, but that specific additional transparency measures are not needed, and will not be sought, at this time. We recognize, however, that more contacts and exchanges of information could be useful and that the Parties could decide to develop additional transparency measures in the future. 8 This does not foreclose the possibility that START could be extended or that, as issues arise in the context of the Moscow Treaty, measures could be implemented to solve any potential problems, and therefore, does not necessarily mean that the agreement is flawed. As Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Committee on July 17, 2002: [B]etween now and 2009... there is plenty of time to sort through what we will do thereafter. Second, we do have national technical means. Third, we have agreed we will meet and work through improved transparency and predictability with the Russians. Now, will we be able to do something better than the START Treaty? I hope so. Do we have a number of years that we can work on that? Yes.... So I think that is not something that ought to in any way stand in the way of approving this treaty[.] 9 The Treaty embodies each Party s sincere and legally binding commitment to substantial reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, with an eye toward flexibility and trust in the light of new threats and our new relationship with each other. Again, the Administration cites this circumstance as the driving force behind the withdrawal clause contained in Article IV of the Treaty. The with- 8 Hearings, p. 58. 9 Hearings, p. 79. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

7 drawal clause requires only three months notice and contains no requirements regarding the reasons for withdrawal. In briefings and hearings, the Administration stated that the flexible withdrawal provision in this agreement is not seen by the Parties as necessary for reasons related to the agreement or the U.S.-Russian relationship. Instead, the withdrawal clause was drafted in light of the likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. 10 Even if the Treaty is implemented faithfully, there is some risk that the Russian Federation s implementation of it could result in the relatively insecure storage of large numbers of currently deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Given the rightful concern that Russian nuclear weapons-usable materials be securely stored (and, as appropriate, be made less useable in nuclear weapons) so as to limit the risk of their theft or diversion, both members and outside experts highlighted the need for increased Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction and non-proliferation assistance to the Russian Federation. Administration officials did not view insecure storage of nuclear materials as a likely consequence of the Treaty, but envisioned the possibility of increased U.S. assistance as a reasonable form of insurance. It is the view of the Committee that the role of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction and nonproliferation assistance, while not directly mentioned in the Treaty, is nevertheless essential for continued strategic offensive reductions in Russia, particularly with respect to Russia s heavy ICBM force, bombers and submarines. Today, when the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and related technology presents one of the greatest challenges to international peace and stability, the role of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction and other nonproliferation programs as the foundation for preventive measures against terrorists use of weapons of mass destruction and of a positive relationship with Russia cannot be doubted. The Committee, in recommending that the Senate advise and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty, accepts the Administration s view of improved U.S.-Russian relations as a working objective. Many members agree with the Administration that such a radically changed context is a reality, and the Committee commends the Administration for codifying this in treaty form and submitting it to the Senate for its advice and consent. The Committee also believes, however, that the Senate and the Administration should take steps to promote closer U.S.-Russian relations, to smooth the way toward each Party meeting its Treaty obligations, and to reduce any risks to world peace and U.S. national security that may result from the manner in which the Russian Federation uses the exceptional force flexibility that this Treaty provides. The Committee therefore recommends that the Senate include in its resolution of ratification 2 conditions and 6 declarations. As is explained later in this report, these provisions are in- 10 Written answer of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the Committee s question for the record, July 9, 2002, Hearings, p. 67. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

8 tended to ensure the success of this Treaty and to preserve the constitutional role of the United States Senate. II. SUMMARY OF THE TREATY The Moscow Treaty, signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002, requires the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their respective aggregate numbers of strategic nuclear warheads to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. The Treaty shall remain in force until this same date, unless both Parties agree to an extension or a superseding agreement. No obligations are imposed by the Treaty on either Party prior to December 31, 2012, except that the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of the Bilateral Implementation Commission. Accordingly, no interim reduction levels are specified, and either Party may increase its numbers of strategic nuclear warheads prior to December 31, 2012, so long as they each manifest a force level of deployed strategic nuclear warheads that does not exceed 2,200 on that date. The United States shall consider the unit of account, for the purposes of its implementation of this Treaty, to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, which it defines as reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. According to the Administration, the Russian Federation will establish its own definition of strategic nuclear warhead as it carries out its reductions under the Treaty. Article II of the Treaty provides that the Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms. According to the Administration s article-by-article analysis submitted with the Treaty, this article makes clear that the Moscow Treaty and the START Treaty are separate, and the provisions of either treaty do not apply to the other. The Moscow Treaty does not contain the traditional transparency or verification provisions associated with past arms control agreements. The Administration plans to rely upon existing verification provisions under the START Treaty, in addition to national technical means, to monitor Russian compliance with the Moscow Treaty, even though the two treaties use different counting rules in measuring strategic force reductions. Administration officials have stated that because the United States will carry out the reductions required under the Moscow Treaty without regard to Russian actions, additional transparency provisions are not required. Article III of the Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), which shall meet at least twice a year for purposes of implementing this Treaty. Article IV establishes the expiration date of the Treaty: it provides that the Treaty remains in force until December 31, 2012. Article IV also allows the Treaty to be extended by mutual agreement or superseded by a subsequent agreement, and provides a national sovereignty clause on withdrawal that provides for three months notice in such an event. Article V requires that the Treaty be registered with the United Nations. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

9 III. BACKGROUND President George W. Bush entered office in January 2001 with a promise to change the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. He sought to move away from the framework of mutually assured destruction (MAD) which had defined relations between the United States and the Soviet Union (and then the Russian Federation) for over forty years. One element of the President s vision of a new strategic framework for U.S.-Russian relations involved withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and expanded research and development on missile defense, but another element involved reductions to U.S. strategic nuclear forces. On May 1, 2001, President Bush delivered a speech at the National Defense University, in which he declared: Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies. We can, and will, change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over. I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world. 11 In 2001, the Department of Defense completed the congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review, a report calling for an evaluation of the size and structure of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in light of changes in the international strategic environment. Such a review had not been conducted since 1994. In November 2001, the President announced that the United States would seek to reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from a current level of approximately 6,000 to a range between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next ten years. President Bush informed Russian President Vladimir Putin and made a public announcement regarding this intention when the two leaders met at the White House on November 13, 2001. For a number of years, President Putin, as well as his predecessor, President Boris Yeltsin, had recognized that the changed strategic environment and economic constraints would prevent the Russian Federation from indefinitely maintaining a START-sized strategic nuclear force. The START Treaty s limit of 6,000 deployed strategic nuclear delivery systems was no longer a realistic force level in the present circumstance. Nevertheless, both Putin and Yeltsin sought to maintain a semblance of strategic parity with the United States through the completion of further arms control agreements imposing required reductions upon both nations. Accordingly, one month after President Bush s announcement of planned U.S. cuts, President Putin declared on December 13, 2001, the Russian Federation s intention to reach a legal agreement with the United States for irreversible, and verifiable reductions in 11 Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at the National Defense University, May 1, 2001, (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501 10.html). VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

10 strategic offensive arms, which we believe should be at the level of 1,500 to 2,200 nuclear warheads for each side. 12 According to press reports, these negotiations quickly bogged down over four central issues. The definition of the unit of account was difficult to resolve since the United States preferred the term operationally deployed strategic nuclear warhead, while the Russian Federation sought to continue to use the counting rules employed in the START Treaty, where reductions applied to the dismantlement of delivery vehicles and launchers, which in turn were counted as containing a specified number of warheads. Secondly, the need for new transparency and verification measures also proved hard to reconcile for the purposes of an overall agreement. Thirdly, there were different approaches as to whether the final agreement would be in the form of an executive agreement, as the United States preferred, or a treaty, which the Russian Federation favored. Finally, the Russian government insisted on general language limiting future U.S. missile defense deployments. The Administration contends that such disputes represent the lingering doubts of the past, not an indication of incompleteness on the part of the resulting agreement. By resolving these disputes and agreeing to disagree where necessary, Presidents Bush and Putin were able to sign the Moscow Treaty on May 24, 2002. On June 20, 2002, the two Presidents submitted this Treaty to the United States Senate and to the Russian Duma, respectively, for their advice and consent to each country s ratification. IV. VIEWS OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE The Committee on Armed Services examined the military implications of the Moscow Treaty. Senators Levin and Warner submitted the following letters to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Both letters appear in this report: UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, October 21, 2002. Honorable JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Chairman Honorable JESSE HELMS, Ranking Member Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, DC. DEAR SENATOR BIDEN AND SENATOR HELMS: Thank you for the opportunity to express my views concerning the national security implications of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, also known as the Moscow Treaty, which was signed by President Bush and Russian President Putin on May 24, 2002 in Moscow. I strongly support the Moscow Treaty and recommend that the Senate provide its advice and consent to ratification to the Treaty 12 Statement Made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, Regarding the Decision of the Administration of the United States of America to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, December 14, 2001. (available at http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/ arh/5b16eb2fe9dcdad943256b22002f6436?opendocument). VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

11 with no changes and with no conditions on the resolution of ratification. The Moscow Treaty is a simple, straightforward document which provides for the largest reductions in strategic nuclear weapons over two-thirds from current levels in arms control history. This Treaty should proceed through Senate consideration unencumbered by reservations, understandings or declarations. Throughout its history, the Senate Armed Services Committee has played a critical role in assessing the national security impact and military implications of arms control agreements negotiated by the Executive Branch. In July and August, the Armed Services Committee conducted two hearings on the national security implications of the Moscow Treaty. The Administration witnesses at these hearings have direct responsibility for critical national security issues related to the Moscow Treaty. These witnesses included Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, USAF; Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral James 0. Ellis, Jr., USN; and Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy, Dr. Everet H. Beckner. In addition, the Committee received testimony from two outside witnesses. The witnesses at the Armed Services Committee hearings unanimously supported ratification of the Moscow Treaty. According to Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Myers, The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I all support the Moscow Treaty. We believe it provides for the long-term security interests of our Nation. We also believe that it preserves our flexibility in an uncertain strategic environment. Moreover, the treaty allows us to implement the recommendations that came out of our Nuclear Posture Review. Admiral Ellis testified that The Moscow Treaty is a positive step early in our strategic journey toward a new partnership with Russia... I fully support this Treaty. Nongovernment witnesses also strongly supported the Treaty. Mr. Charles B. Curtis, formerly Deputy Secretary of Energy and now the President and Chief Operating Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, testified that The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which is sometimes referred to as the Treaty of Moscow, is a truly remarkable document. I believe it deserves the Senate s endorsement. It should be ratified without amendment or, in my judgment, without reservation. In my view, the strength of the Moscow Treaty is in its simplicity. This Treaty is not like any that we have seen before. It is the first arms control treaty to embody the post-cold War U.S.- Russian relationship. In negotiating this Treaty, both sides consciously rejected the Cold War mentality of distrust and hostility that previously had required lengthy negotiations, and extensive legal structures and detailed verification regimes to ensure that both sides would abide by their obligations. This simplicity puts the focus where it belongs on the deep, equitable reductions to strategic nuclear warheads which are the centerpiece of the Moscow Treaty. The Moscow Treaty is the right agreement at the right time. There are three unique features of this Treaty which are key to the strength of this document: 1) it achieves deep reductions in offensive strategic nuclear arsenals; 2) it provides the flexibility to meet VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

12 new security challenges; and 3) it both takes advantage of, and provides the opportunity to, expand our new closer relationship with Russia. The most important feature of the Moscow Treaty is the deep redictions the Treaty will achieve in operationally deployed warheads. This breakthrough Treaty negotiated in a period of just several months will reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals from their present levels of about 6,000 strategic warheads to 1700 to 2200 operationally deployed strategic warheads over the next decade. These reductions which amount to about two thirds of the warheads in the Russian and U.S. arsenals are the most dramatic in the history of arms control agreements. Such reductions are clearly in our national security interest. Russia is no longer an enemy. Our strategic arsenals, swollen by Cold War hostility with the Soviet Union, no longer need to be sustained at such high levels. According to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in his testimony before the Armed Services Committee on July 25, 2002: The reductions characterized in this Treaty will help eliminate the debris of past hostility that has been blocking our way as we build a new relationship. The Treaty President Bush has fashioned and the process by which he fashioned it, I believe, are both models for future cooperation between our two countries. We ve achieved deep reductions and enhanced the security of both our countries without perpetuating Cold War ways of thinking that hinder a desire for better relations. The second great strength of this Treaty is the flexibility it accords our leaders to meet the uncertainties both in the international security environment and in the technological status of our nuclear stockpile. September 11 was a vivid reminder that we are vulnerable to attack in ways we never imagined. It is critical to our national security that our leaders retain the maximum flexibility to respond to emerging threats and changes in the world scene. Many observers have correctly noted that the Moscow Treaty does not contain features that were typical of past bilateral arms control agreements, most of which were signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, the Moscow Treaty does not establish interim warhead reduction goals or a detailed schedule for achieving warhead reductions. It does not define warhead counting rules, require destruction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or launchers, or include limits or sublimits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or launchers. The lack of detailed schedules, sub-limits, and counting rules, and the absence of any requirement to destroy warheads have been criticized by some. Yet the witnesses before our Committee consistently praised the flexibility inherent in this Treaty. Admiral Ellis addressed this issue before our Committee at some length. According to Admiral Ellis in testimony before the Armed Services Committee on August 1: This treaty allows me, as the Commander of the Nation s Strategic Forces, the latitude to structure our strategic forces to better support the national security pillars of assuring our allies, dissuading those who might wish us ill, deterring potential adversaries and, if necessary, defending the nation.... [I]n my judgment, this treaty provides me the ability to prudently meet those VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

13 national security needs and to provide a range of deterrent options to the Secretary and the President for their consideration should the need arise. The Admiral continued: [The Treaty] gives me the flexibility to deal with the uncertainty that s an inherent part... [of] the future. It gives me flexibility with regard to the specific details of that draw down, to the composition of our nation s nuclear stockpile as we draw it down in size, to hedge against the possibility of technological surprise as our stockpile ages in the future, [and] to deal with the potential for change in the international security environment should it arise. It also gives me the flexibility to take the dual use platforms, these strategic platforms that have such important tactical applications, and transform them in support of the nation s security needs in a broader way. Dr. Beckner, the official in our government most directly responsible for assuring that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, reliable, and effective, confirmed that the flexibility inherent in the Moscow Treaty is critical to our effort to maintain the stockpile. The Treaty, he said during the August 1 hearing, provides the United States with the flexibility to maintain an important hedge against unforeseen... technical issues in the smaller enduring nuclear weapons stockpile. This flexibility is particularly important in light of the fact that the U.S. active nuclear stockpile is composed of only a limited number of warhead types only two types of warheads for our land based intercontinental ballistic missiles, two types for our sea launched missiles, and two types of bombs for our bombers. These warheads have not been tested in over a decade. The average age of warheads in the U.S. stockpile is approaching 20 years and some warheads are much older. While Administration officials, such as Dr. Beckner, are pursuing vigorous efforts to monitor the health of the stockpile and assure its effectiveness, on occasion these efforts reveal problems in the stockpile. All of us on the Armed Services Committee understand that our experience with very old warheads is limited and, although no one can predict when, we can predict with certainty that problems will arise. The Administration witnesses who testified before the Armed Services Committee on the Moscow Treaty clearly believe that sustaining a substantial number of warheads in a responsive reserve, in a status that would allow the nation to address such problems as might arise, is in our national security interest. The third great strength of this Treaty, in my view, is how it reflects the new relationship between the United States and Russia. This Treaty is fully consistent with the policy goals that President Bush outlined shortly after he took office. In a landmark speech at the National Defense University in May 2001, President Bush called for a new strategic relationship with Russia. Today s Russia is not yesterday s Soviet Union. This new cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the past. It should be reassuring rather than threatening. It should be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation... I want to complete the work of changing our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

14 President Bush has engaged Russian President Putin on a regular and intensive basis to move the Russian-American relationship beyond Cold War hostility to a relationship built on openness, shared goals, and shared responsibility. The Moscow Treaty is one important measure of President Bush s extraordinary success in building this new relationship. As unique as the Moscow Treaty is, the Treaty also reflects the success and the heritage of past arms control agreements. First, the Moscow Treaty is a legally binding document. I commend President Bush for deciding to put these strategic nuclear reductions in the form of a legally binding treaty. This assures that the agreement will survive the personal relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin, and that it has the weight of law. Second, in order to achieve the required reductions, nuclear warheads will be physically removed from missiles and bombers, rendering them unusable for any near-term military contingencies. Third, the Treaty provides the mechanisms and atmosphere to assure compliance with its provisions and resolution of future issues related to Treaty implementation. The terms of the Moscow Treaty which recognize that the START I Treaty verification regime remains in force and which establish a Bilateral Implementation Commission provide the basis for the predictability, transparency, and confidence needed to assure that both sides achieve the required reductions. A number of my colleagues in the Senate have raised concerns about what the Moscow Treaty does not do. The Treaty does not address warhead dismantlement or tactical nuclear arsenals. No strategic arms control agreement has ever addressed these concerns. I would also note that all the witnesses before the Armed Services Committee agreed that the Moscow Treaty is but a first step. Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed in his testimony that tactical nuclear arsenals are a concern that the U.S. Government will continue to address with the Russian Federation. Further arms control steps, including verification issues and dismantlement, will be discussed on a continuing basis. Based on the hearings conducted by the Armed Services Committees and subsequent analysis, I believe that the Moscow Treaty clearly advances the national security interests of the United States and deserves the Senate s unqualified support. I strongly recommend your Committee s approval of a resolution of ratification for the Moscow Treaty that is free of any conditions. With kind regards, I am Sincerely, JOHN WARNER, Ranking Member. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

15 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, October 7, 2002. The Honorable JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Chairman The Honorable JESSE HELMS, Ranking Member Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, Washington, DC. DEAR CHAIRMAN BIDEN AND RANKING MEMBER HELMS: As requested, this letter is to provide you with my views on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed on May 24th, 2002, between the United States and the Russian Federation, and to offer my suggestions for issues the Foreign Relations Committee should consider in preparing a resolution of ratification for the Treaty. After the President submitted the SORT Treaty to the Senate on June 20th, the Armed Services Committee held two hearings on the Treaty. The first hearing took place on July 25th and included Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the witnesses. We held our second hearing on August 1 and had two panels of witnesses. The first panel consisted of Mr. Charles Curtis, former Deputy Secretary of Energy and currently President and Chief Operating Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and Dr. Ashton Carter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and currently Professor of Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The second panel consisted of Admiral James Ellis, Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command, and Dr. Everet Beckner, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration. I believe the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty is a positive step forward in U.S -Russian relations. I think it is particularly important to have a treaty that will be legally binding on all parties, rather than unilateral steps that are not binding on future administrations. In addition, a treaty will ensure that the Senate fulfills its constitutional role in matters of foreign relations by giving due consideration to any treaty, and providing its advice and consent before ratification. I see this treaty as a starting point for further arms control and an important element in our new relationship with Russia. But there is much more work to be done to continue improving mutual security and trust with Russia, work that includes further reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, reducing nuclear proliferation dangers, and improving confidence, transparency and cooperation with Russia. Although a positive symbolic step forward, it is an unusual treaty. Its central obligation is that both nations will reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1700 and 2200 some 10 years from now, for one day. Then the treaty expires. Contrary to numerous media reports, this treaty does not require reductions in either nuclear warhead stockpiles or de- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2

16 livery systems. It does not require elimination of a single warhead. Under this treaty, both sides need only remove warheads from land-based or submarine-based missiles and from bombers. Both sides are free to keep every warhead so removed and to store these warheads for possible redeployment. Given the unusual features of this Treaty, I recommend a number of items be considered for inclusion in the resolution of ratification, as follows: 1. Unlike previous arms control treaties, the SORT Treaty withdrawal clause would allow each party, in exercising its national sovereignty, to withdraw from the Treaty upon three months written notice. There is no mention of supreme national interest. This makes it appear as though the President could withdraw from the Treaty for any reason short of a supreme national interest. The U.S. should not enter into or withdraw from a treaty lightly; both should be done only with the utmost seriousness of purpose and with the involvement of the Senate, which must give its advice and consent to permit ratification. Consequently, I would urge the Committee to consider a condition to the resolution of ratification that would require the President to consult with and obtain approval from the Senate prior to a U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty. 2. The Treaty is a starting point for further nuclear arms reductions. The Senate should encourage the President to pursue additional reductions of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, to the lowest possible levels consistent with our security, and to encourage the elimination of excess nuclear warheads, rather than their long-term storage. The Senate should also encourage the President to consider accelerating the reductions required in the Treaty so they are achieved in less than 10 years, if possible. 3. The Treaty includes no provisions for verification or transparency that would provide confidence that both parties are implementing their obligations. It is in our national and mutual security interests to increase and improve such transparency and ensure such confidence. The Senate should therefore encourage the President to pursue such steps, including an exchange of detailed information with the Russian Federation on their respective stockpiles of nuclear warheads and fissile material, and on their safety and security. 4. Although the Treaty makes reference in Article III to a Bilateral Implementation Commission, it does not provide any detail about such a Commission, other than to specify that it shall meet at least twice a year. The Senate should require the President to provide details on a regular basis on the Bilateral Implementation Commission and its deliberations. 5. The treaty does not establish any milestones or schedule for reductions, other than the requirement to reach the permitted limit on warheads by December 31, 2012. As a condition for the resolution of ratification, I believe the Senate should require an annual report from the President explaining in detail the steps taken and planned to implement the SORT Treaty. This report should include the planned schedule and milestones to achieve the treaty s obligations; the strategic nuclear force levels (warheads and delivery systems) of both parties; and any measures to increase transparency VerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2