Mneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Librries HQ Donovn Reserch Librry Armor Reserch Librry Fort Benning, Georgi Report dte: 20 September 1944 Title: Publisher: Abstrct: Remrks by Brigdier Generl Merrill Hedqurters Army Ground Forces Remrks by Brigdier Generl Frnk D. Merrill during conference held t AGF HQ on 20 September 1944. Grphics included. Number of pges: 9 p. Notes: From the MCoE HQ Donovn Reserch Librry, Fort Benning, GA. Documents collection. Cll #: D787.2.M55 Clssifiction: Unclssified; Approved for public relese
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.1~~.4, 'i MtRIflD ~ P BRIAD ER ALFRANK D. WRILL, DCONERECE 10W At 20 SEPTEMBER 1944 I. PATROLLING. With regrd to ptroliing we used mounted horse ptrois extensively, even in res which were not especilly ood for mounted ptrols,. I found in mny instnces tht the foot ptrols just couldn't do the jobs requind.. After seeing the results obtined mny times, the infntry bttlion commn.ers desire t.lest mounted pltoon in ech bttlion. In connection with our use of mountbed ptrols-we found tht due to the greter speed ttined they could*stt1 up their rdio nd tke the time to send decent nd dequte messges, wheres N with our regulr infntryfoot ptrols, for good communiction results, you hve / td send signl corps personnel with it. The mounted ptrol cn set up its rdio. quickly, tke dvntge of its mobility nd mke the little time tht is lost t, times py":off in good communictions. 2. USE C! HORSE CAVALRY. We re now rriving in country where horse cviw o 2 euseohredvnteing reo could be used togret dvntge. The type of country now being proched is spirsely wooded res or lightly wooded hills. Roughly, it is_ the sme wy when you get into Chin- good open rolling country which is just wht is needed : rpid envelopments end getting behind the Jps. It is the type of country whib permits mounted troops doing the job much fster nd better thn dismounted tt-opl. It might be of interest to know tht Generl Stilwell sked for n entire c.y division (mounted) bout yer nd hlf go. In generl, we rn into. some situtions in which you could not employ horse cvlry, mounted, but in those situtions the requirements were for dismounted troops'with pck trnsporttion. Then you hve the choice of dismounting the horse cvlry - which it is very cpble of doing - or dding enormous mounts of pck nimls nd equipment to infntry formtions nd tking long time to trin n tht fter llof the time tken for trining, they re not doing cvlry would. In the open country horse recon well.. As mtter of fct we mde n effort to I of reconnissnce troops of the mountin divisio 4 pltoons of the pck type with full communictions inc u e sort would be invluble. I hd no Tbles of Orgniztion t ll for nimls. secured wht I could, t one time hving over 140 nimls. 'We used these nmmals on some of our long mrches. When we first strted to use them the infntry bttlion commnders didn't think too much-of the ide but fter few of the '.tripm, especilly when we were bout hlfwy through mrch, they were oertinly gld n hd them nd ll wnted to know if I couldn't get more. Animls. lso provided good mens of messenger service. In ll, we used dismounted troops on three--mjo envelopments. TWo of these could hve been mde by mounted troops nd.sved-much pbysic!. hrdship on the men to sy nothing of the difference in timewhich coud, hve been gined.... 3. IETAILS cf AN OPERATIE4. (See Sketch No. i, ttched). The.C r f, b f or sometime bee crrying out opertions ginst the jp fortified pos!%ittma shown on sketch. The Jps hd been in there for bout IS months ndnf pretty strongly. The Chinese were hving difficulty with their oprtt ti I& t.- /.. this time it ws decided to send us in 'to ssist with the job. #0 str$ ::"... -;..- mrch from here (indicted on sketch) round the Jpnese right flnk to 4: ' (Point A); we pulled feint here nd left 40 mounted men bck to mke p t. firing noise to deceive the Jps nd with the min body continued on mile mrch to this point-(point B) where we engged the enemy in big successfully cdomplshed our mission. We b~ocked two rods nd t "-2.-"".NM,
RESTRICTED -2- trils. I then moved my 3d bttlion to this re nd we hd quite fortunte stroke of luck t this point,(point C). We moved in, tpped the Jp min telephxe tines nd. listened in on thei" orders, The Jps ordered withdrwl cross the river nd 48 hours lter.strted crossing the river t this point (Point D) MY 3 bttlions were locted here while the bulk of the Jp division ws coming south to cross the river. I ws wek in men, but my wekest point ws in trying to move them round. This is where we could hve done twice s good job with mounted troops. I could hve gined something in here but due to the fct my men were so tired nd on foot, I couldn't mneuver them s I desired nd hd to be content wit the job we hd lredy done. We got bout 4500 Jps in this enggement - in one smll re we counted 435 bodies. At one point in the river where the Jps were crossing we hd 36 mchine guns sited on them - you cn imgine how mny we got t tht spot. The wter in this re ctully "rn red". 4. DETAIS.CAN OPERATIG. (See Sketch No. 2, ttched.) The Jps were here in very hevily fortified positions. We knew they were pretty strong t these points s they hd been orgnized in this re for over yer. The defense positions were relly good ones. We went into the re for ction with one Americn bttlion, one Chinese infntry-regiment nd one Chinese bttery (pck). We lso sent in two other Americn bttlions =these outfits put in good rodblock here (A & B). The Jp generl reserve for the re ws in KANAING. While this opertion (movement to A) went off without incident - it couldn't hve been done. horse troops the other prt (movement to B) of tion woul soup for mounted troops. One bttlion in this f N> i e ws, point B) mrched 75 miles in three dys over bd. reserves here (KAMAING), I shoved skeleton for 'briis. V them t KAMAING. It put out light blocks on the-mr sr( on sketch t Point C) nd then settled down to wtch wht ws hppening. We hd nother piece of good luck during this opertion s one of the men cptured Jp Mjor. We found out then tht two-of the reserve bttlions were moving on the north tril south of C nd tht they hd instructions to get to D nd ttck the flnk of the Chinese 5. dys lter. -Yj decision then ws to pull bck to E. I hd two btteries of loss nd regiment of 75s but I relized I did not hve enough power to sty in there. I pulled out nd got bck nd blocked this two bttlion ffir. This ction ws good exmple of the lck of mounted troops when they were so much needed. We could hve done much better job with mounted troops. My rel difficulty in this ction ws getting from B to E (sketch) before the Jps did. We got to E nd they hit us three hours lter from the trils from the south, We ttcked these bttlions nd chsed them bck.. Lter we drove the Jps out of the re. We mde couple of envelopments during the ction but with mounted troops could hve done more successful job. This holds true for severl other instnces in the theter. 5. Notes.. Americn. The Americn regiment chnged the whole ttitude of the Chinese nd.got them to fighting. They redlly got into good shpe fter witnessing the Americns becuse the Chinese don't like to lose fce by not doing s well s the Americns. Generl Stilwell would rther hve one regiment of infntry thn thousnds of liison officers or plnners. The Chinese py lit tle ttention to liison officers. All our wounded were evcuted by ir; there being no cse when I didn't get them out. RESTRICTED 4o 9.. * I
:--. felkht since wel s some 0 5t,. Chinese.. The two Chinese regiments engged In the e d~t~ 1942 but four dys fter their rrivl in our re they peortst of the boys we trined. 6.Generl Merrill concluded by stting tht the ArnW Ground Fordestnt4 ing doctrines were sound nd hd been proven sound in combt, Wh nod4( is «sound bsic trining. Applied with common sense there is no difficulmty i 4&Pt,, ing-it to conditions in CBI. Ar During lter discussion Generl Merrill mde the following comwnts of interest to Army Ground Forces: 1.. Pck-rtillery would be in.gret demnd in lrge opertions inlow* Burm due to the difficjty in trnsporting hevier rtillery into ridwitk4n re. 2. Personnel whish.he-hd received from,the United Sttes b 4 Cwtbben without combt experience hs performed generlly better th i.. received from other, divisions with previous combt experience. (Generfd Zewrifl ttributed this to superior bsic trining of the personnel received from tt& 'United Sttes nd from the Cribben.) T4' * r -5 4i- Awl'k -' o..,&,.., /..,..,.,,........ I- '&t
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'">" q C-oo -p Jr :.,,. JEADQARTRRS ARMY OUE FORZS Arq Wr College Wshington 25, D. C. 1~ 4g b..s.mmii SUBJECT: Report, AxW!U W Number Inclosure I. The ttchedr WW eeporpt, reproduced s received in this hedqurters, is furnished for your informtion nd file, It does not represent necessrily the views of the theter comnder, this hedqurters or the Wr Deprtment. 2. Distribution hs been mde s indicted below: A-G iiv:co:0f-sz s I 03 s 4:qts t :WAn: S6 estf "It I ". S S t I. U jq :Stt :Uhem:ngr:Mdt i d :~:G *]Uj~:L _..... t! r esi Q ' i Uri, 'I. s t!...'w -2,-. :,,,O.,,,,,;= $ ED s.gm* t 4 swd S "1, s. g-, SWPA CBI I W FDr * NATC~ Alk:~ibC. &6S tamcol Theters... :. 3 t--,z... ty, ;$1 1 Cbmds Ak irq±wi--td A/B R&SC KRD#1: RWD2: ATCF :3 REAK i Centers i i ~: : ts t A I A rmd TI) : CA -: FA I cv -t Proht : i Schools $.:, :... =.::. t,,, M-Armd:"TDCA :FA -I i-cv:-rckt:ls-.,bords :, P 0 e1t, *.... tmjlezdarmy-i 4th ArLySj jns I I *- iisc.....-..... 2 2, :,,,...I,... '"t. Report Distributed: B O SEP 1944 RESTRICTED