Netherlands Defence Academy Measuring Potential Benefits of NCW: 9/11 as case study Prof. dr. Tim Grant Professor, Operational ICT & Communications TJ.Grant@.nl
Outline Goal: To present results of NCW thought experiment Structure: Introduction & background FAA & NORAD ConOps Chronology C2 shortcomings Using NCW to rectify shortcomings Conclusions & recommendations 2
Introducing myself Qualifications: BSc Aeronautical Engineering, Bristol, UK Defence Fellowship (Masters), Brunel, UK PhD Artificial Intelligence, Maastricht, NL Experience: 1966-87: Royal Air Force officer, UK & SG 1987-2004: Consultant, Atos Origin, NL: Dutch-French ICT company 2001-date: Professor, U. Pretoria, ZA: Computer Science Department 2004-date: Professor,, Breda, NL: Operational ICT & Communications 3
Background (1) NCW tenets ( value chain ): Effects superiority Better effects Better actions Agile, improved tempo Decision superiority Better decisions Robust More secure More extensive Knowledge superiority Better Better networks sharing Better understanding Information superiority 4
Background (2) NCW demonstrations, experiments & case studies: Thought experiments minimise cost & time Take actual, non-networked event: Well-documented, with timeline Ask research question: What if units involved had been networked? Compare hypothetical & actual outcomes Events of September 11, 2001, meet criteria: 9/11 Commission Report available for US$10 Declassified timeline published on: http://www.archives.gov/9-11-commission 5
FAA & NORAD ConOps (1) Federal Aviation Authority (FAA): Mission: Smooth flow of air traffic over Continental US (CONUS) Concerns: Bad weather & airport congestion Radar coverage: CONUS North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD): Mission: Defend CONUS from external attack Concerns: Russian bombers & missiles Radar coverage: Boundaries of CONUS, looking outwards 6
FAA & NORAD ConOps (2) 7
FAA & NORAD ConOps (3) President George W. Bush Vice President Dick Cheney Transportation Secretary Normal Y. Mineta Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld FAA HQ (incl. Ops Center) NMCC (Pentagon) SCC (Herndon, VA) NORAD (Colorado Springs, CO) Great Lakes New England CONR (Panama City, FL) Cleveland Indianapolis Boston New York Washington Sector 1 NEADS (Rome, NY) Sector 3 Boston approach NY terminal approach Dulles AA11 hijacked! National What should have happened, 9/11 Otis ANGB (MA) 102 Fighter Wing Langley AFB (Hampton, VA) 119 Fighter Wing Other facilities (not on alert) Scramble! 8
Chronology, 9/11 (1) Sources: Declassified 9/11 Commission staff report, 12 Sep 05 Chronology 9/11 Commission Report (US$10), 2004: Notes to Chapter 1 Chapter 1: We Have Some Planes Aviation Week & Space Technology special report: Three parts, 2002 Initial report of events in FAA SCC, 2001 Analysis: Two-dimensional matrix (spreadsheet form): Rows = events (time-points) Columns = actors See paper for extract 9
Chronology, 9/11 (2) 10
Chronology, 9/11 (3) President George W. Bush Vice President Dick Cheney High-level teleconference Transportation Secretary Normal Y. Mineta Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld FAA HQ (incl. Ops Center) NMCC (Pentagon) SCC (Herndon, VA) NORAD (Colorado Springs, CO) Great Lakes New England CONR (Panama City, FL) Cleveland Indianapolis Boston New York Washington Sector 1 NEADS (Rome, NY) Sector 3 Boston approach NY terminal approach Dulles AA11 hijacked! National What actually happened, 9/11 Otis ANGB (MA) 102 Fighter Wing Langley AFB (Hampton, VA) 119 Fighter Wing Other facilities (not on alert) Scramble! 11
Chronology, 9/11 (4) Otis F-15s Langley F-16s NEADS AA11 / Boston UA175 / New York AA77 / Washington UA93 / Cleveland 0800 0815 0830 0845 0900 0915 0930 0945 1000 1015 1030 9 mins 0 mins 3 mins -4 mins 12 Hijacked Hijacked FAA aware crashes FAA aware Hijacked FAA aware crashes crashes Hijacked FAA aware Battle stns Scramble crashes Take off Battle stns Long Island Scramble New York Take off Washington How much notice (mins)
C2 shortcomings Within civil ATC / military air defence system: Strategic surprise: Lacked response to multi-aircraft suicide hijacking Command & reporting chain: Up & down multi-level hierarchy -> communication delays Nobody had big picture ; lack of shared SA Human error: Failure to follow procedures (advantageous!) Technical problems: Incompatible radar systems = no interoperability Within Al Qaeda: Broadcast: We have some planes 13
Using NCW to rectify shortcomings (1) Assumptions: FAA & NORAD control centres linked to hijack network: Could be VTC / chat / webpage / blog / database etc. All actors net-ready & trained Procedures adapted to network Everything else unchanged 14
Using NCW to rectify shortcomings (2) President George W. Bush Vice President Dick Cheney Transportation Secretary Normal Y. Mineta Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld FAA HQ (incl. Ops Center) NMCC (Pentagon) SCC (Herndon, VA) NORAD (Colorado Springs, CO) Great Lakes New England CONR (Panama City, FL) Cleveland Indianapolis Boston New York Washington Sector 1 NEADS (Rome, NY) Sector 3 Boston approach NY terminal approach Dulles Otis ANGB (MA) AA11 hijacked! National 102 Fighter Wing Langley AFB (Hampton, VA) Scramble! 119 Fighter Wing Other facilities (not on alert) Hijack network 15
Using NCW to rectify shortcomings (3) Otis F-15s Langley F-16s NEADS AA11 / Boston UA175 / New York AA77 / Washington UA93 / Cleveland 0800 0815 0830 0845 0900 0915 0930 0945 1000 1015 1030 16 Hijacked Hijacked FAA aware crashes FAA aware Hijacked FAA aware crashes crashes Hijacked Battle stns FAA aware Scramble Take off crashes Long Island Battle stns Scramble New York Take off Washington How much notice (mins) 9 -> 21 0 -> 8 3 -> 17-4 -> 31
Conclusions Availability of network would have: Enabled better sharing of information: Upholds NCW tenet (1) Short-circuited organisational hierarchy Changed course of events (see tables in paper) Increased notice to NEADS: AA11: 9 -> 21 minutes UA175: 0 -> 8 minutes AA77: 3 > 17 minutes UA93: -4 -> 31 minutes Allowed engagement of UA93: If pax had not stormed cockpit first Insufficient information in public domain to judge: Effects on UA175 & AA77 NCW tenets (2), (3), & (4) 17
Recommendations We recommend: should develop multi-actor simulation: Investigate possible command chains Simulated actors based on OODA-RR model Investigate value of hijack network on quality of NEADS controllers SA and decision making: Needs additional information should seek other events that could be used as thought experiments in NCW 18
Any questions? 19