V AMPHBUS :RPS LANDNG FRCE -/^(9 JMA- Appendx. Dvson Reports - CG 3d Mar Dv Report Appendx 2 - CG 4th Mar Dv Report Appendx 3 - GG sth Mar Dv Report UHCLASSFED Annex EASY MAY 945 pofu,*-?-393?
k m Dvson Reports (To be Dstrbuted Separately) Annex EASY to Specal Acton Report W JKA Campagn. UNCLASSFED
UNtJLS9FWS HEADQUARTERS "2" AMPHBUS CRPS LANDNG FRCE -/W JMA- Landng Force Ar Support Contro Unt Report
ApVEM-ert landng force ar support d PRVSNAL AR SUPPQR 7 March, 945. SPECAL ACTN REPRT 3W JMA CAJVFAGN
AU:VEM-ert HEADQUARTERS, LANDNG FRCE AR SUPPRT CNTRL UNT NE, PRVSNAL AR SUPPRT CMMAND, MF, From: Commander, Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne. To : The Commandng General, Ffth Amphbous Corps. Subj: Ref Encl: Specal Acton Report, WQ JMA Campagn. (a) VAC Staff Memo 5-*s, dtd 0MarU5. (a) Summary of Ar peratons wth carrer arcraft, March to 9 March, 9^5. (b) Summary of Ar peratons wth Army arcraft, g March to k March nclusve.. NARRATVE SUMMARY: (A) Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne, consstng of 7 offcers dnd 56 enlsted men, reported to Commandng General* Landng Force, Ffth Amphbous Corps, on k January 9^5 > send, to Commander Ar Support Control Unts, Amphbous Forces, Pacfc Fleet, on 0 January 9U5, for employment n the W JMA operaton. Three offcers of ths command were then temporarly assgned to the U.S.S* ESTES for duty wth Advance Commander, Ar Support Control Unt; two were temporarly assgned to the U.S.S. AUBURN for duty wth Relef Commander, Ar Support Control Unt; four offcers and forty-eght men were assgned wth the prncpal equpment to the U.S.S* THURSTN, and seven men and the secondary equpment to the U.S.S. CARTERET, for transportaton to the objectve. The Unt Commander, nne offcers and one enlsted man flew to SAPAN and rejoned the organzaton there for transportaton to the objectve. The Unt Commander was then embarked on the U.S.S. AUBURN wth Commandng General, Landng Force, and hs staff. (B) Commander, Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne, and a nucleus of hs staff, landed on W JMA wth Commandng General, Landng Force, on 2h February (l^/5)«due to unavodable delays nunloadng, fostered by the crtcal tactcal stuaton ashore, the unt equpment dd not reach the beach untl 27 February (D-/8J). Emplacement of equpment and testng of crcuts was completed wthn 2l* hours, and Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne then montored the crcuts durng 28 February whle ar support operatons were beng controlled from the U.S.S. ELDRAD, and later from the U.S.S. AUBURN. Commandng General, Landng Force, submtted an offcal J Bfe^te
Subj: M Specal Acton Report, * request that date for the control of ar stcpport mssons to "be shfted ashore at 0700, March whch request was approved by Commander Jont Expedtonary Force. Due, however, to a temporary power falure Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne was unable to assume full control untl approxmately 000, March. (C) Ths Unt exercsed operatonal control of all close ar support mssons untl March 9ty>» when carrer support was wthdrawn and at whch tme the equpment and personnel, less the commandng offcer and a small detachment, were secured for reshpment to SAPAN for further scheduled operatons. The remanng detachment, wth rado jeeps borrowed from other Corps unts, contnued to exercse control of ar strkes flown by Army VF Squadrons untl all ar support was secured at 200, 5 March. Detaled operatonal summares are gven n the enclosures. (D) n addton to normal dutes of ar support control, Commander, Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne served as Deputy Commander, Landng Force Arcraft, and Deputy Ar Defense Commander. As such, he exercsed operatonal control of all shore-based ar unts, transent arcraft, and W FELD Number ne, untl the arrval of the desgnated Ar Defense Commander, Brgader General 3. Moore, U.S.A., who assumed hs functons at noon, 7 March. These addtonal dutes requred much personal attenton, the dverson of three operatonal offcers, a communcatons detal, and the secondary control equpment from the Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt for a perod of ten days. To ths extent the normal operaton of Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne was somewhat hampered, rt recommended that future plannng provde for an Ar Base Commander wth suffcent personnel and equpment to handle ar traffc as soon as the frst feld becomes avalable, and that the Landng Force Arcraft Commander arrve wth Commandng General, Landng Force, to assume full responsblty for hs shore-based ar unts. 2* PERSNNEL; (A) The morale and effcency of the offcers and men remaned hgh throughout the operaton, despte adverse lvng condtons and frequent nght shellng by enemy artllery. No casualtes were ncurred, no cases of sckness reported, and no punshments recorded. Four offcers and one enlsted man have been recommended for award of the Bronze Star for "Mertorous Achevement n Combat". Bght enlsted men have been recommended for mmedate advancement to hgher grades as a reward for outstandng performance of duty under combat condtons. p
Sub,): mm mm B^K^^h^bK^v '-^^^B^^Vk ^vr^jhlß KSet «T «(B) The number of offcers and enlsted men (7 and 57 respectvely)* tentatvely assgned to a landng force ar support control unt has proven nsuffcent for sustaned operaton n the feld. Steps are "beng taken to ncrease ths number to approxmately 22 offcers and S enlsted men. More adequate messng facltes can then be provdedt provson made for better nternal securty! and for the mmedate replacement of casualtes. The fve addtonal offcers requested are necessary to provde relefs for SAR, SAD, and SA net controllers, who durng ths operaton were requred to operate an average of 2 hours daly for twelve consecutve days. 3. EQUPMENT: (A) The prncpal equpment of ths unt conssts of modfed Mark V, U.S. Navy Communcaton Vans, wth control remoted to a specal operatons room (tent)* The arrangement of the control tables and the relatve postons of the net controllers follows generally the layout n the Jont peratons Boom of the AGC*s» except that t s more commodous. All ar support control nets, as lsted n the communcaton annex of the peratons Plan* were manned contnuously by offcers durng daylght; the ASC, LAW, and S&R nets were manned at nght also, as requred. (B) Except for the ntal power falure, and mnor nterruptons on one net or another due largely to volcanc dust sftng nto the recevers, the equpment functoned n a hghly satsfactory manner. ccasonal dffculty n communcatng wth AL! s on the SAR net was experenced, but was usually traceable to mperfectons n the AL's feld equpment or to the locaton of ther sets n rugged, defladed terran. n such nstances communcaton was effected by relay from other statons on the net wth but slght delay. The basc equpment as desgned and assembled s consdered to have passed ts servce test under most dffcult condtons. No change' s recommended at present. (C) The secondary equpment, mounted n three rado jeeps» proved very useful n controllng specal strkes from advanced observaton posts, and for drectng ar traffc at the ardrome. ts retenton for ths purpose s recommended. However, t would not be possble to control full scale ar operatons wth such equpment* and t should not be depended upon for ths purpose, jfe complete duplcate set of Mark V Vans, modfed* s recommended for each landng force ar support control unt, as beng absolutely essental for sustaned operatons n the feld. Such a duplcate set has already been provded for Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne, and steps pre beng taken to so equp all other unts for future operatons. m tm^ ag
Subj: tm 7Mar^5. *» (D) A medum c*rgo truck, a personnel carrer, and an addtonal passenger jeep are also consdered essental addtonal equpment. Approprate changes n the tentatve TBA wll "be arranged. U. PERATNAL PRCEDURE: (a) Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne operated n accordance wth Amphbous Forces, Pacfc Fleet, Standard peratng Procedure for ar support control, thereby nsurng smooth transmsson of ar support control from shp to shore. No change s recommended n ths procedure at present. (B) Due to the locaton of Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne ashore, adjacent to Landng Force Headquarters, and connected drectly by land wre to all major unts, the control of close ar support mssons n coordnaton wth troop movements, and wth other supportng arms, was greatly facltated. t s submtted that ar strkes n close drect support of our troops, and n accordance wth ther current requests, can be handled more expedtously end wth greater safety when controlled from ashore. :^_^ JLH. recommended, therefore, that n future operatons the Landng^ Force Ar Support Control Unt be establshed ashore at the earlest practcable date, accomplsh ths, t s necessary that the unt be loaded n assault shppng, preferably nlst s* s* (C) t s further recommended that Ac aaay offcars of the landng force ar support control unt as possble be embarked on AGC's, for movement to the objectve, and that they actvely partcpate n the control of ar support untl the landng force ar support control unt s establshed ashore. t s partcularly recommended that Commander, Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt, be embarked on the same AG as Commander, Ar Support Control Unt Afloat. (D) The prncpal operatonal dffculty experenced n runnng ar strkes close to our troops was the varable effcency and relablty of the battalon ALP! s, Some of the AL!s were very alert and relable; others were sometmes va&ue and uncertan n reportng observatons. Some of ths dffculty s attrbutable to an overloaded SAR net, and to nsuffcent personnel n the ALP s to mantan constant communcatons. t s evdent however that a better system of selecton and standardzed tranng of AL! s s long overdue. Specfcally, jj/ _s recommended that ar-ground lason offcers should generally be chosen from combat experenced lne offcers and gven specal tranng n avaton tactcs, suffcent to acquant them wth the capabltes and lmtatons of avaton as a supportng arm, and then be thoroughly grounded n the technque of ar support control.
Sut>j: «(B) Comaander, Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne, and hs prncpal assstant conducted numerous strkes from forward postons utlzng the secondary equpment on the SAD, SAR and S4 nets, and drectng the strkes "by observaton of target areas and fall of bombs. Whle ths system offers sorfe advantages for conductng a very close strke, the lmtatons of portable communcaton equpment make t of doubtful expedency. Certanly, t ndcates the undesrablty of turnng over control of strkes to AL's, whose VHF equpment was nvarably nferor to the secondary equpment of Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt. Usually, when at a forward observaton post, Commander, Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne, lmted hmself to passng on observatons over the SAR net to the SAD controller at the staton, who relayed the nformaton drect to the ar coordnator wthout apprecable loss of tme. nly occasonally was t consdered desrable to talk drectly wth the arcraft whle a strke was n progress. (F) Coordnaton between ar and artllery was provded by havng an artllery offcer located n the ar support control room, provded wth rado and telephone connectons drect to all artllery unts. Ths offcer was advsed n advance of all ar strkes, and was thus enabled to take necessary acton regardng artllery fres. Plan "Negat" was used only n very specal cases to permt low alttude photo and DDT spray planes to accomplsh ther mssons. Plan "Mke" was nvolved only when Corps artllery was engaged n hgh angle frng; otherwse the ar strkes were so conducted as not to nterfere wth artllery supportng fres. (G) Coordnaton between Naval gunfre and ar was generally handled by the Naval ground lason offcers n forward postons, but nasmuch as only sporadc call fres were n progress durng the perod of control by Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne, t was possble to run ar strkes wthout formal coordnaton smply by warnng the ar coordnators of any danger areas. 5. SUPPRTNG ARCRAFT: (a) Defensve ar cover, as provded by Carrer Support Groups between March and 9 March nclusve, and as provded by Army Garrson Ar Forces after the latter date, was adequate and effectve. No enemy arcraft closed the objectve area durng the perod, although several attempts were made by sngle arcraft and small formatons. -5 JNMBSMED mmmm
«Subj (B) (l) The prelmnary heavy strkes t made pror to D-3 day "by Army heavy "bombardment unts, dd not accomplsh the desred result of neutralzaton. Ths s consdered attrbutable to the nherent naccuracy of hgh alttude "bombng aganst precson targets. Practcally all the heavy antarcraft nstallatons remaned ntact untl taken out by Naval gunfre and dve bombers. (2) The prelmnary carrer based strkes (D-3 to D-l nclusve) also faled to accomplsh the desred degree of neutralzaton aganst enemy batteres and defensve nstallatons. Ths was due n part to lmted tme and unfavorable weather, but prncpally to the dsposton, number, and effectve camouflage of enemy postons. (c) The D-Day carrer based attacks were well planned, well executed, and n maxmum strength between H-60 and H-Hour. t s beleved that ar support durng ths perod was hghly effectve. Post D-Day ar support was adequate n strength, and s consdered to have been generally employed to good advantage. (D) The ar lason partes performed ther functons satsfactorly, consderng ther prevous nexperence n some nstances, and ther nadequate personnel and equpment. (See paragraph U(D) for addtonal comment). (S) Based on ths and prevous experence, t s consdered that the ALP! s dd not have entrely satsfactory communcatons wth the landng force ar support control unt. nly one SAB. net was avalable to three dvsons, wth a consequent overload. Ths resulted n the nablty of some unts to get ther requests through whle a strke was beng run n another area. Due to the very lmted enemy zone of actvty, and the close proxmty of our lnes, Commander, Landng Force Ar Support Control Unt ne, chose not to nvoke "procedure (l)m, but contnued to deal drectly wth battalon ALP's n the nterest of greater speed n fulfllng requests, and n accomplshng the accurate drecton of strkes. Ths procedure wllundoubtedly be largely used n the future. Consequently t s recommended that a second SAR(MHF) net be provded the battalon AALlsP l s nleu of the useless VHF they now have, and that t be used only for the specal purpose of requestng strkes whle the prmary SAR frequency s n use for reportng observatons of ar attacks n progress. Ths w^uld ental the substtuton of a second ME!* rado set for the VHF set, as t s consdered necessary that all ALP's montor the prmary SAE net at all tmes. The retenton of VHF, (SAD frequency), by
Subj: Specal Acton n ML T> fmjjj^flfclpt\ 7MarU5. 6. CNCLUSNS: regmental and dvson AJllslP!Mw.WroJ^o the two SAR frequences t s consdered desrable, to enable them to know exactly how ar strkes n ther zones are progressng. t s not consdered necessary or desrable that "battal on ALPs be equpped to communcate drectly wth arcraft n the ar. (a) The control of ar support mssons from a shore-based unt located adjacent to Landng Force Headquarters s practcable and hghly desrable. (B) n order to exercse such control a well traned tes of operatonal and techncal personnel s requred* and a complex set of communcaton equpment smlar to that nstalled n an A&C s necessary. (C) That the present organzaton and equpment of landng force ar support control unts* (wth the exceptons noted above), s consdered adequate for the operatonal control of arcraft n support of troops. 7. RECMMENDATNS: (a) t s recommended that the selecton, tranng, and admnstraton of landng force ar support control unts reman a functon of Arcraft, Fleet Marne Force, Pacfc, exercsed through Commander, Ar Support Command, Fleet Marne Force, Pacfc; and that, where possble, landng force ar support control unts be attached to the Thrd and Ffth Amphbous Corps, Fleet Marne Force, for operatonal control on a sem-permanent bass. t s consdered hghly desrable that a landng force ar support control unt be avalable to each Corps and ts dvsons for conductng tranng n ar support mssons, utlzng whatever ar unts may be avalable n the area. Copy to: ComASCU's, PhbsPac (a). CG, ArßlFPac. (l). CG, PhbCorps (3). C, ProvArSupCom (5). FLE (0). V. E. MBGEE, ummrb mmm
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HEADQUARTERS, LANDNG- FRCE AR SUPPRT CNTRL UNT NE, PRVSNAL AR SUPPRT CMMAND, MF, N TEE FELD. Subj: Ar Support provded "by 5th Fghter Group, Army Ar Forces. Garrson Ar Force, durng occupaton of W JMA.. The Vfth Fghter Squadron, 5th Group, arrved at V/ JMA at noon 6 March, and flew ther frst close ar support msson on the afternoon of g March. The l+sth and 78th Fghter Squadrons of the 5th Group arrved S March and "began flyng close ar support mssons on the followng day. The followng summary of close support mssons flown by the 5th Group between 7 March and lh March nclusve s herewth submtted: DATE. S March 9 March 9 March 9 March 9 March 9 March 9 March.0 March.0 March.0 March 0 March. March. March. March.2 March.2 March.U March TARGET AREA 25-202 230-2U6 96 96- -- 85-D,Q,M. 250-T 25-P 250-T 25-K N-TYPE N 00# BMBS N 500# BMBS PLANES EXPENDED EXPENDED 8 P-5s 8 P-5s 6 7 P-5s U 8 P-5s 6 8 P-5s 6 8 F-5s 6 8 P-5s 6 8 P-5s 6 7 P~sls L,M,N,P. 250-N,Q,S. 6 P-5s 2 250-25 8 P-5s 250-N.. 8 P-5s 25-K,L,M.N. 250-T.P. 25-V.Q. 250-T k P-5s 8 250 8 P-5s 6 25-8 P-5s 6 5 P-5s 7 Strkes Sortes ks he 60 25*^ 8 P-5s ll 8 P-5s 6 N FRE N RDS, BMBS.50 CAL EXP. EXP. 6,6^0 8.770 9»85 2,265 2tßkk2 tbkk 6,9^9,272 U.575 +,692 2.950 3»89 0 9,000 0 92,608 2,608.
JMpj ]P frrt ' jf f"*jf" Support provded "by 5th Tghter Group! Army Ar Forces, Garrson Ar Force, durng occupaton of W JMA* 7MarU5. 2. Consderng that these squadrons had not prevously "been employed n close support mssons, and that they had no prevous knowledge of the control technque employed, ther performance has been hghly satsfactory. The flght- leaders were ntellgent, cooperatve, and effcent n controllng ther unts n flght. The plots were darng and skllfull pressng ther strkes hone to mnmum alttudes wth a consequent hgh degree f f» of accuracy n ther strafng and glde "bombng. t s consdered that the fl..sth lghter Group provded materal and tmely assstance to our troops.._ (B) - - 2
WvfWFrn scom W Jl-A Prelmnary Report (To be Dstrbuted Separately) Annex G-SRG-S to Specal Acton Report W JA Campagn.
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