Fiscal Policies for Innovation and Growth Chapter 2 of the April 2016 Fiscal Monitor Peterson Institute March 31, 2016 1
Growth at the frontier United States Real GDP per Capita, 1929-2030 (2009 dollars, logarithmic scale) 40,000 Keynes Bands US real GDP per capita Annual growth 2.1% Annual growth 1.4% 4,000 1929 1949 1969 1989 2009 2029 Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Census Bureau, January 2016 WEO. Forecast using January 2016 WEO projections for 2016-2021. 1
Outline The role of fiscal policy for innovation Three pillars of innovation today we focus on two Research & Development Technology transfer Entrepreneurship Key findings and policy recommendations 2
Research & Development Scope to do more
Public R&D is important Basic research yield often high social returns average 20 percent Should complement not substitute for private R&D Encourage research collaboration between universities and private firms Private R&D 4 3 2 1 0 Public and Private R&D, 2012 JPN FIN DNK DEU USA BEL FRA GBR EST IRL SGP CHN NLD HUN CZE PRT CAN ESP ITA SVK RUS POL TUR ROU ARG KOR 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 Public R&D 3
Private R&D is too low Two reasons for underinvestment in private R&D Credit constraints especially prevalent during recessions Fiscal Monitor finds that fiscal stabilization policies have strong implications for R&D and TFP growth Spillovers to the wider economy two solutions Coase s property rights but the market for technology is small relative to the size of R&D spillovers Pigou s price correction: fiscal incentives to efficiently address externalities 4
Scaling up fiscal incentives can yield a major growth dividend Fiscal incentives to R&D can yield substantial GDP payoffs 0.4 percent of GDP fiscal cost Effective Design Critical R&D Tax credits R&D Subsidies 40 percent cost reduction of extra R&D for firms 40 percent increase in private R&D investment 5 percent higher GDP over the long-run Note: estimates are averages across OECD countries 5
major growth dividend User cost Marginal private benefit Marginal social benefit 1. Domestic: social returns 2 to 3 x private returns Correction 50% Subsidies 10% A Marginal private cost 2. Price response R&D 1 Corrective incentive B Underinvestment 40% Research and development underinvestment R&D 3. GDP elasticity R&D.13 GDP effect of R&D underinvestment 5% 4. International spillovers GDP effect of 8% 6
Effective Design Critical Some examples of corrective incentives Australia Small firms: 45% refundable R&D tax credit Large firms: 40% non-refundable R&D tax credit (capped) US Regular: 20% R&D tax credit on increment Simplified: 14% R&D tax credit on increment China 150% R&D super deduction 15% reduced CIT rate for high-tech firms Germany No tax incentives R&D subsidies: can be 25-50 percent of R&D costs 7
Patent box? No! Synthetic Control Estimation Results: Intellectual Property Box and Private R&D (Log of real R&D spending) Ineffective no effect at all in two countries Only effective where tax relief is large and link with R&D strong Inefficient as relief depends on income, not R&D Negative international spillovers focus is on attracting mobile IP income (aggressive tax competition) 8
Entrepreneurship New, not small, is beautiful
Downward trend in US business entry (and elsewhere) 18 y 16 14 12 10 8 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Source: U.S. Census Bureau Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS). 9
Income taxes may deter business entry Income taxation theory Success taxes hurt experimentation But: tax insurance (if losses can be offset) encourages risk taking Empirics: new panel-data analysis Effects of PIT robustly insignificant Effect of CIT significant, but modest size Rate of entry (percent) 20 15 10 5 Entrepreneurial Entry and Business Taxation 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Effective average tax rate (percent) 10
Beware of small business trap Tax incentives small firms Most small firms are not new or innovative Small-business-trap : bunching at kinks and notches Bunching at a Kink Evidence for Costa Rica 2006 13 (Density of taxpayers along the income distribution) Schemes better favor new firms Focus on innovation Refundable schemes Simplified schemes 11
Key findings and policy recommendations R&D scope to do more and better Fiscal stabilization matters, also for long-run growth R&D incentives: GDP could rise by 5 percent; impact can be 8 percent if international spillovers are taken into account Design matters: e.g. no patent box Entrepreneurship New, not small is beautiful 12