Service offshoring and wages: worker-level evidence from Italy Elisa Borghi Università Carlo Cattaneo - LIUC Rosario Crinò Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) Final Workshop MIUR-PRIN Project Production, R&D and Knowledge Offshoring: Economic Analyses and Policy Implications September 25,2013
Introduction Research Question Effects of service offshoring on the wages of Italian workers
Introduction Research Question Effects of service offshoring on the wages of Italian workers Methodology Worker-level wage regressions
Introduction Research Question Effects of service offshoring on the wages of Italian workers Methodology Worker-level wage regressions Motivation ICT development and fear of service offshoring
Introduction Research Question Effects of service offshoring on the wages of Italian workers Methodology Worker-level wage regressions Motivation ICT development and fear of service offshoring Main results
Introduction Research Question Effects of service offshoring on the wages of Italian workers Methodology Worker-level wage regressions Motivation ICT development and fear of service offshoring Main results No significant reductions in workers wages
Introduction Research Question Effects of service offshoring on the wages of Italian workers Methodology Worker-level wage regressions Motivation ICT development and fear of service offshoring Main results No significant reductions in workers wages Contribution to widening the wage gap between more and less skilled employees
Introduction Research Question Effects of service offshoring on the wages of Italian workers Methodology Worker-level wage regressions Motivation ICT development and fear of service offshoring Main results No significant reductions in workers wages Contribution to widening the wage gap between more and less skilled employees Heterogeneity in the effects of service offshoring
Literature Fraction of jobs potentially at risk of offshoring is quite large (roughly 25% in developed countries ) [Blinder (2006, 2009); Kroll (2007); Moncarz et al. (2008); Blinder and Krueger (2009); Kletzer (2009)]
Literature Fraction of jobs potentially at risk of offshoring is quite large (roughly 25% in developed countries ) [Blinder (2006, 2009); Kroll (2007); Moncarz et al. (2008); Blinder and Krueger (2009); Kletzer (2009)] Actual impact of service offshoring on the labor market has been moderate in many developed countries (2 4% of job separation in U.S. in the first half of past decade) [Bhagwati et al. (2004); Mankiw and Swagel (2006); Kirkegaard (2007)]
Literature Fraction of jobs potentially at risk of offshoring is quite large (roughly 25% in developed countries ) [Blinder (2006, 2009); Kroll (2007); Moncarz et al. (2008); Blinder and Krueger (2009); Kletzer (2009)] Actual impact of service offshoring on the labor market has been moderate in many developed countries (2 4% of job separation in U.S. in the first half of past decade) [Bhagwati et al. (2004); Mankiw and Swagel (2006); Kirkegaard (2007)] Industry- or firm-level studies: small effects on domestic employment. (even positive in some cases, by boosting productivity and expanding scale of firms operations) [Recent contributions: Liu and Trefler (2011); Hijzen et al. (2011); Crinò (2012)]
Literature Evidence on Italy: Service offshoring has not caused significant reductions in domestic employment over the last two decades [Falzoni and Tajoli (2011) ; Crinò (2010)]
Literature Evidence on Italy: Service offshoring has not caused significant reductions in domestic employment over the last two decades [Falzoni and Tajoli (2011) ; Crinò (2010)] Service offshoring affects the skill composition of labor demand, favouring high-skilled workers [Crinò (2010a, 2010b, 2012)]
Literature Evidence on Italy: Service offshoring has not caused significant reductions in domestic employment over the last two decades [Falzoni and Tajoli (2011) ; Crinò (2010)] Service offshoring affects the skill composition of labor demand, favouring high-skilled workers [Crinò (2010a, 2010b, 2012)] Geishecker and Gorg (2012): individual level wage data for U.K.: raise in the skill premium
Literature Evidence on Italy: Service offshoring has not caused significant reductions in domestic employment over the last two decades [Falzoni and Tajoli (2011) ; Crinò (2010)] Service offshoring affects the skill composition of labor demand, favouring high-skilled workers [Crinò (2010a, 2010b, 2012)] Geishecker and Gorg (2012): individual level wage data for U.K.: raise in the skill premium Wage level regression: material offshoring raises the skill premium [Hummels et al. (AER - forthcoming)]
Focus on wage effects Contribution
Contribution Focus on wage effects Rich micro-level data (matched employer-employee data)
Contribution Focus on wage effects Rich micro-level data (matched employer-employee data) Worker-, firm- and industry-level characteristics considered
Contribution Focus on wage effects Rich micro-level data (matched employer-employee data) Worker-, firm- and industry-level characteristics considered Focus on job stayers: control for worker-firm pairs
Matched Employer-Employee Data Administrative records from the Italian National Social Security Institute (INPS)
Matched Employer-Employee Data Administrative records from the Italian National Social Security Institute (INPS) All individuals born in four different dates with at least one contract registered at INPS in a given year
Matched Employer-Employee Data Administrative records from the Italian National Social Security Institute (INPS) All individuals born in four different dates with at least one contract registered at INPS in a given year Full time workers 16-65
Matched Employer-Employee Data Administrative records from the Italian National Social Security Institute (INPS) All individuals born in four different dates with at least one contract registered at INPS in a given year Full time workers 16-65 100,000 individuals; 60,000 per year
Matched Employer-Employee Data Administrative records from the Italian National Social Security Institute (INPS) All individuals born in four different dates with at least one contract registered at INPS in a given year Full time workers 16-65 100,000 individuals; 60,000 per year Time span: 1998-2002
Employer-employee data Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics on the Matched Employer-Employee Data All sample Manufacturing Services White-Collar Blue-Collar Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. a) Workers Age 35.9 10.54 35.72 10.56 36.08 10.52 37.4 9.71 34.92 10.93 Daily wage 73.6 429.17 69.56 226.41 77.03 545.81 99.6 623.93 56.39 218.28 Gender: Female 0.37 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.42 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.30 0.46 Occupation: Executives 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.17 - - Occupation: Managers & white-collar 0.39 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.97 0.17 - - Occupation: Blue-collar 0.54 0.50 0.66 0.48 0.43 0.50 - - 0.89 0.31 Occupation: Apprentices 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.22 - - 0.10 0.30 Industry: Services 0.54 0.50 - - - - 0.69 0.46 0.44 0.50 b) Firms Size (employees) 71.1 591.61 67.5 353.12 74.3 743.18 Organization: Single firm 0.80 0.40 0.85 0.36 0.76 0.42 Organization: Parent firm 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.31 0.14 0.35 Organization: Subsidiary 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.29 Industry: Services 0.53 0.50 - - - - Source: Administrative records from INPS.
17 industries, ATECO81 Offshoring Indicators
Offshoring Indicators 17 industries, ATECO81 Share of imported private services in total input purchases
Offshoring Indicators 17 industries, ATECO81 Share of imported private services in total input purchases Imports of services: ISTAT s Import Matrices
Offshoring Indicators 17 industries, ATECO81 Share of imported private services in total input purchases Imports of services: ISTAT s Import Matrices Total input purchases: ISTAT s Input-Output accounts
Offshoring Indicators 17 industries, ATECO81 Share of imported private services in total input purchases Imports of services: ISTAT s Import Matrices Total input purchases: ISTAT s Input-Output accounts 4 different services:
Offshoring Indicators 17 industries, ATECO81 Share of imported private services in total input purchases Imports of services: ISTAT s Import Matrices Total input purchases: ISTAT s Input-Output accounts 4 different services: Finance and insurance
Offshoring Indicators 17 industries, ATECO81 Share of imported private services in total input purchases Imports of services: ISTAT s Import Matrices Total input purchases: ISTAT s Input-Output accounts 4 different services: Finance and insurance Computing and information
Offshoring Indicators 17 industries, ATECO81 Share of imported private services in total input purchases Imports of services: ISTAT s Import Matrices Total input purchases: ISTAT s Input-Output accounts 4 different services: Finance and insurance Computing and information R&D
Offshoring Indicators 17 industries, ATECO81 Share of imported private services in total input purchases Imports of services: ISTAT s Import Matrices Total input purchases: ISTAT s Input-Output accounts 4 different services: Finance and insurance Computing and information R&D business services
Offshoring indicators M sht = imports of services (s= service; h= industry; t= time)
Offshoring indicators M sht = imports of services (s= service; h= industry; t= time) Total service imports at the industry level: MS ht = 4 s=1 M sht
Offshoring indicators M sht = imports of services (s= service; h= industry; t= time) Total service imports at the industry level: MS ht = 4 s=1 M sht Proxy for service offshoring (normalizing by the total purchases of intermediate inputs in each industry, I ) SOS ht = MS ht I ht
Offshoring indicators M sht = imports of services (s= service; h= industry; t= time) Total service imports at the industry level: MS ht = 4 s=1 M sht Proxy for service offshoring (normalizing by the total purchases of intermediate inputs in each industry, I ) SOS ht = MS ht I ht Four disaggregate indicators for all the services covered by the Import Matrices.
Offshoring indicators Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics on the Offshoring Indicators a) Manufacturing Mean St. dev 1998 2002 change % SOS 1.50 1.527 1.51 1.53 0.02 SOS_FI 0.29 0.271 0.30 0.32 0.01 SOS_CI 0.31 0.801 0.28 0.30 0.02 SOS_RD 0.10 0.107 0.11 0.10-0.01 SOS_BS 0.80 0.518 0.81 0.81 0.00 MOS 26.30 11.572 24.65 26.09 1.44 b) Services Mean St. dev 1998 2002 change % SOS 1.90 1.437 2.09 1.85-0.23 SOS_FI 0.46 0.309 0.53 0.50-0.03 SOS_CI 0.19 0.146 0.18 0.18 0.00 SOS_RD 0.03 0.033 0.04 0.03-0.01 SOS_BS 1.21 0.989 1.34 1.14-0.20 MOS 2.84 0.967 2.93 2.66-0.26 SOS: service offshoring, aggregate; SOS_FI: Finance and insurance; SOS_CI: computer and information; SOS_RD: R&D; SOS_BS: business services; MOS: Material offshoring. Source: ISTAT.
Empirical model where: ln w ijht = α ij + α t + β 1 Γ ht + θ Θ it + ω Ω jt + λ Λ ht + ε ijht Γ ht = service offshoring
Empirical model ln w ijht = α ij + α t + β 1 Γ ht + θ Θ it + ω Ω jt + λ Λ ht + ε ijht where: Γ ht = service offshoring Θ it = individual characteristics
Empirical model ln w ijht = α ij + α t + β 1 Γ ht + θ Θ it + ω Ω jt + λ Λ ht + ε ijht where: Γ ht = service offshoring Θ it = individual characteristics Ω jt =firm characteristics
Empirical model ln w ijht = α ij + α t + β 1 Γ ht + θ Θ it + ω Ω jt + λ Λ ht + ε ijht where: Γ ht = service offshoring Θ it = individual characteristics Ω jt =firm characteristics Λ ht = industry characteristics
Empirical model ln w ijht = α ij + α t + β 1 Γ ht + θ Θ it + ω Ω jt + λ Λ ht + ε ijht where: Γ ht = service offshoring Θ it = individual characteristics Ω jt =firm characteristics Λ ht = industry characteristics α ij = worker-firm fixed effect
Empirical model ln w ijht = α ij + α t + β 1 Γ ht + θ Θ it + ω Ω jt + λ Λ ht + ε ijht where: Γ ht = service offshoring Θ it = individual characteristics Ω jt =firm characteristics Λ ht = industry characteristics α ij = worker-firm fixed effect α t = time effect
Results: Service Offshoring and workers wages Benchmark Individual Charact. Firm Charact. Material Offsh. (1) (2) (3) (4) SOS -0.042-0.044-0.043-0.022 [0.031] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] age 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.085*** [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] age2-0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Occup: Managers -0.126** -0.126** -0.125** [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] Occup: Blue coll. -0.165** -0.165** -0.164** [0.060] [0.060] [0.060] Occup: Apprentices -0.238*** -0.239*** -0.239*** [0.052] [0.053] [0.053] Occup: Others -0.041-0.037-0.036 [0.085] [0.083] [0.083] Employees 0.005 0.004 [0.004] [0.005] MOS -0.002** [0.001] Observations 497.141 497.141 496.024 496.024 R-squared 0.070 0.075 0.075 0.075 Groups 208.814 208.814 208.249 208.249 The dependent variable is log daily wages. All specifications control for worker-firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in brackets are corrected for clustering within industry. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Results: Service Offshoring and workers wages Industry Charact. Openness Import Penetration Exports & Imports (5) (6) (7) (8) SOS -0.065-0.052-0.061-0.046 [0.040] [0.038] [0.042] [0.041] Production 0.083 0.084 0.096 0.123 [0.167] [0.137] [0.150] [0.136] Full-time equivalent 0.047-0.037-0.024-0.075 [0.135] [0.146] [0.134] [0.146] Capital intensity -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.023*** [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] Material intensity -0.106-0.118-0.141-0.135 [0.115] [0.113] [0.120] [0.121] Openness -0.028** [0.011] Import penetration -0.031*** [0.010] Exports -0.022* [0.011] Imports -0.026*** [0.008] Observations 417.016 417.016 417.016 417.016 R-squared 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 Groups 176.335 176.335 176.335 176.335 The dependent variable is log daily wages. All specifications control for worker-firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in brackets are corrected for clustering within industry. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Results: Service Offshoring and skill premium Benchmark Individual Charact. Firm Charact. Material Offsh. Industry Charact. Openness Import Exports & Penetration Imports (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) SOS -0.031-0.048-0.047-0.026-0.069-0.056-0.065-0.050 [0.028] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.041] [0.039] [0.043] [0.041] SOS wc -0.025*** 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.014* 0.014* 0.013* 0.013* [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] Observations 497,141 497,141 496,024 496,024 417,016 417,016 417,016 417,016 R-squared 0.071 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 Number of groups 208,814 208,814 208,249 208,249 176,335 176,335 176,335 176,335 The dependent variable is log daily wages. All specifications control for worker-firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in round brackets are corrected for clustering within industry. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Results: Offshoring of individual services and wages Benchmark Individual Charact. Firm Charact. Material Offsh. Industry Charact. Openness Import Exports & Penetration Imports (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) SOS_FI 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.005-0.061-0.040-0.061-0.042 [0.066] [0.053] [0.052] [0.047] [0.074] [0.074] [0.075] [0.074] SOS_RD 0.041 0.045 0.053 0.056-0.031-0.058-0.037-0.068 [0.113] [0.100] [0.100] [0.087] [0.086] [0.098] [0.093] [0.101] SOS_CI 0.026 0.036* 0.036* 0.094*** 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.007 [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.026] [0.029] SOS_BS -0.133-0.150* -0.148* -0.112-0.257** -0.233** -0.254** -0.220** [0.078] [0.075] [0.074] [0.069] [0.085] [0.080] [0.087] [0.080] Observations 497,141 497,141 496,024 496,024 417,016 417,016 417,016 417,016 R-squared 0.071 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 Number of groups 208,814 208,814 208,249 208,249 176,335 176,335 176,335 176,335 The dependent variable is log daily wages. All specifications control for worker-firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors reported in round brackets are corrected for clustering within industry. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Conclusion Service offshoring does not cause significant reductions in workers wages
Conclusion Service offshoring does not cause significant reductions in workers wages Service offshoring may contribute to widening the wage gap btw. more and less skilled employees (but small effect)
Conclusion Service offshoring does not cause significant reductions in workers wages Service offshoring may contribute to widening the wage gap btw. more and less skilled employees (but small effect) Offshoring of business services exerts negative effects on wages, while offshoring of other services has virtually no impact.
Conclusion Service offshoring does not cause significant reductions in workers wages Service offshoring may contribute to widening the wage gap btw. more and less skilled employees (but small effect) Offshoring of business services exerts negative effects on wages, while offshoring of other services has virtually no impact. Implications:
Conclusion Service offshoring does not cause significant reductions in workers wages Service offshoring may contribute to widening the wage gap btw. more and less skilled employees (but small effect) Offshoring of business services exerts negative effects on wages, while offshoring of other services has virtually no impact. Implications: Fear of service offshoring (Amiti and Wei, 2005) largely exaggerated
Conclusion Service offshoring does not cause significant reductions in workers wages Service offshoring may contribute to widening the wage gap btw. more and less skilled employees (but small effect) Offshoring of business services exerts negative effects on wages, while offshoring of other services has virtually no impact. Implications: Fear of service offshoring (Amiti and Wei, 2005) largely exaggerated Specific government policies may help to mitigate adjustment costs