Joint Research Centre (JRC) Serving society, stimulating innovation, supporting legislation EU Stress Tests and National Action Plans Manuel Martín Ramos Joint Research Centre European Commission Nuclear Safety and Security Coordination Manuel.MARTIN-RAMOS@ec.europa.eu
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 2 Outline Objective Methodology Scope The peer review process Results of the Stress Tests Follow up. The National Action Plans Peer review of the National Action Plans Conclusions
Objective EU Council of 24 25 March, 2011, requested that the safety of all EU nuclear plants should be reviewed, on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessment ("stress tests") Stress tests to be developed by ENSREG (European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group), the EC and WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association) Assessments to be conducted by National Authorities and subject to peer review Stress tests to be carried out in neighbouring countries and beyond Results and necessary measures to be reported back to the Council, and made public. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/stress_tests_en.htm http://www.ensreg.eu
Methodology Stress tests to be conducted in two tracks: - Safety (assessment of the resistance of NPP agains extreme events). - Security (analysis, prevention and response to of malevolent acts) Terms of Reference (Safety track) drafted by WENRA. (The work on security is carried out by an Ad hoc Group on Nuclear Security composed of experts from the Member States, with the participation of the European Commission) And in three steps 1. Assessment by the nuclear operators (licensees) during the period June October 2011, 2. Review by national authorities (regulators) by end 2011, and 3. European peer reviews from January 2012 until April 2012.
Scope Targeted reassessment of robustness and safety margins of nuclear installations in: TOPIC 1. Initiating events. Earthquakes, flooding, extreme weather conditions. (Design basis. Margins) TOPIC 2. Loss of Safety Functions. Loss of power, loss of ultimate heat sink; or a combination of both. (Consequence and cliff-edge effects of successive loss of electrical power systems, plus loss of ultimate heat sink) TOPIC 3. Severe Accident Management (Containment integrity, loss of cooling core and spent fuel, assessment of severe accident management in catastrophic environment, etc)
The peer review process. Participants Nuclear Member States Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Finland France Germany Hungary Lithuania Netherlands Romania Slovakia Slovenia Sweden Spain United Kingdom European Commission Non Nuclear Member States Austria Denmark Ireland Italy Luxembourg Poland Nuclear Non-Member States Ukraine Switzerland Observers Canada Croatia IAEA Japan UAE USA More than 190 units of different designs (PWR, VVER, BWR, GCR, CANDU, RBMK) including permanently shutdown plants with spent fuel on site
The peer review process. National Reports Desktop Review (More than 2000 questions) ENSREG BOARD supervising the peer review process 3 topical reviews : External hazards Loss of safety functions Severe accident management (80 experts 2 w seminar) Draft Country Reports (compilation of 3 topical reviews) 17 Country Reviews: 6 teams working in parallel 8 members / team Review meetings in each country One site visit (4-5 days per visit) Final Country Reports Topical Summary reports Board Final Report endorsed by ENSREG
The peer review process. Schedule
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 9 Results of the Stress Tests All plants in agreement with their license basis Significant steps taken in all countries to improve safety of plants, with different degrees of practical implementation Global consistency over Europe in identification of strong features, weaknesses and measures to increase robustness Significant measures to increase robustness considered or in place: (Additional mobile equipment, hardened fixed equipment, improved severe accident management)
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 10 Results of the Stress Tests Guidance on assessment of extreme natural hazards (including development of a state-ofthe art methodology for assessment of plant margins in case of extreme natural hazards) Reinforced Periodic Safety Reviews: necessity to re-evaluate natural hazards and relevant plant provisions as often as appropriate, but at least every 10 years. Improved Containment Capabilities: Urgent implementation of the recognized measures to protect containment integrity (prevention of hydrogen explosions, prevention of containment overpressure ) Prevention of accidents resulting from natural hazards and limiting their consequences: Implementation of measures considering also devastation and isolation of site, event of long duration; unavailability of numerous safety systems, simultaneous accidents in several plants, including their spent fuel pools, presence of radioactive releases bunkered equipment, mobile equipment protected against extreme natural hazards Emergency response centres protected against extreme natural hazards Rescue teams and equipment rapidly available to support local operators
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 11 Follow up. The National Action Plans Follow-up of the Stress Tests through National Action Plans (NAcP) developed and made public by each national regulator (ENSREG Action Plan of 25 July 2012) End 2012 National Action Plans workshop to discuss contents and status of implementation of the NAcP Brussels 22 26 April, 2013 NAcP NAcP identify regulators actions that ensure improvements in the nation's nuclear power plants, as identified in the EU stress tests. Structured in the 6 topics discussed in the CNS: (1) external events (2) design issues (3) severe accident management (Scope of the Stress Tests) (4) national organizations, (5) emergency preparedness and response (6) international cooperation (Outside the scope of the Stress Tests)
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 12 National Action Plans Workshop OBJECTIVE: To discuss and peer review the content and status of implementation of the National Action Plans. (ENSREG Action Plan of July 25, 2012) SCOPE: Natural external hazards, loss of safety systems/design issues, and management of severe accidents (same as Stress Tests) PARTICIPANTS: 68 experts from 21 European Union member states, the European Commission, Switzerland and Ukraine 11 observers from Armenia, Canada, Taiwan and the IAEA 31 experts to support the national delegations (2 invited speakers) OUTCOME: 17 rapporteurs country reports 1 workshop summary report
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 13 Methodology BEFORE THE WORKSHOP: Peers to review the National Action Plans and raise questions and comments DURING THE WORKSHOP: Countries presented their NAcP and addressed questions and comments 12 rapporteurs (2 rapporteurs per group of three countries) drafted a country report based on the NAcP, presentations and discussions Rapporteurs presented the country reports to the plenary. Additional comments and suggestions Main findings extracted to a NAcP Workshop Summary Report
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 14 Findings (Actions) All countries addressed the findings, recommendations and suggestions from the stress test, and identified actions (analysis, improvements of procedures or hardware, regulatory actions, etc) with corresponding implementation schedule Extreme natural hazards: All participating countries reported their analyses of safety margins. Measures to further increase the robustness of the NPPs are planned or have already begun (bunkered or hardened systems, mobile equipment, etc) Periodic Safety Review: All participating countries have introduced the general requirements for PSR in their national regulations, (PSR methodology varies among countries) Containment integrity under severe accident conditions remains an important issue for accident management. This was well recognized and discussed. Related activities are included in most NAcPs (containment filtered venting, PAR)
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 15 Findings (schedules) All countries outlined a stepwise process in implementing improvement measures. Several hardware improvements commenced immediately after the accident. Further generic or plant specific analyses are ongoing. Further hardware improvements subject to the results of these investigations. Overall schedule Analyses and reviews: 2014. Implementation of major modifications: 2015-2018. (Latest date mentioned is 2020)
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 16 Findings (transparency) All participating countries are strongly committed to the issue of transparency of their work. All NAcPs are published in English on ENSREG website All NAcPs are published on the member states national websites, (about half of them also in national language). NAcPs will be updated according to status of implementation (at least annually) All countries are committed to follow-up implementation of their NAcP until all measures have been finalized. Follow-up peer review in 2015
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 17 Findings (challenges) Completing the studies necessary to re-evaluate the strategy for severe accident management Reassessing natural hazards systematically in the PSR process Exchange results of PSR between countries Developing requirements for design, qualification and maintenance of mobile equipment that is not regularly used, and for bunkered equipment Qualifying instrumentation for severe accident conditions (esp. in the long term) Necessary resources and arrangements are in place to cope with simultaneous severe accidents on several installations of the same site in the context of regional devastation resulting from a natural disaster Keeping the schedule for the implementation of appropriate hardware measures
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 18 Findings (challenges, cont.) Generating a long term schedule, coping with the uncertainties related to the ongoing investigations and analyses Optimising the prioritisation between improvements already launched and new actions originating from lessons learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi accident Enhancing international exchanges on research and solutions on molten core cooling and stabilisation (in/ex-vessel) Dealing with large volumes of contaminated water Ensuring all aspects of installation safety (e.g. operational safety, safety culture) while performing ambitious programmes specifically originated from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident Assessing the role of contractors intervention in emergency situation and ensuring that the necessary arrangements for such interventions are in place
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 19 Conclusions The Stress Tests constituted an unprecedented and very intensive one of a kind effort to review the safety of nuclear installations in Europe (global effort of more than 500 person-months during a short period of time) The Stress Tests constituted an unprecedented opportunity for the exchange of information on the national nuclear safety framework of EU and neighbouring countries Participation of neighbouring countries and observers from outside the EU has extended the concept beyond EU. The EU Stress Tests have been a model for other countries Close cooperation among national operators, regulatory authorities, other organisations, and EC The results of the Stress Tests (including the country reports, NAcP, ) are public The Stress Tests have originated concrete improvements in nuclear safety (including regulation, plant modifications, etc)
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 20 Questions?
JRC Management Meeting, 17 July 2012 21 Thank you for your attention!