RE: Alarm from an Industry Professional over Australia s Procurement of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter.

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Danny Nowlan 9 Harriet St Marrickville NSW 2204 Australia BSc, BE (Aero), Masters (Aero) (USyd) 5 th May 2014 RE: Alarm from an Industry Professional over Australia s Procurement of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. To Whom It May Concern: My name is Danny Nowlan and I am professional Aeronautical Engineer and graduate of the University of Sydney. I have been practicing in the field of vehicle performance simulation for over 19 years. Though I now run a software simulation company producing world class simulation products for the motorsport industry, I still maintain a keen interest in both civilian and military aviation. I also have colleagues and students of mine who have served in the RAAF. I am writing to you to convey some material you might find helpful as you fight this current government on its budget cuts. Australia s decision to acquire the F-35 Joint strike fighter as announced on April 23, 2014 represents spending $24 billion dollars we do not have on something that will not work. It also represents one of the greatest governance failures in Australian political history. What we are about to discuss can be readily verified by documents on the public record which makes this decision even more disturbing. Firstly the stealth of this aircraft or its ability to avoid detection has been greatly overstated. In 2006 the U.S Department of Defence downgraded the F-35 level of stealth from very low observable (F-22, B-2 levels) to low observable (F-117 standard). It is also a matter of public record that the F-35 is only optimised against X-band radar from the forward aspect. Even the F-35 s competitors are highlighting this on the public record. Find enclosed Fig-1 that comes from a Boeing briefing to the U.S Navy comparing the F- 18 Growler s and F-35 ability to penetrate hostile enemy airspace.

Fig-1 Comparison of F-35 and Growler ability against radar detection. You can see very clearly the limited ability of the F-35 to avoid radar detection. In particular the document clearly states X-band only on ingress and no spectrum capability on egress. This is in line with the testimony that organisations such as Air Power Australia and REPSIM have given in the past to the Australian Parliament. It also illustrates how compromised the F-35 is against the likely threats it will have to face. It should also be added that Russian built SA-20 surface to air missile systems and above and Sukhoi built Su-35S and PAK-FA will come equipped with L-Band radars that will readily detect the F-35. This was the type of radar that shot down an F-117 stealth fighter in the Kosovo conflict in 1999. This brings into direct question one of the fundamental tenants of getting this aircraft which is its ability to avoid radar detection. With the stealth compromised the poor airframe performance of the F-35 will leave it vulnerable. Even the most rudimentary of specific power calculations (the basis on which the performance of the F-15 and F-16 was specified) shows the F-35 is hopelessly outclassed by current fighters (such as the F-16 and Su-35S) and is not in the same league as the F-22 or threats it will have to face in the future such as the Sukhoi PAK-FA. However the ultimate statement in this particular argument comes straight from Lockheed Martin itself (manufacturer of the F-35). In 2013 Bill Flynn one of the

Lockheed Martin test pilots responsible for testing the flight performance of the F-35 had this to say, In terms of instantaneous and sustained turn rates and just about every other performance metric, the F-35 variants match or considerably exceed the capabilities of every fourth-generation fighter This statement is completely without foundation, particularly when the F-35 is compared to the Su-35S, The Eurofighter and the Dassault Rafale. I should also add that in the 2012 Alaska s Red Flag air exercises the Eurofighter achieved simulated kills against an F-22 raptor (the front line air dominance fighter of the USAF) in a visual range engagement. Given the F-22 is supposed to fly top cover for the F-35 this raises considerable concerns about the F-35 s survivability in modern air combat. Also despite protestations from defence, the RAAF and Lockheed Martin the F-35 s issues are far from resolved. There are a numerous US Government reports that have identified significant issues with the F-35. An example of this is the latest U.S Department of Defence DOT & E report of 2013 on the F-35. These problems cover the structure of the aircraft, aircraft performance, software development and the inability of this aircraft to fly in adverse weather conditions like lightning. A key example of this was a finding in the latest U.S Department of Defence DOT & E report of 2013 on the F-35 regarding the Verification Simulation program. This is used to validate how the F-35 will perform in the missions it has to perform. To put this in perspective it might be prudent to review the testimony of Air Vice Marshall Kym Osley (officer in charge of the RAAF s acquisition of the F-35) on several occasions to the Australian Parliament. He has stated on a number of occasions that organisations such as Air Power Australia and RepSim analysis are incorrect because of a lack of classified information. In addition defence have always claimed that the simulation validation has been one of the key reasons we should acquire the F-35. However the U.S Department of Defence DOT & E report of 2013 on the F-35 has found the simulations used to validate the F-35 now has a significant chance of failing. To quote the report directly, The program (Verification Simulation) is now at significant risk of failing to mature the VSim and adequately verify and validate that it will faithfully represent the performance of the F-35 in the mission scenarios for which the simulation is to be used in operational testing Not only does this call into direct question the testimony given by Air Vice Marshall Osley this should be sending significant alarm bells both in Defence and the RAAF that the basis on which the F-35 has been selected is now on very shaky ground.

Yet the ultimate comment about the validity of the F-35 was a press conference given by the Chief of US Air Combat Command (A-1), General Mike Hostage. On the 3 rd of February this year in an interview with the Air Force Times he stated: "If I do not keep that F-22 fleet viable, the F-35 fleet frankly will be irrelevant. The F-35 is not built as an air superiority platform. It needs the F-22." So the F-35 might have a role to play in the USAF, but the RAAF F-35s has to handle air superiority as well. If this is General Hostage s view then the RAAF is in significant trouble. It should also be noted in the press conference on the 23 rd of April 2014 when the acquisition of the F-35 by Australia was announced, the Prime Minister Tony Abbot, Minister of Defence David Johnstone and the chief of the RAAF Air Marshall Brown highlighted that air superiority was the major reason we obtained this aircraft. All these factors point to a failed program. It s also worth reflecting that the development of the F-35 was started in 2001 and the aircraft is not likely to see service until 2020. What has also been disturbing in this debate is the reluctance of both Defence and the RAAF to take on the critics of the F-35 in an open debate. A prime example of this is when the ABC 4 corners did a report on the F-35 called Reach for the Sky aired on the 18 th of February 2013. The critics of the F-35 took part; the United States Air Force took part even Lockheed Martin took part. The RAAF and Defence did not take part. The RAAF and defence always play the classified card in deflecting debate on the F-35. Given everything we have discussed here the harsh reality is they would never prevail in an open debate. Also the cost of this aircraft has not been budgeted for as claimed by the prime minister and minister of defence. The future fund of where this plane is supposedly funded is reserved for pensions. Even Professor Hugh White a former vice secretary of defence acknowledged this in an article he wrote for the Age on April 28 2014. Yet the most disturbing aspect of all this has been the complicity of both sides of politics in acquiring the F-35. As an example of this I have attached the correspondence with my local member Anthony Albanese and a submission I put to the Joint Standing committee of Foreign affairs, Defence and trade. The glossing over of the relevant concerns I made were of grave concern. In my view it is one of the single greatest failures of governance in Australian history. It is also worth reflecting that the alternatives to the F-35 are considerably more price effective. A fly away cost of a Dassault Rafale is half of the F-35. We would also be able to build this aircraft under license and get access to the all important software of the aircraft. This is exactly the re boot the Australian aerospace industry desperately needs. Also if the F-22 production line was re-opened 100 extra F-22 s would bring the unit price would come down to $116 million dollars a copy. To put this in perspective the government s latest purchase of F-35 s works out at about $206 million dollars per aircraft.

I realise that right know you are in for a hard fight against a very determined government. Feel free to use the information I have provided here on the F-35 to aid in this endeavor. For a government that espouses fiscal responsibility and restraint the F-35 is not just a colossal waste of money it also represents one of the most flagrant failures of governance in Australia Political/military history. Please feel free to contact me if you require any more information. Best regards, Danny Nowlan BSc, BE (Aero), Masters (Aero) (USyd)