Sicily December 3, 2005 By: Alex Butler
Introduction The campaign on the island of Sicily in the summer of 1943 was ultimately a strategic success in the eyes of its planners, even though in retrospect, more could have been accomplished. If it were not for the differences in goals that both the American and British leadership showed at the Casablanca Conference in Morocco, which defined a limited scope to the entire operation, the inexperience of most of the operational commanders, and the general lack of cooperation between services, this operation might have moved faster and been more of a strategic success. However, it must be recognized that in terms of the goals that were laid out by the conference in Casablanca, Morocco, the mission was a success. To explain how these factors impacted the thirty-eight days of fighting that took place on the island of Sicily, we will start with the planning and background of the Allies and their positions. We then will discuss the initial invasion, followed by the actions after the beachhead was established. Finally, we will conclude with what was learned by the invasion of Sicily, what could have been different, and what were decisive moments in the campaign. Throughout the reading of this battle the reader should stay alert for points where commanders could or would not work together, where the scope of the campaign demonstrated limited planning, and how inexperience played a role in the battle. Pre-Invasion and Planning Sicily is often an overlooked chapter in the annals of World War II and many people think that Operation Overlord, D-Day, was the biggest amphibious invasion of the war. In terms of numbers of people landed in the first day and the size of the landing area/beachhead, Operation Husky, the code name for the invasion of Sicily, took the title
for the largest amphibious landing of the war. Sicily is an island off of Italy which whimsically looks as if the boot of Italy is kicking it. Sicily is ninety miles from the North African coast and only two and one half miles from the Italian coast and forms a virtual land bridge between Africa and Southern Europe. The idea to invade Sicily was born from the conference that took place in January of 1943 in Casablanca, Morocco. With the North African campaign quickly coming to an end, the Allies were faced with an opportunity to exploit their success, transfer their momentum into a different theater, and finally, to go on the offensive. As the British argued, Sicily s was a strategic location as a natural land bridge between Africa and the soft underbelly of the Axis Empire and it seemed the natural place to go next. By capturing Sicily, the British hoped to open the Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea for Allied shipping, particularly British shipping, by capturing Axis airbases and ports and denying their use by the Axis powers. Secondly, the British argued that Sicily could act as a future base of operations for attacks to Italy that would hopefully shock the Italians out of the war. Furthermore, the British hoped that attacking Sicily would take some pressure off of the Soviet front, and pacify Stalin s push for opening another front. The Americans, mainly represented by General Marshall, were greatly opposed to the idea of going into Sicily. He believed no more resources needed to be diverted from the efforts to launch a cross channel attack on Northern France, and the Italians would be fighting more vigorously because Sicily was part of the Italian homeland. However, a compromise was struck to the effect that the Americans would participate only with a renewed commitment by the British to a cross channel attack into Northern France the following year. However, it must be said that these opposing views upon going into the battle, proved to limit the success of the entire
campaign. Where the British hoped this would be a starting point to an eventual push up the Italian peninsula the Americans hoped that Sicily would be last of their Mediterranean adventures. Amphibious Invasion Plans The organization of the invasion force had Dwight D. Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander of the operation and who by this point in the war was no stranger to amphibious operations. The lessons learned in this campaign would be indispensable for future amphibious assaults, D-Day. Under him were three British as his land, sea, and air commanders and his principal deputy and the actual commander of the land forces was General Sir Harold Alexander, also British. The invasion forces were made up of the American 7 th Army under the command of Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr. and the British 8 th Army under the command of General Sir Bernard Montgomery. This arrangement was the first time that an American force operated as a Field Army. Unfortunately, this independence caused much controversy and friction throughout the campaign. The island of Sicily had only two real areas that were suitable for amphibious operations, the northwest corner of the island and the southeast portion of the island. To achieve total victory in Sicily, the Allies ultimate goal was to capture the Port of Messina in the northeast corner of the island. Although Messina was the ultimate goal, the terrain and distance from North Africa made it impossible to hit it as an initial target. Thus, the Allies were confined to landing at one or both of the beaches suitable for amphibious assaults. Initially, the plan called for the Americans to assault the northwestern beach and the British the southeastern beach, followed by a two-pronged
race to Messina. However, General Alexander made the command decision not to go about this route because the two forces could not provide mutual support for each other, and he decided to have both forces assault the southeastern beach. This less aggressive plan was even recognized by Axis forces. Most of this decision was based on Alexander s perception of American forces, which after the defeat in Kasserine Pass in North Africa, a few months earlier, he felt were inexperienced and less able than their British counterparts. This notion later came to play a critical role in the invasion plan. Once ashore the British 8 th moved up the eastern shore with the American 7 th protecting their left flank. The only objectives the 7 th Army was given were to move to the yellow and blue lines which denoted depth inland and were to be coordinated with the movement of the British forces. This was clearly a support role for the American forces who took it to heart. The British were to be used to do all the hard work and were the ones to assault Messina. When Alexander made the invasion plans for Sicily he laid out the amphibious invasion with a great degree of detail, but did not bother to elaborate on the rest of the operation. This was to enable his commanders adequate latitude when faced with the enemy positions, but it also led to some degree of conflict by the American forces who, as the way they saw it, if the yellow and blue lines were met they were free to do anything else. Defense of the Island The defenses on the island consisted of two hundred thousand to three hundred thousand Italian soldiers and thirty thousand German soldiers, divided into two divisions. However, the Italian soldiers and one of the German divisions were woefully underequipped and morale for the Italians was extremely low. The defense of the island was
headed by General Guzzoni. He circled the island with a thin ring of Italian forces and put two divisions of Italian soldiers at each of the two probable landing sites. Fortunately for the Allies, Guzzoni was overruled by Hitler s advisor to Italy and was not allowed to concentrate the two German Divisions in the southeastern beach, from which he thought an invasion was most likely to come. Instead, the 15 th Panzer Grenadier Division, the most battle-ready division on the island, was transferred to the western beach. The aim of the defenders of Sicily was to drive any invasion force off as soon as possible. It was believed if the Allies could land a force and gain a beachhead, any chance of saving the island would be lost. The Invasion On the night of 9 July 1943 the Allied invasion steamed toward the island of Sicily. The force was battered by a forty mile per hour gale wind, dubbed the Mussolini wind. At 2330 the elements of the 82 nd Airborne Division were dropped into the middle of where the 7 th Army was to land. British Glider units were being dropped off as well. The mission of the 82 nd was to prevent reinforcements from being brought up and to create havoc in the Axis camps as the landings occurred. However, this mission was not to be taken lightly for most of the forces dropped in, ended up miles from their designated positions with many of the British gliders crashing into the sea. By 2200, even before the first bullet flew, General Guzzoni ordered a full alert because earlier that day the Allies were spotted sailing toward Sicily. On the morning of 10 July at 0145 Allied forces waded ashore onto the island of Sicily. There was little resistance on either landing site. The British 8 th moved right in and started up the east coast almost walking in to Syracuse unopposed and was on the way to Augusta. Patton s 7 th Army walked on
shore with the middle of the line receiving most of the resistance. However, with poorly coordinated attacks on the part of the Axis forces they were unable to walk the 7 th Army back into the sea. The worst fighting occurred with a German thrust of 17 Tiger I heavy tanks, an armored artillery battalion, and two battalions of motorized infantry, which overran 1 st battalion, 180 th infantry (45 Division) and even captured their commander. Critical to the 7 th s survival was the seemingly constant naval fire. By night s end the 7 th Army was a little battered, but the Army and Navy moved a total of 66,285 people, 17,766 deadweight tons of cargo, and 7,396 vehicles. This was not without complications as the weather had put elements of the 82 nd all over Sicily and there was a dangerous bulge in the 7 th Army s center where the 505 th Parachute Regiment should have been. The 45 th division was scattered over a ten mile front. Shifting sandbars had beached over one hundred fifty to two hundred landing crafts, and the beaches were congested because of poor access routes and the very soft sand. On the 11 th of July the 7 th saw its worst day as the Axis forces attempted to cut them in to two and drive them into the sea. By the end of the day, the 7 th Army suffered 2,300 casualties, the most in a single day on Sicily, and that night Patton decided to reinforce his army with over 2,000 paratroopers from Africa. Despite the best attempts of leadership to inform everyone of the drop, the planes arrived shortly after an Axis aerial attack, twenty-three planes were shot down and thirty-seven of the one hundred forty-four planes were badly damaged. In total, the paratroopers suffered approximately ten percent casualties. As the 7 th Army began its push out of its beachhead and to the yellow line, the British 8 th encountered an ever-stiffening resistance as Hitler transferred the elite 1 st Parachute Division from France to Sicily. In the midst of this mounting resistance to the British 8 th, General
Alexander made a decision that would define British and American relations for the rest of the campaign. Bordering the American right flank was Highway 124. On the night of the 13 th Alexander transferred Highway 124 to the British sector so that the 8 th could flank around Axis forces. This decision infuriated American leadership, especially Patton. The decision caused a delay that gave the Germans time to prepare for the coming attack. This move by Alexander showed the apparent bias of British to American forces. The stall in activity was best shown as the 45 th Division movement virtually back to the shore to sidestep the 1 st Division. Palermo and Messina With this insult Patton turned his eyes toward Palermo on the western side of the island. He first convinced Alexander to sanction a reconnaissance of the town of Agrigento that gave General Truscott the ability to capture it on the 15 th of July. Then Alexander reluctantly agreed to Patton s query of launching an independent drive toward Messina. With Alexander s support Patton s first order of business was to take Palermo while Bradley and his second corps moved to cut the island in half. However, Alexander had a change of mind and ordered the 7 th Army back, but the Americans claimed that his message was garbled in transmission and by the time it was clarified they were at the gates of Palermo. As startling as the fall of Palermo might have been, even more startling was that the fall of Palermo was closely followed by the overthrow of Mussolini on 25 July, meeting one of the long term objectives of the campaign. On the 23rd of July the campaign for Sicily took another twist when Alexander ordered Patton to turn east for Messina, due to the bog down of the British 8 th. This signaled a shift in strategies and the adoption of the two pronged race to Messina that was originally planned. The attack on
Messina was not similar to Palermo because the mountainous region of the island provided a defender s paradise. There were four roads that led to this area of the island, two of which actually went to Messina. Alexander divided the avenues of approach in half with each army getting two roads, one of which went to Messina. Patton still furious from the highway 124 incident said This is a horserace in which the prestige of the US Army is at stake. The horserace to Messina pushed the German defenders into a defensive line called the Etna Line. The German plan was to scale back the defensive line while simultaneously pulling troops out of Sicily. The Allied advances slowed to a crawl as one hundred degree temperatures, malaria and other fevers incapacitated over ten thousand soldiers. As Patton s push for Messina continued, hills and mountains on the Etna Line saw a seesaw back and forth. The German soldiers used the terrain almost with expert precision which, combined with an endless number of landmines, proved an almost impregnable defense. This was best demonstrated by the battle of Troina in which the 7 th Army met stiff resistance and the only Medal of Honor recipient of the entire campaign was gilded into history. The push to Messina by Patton also saw three amphibious assaults which took the enemy by surprise, but proved only limited in their effectiveness, because of the Germans continual withdrawal on the island and their pulling back of lines. On August 11 th, the German forces started a full scale withdrawal from Sicily and on the 17 th of August elements of the 3 rd Infantry Division 7 th Infantry Regiment entered Messina. This all occurred only a few hours in front of the British and only a few hours after the last German units left. By the time the British arrived, the column commander walked up to Patton and congratulated him for winning his race.
Net Effect Sicily started out with two forces deeply divided in terms of goals for the operation. The Americans hoped it was the last of their Mediterranean adventures and the British hoped it was only a beginning. The invasion could be declared a success. They opened up the Eastern Mediterranean shipping lanes for the Allies, denied the use of Sicily as a base for air and sea operations. Even the largest goal of the operation was successfully accomplished and Mussolini was overthrown. The Americans fought successfully for the first time as a complete field army and proved themselves on the field of battle. The army gained valuable experience in logistics and Sicily was a victory for logisticians, as much as a victory for the infantry man. However, the campaign in Sicily also demonstrated several aspects that were ineffective. First, it showed an inability of British and American forces to work together, as well as an inability of commanders to work in the combined land, sea, and air environment. Ground commanders complained about the lack of close air support and the inaccuracy of airborne drops, the air commanders complained of their aircrafts being fired upon by Allied ground and naval forces, and the naval officers chided the land commanders for not fully exploiting the fleet s amphibious capabilities to outflank the enemy once the campaign had begun. Another factor that was even noticed by Axis forces was the relative conservative nature of Allied forces. Many people criticized Allies for not landing on both of the beaches similar to the initial plan or for Allies not attempting to block the evacuation of the Axis forces from Messina to the toe of Italy. In that evacuation, roughly one hundred thousand soldiers and ten thousand vehicles went to Italy, where Allies would fight them later in
September 1943 when Allies launched an invasion. Many people attribute this relatively conservative nature, not to caution, but to the desire to not expand Sicily into Italy, and after Sicily to go back to focus on a cross-channel invasion. Sicily also saw the downfall of Patton as well with the killing of seventy-five EPOW s, two slapping incidents, and hostilities with the British most likely cost his command of the 7 th and command of the Italy invasion or Normandy invasion. Conclusion By the time the last bullet flew thirty-eight days of battle provided twenty nine thousand enemy soldiers killed or wounded and over one hundred forty thousand captured. The British saw 12,843 casualties including 2,721 killed. The Americans came out of the campaign with the least number of casualties with 2,237 killed and 6,544 wounded or captured. The campaign in Sicily was critical to future success including the invasion in Normandy. It gave key leaders experience necessary for future operations. The campaigns in the Mediterranean demonstrated to the Soviets that we were attempting to provide support and reduce the pressure on the Soviets by German forces. It must be said that at the earliest, 1944 would have been the time when a cross channel invasion could occur, and by having actions in Sicily and eventually in Italy, it employed German forces, denying them the ability to fight in the Soviet or build up the Atlantic Wall. Three hundred thousand soldiers would have made a significant difference in the Soviet theater. The objective of Sicily was mixed when it was initially planned, but by the time Messina fell there was a defined mission and a commitment by all Allied nations to provide pressure to Hitler s Europe from its soft underbelly. The Sicily campaign is a very an interesting campaign with the fortifications in mountains, landmines, and four
amphibious landings, it attests to how soldiers on all sides fought to maintain or capture their objectives. It may have taken only thirty-eight days to take Sicily, but soldiers on both sides fought courageously for their nations, and for Sicily s effects. I believe this was felt at later times in the war.