Governance and Decision-making Process: CTBTO Experience

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Governance and Decision-making Process: CTBTO Experience BAN New York, 3 March 2017 Xiaodong Yang Officer-in-Charge Legal Services Section Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO xiaodong.yang@ctbto.org

Brief introduction Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (opened for signature on 24 September 1996) (CTBT) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO (PrepCom) (adopted on 19 November 1996) PrepCom Executive Secretary: Dr Lassina Zerbo

Vienna International Centre

Dr Lassina Zerbo

Context Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) (PTBT) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970) (NPT) NPT Review Conference 1995 decision (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)): (1) Indefinite extension of NPT (2) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996.

Atmospheric and Underground Nuclear Testing

CTBT: the verification regime and the Treaty Organization The verification regime Article IV (1) of the CTBT: In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be established consisting of the following elements: (a) An International Monitoring System; (b) Consultation and clarification; (c) On-site inspections; and (d) Confidence-building measures. At entry into force of this Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty.

CTBT: the verification regime and the Treaty Organization The verification regime International Monitoring System (IMS) Consultation and clarification On-site inspections (OSI) Confidence-building measures The IMS is supported by the International Data Centre (IDC)

The CTBT verification regime Technical Components International Monitoring System (IMS) Build and sustain 50 primary seismic 120 auxiliary seismic 11 hydroacoustic 60 infrasound 80 radionuclide 16 laboratories International Data Centre (IDC) collect, analyze, distribute data and products On-Site Inspections (OSI) conduct on-site inspections after Entry-into-Force

International Monitoring System 337 Facilities Nearing Completion Seismic Primary Array Seismic Primary 3-comp Station Seismic Auxiliary Array Seismic Auxiliary 3-comp Station Hydroacoustic (hydrophone) Station Hydroacoustic (T-phase) Station Infrasound Station Radionuclide Station Radionuclide Lab

On-site inspection Clarifies whether a nuclear explosion has been carried out Gathers facts to identify violator OSI: AFTER ENTRY-INTO-FORCE FINAL VERIFICATION MEASURE Authorized by Executive Council by green light mechanism (30/51) Final judgment lies with Executive Council IFE 14 Jordan

CTBT: the verification regime and the Treaty Organization The Treaty Organization: CTBTO Conference of the States Parties (all States Parties to the CTBT) (the principal organ ) Executive Council (51 members) (the executive organ ) Decides on on-site inspections Technical Secretariat (including the International Data Centre (IDC)) Operation of IMS and IDC, and support for OSI

Lessons learned from the negotiation of the CTBT Organization of the negotiation Working Group 1 verification issues Working Group 2 legal and institutional issues

Lessons learned from the negotiation of the CTBT Involvement of scientists and technical experts Friends of the Chair (of Working Groups) De-politicization of disagreements

Lessons learned from the negotiation of the CTBT Substantive issues (1) Number and location of IMS stations (2) National technical means (3) Role of IDC (4) OSI: red light or green light (5) OSI: Executive Council decisions (6) OSI: rights and obligations of the Inspected State Party (7) OSI: reporting and taking action

Experience of the CTBTO PrepCom The experience of the CTBTO PrepCom in preparing for the effective implementation of the CTBT throws much light on the notion of an internationally and effectively verifiable treaty.

Experience of the CTBTO PrepCom The Resolution for the establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO was adopted on 19 November 1996 All States that have signed the CTBT are members of the PrepCom Started functioning early 1997

Experience of the CTBTO PrepCom Structure of the PrepCom Preparatory Commission (PC) plenary body Working Group A (WGA) Budgetary and administrative matters Working Group B (WGB) Verification matters Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS)

Experience of the CTBTO PrepCom Rules of procedure The rule of consensus

Experience of the CTBTO PrepCom Technical capabilities Infrastructure Technical expertise Organizational development (e.g., Operations Support Centre (OSC) for OSI)

Experience of the CTBTO PrepCom Legal framework Processes and procedures Standing arrangements Legal support for on-site inspections

Work and achievements of the CTBTO PrepCom Verification regime in place IMS 90% complete Fully functional IDC Readiness of OSI (Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14))

Work and achievements of the CTBTO PrepCom Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14) in Jordan The most sophisticated OSI exercise conducted to date by the CTBTO Five-week-long field exercise (3 November 9 December 2014) Four years of preparation 150 tonnes of specialized equipment Over 200 international experts Covering an inspection area of nearly 1,000 square kilometres Using 15 of the 17 techniques permissible under the CTBT Also testing the CTBTO s elaborate logistical system

Work and achievements of the CTBTO PrepCom Expertise and experience accumulated over 20 years Institutional building Operation management Technical and legal capabilities Inter-organizational cooperation and coordination

Work and achievements of the CTBTO PrepCom Promotion of the CTBT Article XIV conferences Information and consultation

Entry-into-force According to Art. XIV 44 Annex 2 States required to ratify 8 remain Neither signed nor ratified DPRK India Pakistan Signed but not ratified China Egypt Iran Israel USA

Thank you