Thwarting the Modern Terrorist at Hotels and Special Events
Agenda Introduction Attacks on Special Events Attacks on Hotels Diagnosis of Tactics Utilized Mitigation Strategies Questions Closing
Special Event Attacks Bataclan Theater Paris, France Cricket Team Lahore, Pakistan San Bernardino Nice, France Multiple Attackers Military Tactics Used Attacked security & LEO Employee/Contractor insider knowledge High Caliber weapons used Suicide vests Vehicles Explosives
Impact on Special Events 44% Anticipate changes to meeting and event industry More destination research and communications regarding risk More attendee screening Provide more employee training Updating procedures and contingency plans Adding more security staff Working with local and federal law enforcement Developing new security plans Predict no changes 27% 15% 14% 5% 5% 19% 15% 9% MPI Meetings Outlook, Winter 2016
Impact on Economy and Business Revenues Egypt 2013 11% of countries GDP tied to tourism 2014 tourism reported slumps of almost 31%, industry earnings only $5.9bn. Sinai hotel occupancy has 20000000 plummeted and as of January 15000000 2016 it is estimated to cost 10000000 $230-$300 million per month to 5000000 the economy 0 Egypt Tourism 2010 2011 2012 2013
The Mumbai Attack India s 26/11 One of the best planned terrorist attacks - audacious and ambitious Multiple attacks at different locations prevented authorities from developing an overall assessment of the situation The first active shooter type terrorist attack Precise planning, detailed reconnaissance and thorough preparation both physical and mental Terrorist reconnaissance done in late 2007 consistent with other large scale terrorist operations Terrorist planners stayed in the hotel during their recce and took a guided tour through the hotel, videoing the tour Terrorists entered at the famous Leopold Café and moved to the rear entrance of the Taj Walked through the grounds and ground floor of the hotel Then swiftly moved to the upper floors causing confusion and delaying rescue operations Suicide attackers who were able to operate effectively over an extended period of time Heavily armed assault rifles, machine guns, pistols, hand grenades, improvised explosive devices. Additional supplies were placed around the hotel
Multiple Attacks
Taj Mahal Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Mumbai, India 26 November 2008, approx. 8:30pm NSA 7 dinner in the Souk Restaurant on the 25 th floor Approx. 30 fellow diners in the restaurant Americans, Europeans and Indian elite
Overview Heard a commotion advised that a fight had broken out between two rival gangs NSA team and diners received word that the hotel was under attack by terrorists Nobody was responding so Bob assumed leadership role The restaurant was not safe surrounded by windows Found a supply of weapons in the kitchen so armed with meat cleavers and carving knives Informed that terrorists were making their way to the top of the hotel No defence and nowhere to go
Reaction NSA 7 found a conference venue on the same floor that could be secured Established a holding area and moved the restaurant patrons there Already 120 people there we were now 150 people Barricaded the doors Brought up the elevator and jammed it open Took out the lights near the entrance Positioned near each entry point NSA team member in the ceiling Addressed the group after every explosion or noise or at 20 min intervals See the attackers / hear shots and explosions / see and hear activity at the nearby Trident hotel Stayed in holding area for 5 ½ hours Moved the group down 25 floors as a fire had broken out below that was moving towards the holding area One floor at a time over 1 ½ hours until a safe route out was found
Run Group not under actual attack in the restaurant We believed that the terrorists were heading towards us Left the secured area only when the threat of fire became imminent Move slowly down 25 flights of stairs took about 2 ½ hours It took 7 ½ hours to get out 150 people were rescued
Hide Terrorists were shooting anyone they could see We were relatively safe - out of sight and they didn t know we were there Occasionally spotted some of them but had no idea how many there were Sophisticated, well-planned attack on multiple venues Found a hiding place and secured the area
Fight We were armed with weapons Element of surprise should a terrorist locate us We were ready to fight We had a fighting chance
Lessons Learned Commu icatio s 2 people called 3 numbers continuously / hotel lobby, security manager and the Mumbai police Getting info from our own people in India as well as in South Africa Pros and Cons of Broadcast Information received was invaluable BIGGEST CHALLENGE WAS TO REMAIN UPDATED Co tro Who s in charge?
Analysis of Attack Strategies Armed assailants Small team tactics used to storm facilities, creating panic, driving evacuations to secondary attacks Multi-stage bombing attacks & personnel flow during evacuation Use of suicide vests as last resort weapons Placement of VBIED near evacuation locations
Emerging Strategies Use of Drone to carry payload of explosives or chem/bio into unsuspecting crowd at event or venue Weaponization of chemical/biological materials Re-emergence of Sniper Attacks Nice, France vehicles used as weapons Targeting of senior executives in their homes i.e. cripple Marriott by executing the leaders
Mitigation Strategies "Layers of security beyond the building perimeter Lessons from Marriott Alternate or backup CCTV rooms Maps or 3D walk-through models of the hotel Train your staff to recognize surveillance and limit how much information is public. Surveillance Detection Strategies Protective Intelligence Trained and Practiced Threat Assessment Programs
Mitigation Strategies Thorough searches at entry points to the location Where possible, create buffer / reaction zones Communications - crisis communication strategy and information management plan Leadership Communication training of all hotel staff Train all staff in evacuation skills and crisis management Empower staff to handle crises Appoint key reaction staff on each floor Ongoing drills and training Plan for emergencies
Back to Basics Event Security Assess Dynamics of event security are changing Basics still apply Open Plan Credential Secure Post Clear
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