Jane's Defence Weekly [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly for full article] The 'soft' touch: Delivering non-kinetic effects to influence the battlespace In line with an increasing reliance on concurrent effects in the information space, the UK has developed an integrated vision for information operations that is bringing a new approach to the battlefield, reports David Reynolds After more than a decade of warfighting in Afghanistan under Operation 'Herrick', UK land forces are rebalancing formations for contingency operations. Fundamental to the new integrated approach is the inclusion of information operations (IO) as a key component in delivering non-kinetic effects. IO can deliver non-kinetic effects to frontline combat operations to influence an enemy's decision-making. This picture shows a soldier from the British Army's Royal Anglian Regiment engaging the Taliban in Helmand. (Picture Pool/DPL) 1639380 In the military environment information is a powerful tool for informing, disrupting, corrupting, and influencing an enemy's decision-making process with 'knowledge' derived from functions and systems often based within a headquarters that collates, processes, and delivers a plan to support a commander's intent. Article 1 Page 1 of 12
The expansion of the global communications network has enabled more and more populations to share information in near real time or anonymously. Extremists have embraced this to generate fear and, increasingly, to recruit disaffected youngsters. They use the internet and social media as a conduit for propaganda, such as streamed execution videos, while maintaining a dialogue with their internal target audience to spread influence and support. Information strategy The Cabinet Office is responsible for strategic communications during UK military operations. Based on government intent, the strategy is shaped with the consideration of partners, most notably the Stabilisation Team at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Weekly topline messages in response to incidents and events are passed via the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) to the deployed formations to support tactical engagement. IO often emerges at an early stage of the planning process to deliver effect in support of combat units. (DPL) 1639377 The tactical delivery is directed on operations by the strategic communications director, who co-ordinates the delivery of key messages across the specialist functions. The media spokesperson will use press opportunities to announce the aims, which are repeated in the narrative of psychological operations (psyops) products, while the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG) works to support the strategic message as part of engagement to deliver infrastructure projects. Article 1 Page 2 of 12
In Helmand the key message 'The UK is in Helmand to provide security and stability in order to allow reconstruction to take place' gave direction to each IO function, albeit amid challenges in the deployment's heavily kinetic early years. The fusion of influence activity Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where planning required a sustained joint approach to almost every event, provided the catalyst for amalgamating influence activities. In previous deployments the lack of an integrated approach resulted in some functions working in isolation and a fragmented plan being delivered. A key difference between media operations and IO is that media operations cannot control a message after it has been announced, while IO will attempt to control the message at all stages of delivery to the target audience. While remaining related, media operations and IO must therefore work separately. A Challenger tank sits across the main road into Pristina in 1999 in a demonstration of power and intent to deliver influence to the KLA. (Simon Kelly/DPL) 1639381 Pooling IO resources The pooling of IO resources was pioneered by 3 Commando Brigade in 2008 when it deployed a dedicated information exploitation team in Helmand to manage the intelligence, surveillance, targeting acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) functions that provide the raw data often used to support a wider information plan. Article 1 Page 3 of 12
In 2014 the UK's military communications strategy underwent a major review. This drafted a new philosophy to manage IO, with a single command merging the separate functions of IO and psyops, as well as media and public relations (although all the units retain their independent core skills and do not work together). In late 2014 the new concept led to the formation of the Security Assistance Group (SAG), centralising all IO-related activity under a one-star command, as directed by the Future Army 2020 (FA20) plan. The SAG initiative was short-lived, however. In early 2015 UK Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir Nick Carter announced the formation of a new brigade that will effectively replace the SAG as the military's principal partner with the FCO Stabilisation Team. 77 Brigade will focus capability and target the digital narrative to generate influence in support of combat power. It will streamline the delivery of the strategic message at the tactical level by drawing current IO facilitators into one grouping. This serves to co-ordinate the integration of 'influence assets', which, operating separately, will have a broader vision of other activity. The new brigade Under FA20 the restructured British Army has been divided into three principal formations: the Reaction Force, centred on 3 (UK) Division; the Adaptable Force, based on 1 (UK) Division; and Force Troops Command (FTC), tasked to deliver specialist support. 77 Brigade will sit within the FTC, using 'soft effects' to direct IO. "What 77 Brigade does is it pulls together much of our force structure that's involved in the employment of soft effects, whether it is the Security Stabilisation Group [drawn from the FCO], the linkages we have through that to DFID [Department for International Development], or whether it's psychological operations or the Media Operations Group, who are increasingly learning much about how they apply social media to achieve an effect," said Gen Carter, speaking at Army Headquarters in Andover, Wiltshire on 15 January. "77 Brigade is going to advance this approach of integrated action and, in a sense, it is a new way of operating. I think it plays into this idea of constant competition, which is my take on how the world is at the moment. At the tactical level 77 Brigade is absolutely about getting the British Army to think laterally about how it achieves its effect." The brigade comprises the MSSG, the 15 'Shadow' Psychological Operations Group, the Media Operations Group, and the Security Capacity Building Team (SCBT). It will have an embedded intelligence section linked to the Land Intelligence Fusion Centre as well as other assets such as a Policy and Political Advisor (POLADS) and Legal Advisor (LEGAD). It will also have links to DFID and other government resources. Article 1 Page 4 of 12
A poster recovered from insurgents praising the attack on the Twin Towers, highlighting their form of IO. (David Reynolds/DPL) 1639382 MSSG delivers engineering consultancy and project management for civilian projects. As well as in frontline operations, its wide range of specialist skills plays a vital role in humanitarian relief work where infrastructure needs replacing. The unit has more than 150 personnel and deploys teams of up to 40 on regular global exercises to build awareness with foreign forces. Doctrine Current UK doctrine (ADP Operations) lists IO as an 'integrated strategy' and not a capability on its own. It must therefore be integrated with wider military activity across the campaign plan, where it can orchestrate and synchronise a broad range of activities and capabilities. IO as a function is often used to achieve change in the battlespace as part of preliminary operations. These 'early' activities can include key leader engagement with local communities, cultural awareness to avoid collateral damage to sensitive buildings, and broadcasts to encourage people to leave an area or warn them of other threats. IO can also support deception operations and prepare to exploit operational success across the media. Future operations Article 1 Page 5 of 12
Both NATO and the UK face future operational challenges with significant implications for IO, ranging from the spread of the Islamic State to growing tensions in the Baltic region and the influx of migrants in the Mediterranean. The RN will also engage influence activity as the UK continues to protect trading routes across maritime pinch points such as the Suez Canal, which is vital to the UK economy and the 'just-in-time' process of supplying food to the country. Middle East instability remains politicians' biggest concern as the Islamic State continues to subvert regional security and threatens to spread to North Africa and Europe. Coalition strategic and tactical influence activity is supporting ongoing kinetic operations in northern Iraq. A key aspect of engagement in recent years has been a focus on hearts and minds, especially with youngsters, as pictured here in Kabul in 2002. (Steve Taylor/DPL) 1639383 Operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated the importance of training local forces and empowering them to take charge. In the Middle East Kurdish and Syrian rebel forces are being trained so they can take military command of future operations. The IO campaign alongside this training phase is currently focused on the kinetic success of the air war against the Islamic State, both in Iraq and Syria, as the military prepares for the next phase of the coalition operation to disrupt and dismantle the group's capability and function. Target audiences The UK military's new strategic communication direction is delivering a whole new approach to operations and its potential target audiences. In the past both media and psyops have been viewed as reactive: the Article 1 Page 6 of 12
spokesperson on television or in the media would only provide reaction to an event (or more often a fatal incident). In Helmand and Iraq spokespeople were often seen as providing a negative narrative simply because they were reacting to events. However, in northern Iraq a proactive information campaign under Operation 'Shader' is now being maintained at the strategic level. Instead of having spokespeople make statements after an event, the Directorate of Defence Communications releases facts and figures of RAF fighter and unmanned aerial vehicle strikes supported by imagery. These releases are posted on official websites for the wider media and have proved highly effective. Under the new IO strategy, information about Operation 'Shader' engagement in northern Iraq has been channelled through the UK Ministry of Defence website with little sight of spokespeople. (Simon Kelly/DPL) 1639376 A senior military IO operator said the problem with press conferences and regular updates is that it is hard to control the narrative. "Iraq is a particular area where we simply don't want to talk until we have something significant to say. We are using all forms of social media and that is working well," he said. "Iraq is potentially explosive and we need to be wise about what we say, what we do, and how we protect our soldiers. Images of a named soldier training the Kurds could be used by insurgents, who could put a bounty on a man they can name. Today's conflicts are highly complex and different to the past." Article 1 Page 7 of 12
Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2015 For the full version and more content: IHS Jane's Defence Industry and Markets Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence Centre, which provides world-leading analysis of commercial, industrial and technological defence developments, budget and programme forecasts, and insight into new and emerging defence markets around the world. IHS defence industry and markets news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Defence Weekly. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly online, offline or print visit http://magazines.ihs.com/. For advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team Article 1 Page 8 of 12