(U//FOUO) Terrorist Threat to Homeland Military Targets in the Aftermath of Usama bin Ladin's Death

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(U//FOUO) Terrorist Threat to Homeland Military Targets in the Aftermath of Usama bin Ladin's Death 25 May 2011 (U) Scope (U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin addresses the effect of the 2 May 2011 death of al-qa ida leader Usama bin Ladin on the terrorist threat to military facilities and personnel in the Homeland. This information is provided to support the activities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Defense (DoD), and to assist federal counterterrorism and law enforcement officials in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States. (U) Warning: This joint DHS/FBI/DIA document is (U//FOUO). It is subject to release restrictions as detailed in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 482) and the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS and FBI policy for FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, media, or other personnel who do not have an authorized need-to-know without appropriate prior authorization. (U) Warning This product may contain U.S. person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. U.S. person information is highlighted with the label USPER and should be protected in accordance with constitutional requirements and all federal and state privacy and civil liberties laws.

(U) Key Findings (U//FOUO) We assess that the 2 May 2011 U.S. military operation resulting in the death of bin Ladin may prompt terrorists particularly homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) acting alone or in concert with others to try to avenge his death by attacking military targets in the United States. *, Military installations, ancillary military facilities, and military personnel-possibly including the highly publicized specific units, service members, and leadership associated with the operation could be potential targets of such attacks. (U//FOUO) Despite their awareness of the generally tight security at most military installations, some HVEs have plotted or attempted to attack these facilities. Since early 2007, military targets have been the focus of numerous plots or attacks. (U//FOUO) We assess that terrorists may also consider targeting off-base uniformed U.S. military personnel and less secure ancillary military facilities physical spaces not under the operational control of DoD or state National Guard bureaus, but having federal or state military personnel, civilian staff, or family members working or living in them. These personnel and facilities may be seen as attractive targets because they are more accessible. (U//FOUO) We have no information indicating any active terrorist plotting against Homeland military targets specifically in response to bin Ladin's death. (U//FOUO) Potential for Retaliation Against Homeland Military Targets (U//FOUO) We assess bin Ladin's death at the hands of the U.S. military could prompt terrorists including HVEs acting alone or in concert with others to retaliate by striking military facilities and personnel in the United States. Possible Homeland military targets could include military installations; government and public facilities in which military personnel work, live, or visit; elite units or personnel believed to be associated with bin Ladin's death; and senior military and DoD personnel. (U//FOUO) HVEs acting alone, in particular, pose threats because they are already in the country and are more likely to be familiar with prospective targets. Moreover, their ability to operate in isolation and use commonly available materials or weapons makes them difficult to detect and disrupt in advance. * (U//FOUO) An HVE is a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists, who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor. (U//FOUO) For the purpose of this document, we define a "lone offender" as an individual who commits terrorist acts alone and without direction from a group or another individual. The perpetrator may have contact with others, but those individuals are not aware of the perpetrators plans or intentions. Page 2 of 5

(U//FOUO) HVEs acting alone may also present a more immediate threat because they likely would have greater access to U.S. targets than foreign operatives and would not be constrained by organizational and logistical factors that can slow operational decisions by established terrorist groups overseas. (U) Previous Terrorist Targeting of U.S. Military Installations, Ancillary Facilities, and Personnel (U//FOUO) Military installations in the Homeland have featured prominently in past plots because they represent symbolic targets that are likely to generate significant media attention if attacked. Although most U.S. military installations are hardened targets and are difficult to access, HVEs and lone offenders have not been deterred from plotting attacks against them. (U//FOUO) On 5 November 2009, Major Nidal Hasan USPER allegedly opened fire at the Fort Hood military installation's Readiness Center in Killeen, Texas killing 13 and wounding 32. (U//FOUO) On 27 July 2009, the FBI arrested seven individuals, including Daniel Patrick Boyd USPER, in various locations in and around Raleigh, North Carolina on terrorism charges. On 9 February 2011, Boyd pled guilty to providing material support to terrorists and conspiracy to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons in a foreign country related to providing weapons and financing to terrorists in Afghanistan. Boyd had also conducted reconnaissance of the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Virginia that year and had acquired maps of the base to be used for attack planning. (U//FOUO) On 20 May 2009, four men were arrested and later convicted of involvement in a plot to blow up two Jewish centers in a Bronx, New York neighborhood, and to shoot down military aircraft at Stewart Air National Guard Base in Newburgh, New York using a surface-to-air missile that authorities had rendered inert and provided to them during an undercover operation. (U//FOUO) On 7 May 2007, six individuals were arrested in connection with a plot to conduct a terrorist attack against the U.S. Army base at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Five who were later convicted for conspiring to attack U.S. military personnel (one was convicted on a weapons charge only) conducted pre-operational surveillance of Fort Dix and other military targets in New Jersey, including McGuire Air Force Base, Lakehurst Naval Air Station, the U.S. Army base at Fort Monmouth, and Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. (U//FOUO) HVEs and lone offenders also have attacked, or attempted to attack, ancillary military facilities such as recruiting stations and other minimally secured sites. (U//FOUO) On 8 December 2010, Antonio Benjamin Martinez aka Muhammad Hussain USPER, was arrested for allegedly attempting to detonate a car bomb at the Armed Forces Career Center in Catonsville, Maryland. Martinez was indicted on 21 December 2010 for attempting to murder federal officers and employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction against property owned, leased, or used by the United States. Page 3 of 5

(U//FOUO) Carlos Bledsoe USPER on 1 June 2009 allegedly drove into the parking lot of a U.S. Army and Navy recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas and opened fire on two soldiers, killing one and wounding the other. (U) In late June 2009, according to an FBI affidavit, Hosam Smadi used the Internet to identify and map possible targets for terrorist attacks in Texas, including military recruiting centers. Smadi targeted recruiting centers after having discussed the Little Rock attack on a recruiting center with a source earlier that month. According to the same source, Smadi later decided instead to attack a commercial center in hopes of causing more damage, casualties, and economic impact. Smadi pled guilty in May 2010 to attempting to bomb a downtown Dallas skyscraper and in October 2010 was sentenced to 24 years in federal prison. (U) In December 2007, Kevin James USPER, Levar Washington USPER, and Gregory Patterson USPER pled guilty to conspiracy to levy war against the U.S. Government. According to the indictment against James, the group intended to conduct smallarms attacks against 10 recruiting centers in southern California. (U//FOUO) Terrorists could also target current and former U.S. military personnel outside of secure military installations or facilities, as was the case in an attack earlier this year in Germany. (U//FOUO) On 2 March 2011, a lone gunman boarded a U.S. Air Force bus at the airport in Frankfurt, Germany and opened fire, killing the bus driver and one of the 15 airmen. The alleged shooter, apprehended by the German police shortly after the incident, reportedly was connected to individuals known to have advocated violent extremism. (U//FOUO) We encourage military personnel and federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement to remain vigilant and report any indications of suspicious activity. Page 4 of 5

(U) Reporting Notice (U) DHS, FBI, and DIA encourage recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center. The FBI s 24/7 Strategic Information and Operations Center can be reached by telephone at 202-323-3300 or by email at SIOC@ic.fbi.gov. The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9685 or by email at NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov. FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm and Fusion Center information may be obtained at http://www.dhs.gov/contact-fusion-centers. For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9201 or by email at NICC@dhs.gov. When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. (U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response (U//FOUO) Information contained in this intelligence bulletin is for official use only. No portion of this bulletin should be released to the media, the general public, or over nonsecure Internet servers. Release of this material could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities. (U) For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the FBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section at 202-324-3000 or FBI_CTAS@ic.fbi.gov, or I&A Production Branch staff at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov. (U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.4.2.7 Page 5 of 5