The Raising of American Troops for Service in the West Indies during the War of Austrian Succession, 1740±1 Abstract This article is an account of the raising and dispatch to the West Indies of a regiment of troops recruited in the American colonies for the Vernon±Cathcart expedition to Cartagena on the Spanish Main. T h e W a r o f Austrian Succession was a unique experience for the American people for it was the first time that the British government raised large numbers of American troops to serve in the West Indies. Before the War of Austrian Succession, with the exception of attacks against the French in Canada, such as the Walker expedition to Quebec in 1711, American soldiers had almost exclusively been employed by American provincial governments in operations against Indians. 1 All of this would change in the War of Austrian Succession: 3,000 American troops would be dispatched during the War of Austrian Succession to the West Indies to serve with regular British military forces in order to attack the Spanish. The Vernon± Cathcart expedition against Cartagena on the Spanish Main, in 1741, was thus the first time in which large numbers of Americans would serve outside the mainland of North America. Moreover, the Vernon±Cathcart expedition to the West Indies would place unusual demands on the American colonies. And the American people, especially their elected colonial assemblies, would respond to some of the burdens of the expedition by placing local American interests before the requirements of imperial warfare. The plan for the assault on Cartagena, which was formulated by the British government in the last months of 1739, called for a force of eight regiments of British soldiers to be sent from the British Isles to the West Indies. At the same time an additional force of approximately 3,000 troops was to be recruited in the North American colonies and sent to the West Indies. The forces from Britain and North America were to rendezvous at Jamaica where, in conjunction with British naval forces, they were to undertake an attack on Cartagena. 2 The decision to raise a force of Americans 1 There are many historians of warfare in colonial America. Two of the best are D. E. Leach, Arms for Empire: a Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607±1763 (New York, 1973) and I. K. Steel, Warpath: Invasions of North America (New York, 1994). 2 The most recent, and by far the best, account of the campaign in the West Indies is R. Harding, Historical Research, vol. 73, no. 180 (February 2000) Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden MA 02148, USA.
the raising of american troops, 1740±1 21 to be employed in operations in the West Indies apparently grew out of the belief, in London, that `every part of our Dominions, in proportion to their strength and numbers should contribute to the promoting of the common cause', 3 and that there `is a very great number of good men in our colonies in America which may be used with very great advantage against either France or Spain'. 4 Thus, in the spring of 1740, orders were issued for the first time by the government in London to raise in America a regiment of troops for service against the Spanish in the West Indies. Alexander Spotswood, the governor of Virginia who held the rank of major general, was appointed colonel of the regiment to be recruited in America. 5 However, Spotswood died on 7 June 1740, and was succeeded by Lieutenant Governor William Gooch also of Virginia. 6 This regiment of Americans was to consist of four battalions of infantry. Each battalion would be commanded by a lieutenant colonel, with a major as second-incommand, and a staff consisting of an adjutant, a surgeon and a chaplain. Furthermore, each battalion would be divided into companies with an establishment calling for 100 privates, two drummers, four corporals, four sergeants, one ensign, two lieutenants, and commanded by a captain. 7 All the non-commissioned officers and the rank and file of the regiment were to be Americans. All the field and staff officers, as well as one lieutenant in each company, were to be British and appointed by the government in London. However, the British government, recognizing the importance of local contacts in an effective recruitment drive, reserved a number of commissions for Americans. All the captains, ensigns and one half of the lieutenants were to be Americans and they were to be appointed by the governors of the various American colonies. Officers appointed in America were `to be men of interest in their country and well disposed to our service'. 8 The American troops were to be recruited in eleven North American colonies. 9 Thus, on 5 January 1740, with the exception of Nova Scotia, South Carolina and Georgia, instructions were sent to every British colony on the mainland of North America directing the governors to raise the required men. 10 Jonathan Belcher, the governor of Massachusetts, was informed, as Amphibious Warfare in the 18th Century: the British Expedition to the West Indies, 1740±1 (Woodbridge, 1991). 3 Public Record Office, CO 5/752 fo. 357. In all quotations from manuscripts, standard abbreviations have been extended and capitalization modernized, but the original spelling has been retained. 4 British Library, 32692 fo. 544. 5 Ibid. fos. 9±13. 6 P.R.O., CO 5/41 fo. 215. 7 P.R.O., T 1/103 fo. 239. 8 P.R.O., SP 44/184 fos. 46±58. 9 New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina. 10 Brit. Libr., Add. MS. 32693 fos. 15±25.
22 the raising of american troops, 1740±1 were ten other governors in America, of the intended expedition to the West Indies and instructed to begin recruiting troops for service in the Caribbean. `Considering the number of inhabitants', the British government required Massachusetts to provide ten companies consisting of 1,000 men. Belcher was likewise directed to issue a proclamation `inviting our good subjects to enlist in our service'. This proclamation also stated that all `officers and soldiers, shall enter into our pay and enjoy the same pay, rank and privileges with the rest of our British troops'. The wages of privates and non-commissioned officers would begin the day on which the men actually enlisted, while commissioned officers' pay would begin from the date of their commissions. The troops raised in America would also be armed, clothed and equipped by the British government. Indeed, upon arrival in the West Indies, the American troops `shall be provided for in every other respect as our British troops'. In the meantime the American colonial governments would be required to provide the American troops with `all other necessarys' and to pay for their provisioning during the initial stages of deployment to the West Indies as well as to pay for the chartering of the ships needed to transport the troops from America to Jamaica. 11 To assist with training the American troops, a number of privates and non-commissioned officers belonging to the British forces garrisoning Nova Scotia, as well as the four independent companies 12 stationed at New York City, were to be transferred to the American regiment. Also the troops raised in America would be able to share, on an equal basis with the British forces, in `plunder'. At the conclusion of the expedition the American forces would be returned to America at the expense of the British government. To assist the governors of the colonies with recruiting and organizing the force, Colonel William Blakeney, the adjutant general of the expedition, was to be sent to New York City. Blakeney was to bring with him eighty-eight blank commissions for American officers. 13 He was also to bring 3,000 muskets, bayonets, cartridge boxes with belts, a number of tents, drums and camp colours for the American troops. 14 Blakeney was also given 500 by the government as `equipage money', whilst a further 500 was given for the subsistence of the troops to be recruited in America. 15 Moreover, an additional 1,000 stand of arms as well as all the clothing required by the Americans was to be dispatched directly to the West Indies. 16 Blakeney was asked to report back to London on the progress made by the colonial authorities in America in their efforts to raise the required number of troops. In the event that the governors of the colonies could not themselves recruit 11 P.R.O., CO 5/752 fos. 357±63. 12 For a history of the independent companies, see S. M. Pargellis, `The four independent companies of New York', in Essays in Colonial American History Presented to Charles McLean Andrews by his Students (New Haven, Conn., 1931), pp. 96±123. 13 In all, there were 30 commissions for captains, 28 for lieutenants and 30 for ensigns. 14 P.R.O. SP 44/184 fos. 7±8, 56. 15 The Papers of Lewis Morris, Governor of the Province of New Jersey... (New York, 1852), pp. 103±4. 16 P.R.O., CO 5/41 fos. 26±7, 52±3.
the raising of american troops, 1740±1 23 the men, then Blakeney was directed `to apply to the governors for leave to beat up for volunteers'. Conversely, if it should appear that more than 3,000 American troops could in fact be recruited, then Blakeney was to `give assurances' that additional arms, clothing and equipment would be supplied to the Americans upon their arrival in the West Indies. 17 Upon arrival at New York City in June 1740, Blakeney found `a strong disposition in the people of these provinces to engage in the expedition', allowing him to surmise that it would indeed be possible to recruit more than 3,000 Americans. 18 Since the governors of each American colony were the officials who had the main responsibility for raising and dispatching the troops to the West Indies, when the directive from the government in London calling for the recruitment of such troops arrived at Philadelphia, George Thomas, the lieutenant governor of Pennsylvania, called a meeting of his council and on 14 April issued a proclamation calling for volunteers. Thomas's proclamation stated the reasons for the war with Spain and called for men to enlist in `the glorious expedition'. The Pennsylvania proclamation further stated that the forces raised in America would be armed, equipped and paid by the British government and notices were to be placed in the newspapers announcing when, where and how men could enlist. The Pennsylvania proclamation also stressed the fact that the troops raised in America would be commanded by `an officer long settled in North America and engaged in affection to protect their persons and secure their interests'. More importantly, the governor would appoint and issue king's commissions to those persons who are `inhabitants or well known' to command the troops raised in Pennsylvania. 19 Similar proclamations were issued by the governors of other colonies in America. 20 To facilitate the recruitment process, a number of colonies paid bounties as well as offered other inducements to men who enlisted for the expedition. The government of Virginia granted each man who volunteered 6s 6d at the time of enlisting, and then three Spanish pistoles upon embarking for Jamaica. 21 The colony of Rhode Island granted each man who enlisted three pounds and an exemption from military service for a period of three years after his return from the West Indies. 22 The Massachusetts general court gave each man who enlisted `five pounds in bills of old tenor or one pound thirteen shillings and four pence in bills of new tenor'; in addition each soldier was issued with `a good and convenient blanket' when he 17 P.R.O., SP 41/12, Memoranda for Col. William Blakeney, 5 Apr. 1740. 18 P.R.O., Co 5/41 fo. 215. 19 Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, ed. S. Hazard (10 vols., Philadelphia and Harrisburg, Pa., 1851±2), iv. 395±7. 20 E.g., Documents relating to the Colonial History of the State of New Jersey (33 vols., Trenton, N.J., 1880±1928), xv. 114±17. 21 P.R.O., CO 5/1423 fo. 63. 22 Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New England, ed. J. R. Bartlett (10 vols., Providence, R.I., 1856±65), iv. 573.
24 the raising of american troops, 1740±1 embarked for the West Indies. 23 And in New Hampshire each soldier was granted for enlisting five pounds `in bills of credit on this province and a blanket'. 24 The Quaker-controlled assembly in Pennsylvania, unlike in most of the other colonies, refused to grant the governor's request for an appropriation of money to pay bounties to enlist men. 25 Nevertheless, the failure of Pennsylvania to grant a bounty for enlisting apparently did not hinder the raising of men in that province. Obviously the payment of bounties was a means of facilitating enlistments, but perhaps of far greater importance in obtaining volunteers for service in the West Indies was the granting of British army commissions to Americans. When Blakeney arrived at New York he divided among the various colonies the eighty-eight blank commissions which he had brought from England. From the outset there were more candidates to be made officers than there were blank commissions, 26 but it was the desire to obtain a king's commission in the British army which attracted to the expedition those people in the American colonies who were willing and capable of obtaining the men required to fill up the ranks of the American regiment. Indeed, according to Massachusetts Governor Jonathan Belcher, `Commissions is what will encourage the enlistment more than anything else'. 27 In New Jersey, the governor Lewis Morris promised four men that if `they could raise companies (as they believed they could) I would give them commissions'. 28 The problem, however, was there were just eighty-eight blank commissions made available for Americans. Given the enthusiasm that existed in the colonies for enlisting for service in the expedition to the West Indies, but also for doing so primarily under American officers, the commissions offered could not meet such expectations. Moreover, although the number of commissions required for a 3,000-man strong regiment was indeed eightyeight, the governors had been authorized by their instructions to recruit as many men as possible and did in fact enlist more than 3,000 men. Ordering the governors of the colonies in America to recruit more men than there were commissions for the American officers who actually raised the men was probably a mistake for, as Lewis Morris observed, this `will render the raising of future levyes very difficult'. 29 In order to overcome the problem of the shortage of commissions available in the colonies it was decided by the British authorities that all those American officers who had received warrants from colonial governors would be commissioned upon arrival in the West Indies. For example, in Pennsylvania Lieutenant George Thomas raised eight companies of soldiers, 23 The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of Massachusetts Bay (21 vols., Boston, Mass., 1869±1922), xii. 671. 24 P.R.O., CO 5/948 fo. 85. 25 P.R.O., CO 5/1233 fo. 197. 26 P.R.O., CO 5/41 fo. 224. 27 P.R.O., CO 5/752 fo. 366. 28 Papers of Lewis Morris, p. 95. 29 Ibid., p. 104.
the raising of american troops, 1740±1 25 but could give king's commissions to the officers of only four companies, with the result that four captains, four lieutenants and four ensigns received warrants from the provincial lieutenant governor instead of commissions from the king. 30 Nevertheless, not everybody in America thought this arrangement to be suitable. There were several reasons for this. For instance, some of the colonial governors, given the terms of their instructions, believed that they would receive enough commissions to grant a captain's commission to every person who raised a company. Such was the case with Governor Morris in New Jersey who reported that he had recruited three companies and could have raised an additional two companies `had there been commissions sent as was expected from his Grace's [the Duke of Newcastle's] letter; these not coming put a great damp upon the thing'. 31 Others were simply not convinced that the commissions would be forthcoming in the West Indies and were not willing to take a chance. In Massachusetts commissions and arms were provided for only four companies. However, Belcher persuaded a fifth company to go on the expedition without these items. 32 In the event, the promise that commissions and arms would be issued in the West Indies was disregarded by a number of men, and five out of ten of the companies which were eventually raised in Massachusetts were disbanded and the men sent home by the provincial authorities. Another reason why the men would not go on the expedition was the failure of the British government to provide arms for them. Indeed, the governor of Massachusetts believed that, if he had had several months' notice, as well as commissions for American officers and arms for the men, he could have recruited `twenty or more companies' in the Bay Province. 33 Although there were problems in retaining the men once enlisted, there was apparently no difficulty in initially recruiting the rank and file. Thus Blakeney reported from New York City that `As to the American levies, they go briskly, even beyond what could have been expected during the high harvest and high wages'. 34 At times, however, some persuasion was necessary for an effective recruitment. For instance in Virginia the justices of the peace were authorized by statute to enlist forcibly `such able-bodied men as do not follow or exercise any lawful calling or employment, or have not some other lawful and sufficient support and maintenance to serve his Majesty as soldiers'. 35 Many of the men who joined up as privates appear, for the most part, to have been the less fortunate in American society, that is unemployed or underemployed labourers, debtors, indentured servants and the like. Morris in New Jersey said that recruits were debtors and `some of 30 P.R.O., CO 5/1234 fo. 97. 31 Papers of Lewis Morris, pp. 103±4. 32 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, Mass., 1894), 6th ser., vii. 331. 33 P.R.O., CO 5/41 fos. 233±4. 34 Ibid. fo. 224. 35 W. W. Hening, The Statutes at Large: being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia (13 vols., Richmond, Va., 1809±23), v. 95.
26 the raising of american troops, 1740±1 the meaner half and some servants' 36 and in Pennsylvania there were complaints in the colonial assembly about the large number of indentured servants being recruited. 37 A British general officer would later complain that the Americans enlisted from Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina were mostly `Irish (probably popists) or English convicts'. 38 In essence, as one authority (who is also the most recent historian of the expedition to Cartagena) concluded, the troops from Massachusetts, as presumably from other American colonies, were recruited from roughly the same socioeconomic background as were the rank and file of the British army. 39 The payment of subsistence to the troops recruited in the colonies for the West Indian expedition was a third problem and one that became embroiled in the maze of chronic financial problems of colonial America. Before his death, Spotswood put forward a plan which was published at the time, calling for paying the soldiers, upon embarkation, four months' pay in coin at the rate of one Spanish pistole per month. According to Spotswood there were several advantages to this scheme. If the soldiers received four months' pay in advance they could leave money to support their families whilst in the West Indies. Payment in advance would also assist enlistments by giving indentured servants the means of buying their freedom as well as giving debtors money to pay off their creditors. Moreover, the payment of all the troops recruited in America at the same rate, and in Spanish coins, would eliminate the problems which were bound to occur if the troops were paid by the colonial governments in provincial paper money which greatly fluctuated in value among various colonies. Moreover, the payment of American soldiers in Spanish coin, Spotswood maintained, would do away with the jealousy which could arise between the troops as a result of different colonies being paid in provincial paper money of widely differing values. 40 After consulting Lieutenant Governor William Gooch of Virginia and Lieutenant Governor George Clarke of New York, Blakeney agreed to pay the American troops one pistole a month until they joined the main British force in the West Indies when they were to receive the same rate of pay as British soldiers. Blakeney reckoned that one pistole equalled twenty-eight shillings in New York money, which worked out to each American private soldier receiving 2s 2/5d sterling per day, which was only 2/5d per day more than the wages of a private in the British army. 41 However, upon further reflection and probably on the advice of Lewis Morris of New Jersey, 42 Blakeney dropped the idea of paying the subsistence of the American troops in Spanish pistoles. Instead he concluded that `the common currency in all 36 Papers of Lewis Morris, pp. 89, 96. 37 P.R.O., CO 5/1234 fos. 103±4. 38 P.R.O., CO 5/42 fos. 46±7. 39 Harding, p. 74. 40 P.R.O., CO 5/41 fo. 221. 41 P.R.O., CO 5/41 fo. 219. 42 Papers of Lewis Morris, p. 84.
the raising of american troops, 1740±1 27 the colonies is paper, gold and silver, whether in bullion or specie, [and as such it] is but a commodity that rises and falls according to its quantity in the market'. Therefore the British officer reasoned that, since pistoles cost more in London than in America, and that since the rarer sterling bills of exchange usually commanded a higher value in America, the British government could get more value for its money if the subsistence of the American troops was paid, not in Spanish pistoles, but rather in sterling bills of exchange to be drawn on London. In the event, the subsistence of the troops was paid by Blakeney in the following manner: by transmitting to various colonial governors sterling bills of exchange drawn on London, which were then to be negotiated and exchanged for various provincial paper currencies in which the soldiers were then paid. 43 There were problems inherent in such a scheme. For instance, those governors, such as Morris of New Jersey, whose provinces were not the site of a major commercial centre, encountered difficulties in negotiating large sterling bills of exchange. 44 Another problem was that the soldiers, who had believed that they would be paid in coin, were now being paid in provincial paper money. Under the terms of the instructions from the British government to the colonial governors for raising troops each colonial government had to provide ships to transport their troops to the Caribbean as well as pay for the provisions required to feed the men during the voyage. 45 In order to obtain the necessary money to pay for the transportation of the troops to the West Indies, each governor had to seek and obtain from his colonial assembly an appropriation of funds. The necessity of raising money to pay for provisioning and transporting the troops to the West Indies was a difficult task for some of the governors, given the political and economic conditions in colonial America. The economies of the British colonies in America were for the most part agricultural and were characterized by an inadequate circulating medium and chronic shortages of specie. These monetary problems were compounded by the fact that each colonial assembly looked upon itself as being a mini house of commons having all the rights, prerogatives and privileges of that body. 46 Moreover, the members of each colonial assembly represented local interests within a colony. As such they were often loath to increase the taxes of their constituents at the command of the government in London and for such a far-away crisis as a military expedition to the West Indies, that did not seem directly to concern or benefit their voters. The British government finally recognized that there might be some difficulty in obtaining the needed appropriations from the colonial assemblies in America. As a result, in April 1740, the governors were authorized, if absolutely necessary, to draw bills on the Navy Board in London in order to 43 P.R.O., CO 5/41 fos. 224±5. 44 Papers of Lewis Morris, pp. 94, 103. 45 E.g., P.R.O., CO 5/752 fos. 361±2. 46 Cf. J. P. Greene, The Quest for Power: the Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689±1776 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1963).
28 the raising of american troops, 1740±1 pay for the provisions and shipping needed to transport the troops to the West Indies. 47 In some colonies such as Massachusetts, 48 New York 49 and Virginia 50 the colonial assemblies promptly enacted the legislation required to pay for the costs of transportation of their troops to the West Indies. However in Pennsylvania, `because it is repugnant to the religious principles professed by the greater number of the present assembly, who are of the people called the Quakers', the legislative branch of the government expressly refused to appropriate the money needed to victual and transport the Pennsylvania troops. The lieutenant governor, George Thomas, attempted repeatedly and failed to get the assembly of Pennsylvania to grant the required funds. 51 Finally, seeing no other alternative, Thomas was forced to borrow 5,124 1s 8d from a group of prosperous Philadelphians to feed and transport the eight companies of Pennsylvania troops. In order to repay this debt, the lieutenant governor applied to the Navy Board in London for money even though there was 9,750 14s 1d in the Pennsylvania provincial treasury. 52 In New Jersey it was only with difficulty that Governor Morris was able to obtain a bill from the colonial assembly, which he and his council thought unsuitable, to pay for the transportation of the troops to the Caribbean. According to Morris, the New Jersey assembly did not want to pay the money required for the transportation of the troops, but at the same time it did not wish to be seen as refusing to take any action on the question. As a way out of this dilemma, the assembly wanted to adjourn `under the pretence of waiting to see what their neighbors of Pennsylvania and New York would do'. Morris, seeing this as a way of avoiding taking any action, refused to permit an adjournment and applied pressure to the members of the assembly, finally forcing the body to pass a bill appropriating 2,000 in bills of credit for the transportation costs of the troops. However, `This bill, instead of raising any money, only applied money already raised and applied for the support of the government by other acts'. Furthermore, whilst there was no grant of moneys made in the New Jersey legislation for the victualling of the troops, the money actually appropriated for the transportation costs had to be expended under the direction of the assembly. Even though Morris and his council believed that the bill passed `was very confused and scarce intelligible', the assembly refused to alter the legislation claiming that it was `a money bill'. The governor thought that the New Jersey assembly had passed this bill in the belief that Morris would veto it and the members of 47 P.R.O., CO 5/752 fos. 355±6. 48 Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, xii. 694, 707±8. 49 The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution (5 vols., Albany, N.Y., 1894), iii. 64±8. 50 Hening, v. 121±3. 51 Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, iv. 402±33. 52 P.R.O., CO 5/1234 fos. 103±7, 109, 115.
the raising of american troops, 1740±1 29 the assembly would then be able to blame the governor for the failure to appropriate the money required to pay for the transportation of the New Jersey troops. In the event, Morris repeatedly attempted but failed to get the assembly to amend the legislation. In the end the governor was forced to consent to the bill, even though he believed it to be a flawed piece of legislation, and after informing the assembly that it would in no way serve as a precedent for future legislation. 53 In other colonies, too, the problems caused by the shortage of specie had to be at least temporarily solved if the costs of victualling and transporting troops to the West Indies were to be met. The lack of a circulating medium was usually overcome by the issuing of paper notes even though this was in theory prohibited by the British government. In fact there was a long tradition in the issuing of paper money in America, with the first issue dating back to 1690 in Massachusetts. The issuing of paper money would once more be resorted to in order to finance the expedition to the West Indies. In Delaware, for example, the provincial assembly voted on 9 August 1740 1,000 to pay for the victualling and transportation of troops. In lieu of money, bills of credit, which were later to be redeemed by taxation, were issued by the provincial government in order to pay for provisions and the freight of shipping. 54 In New Hampshire, a province described by its governor as `being very thin in men and estate', 55 the assembly voted 2,000 to pay for the feeding and transportation of the force. However, as in Delaware, bills of credit were issued in New Hampshire too, which were to be redeemed by the end of 1742 through taxation. Eager to collect the funds needed to redeem these bills, and thus overcome the shortage of specie in the local economy, the colony of New Hampshire allowed its inhabitants to pay their taxes in a variety of ways, namely in money, bills of exchange or in commodities. For taxation purposes a number of commodities, such as hemp, flax and bar iron, were assigned monetary values. The items collected as taxes were then sold off by the province and the proceeds were used to redeem the bills of credit. 56 In North Carolina, upon receipt of instructions from London calling for the raising of troops for the West Indies expedition, the governor, Gabriel Johnston, went before the colonial assembly and requested an appropriation of funds. Thereupon, the assembly demanded that Johnston lay before the house `the original instructions signed by his Majesty, and other letters referred to in your Excellency's speech'. The governor, to placate the assembly, consented to this and produced the documents even though he believed that the assembly had 53 Papers of Lewis Morris, pp. 116±17; SPEECHES MADE, and a LETTER wrote by his Excellency LEWIS MORRIS, Esq... (Philadelphia, Penn., 1741). 54 Minutes of the House of Assembly of the Three Counties upon Delaware at sessions held at New Castle in the Years 1740±2 (N.P., 1929), pp. 5±10; R. Rodney, Colonial Finances in Delaware (Wilmington, Del., 1928), p. 27. 55 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society..., 6th ser., vii. 314. 56 Laws of New Hampshire, ed. A. S. Batchellor (10 vols., Manchester, N.H., 1904±22), ii. 579±81.
30 the raising of american troops, 1740±1 `no right to demand a sight of my original instructions'. After inspecting the governor's instructions, the assembly decided to pay for the raising and transportation of the North Carolina troops by issuing `a certain quantity of new bills'. This was done although Johnston had informed the body that, under the terms of his instructions, he could not consent to the issuing of paper money, unless the legislation contained `a suspending clause that it should not take effect till his Majesty's pleasure should be known'. Nevertheless, the assembly disregarded Johnston's threat of a veto and passed a bill without a suspending clause, appropriating the necessary funds in paper money which were to be redeemed in one year by means of taxes and which could be paid in commodities. By this measure Johnston was, in effect, given the choice of either consenting to the issuing of paper money or not having the legislation necessary to raise the troops for the West Indies expedition. In the end, Johnston was forced to consent to the wishes of the North Carolina assembly and approve a paper money bill without a suspending clause. 57 In the final analysis, the general lack of specie in the colonial economies, itself the result of a number of factors, amongst them being the lack of any form of institutionalized banking, meant that both governors and colonial assemblies were forced to resort to credit, in the form of paper money issues, in order to raise the funds needed to finance the military expedition to the West Indies. The fate of the American soldiers on the expedition to the West Indies was at best inglorious and deadly; moreover, it has largely been forgotten. The troops from Virginia, Maryland, Delaware and Pennsylvania sailed directly to Jamaica while the forces from the northern colonies assembled on ship board at Hampton, Virginia, and on 29 October 1740 proceeded to the West Indies. 58 At the beginning of 1741 some 3,119 American troops had been assembled at Jamaica. 59 The British did not think very much of these troops. None of the Americans knew anything about soldiering and it was found, at best, difficult to discipline them. Nevertheless, the Americans were ultimately vital to the military operations in the Caribbean for they formed approximately forty per cent of the British forces in the West Indies. 60 They served in the ill-fated attack on Cartagena and subsequently in the botched campaign in Cuba. However, it was not enemy action which killed American soldiers in the West Indies but rather tropical diseases. By the end of 1741, the American force had been reduced to some 1,300 rank and file of which 450 men were sick. 61 When George Washington's half-brother Lawrence returned to Virginia from the expedition to the West Indies, he named the family plantation after Admiral Edward Vernon, the British naval com- 57 The Colonial Records of North Carolina, ed. W. L. Saunders (10 vols., Raleigh, N.C., 1886±90), iv. 252±72. 58 P.R.O., CO 5/41 fos. 250±5. 59 P.R.O., CO 5/42 fo. 25. 60 Harding, p. 70. 61 P.R.O., CO 5/42 fo. 109.
the raising of american troops, 1740±1 31 mander in chief at Cartagena. Mount Vernon is perhaps the only monument to the Americans who served in the 1740±1 expedition to the West Indies. At the end of the campaign in the Caribbean, when the disease-ridden remnants of the American force straggled back to America, the whole episode was soon forgotten both in America and in Britain. In 1740 the British successfully raised more than 3,000 American troops to serve on an expedition to the West Indies. When the directive arrived in America from London to recruit men for service in the West Indies there were no difficulties in enlisting the troops; men in all the American colonies were willing to take the king's shilling and join `the glamorous expedition'. What was not predicted by anybodyðeither in America or BritainÐin the rush to recruit the men and dispatch the force to the West Indies was that colonial America had become a different country from Britain. Americans in 1740 were just not prepared to enlist and then serve under British officers in any expedition. It was quickly discovered that key to the recruiting of Americans for the West Indies was the granting of commissions to Americans who also had the ability and means actually to recruit the required men. In several colonies, Massachusetts and New Jersey for example, it was found that the men would not serve unless their American officers were granted British army commissions. Several years later when the British government once more attempted to raise two regiments in America it was again found that Americans would not serve under British officers. 62 Not only was there a marked reluctance on the part of Americans to serve under British officers, there was also a tendency in the colonial assemblies, when requested to appropriate money to support American troops serving with the British, to respond to local American political considerations rather than to the demands of British imperial interests. In New Jersey and North Carolina, for example, when requesting funds to transport the troops the governors found themselves embroiled in disputes with the colonial assemblies over rights and privileges. The assembly in Pennsylvania, when confronted with demands for funds to support a British military effort, absolutely refused to disregard the religious convictions of its constituents. In other colonies the governors discovered that the only possible way, politically as well as economically, to obtain the necessary funds from the colonial assemblies was to consent, at times even contrary to their instructions from London, to the issuing of bills of credit or of paper money. Perhaps the American colonies were ultimately successful in forcing some changes in the recruitment policies pursued by the British government. It is worthwhile noting that in the seventeen-fifties, during the Seven Years' War, the British government avoided the problems caused by the issuing of paper money, as well as other potential conflicts with the colonial assemblies over money for 62 Cf. Correspondence of William Shirley; Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, ed. C. H. Lincoln (2 vols., New York, 1912), i. 295±6.
32 the raising of american troops, 1740±1 military purposes, by simply providing from London the necessary funds to the various American provincial governments. 63 Thus the raising and paying of troops in America, for the expedition to the West Indies in 1740, brought forth some unexpected reactions on the part of the Americans. In the way various colonial assemblies acted and the inability of the royal governors, or indeed the British government, to force them to do otherwise, one can discern the stirring of regional self-confidence and political independence which would later lead to nationalism and revolution in America. Queen's College David Syrett City University of New York 63 E.g., The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803 (36 vols., 1806± 20), xv. 937.