(U) Scope. 18 November 2016

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18 November 2016 (U//FOUO) Holiday Celebrations and the Presidential Inauguration Remain Attractive Targets for HVEs/Foreign Terrorist Organizations; Vigilance Encouraged (U) Scope (U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to remind law enforcement, military, and security personnel to remain vigilant and aware of upcoming public and private events this holiday season and during the presidential inauguration. This JIB is provided by the FBI and DHS to support their respective activities and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and private sector security partners in deterring, preventing, or disrupting terrorist attacks within the United States. IA-0033-17 (U) Warning: This document is (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS. (U) This product contains US person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. It has been highlighted in this document with the label USPER and should be handled in accordance with the recipient's intelligence oversight and/or information handling procedures.

(U//FOUO) Holiday Celebrations and the Presidential Inauguration Remain Attractive Targets (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS remain concerned that the upcoming holiday celebrations, beginning with Thanksgiving and the start of the shopping season and lasting through the inauguration of the 45th President, could be targeted by international terrorists or homegrown violent extremists (HVEs). * Given the perceived symbolic nature of conducting an attack during these events, we continue to monitor threats with an unspecified attack date emanating from foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) particularly individuals associated with or inspired by the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the event that these groups advance their plotting efforts in the near-term to coincide with the holidays. HVEs continue to pose the most significant near-term threat to the Homeland. (U//FOUO) Potential Threats from Homegrown Violent Extremists (U//FOUO) Terrorists generally plan operations when operationally feasible rather than timed to specific events, though there is some limited historical precedence of terrorists planning operations during holidays or releasing messaging highlighting specific events. Furthermore, USbased ISIL supporters and HVEs may be encouraged or inspired to act during this timeframe due to the symbolism and significance of the holidays and the ensuing large crowds, as well as the success and media attention given to recent attacks in the West. Based on historical precedence during past holiday seasons and presidential transition periods, we expect to see an increase in threat reporting between now and the end of January 2017, much of which is likely to be of dubious credibility, vague in nature, uncorroborated, and often meant to intimidate.» (U//FOUO) HVEs pose the most significant near-term threat to the Homeland, likely by conducting small-scale, largely opportunistic attacks on civilian targets using small arms. The compartmented nature of lone-offender attack planning challenges the ability of law enforcement to detect pre-operational activity and to disrupt attack preparation.» (U//FOUO) On 11 November, ISIL released the third edition of its multilanguage magazine Rumiyah. The newest edition contains a guide for attacking crowds with load-bearing trucks and describes the Macy s Thanksgiving Day Parade as an excellent target. The guide encourages readers to crush victims with the truck, continue the attack with a firearm or knife, and leave behind evidence stating the attacker s allegiance to ISIL. Large outdoor gatherings of all kinds and pedestrian-congested streets are suggested as targets. While ISIL s previous and now-defunct magazine Dabiq never published attack guides, two of the three Rumiyah editions have since its debut in September 2016, including a guide to conducting knife attacks released in October 2016. The FBI and DHS assess we can expect more attack guides to be published in future editions of Rumiyah, which is normally released monthly. *(U//FOUO) FBI and DHS define an HVE as a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor. (U//FOUO) FBI and DHS define a lone offender as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor. Page 2 of 6

» (U) On 2 December 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik opened fire on Farook s co-workers during a training/holiday office party being held in a conference room at the Inland Regional Center a medical center conference room in San Bernardino, California, killing 14 and injuring at least 22 others. FBI testimony on the investigation to date suggests the couple was inspired by FTOs.» (U) Mohamed Osman Mohamud USPER was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison after he attempted to detonate a vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VBIED) during a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon in November 2010. (U) Upcoming Holidays and Dates of Importance Include:» (U) 24 November 2016: Thanksgiving (Federal Holiday)» (U) 7 December 2016: Pearl Harbor Day» (U) 24 December 2016 1 January 2017: Hanukah» (U) 25 December 2016: Christmas (Federal Holiday falls on 26 December)» (U) 26 December 2016 1 January 2017: Kwanzaa» (U) 31 December 2016: New Year s Eve» (U) 1 January 2017: New Year s Day (Federal Holiday falls on 2 January)» (U) 16 January 2017: Dr. Martin Luther King, JR Day (Federal Holiday)» (U) 20 January 2017: 45th Presidential Inauguration (U) Outlook (U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS remain concerned about the difficulty of detecting violent extremists, especially lone offenders, given the individualized nature of radicalization to violence. * Further, foreign-based ISIL members and supporters easy access to aspirational violent extremists through social media, combined with FTOs aggressive push for lone actor attacks in the West, raises our concern that attacks by HVEs could occur with little to no warning. We continue to advise current and former US government employees, military personnel, and law enforcement to actively review their social media accounts for information that could attract violent extremists attention, and to routinely exercise operational security in their interactions online. We also advise that persons attending large gatherings remain vigilant and report suspicious activities to law enforcement. (U) Indicators (U//FOUO) Some observed behaviors that may be suspicious include constitutionally protected activity. These behaviors should not be reported absent articulable facts and circumstances that support the source agency s suspicion that the observed behavior is not innocent, but rather reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism. These include indicators of material support to terrorist groups, indicators of violent extremist radicalization, and signs of travel overseas with the intent of engaging in violence. * (U//FOUO) FBI and DHS define radicalization as the process through which an individual changes from a nonviolent belief system to a belief system that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or use unlawful violence as a method to effect societal or political change. Page 3 of 6

(U) Past Behaviors Associated with Pre-Operational Surveillance and Testing of Security» (U//FOUO) Suspicious observation of or unusual questions to building maintenance or security personnel about security procedures;» (U//FOUO) Engaging in overtly suspicious actions to provoke and observe responses by security or law enforcement officers;» (U//FOUO) Suspicious interest in entry points, peak days and hours of operation, security personnel, surveillance assets (including cameras), and access controls, such as alarms, barriers, doors, gates, or locks;» (U//FOUO) Suspicious observation of security reaction drills or procedures, or multiple false alarms or fictitious emergency calls to same locations or similar venues;» (U//FOUO) Loitering, parking, or standing in the same area over multiple days with no reasonable explanation;» (U//FOUO) Unusual attention to or avoidance of surveillance cameras;» (U//FOUO) Attempts to disguise appearance from visit to visit (change in hair color, style of dress);» (U//FOUO) Interest, without justification, in obtaining site plans, ingress and egress routes, and information on employees or the public;» (U//FOUO) Garments not appropriate for weather/seasons;» (U//FOUO) Unusual behavior, such as staring at or quickly looking away from personnel or vehicles entering or leaving facilities or parking areas;» (U//FOUO) Discreet use of still cameras and video recorders or note taking or use of sketching materials, consistent with pre-operational surveillance, that would raise suspicion in a reasonable person;» (U//FOUO) Attempted or unauthorized access to rooftops or other potentially sensitive areas; and» (U//FOUO) Suspicious observations of or questions about facility air conditioning, heating, and ventilation systems. (U) Potential Indicators of Violent Extremist Radicalization or Mobilization (U) Recognition of common indicators, combined with a fundamental understanding of recruitment and radicalization tactics, may allow for the early detection of those at risk and assist in intervention efforts.» (U//FOUO) Communicating with known or suspected foreign-based or US-based violent Page 4 of 6

extremists using e-mail, social media platforms, or messaging applications;» (U//FOUO) New or increased advocacy of violence, including providing material support or recruiting others to commit criminal acts;» (U//FOUO) Consumption and sharing of media glorifying violent extremist acts in attempting to mobilize others to violence;» (U//FOUO) Active participation in, or encouraging visits to, violent extremist websites highlighting perceived Western atrocities to encourage others to engage in violence;» (U//FOUO) Advocating that their ideological, cultural, or national group requires violent defense from an external threat, combined with advocacy of violence;» (U//FOUO) Reports that a community member has initiated unexplained isolation, including broken contact with friends and family, unexplained self-initiated exit from school or work, combined with advocacy of violence;» (U//FOUO) Participation in paramilitary exercises and reconnaissance and surveillance activities in a manner that is reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism, particularly in conjunction with advocacy of violence;» (U//FOUO) Suspicious training behavior that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person, such as the targeting of effigies, mimicking specific operational conditions at gun ranges or gun shows, or practicing assault tactics at paintball facilities;» (U//FOUO) Use of cover terms to mask the true meaning of events or nefarious activities combined with active advocacy of violence;» (U//FOUO) Attempting to or successfully acquiring firearms or ammunition prohibited under federal, state, or local law;» (U//FOUO) Suspicious weapons purchases, such as attempted purchases by individuals providing inconsistent or suspect identification, refusal to fill out the appropriate documentation, or issuance of vague or cryptic warnings that are violent in nature during purchase;» (U//FOUO) Acquisition of suspicious quantities of weapons and ammunition, or materials that could be used to produce explosives such as hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane, or fertilizer;» (U//FOUO) Attempting to enlist in the US military or state and local law enforcement, or seeking employment in a correctional institution by individuals confirmed to be known or suspected terrorist matches in government counterterrorism screening databases;» (U//FOUO) Testing of operation response systems associated with commercial facilities may be indicated by a pattern of false alarms, equipment failures, or power outages; and» (U//FOUO) Inquiring about operations or security measures in publically accessible areas; Page 5 of 6

using video/camera/observation equipment; or possessing maps, photos, or diagrams that are not related to their jobs. (U) DHS Hometown Security: Tools to Help Your Community Prepare (U) DHS provides free tools and resources to communities because the Department recognizes that communities are the first line of defense in keeping the public safe and secure. The Department encourages businesses to Connect, Plan, Train, and Report. Applying these four steps in advance of an incident or attack can help better prepare businesses and their employees to proactively think about the role they play in the safety and security of their businesses and communities.» (U) Find more at https://www.dhs.gov/hometown-security (U) Responding to Active Shooters and Improvised Explosive Devices (U) To assist law enforcement in better understanding and responding to violent situations, active shooter resources are available on www.fbi.gov. Additional resources are available below.» (U) FBI Active Shooter Study: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/fbi-releases-study-on-activeshooter-incidents» (U) DHS Active Shooter Resources: www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness» (U) Counter-IED information: https://tripwire.dhs.gov (U) Report Suspicious Activity (U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx. (U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response (U//FOUO) Information contained in this intelligence bulletin is for official use only. No portion of this bulletin should be released to the media, the general public, or over nonsecure Internet servers. Release of this material could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities. (U) For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the FBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section by email at FBI_CTAS@ic.fbi.gov or the I&A Production Branch by e- mail at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov. (U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1 HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3, HSEC-8.5 Page 6 of 6

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED///FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Office of Intelligence and Analysis Customer Feedback Form Product Title: (U//FOUO) Holiday Celebrations and the Presidential Inauguration Remain Attractive Targets for HVEs/For 1. Please select partner type: and function: 2. What is the highest level of intelligence information that you receive? 3. Please complete the following sentence: I focus most of my time on: 4. Please rate your satisfaction with each of the following: Very Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied Somewhat Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied N/A Product s overall usefulness Product s relevance to your mission Product s timeliness Product s responsiveness to your intelligence needs 5. How do you plan to use this product in support of your mission? (Check all that apply.) Drive planning and preparedness efforts, training, and/or emergency response operations Observe, identify, and/or disrupt threats Share with partners Allocate resources (e.g. equipment and personnel) Reprioritize organizational focus Author or adjust policies and guidelines Initiate a law enforcement investigation Initiate your own regional-specific analysis Initiate your own topic-specific analysis Develop long-term homeland security strategies Do not plan to use Other: 6. To further understand your response to question #5, please provide specific details about situations in which you might use this product. 7. What did this product not address that you anticipated it would? 8. To what extent do you agree with the following two statements? Strongly Agree Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree N/A This product will enable me to make better decisions regarding this topic. This product provided me with intelligence information I did not find elsewhere. 9. How did you obtain this product? 10. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up conversation about your feedback? Yes To help us understand more about your organization so we can better tailor future products, please provide: Name: Position: Organization: State: Contact Number: Email: Submit Request Privacy Act Statement CLASSIFICATION: Product Serial Number: IA-0033-17 UNCLASSIFIED///FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REV: 29 October 2014