New START Treaty U.S. Senate Briefing Book. A Joint Product of the United States Departments of State and Defense April 2010

New START Treaty U.S. Senate Briefing Book A Joint Product of the United States Departments of State and Defense April 2010

New START Treaty U.S. Senate Briefing Book SUMMARY A Joint Product of the United States Departments of State and Defense April 2010 NEW START TREATY RATIFICATION KEY POINTS... 2 THE NEW START TREATY AT A GLANCE... 3 APRIL 8, 2010 STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT OBAMA... 4 QUOTES FROM ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS... 7 KEY ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS ON NEW START TREATY PRESIDENT OBAMA... 10 SECRETARY OF STATE CLINTON, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS MULLEN... 12 FACT SHEETS NEW START AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS... 16 CENTRAL WARHEAD AND DELIVERY VEHICLE LIMITS OF THE NEW START TREATY... 17 THE TRIAD/U.S. NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE... 18 INVESTMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR COMPLEX FACT SHEET... 19 VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN S OP-ED... 20 MISSILE DEFENSE FACT SHEET... 22 SECRETARY GATES OP-ED... 23 SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 White House Fact Sheet on PAA KEY POINTS... 26 DOD MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW FACT SHEET... 29 CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE... 32 VERIFICATION... 33 TELEMETRY... 34 COMPARISON OF THE START, SORT AND NEW START TREATIES... 35 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS... 37 U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY: OVERVIEW OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATION S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY... 42

New START Treaty U.S. Senate Briefing Book A Joint Product of the United States Departments of State and Defense April 2010 PRESIDENT OBAMA S PRAGUE SPEECH... 43 PRESIDENT OBAMA S STATEMENT ON THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NPT... 49 VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN S SPEECH AT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY... 50 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW FACT SHEET... 56 ADDITIONAL REFERENCE MATERIALS STATEMENT ON THE START FOLLOW ON TREATY BY GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN, MARCH 26, 2010... 59 HOW TO PROTECT OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT BY GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN, OP-ED JANUARY 19, 2010 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL... 60 TOWARD A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD BY GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN, OP-ED JANUARY 15, 2008 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL... 62 ARMS CONTROL S NEW ERA EDITORIAL MARCH 28, 2010 The New York Times... 66 A WORTHY U.S.-RUSSIA ARMS CONTROL TREATY EDITORIAL MARCH 27, 2010 THE WASHINGTON POST... 67

SUMMARY Page 1

NEW START TREATY RATIFICATION KEY POINTS In a world where the United States faces the challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) makes America more secure. The Treaty reduces by 30 percent the limit on the number of Russian nuclear weapons and helps us better track the remaining ones. At the same time, the United States retains the nuclear force level we need to protect ourselves, as validated by the Defense Department s planners through rigorous analysis in the Nuclear Posture Review. New START also ensures our own military the flexibility to deploy and maintain our forces including bombers, submarines, and missiles in ways that best meet U.S. national security interests. The new Treaty places no limits on America s missile defense systems and plans, nor does it limit our long-range conventional strike capabilities. Strong verification measures are built into the treaty so that we can monitor compliance. New START is also accompanied by smart investments in America s nuclear security enterprise about $5 billion in additional funds over the next five years to ensure that our own weapons remain safe, secure and effective. Finally, the new Treaty creates powerful momentum for broader U.S.-Russian cooperation on important other issues ranging from cooperation in Afghanistan, to responding to Iran and North Korea, to facilitating trade and investment; and the treaty will strengthen our collective leverage in preventing nuclear proliferation throughout the world. New START is squarely in line with the last three strategic nuclear arms treaties, which received nearly unanimous bipartisan support in the U.S. Senate: o SORT Treaty, 2003: 95-0 o START II Treaty, 1996: 87-4 o START I Treaty, 1992: 93-6 Page 2

THE NEW START TREATY AT A GLANCE Treaty Structure: The New START Treaty is organized in three tiers of increasing level of detail. The first tier is the Treaty text itself. The second tier consists of a Protocol to the Treaty, which contains additional rights and obligations associated with Treaty provisions. The basic rights and obligations are contained in these two documents. The third tier consists of Technical Annexes to the Protocol. All three tiers will be legally binding, and all three tiers will be submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Strategic Offensive Reductions: Under the Treaty, the U.S. and Russia will be limited to significantly fewer strategic arms within seven years from the date the Treaty enters into force. Each Party has the flexibility to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the Treaty. These limits are based on a rigorous analysis conducted by Department of Defense planners in support of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. Aggregate limits: 1,550 warheads. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as one warhead toward this limit. This limit is 74% lower than the limit of the 1991 START Treaty and 30% lower than the deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty. A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. This limit is less than half the corresponding strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit of the START Treaty. Verification and Transparency: The Treaty has a verification regime that combines the appropriate elements of the 1991 START Treaty with new elements tailored to the limitations of the Treaty. Measures under the Treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase confidence and transparency, the Treaty also provides for the exchange of telemetry. Treaty Terms: The Treaty s duration will be ten years, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement. The Parties may agree to extend the Treaty for a period of no more than five years. The Treaty includes a withdrawal clause that is standard in arms control agreements. The 2002 Moscow Treaty terminates upon entry into force of the New START Treaty. The U.S. Senate and the Russian legislature must approve the Treaty before it can enter into force. No Constraints on Missile Defense and Conventional Strike: The Treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs or current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities. Page 3

THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary Remarks of President Barack Obama As Prepared for Delivery New START Treaty Signing Ceremony Prague, Czech Republic April 8, 2010 Good morning. I m honored to be here in the Czech Republic with President Medvedev and our Czech hosts to mark this historic completion of the new START treaty. Let me begin by saying how happy I am to be back in the beautiful city of Prague. The Czech Republic, of course, is a close friend and ally of the United States. And I have great admiration and affection for the Czech people. Their bonds with the American people are deep and enduring, and Czechs have made great contributions to the United States over many decades including to my hometown of Chicago. I want to thank my friend and partner, Dmitry Medvedev. Without his personal efforts and strong leadership, we would not be here today. We have met and spoken by phone many times throughout the negotiation of this Treaty, and as a consequence we have developed a very effective working relationship built upon candor, cooperation, and mutual respect. One year ago this week, I came to Prague and gave a speech outlining America s comprehensive commitment to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, and seeking the ultimate goal of a world without them. I said then and I will repeat now that this is a long-term goal, one that may not even be reached in my lifetime. But I believed then as I do now that the pursuit of that goal will move us further beyond the Cold War, strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, and make the United States, and the world, safer and more secure. One of the steps that I called for last year was the realization of this Treaty, so I am glad to be back in Prague today. I also came to office committed to resetting relations between the United States and Russia, and I know that President Medvedev shared that commitment. As he said at our first meeting in London, our relationship had started to drift, making it difficult to cooperate on issues of common interest to our people. And when the United States and Russia are not able to work together on big issues, it is not good for either of our nations, or for the world. Together, we have stopped the drift, and proven the benefits of cooperation. Today is an important milestone for nuclear security and non-proliferation, and for U.S.-Russia relations. It fulfills our common objective to negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. It includes significant reductions in the nuclear weapons that we will deploy. It cuts our delivery vehicles by roughly half. It includes a comprehensive verification regime, which allows us to further build trust. It enables both sides the flexibility to protect our security, as well as America s unwavering commitment to the security of our European allies. And I look forward to working with the United States Senate to achieve ratification of this important Treaty later this year. Finally, this day demonstrates the determination of the United States and Russia the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world s nuclear weapons to pursue responsible global leadership. Together, we are Page 4

keeping our commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which must be the foundation of global non-proliferation. While the new START treaty is an important step forward, it is just one step on a longer journey. As I said last year in Prague, this treaty will set the stage for further cuts. And going forward, we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons. President Medvedev and I have also agreed to expand our discussions on missile defense. This will include regular exchanges of information about our threat assessments, as well as the completion of a joint assessment of emerging ballistic missiles. And as these assessments are completed, I look forward to launching a serious dialogue about Russian-American cooperation on missile defense. But nuclear weapons are not simply an issue for the United States and Russia they threaten the common security of all nations. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist is a danger to people everywhere from Moscow to New York; from the cities of Europe to South Asia. So next week, 47 nations will come together in Washington to discuss concrete steps that can be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years. And the spread of nuclear weapons to more states is also an unacceptable risk to global security raising the specter of arms races from the Middle East to East Asia. Earlier this week, the United States formally changed our policy to make it clear that those non-nuclear weapons states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and their non-proliferation obligations will not be threatened by America s nuclear arsenal. This demonstrates, once more, America s commitment to the NPT as a cornerstone of our security strategy. Those nations that follow the rules will find greater security and opportunity. Those nations that refuse to meet their obligations will be isolated, and denied the opportunity that comes with international integration. That includes accountability for those that break the rules otherwise the NPT is just words on a page. That is why the United States and Russia are part of a coalition of nations insisting that the Islamic Republic of Iran face consequences, because they have continually failed to meet their obligations. We are working together at the UN Security Council to pass strong sanctions on Iran. And we will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective security. While these issues are a top priority, they are only one part of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Today, I again expressed my deepest condolences for the terrible loss of Russian life in recent terrorist attacks, and we will remain steadfast partners in combating violent extremism. We also discussed the potential to expand our cooperation on behalf of economic growth, trade and investment, and technological innovation, and I look forward to discussing these issues further when President Medvedev visits the United States later this year. Because there is much we can do on behalf of our security and prosperity if we continue to work together. When one surveys the many challenges that we face around the world, it is easy to grow complacent, or to abandon the notion that progress can be shared. But I want to repeat what I said last year in Prague: When nations and peoples allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. When we fail to pursue peace, then it stays forever beyond our grasp. Page 5

This majestic city of Prague is in many ways a monument to human progress. And this ceremony is a testament to the truth that old adversaries can forge new partnerships. I could not help but be struck the other day by the words of Arkady Brish, who helped build the Soviet Union s first atom bomb. At the age of 92, having lived to see the horrors of a World War and the divisions of a Cold War, he said, We hope humanity will reach the moment when there is no need for nuclear weapons, when there is peace and calm in the world. It is easy to dismiss those voices. But doing so risks repeating the horrors of the past, while ignoring the history of human progress. The pursuit of peace and calm and cooperation among nations is the work of both leaders and peoples in the 21st century. For we must be as persistent and passionate in our pursuit of progress as any who would stand in our way. Thank you. ## Page 6

On the New START Treaty QUOTES FROM ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON THE NEW START TREATY MARCH 26, 2010 President Obama: We ve turned words into action. We ve made progress that is clear and concrete. And we ve demonstrated the importance of American leadership and American partnership on behalf of our own security and the world s. Secretary of Defense Gates: This Treaty strengthens nuclear stability. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen: I, the vice chairman and the Joint Chiefs, as well as our combatant commanders around the world, stand solidly behind this new treaty, having had the opportunity to provide our counsel, to make our recommendations and to help shape the final agreements. This treaty achieves a proper balance more in keeping with today's security environment, reducing tensions even as it bolsters nonproliferation efforts. [T]his treaty enhances our ability to do that which we have been charged to do: protect and defend the citizens of the United States. I am as confident in its success as I am in its safeguards. On Verification President Obama: [The new START treaty] puts in place a strong and effective verification regime. And it maintains the flexibility that we need to protect and advance our national security and to guarantee our unwavering commitment to the security of our allies. Secretary of Defense Gates: The verification measures for this treaty have been designed to monitor compliance with the provisions of this treaty. Because throw-weight of missiles was not an issue, telemetry is not nearly as important for this treaty as it has been in the past. In fact, we don't need telemetry to monitor compliance with this treaty. Nonetheless, there still is a bilateral agreement to exchange telemetry information on up to five missile launches a year. I think that when the testimony of the intelligence community comes on the Hill that the DNI and the experts will say that they are comfortable that the provisions of this treaty for verification are adequate for them to monitor Russian compliance and vice versa. It will reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons that both Russia and the United States are permitted to deploy by a third, and maintains an effective verification regime. Page 7

On the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Elimination Secretary of State Clinton: The treaty also shows the world, particularly the states like Iran and North Korea, that one of our top priorities is to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and keep nuclear materials out of the wrong hands. The new START treaty demonstrates our commitment to making progress toward disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the so-called NPT. So as we uphold our commitments and strengthen the NPT, we can hold others accountable to do the same. That's not only in our security interests, but it also is a commitment by the United States and Russia toward nonproliferation and toward the eventual goal of a world without nuclear weapons. So I'm going to reaffirm our commitment to convincing countries that the path of nonproliferation, of lowering the temperature when it comes to nuclear weapons, which we are doing with this treaty, is the path they want to be on. On Ratification Secretary of State Clinton: Some of the time that had to be taken in order to really get the point where we both felt like we had the package necessary to go to our legislative bodies. I believe that a vast majority of the Senate at the end of the day will see that this is in America's interest and it goes way beyond politics. I'm not going to, you know, set any timetables, but we're confident that we'll be able to make the case for ratification. Secretary of Defense Gates: Let me first say a word about ratification from my perspective. There has been a very intense continuing consultation on the Hill as the negotiations have proceeded. Two of the areas that have been of concern in the Senate, among senators: Are we protecting our ability to go forward with missile defense? And are we going to make the investment in our nuclear infrastructure so that the stockpile will remain reliable and safe? We have addressed both of those. Missile defense is not constrained by this -- by this treaty. And we have in our budget, the president's budget that went to the Hill for F.Y. '11, almost $5 billion for [new] investment in the nuclear infrastructure and maintaining the stockpile. So I think we have addressed the concerns that there may have been on the Hill, and so I echo the sentiments of Secretary Clinton. I think the prospects are quite good. Page 8

On Missile Defense and Extended Deterrence Secretary of Defense Gates: There are no constraints on missile defense. America s nuclear arsenal remains an important pillar of the U.S. defense posture, both to deter potential adversaries and to reassure more than a dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security. The reductions in this treaty will not affect the strength of our nuclear triad. Nor does this treaty limit plans to protect the United States and our allies by improving and deploying missile defense systems. Secretary of State Clinton: We, we have consistently conveyed to our European friends and allies America's absolute commitment to our NATO partners and to their defense. The phase adaptive approach that the president concluded was the best way forward on missile defense, we think, actually makes Europe safer from what are the real threats that are out there. One of the reasons why it's so significant that the presidents will meet in Prague is because we want to send exactly that signal, that this is good for Europe, as well as for the United States and Russia. Page 9

THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary The White House Friday, March 26, 2010 Remarks of President Barack Obama As Prepared for Delivery Announcement of New START Treaty Good morning. I just concluded a productive phone call with President Medvedev. And I m pleased to announce that after a year of intense negotiations, the United States and Russia have agreed to the most comprehensive arms control agreement in nearly two decades. Since taking office, one of my highest national security priorities has been addressing the threat posed to the American people by nuclear weapons. That is why last April in Prague I stated America s intention to pursue the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a goal that has been embraced by Presidents like John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan. While this aspiration will not be reached in the near future, I put forward a comprehensive agenda to pursuit it to stop the spread of these weapons; to secure vulnerable nuclear materials from terrorists; and to reduce nuclear arsenals. A fundamental part of that effort was the negotiation of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia. Furthermore, since I took office, I have been committed to a reset of our relations with Russia. When the United States and Russia can cooperate effectively, it advances the mutual interests of our two nations, and the security and prosperity of the wider world. We have worked together on Afghanistan. We have coordinated our economic efforts through the G-20. We are working together to pressure Iran to meet its international obligations. And today, we have reached agreement on one of my Administration s top priorities a pivotal new arms control agreement. In many ways, nuclear weapons represent both the darkest days of the Cold War, and the most troubling threats of our time. Today, we have taken another step forward in leaving behind the legacy of the 20th century while building a more secure future for our children. We have turned words into action. We have made progress that is clear and concrete. And we have demonstrated the importance of American leadership and American partnership on behalf of our own security, and the world s. Broadly speaking, the new START Treaty makes progress in several areas. It cuts by about a third the nuclear weapons that the United States and Russia will deploy. It significantly reduces missiles and launchers. It puts in place a strong and effective verification regime. And it maintains the flexibility that we need to protect and advance our national security, and to guarantee our unwavering commitment to the security of our Allies. With this agreement, the United States and Russia the two largest nuclear powers in the world also send a clear signal that we intend to lead. By upholding our own commitments under the Nuclear Non- Page 10

Proliferation treaty, we strengthen our global efforts to stop the spread of these weapons, and to ensure that other nations meet their own responsibilities. I am pleased that almost one year to the day after my last trip to Prague, the Czech Republic a close friend and ally of the United States has agreed to host President Medvedev and me on April 8th, as we sign this historic Treaty. The following week, I look forward to hosting leaders from over forty nations here in Washington, as we convene a Summit to address how we can secure vulnerable nuclear materials so that they never fall into the hands of terrorists. And later this spring, the world will come together in New York to discuss how we can build on this progress, and continue to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. Through all of these efforts, cooperation between the United States and Russia will be essential. I want to thank President Medvedev for his personal and sustained leadership as we worked to reach this agreement. We have had the opportunity to meet many times over the last year, and we both agree that we can serve the interests of our people through close cooperation. I also want to thank my national security team, who did so much work to make this day possible. That includes the leaders with me here today Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. And it also includes a tireless negotiating team. It took patience. It took perseverance. But we never gave up. And as a result, the United States will be more secure, and the American people will be safer. Finally, I look forward to continuing to work closely with Congress in the months ahead. There is a long tradition of bipartisan leadership on arms control. Presidents of both parties have recognized the necessity of securing and reducing these weapons. Statesmen like George Shultz, Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and Bill Perry have been outspoken in their support of more assertive action. Earlier this week, I met again with my friends John Kerry and Dick Lugar to discuss this Treaty, and throughout the morning, my Administration will be consulting Senators from both parties as we prepare for what I hope will be strong, bipartisan support to ratify the new START treaty. With that, I ll leave you in the able hands of my Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. Thank you everybody. ### Page 11

THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary Press Briefing by Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen on the Announcement of the New START Treaty James S. Brady Press Briefing Room March 26, 2010 SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, thank you all very much. This is a good day for America and our security. And as President Obama just reiterated, it is one of the highest priorities of the Obama administration to pursue an agenda to reduce the threat posed by the deadliest weapons the world has ever known. President Obama set that forth in his speech at Prague last year. And today, he and President Medvedev reached an agreement to make significant and verifiable reductions in our nuclear arsenals. Long after the Cold War s end, the United States and Russia still possess more than 90 percent of the world s nuclear weapons. We do not need such large arsenals to protect our nation and our allies against the two greatest dangers we face today: nuclear proliferation and terrorism. This treaty represents a significant step forward in our cooperation with Russia. We were committed from the beginning to reset the U.S.-Russia relationship, because we saw it as essential to making progress on our top priorities -- from counterterrorism, to nuclear security and non-proliferation. Now, we will continue to have disagreements with our Russian friends. But this treaty is an example of deep and substantive cooperation on a matter of vital importance. And more broadly, it shows that patient, principled diplomacy can advance our national interests by producing real results, in this case results that are good for us, good for Russia, and good for global security and stability. The treaty also shows the world -- particularly states like Iran and North Korea -- that one of our top priorities is to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime and keep nuclear materials out of the wrong hands. The new START treaty demonstrates our commitment to making progress toward disarmament under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the so-called NPT. So as we uphold our commitments and strengthen the NPT, we can hold others accountable to do the same. I know that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen will say more about the details of the treaty, but I want to make clear that we have adhered to the Russian proverb that President Reagan frequently employed, trust, but verify. Verification provides the transparency and builds the trust needed to reduce the chance for misunderstandings and miscalculations. President Obama insisted on a whole of government effort to reach this result, and that s exactly what this was. He and President Medvedev met several times and spoke often by phone. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, General Jones worked closely with their Russian counterparts. Foreign Minister Lavrov and I met in person, most recently last week in Moscow, and we spoke on the phone too many times to count. Page 12

Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller worked tirelessly in Geneva for many months as our chief negotiator. Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher, who is here with us, joined her at a crucial time to help complete the agreement, assisted very ably by our State Department expert team, including Jim Timbie. Teams of people at the State Department, the White House, DOD, elsewhere worked tirelessly to make this happen. Let me conclude by saying that I look forward to working with my former colleagues in the Senate. They will be our partners in this enterprise. I know President Obama had an excellent meeting, as he reported to you, with both Senators Kerry and Lugar. And Rose, Ellen and General Jones and others of us have briefed members along the way. I look forward to working toward ratification to bring this treaty into force. Now it s my great pleasure and honor to turn the podium over to my friend, Secretary Bob Gates. SECRETARY GATES: This treaty strengthens nuclear stability. It will reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons that both Russia and the United States are permitted to deploy by a third, and maintains an effective verification regime. America s nuclear arsenal remains an important pillar of the U.S. defense posture, both to deter potential adversaries and to reassure more than two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security. But it is clear that we can accomplish these goals with fewer nuclear weapons. The reductions in this treaty will not affect the strength of our nuclear triad. Nor does this treaty limit plans to protect the United States and our allies by improving and deploying missile defense systems. Much of the analysis that supported the U.S. negotiating position was provided by the Defense Department s nuclear posture review, which will be released shortly. As the number of weapons declines we will have to invest more heavily in our nuclear infrastructure in order to keep our weapons safe, secure and effective. I look forward to working with the Congress to make sure that Departments of Defense and Energy have the funding necessary to properly accomplish this mission. The subject of America s nuclear deterrent and this treaty carries special personal meaning for me. My professional career began as a junior Air Force Officer under the Strategic Air Command, and my first assignment 43 years ago was at Whiteman Air Force Base, then home to 150 Minuteman ICBMs. Since 1971, I have been involved in strategic arms negotiations in different capacities at CIA and here at the NSC. And I particularly recall the day President Reagan signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Treaty, which marked the transition from arms control to disarmament. That process accelerated with START and reaches another important milestone with this treaty. The journey we have taken from being one misstep away from mutual assured destruction to the substantial arms reductions of this new agreement is testimony to just how much the world has changed and all of the opportunities we still have to make our planet safer and more secure. Page 13

Admiral Mullen. ADMIRAL MULLEN: Good morning, everyone. I would only like to add that I, the Vice Chairman, and the Joint Chiefs, as well as our combatant commanders around the world, stand solidly behind this new treaty, having had the opportunity to provide our counsel, to make our recommendations, and to help shape the final agreements. We greatly appreciate the trust and confidence placed by us -- placed in us by the President and by Secretary Gates throughout this process. And we recognize the trust and confidence this treaty helps foster in our relationship with Russia s military -- a trust complementary to that which the President has sought to achieve between our two countries. Indeed, I met with my Russian counterpart, General Makarov, no fewer than three times during the negotiation process. And each time we met, we grew closer not only toward our portion of the final result, but also toward a better understanding of the common challenges and opportunities our troops face every single day. The new START deals directly with some of the most lethal of those common challenges -- our stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons -- by dramatically reducing these stockpiles. This treaty achieves a proper balance more in keeping with today s security environment, reducing tensions even as it bolsters nonproliferation efforts. It features a much more effective, transparent verification method that demands quicker data exchanges and notifications. It protects our ability to develop a conventional global strike capability should that be required. And perhaps more critically, it allows us to deploy and maintain strategic nuclear forces -- bombers, submarines, missiles; the triad which has proven itself over the decades -- in ways best suited to meeting our security commitments. In other words, through the trust it engenders, the cuts it requires, and the flexibility it preserves this treaty enhances our ability to do that which we have been charged to do: protect and defend the citizens of the United States. I am as confident in its success as I am in its safeguards. Thank you. Page 14

FACT SHEETS Page 15

NEW START TREATY AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS Key Point: The New START Treaty makes America more secure. The New START Treaty will enhance U.S. national security by stabilizing the strategic balance between the United States and the Russian Federation at lower levels of nuclear forces. The Treaty will establish lower limits for U.S. and Russian nuclear forces of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. It also will limit to 800 the total number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. The Treaty s lower strategic force limits were validated through rigorous analysis conducted by Department of Defense Planners in support of the Nuclear Posture Review. The New START Treaty allows the United States to determine our own force structure, giving us the flexibility to deploy and maintain our strategic nuclear forces in a way that best serves U.S. national security interests. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary and protect our allies. The New START Treaty s verification provisions provide visibility into Russia s nuclear forces and thereby help to mitigate the risks of surprises, mistrust, and miscalculations that can result from excessive secrecy or decisions based on worst-case assumptions. The Treaty will give us a vital window into the Russian strategic arsenal. This goal is achieved through a verification regime that is adapted from START, but is simplified, less costly to implement, and tailored to the specific provisions of the new Treaty, as well as transparency measures such as the exchange of telemetry on flight tests. Page 16

CENTRAL WARHEAD AND DELIVERY VEHICLE LIMITS OF THE NEW START TREATY Key Point: The Treaty reduces by about 30 percent the limit on the number of Russian nuclear weapons and helps us better track the remaining ones. At the same time, the United States retains the nuclear force level we need to protect ourselves, as validated by the Defense Department s planners through rigorous analysis in the Nuclear Posture Review. The principal U.S. objective in bilateral strategic arms control is to increase stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship at significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons. The New START Treaty sets aggregate limits which are 56% lower than the limit for deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 74% lower than the limit for deployed warheads established in the 1991 START Treaty, which expired in December 2009. The New START Treaty limit for deployed warheads will be 30% lower than the limit for deployed strategic warheads established under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which the New START Treaty will supersede. The New START Treaty provides the United States the flexibility to determine for ourselves the structure of our strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the Treaty. The Central Limits of the New START Treaty are: Deployed Warheads: 1,550 All warheads emplaced on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs are counted under this limit Deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments are each counted with one warhead Deployed and Non-Deployed Launchers and Heavy Bombers: 800 Deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers Deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers Deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments Deployed Ballistic Missiles and Heavy Bombers: 700 Deployed ICBMs Deployed SLBMs Deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments Timetable for Limitations: Duration of Agreement: Limits begin to apply seven years from the date the Treaty enters into force Ten years with an option to extend, if both sides agree, by no more than five years Page 17

THE TRIAD AND U.S. NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE Key Point: The New START Treaty ensures our own military the flexibility to deploy and maintain our forces including bombers, submarines, and missiles in ways that best meet U.S. national security interests. An early task for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was to develop U.S. positions for the New START negotiations. The Treaty s lower strategic force levels are based on analysis conducted last year, at the initial phase of the 2010 NPR process, which also considered how U.S. forces should be structured at the levels established by the new agreement. The NPR reached the following conclusions: Stable deterrence can be maintained while reducing U.S. strategic delivery vehicles by about 50 percent from the START I level and reducing deployed strategic warheads by about 30 percent from the 2002 Moscow Treaty level. Contributions by non-nuclear systems to U.S. deterrence and reassurance goals should be preserved by avoiding limitations on missile defenses and preserving options for using heavy bombers or long-range missile systems in conventional roles. During the ten-year duration of New START, the triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will be maintained, keeping all 14 Ohio-class strategic submarines (SSBNs) in the force at least for the near term and de-mirving all Minuteman III ICBMs to a single warhead each to increase stability in a crisis. The FY 2011 budget request includes funds to sustain the Triad, including: continuing the Minuteman III life extension program; developing new technologies to replace the current fleet of Ohio-class SSBNs, which begin to retire in the 2027 timeframe; and investing over $1 billion over the next five years to support upgrades to the B-2 stealth bomber. The New START Treaty affirms the right of the United States to determine the composition and structure of our strategic offensive arms within the Treaty s overall limits. This allows the United States to adjust our force structure over time as appropriate to the strategic circumstances. The Treaty limitations take effect seven years after the date the Treaty enters into force. Page 18

INVESTMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR COMPLEX The United States is committed both to taking concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons and ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness of our stockpile as along as nuclear weapons exist. This requires investing now in revitalizing the intellectual infrastructure that serves as the foundation of our capabilities in addition to recapitalizing an outdated physical infrastructure. These investments will transform a nuclear weapons complex into a modern, sustainable 21 st Century Nuclear Security Enterprise. This is not only critical to maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent, but also supports a number of other essential nuclear security missions, including nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, emergency response, and support to the intelligence community. By law, the Department of Energy s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is tasked to maintain and enhance the safety, reliability and performance of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, in addition to broader nuclear security missions. The President s budget request for NNSA for fiscal year 2011 reflects the Administration s commitment to the Nation s nuclear deterrent and the Nuclear Security Enterprise that enables it. The President s budget includes more than $7 billion for Weapons Activities and associated infrastructure, up 10 percent from fiscal year 2010. This request: Increases funding for directed stockpile work by 25% to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including: full production of the W76-1 to extend the life of the warhead for an additional 30 years; a life extension study for the B61 gravity bomb to extend its service life, enhance its safety and use control features, and ensure compatibility with modern aircraft; a study to explore future options to maintain the W78 warhead; and continued maintenance, surveillance and certification for all weapons systems. Increases funding for science, technology and engineering by more than 10% to ensure the ability to assess and certify the stockpile without underground nuclear testing utilizing advanced scientific capabilities, including the world s fastest supercomputers, and stepwise development of the predictive framework capability. Reinvests in the scientists, technicians and engineers responsible for a successful stockpile stewardship and management program and recapitalization of the physical infrastructure, including major long-term construction projects to replace aging facilities that house essential capabilities for plutonium and uranium. The President s plan sustains and augments stockpile stewardship and management investments into the future, with funding for these programs increasing steadily, to $7.6 billion per year by fiscal year 2015. Through these investments, NNSA s Nuclear Security Enterprise will ensure a highly specialized and trained technical workforce, committed to maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent through safe and security operations and stewardship of the environment, while leveraging their capabilities to address cross-cutting national security mandates through scientific innovation. Page 19

OP-ED: The President's Nuclear Vision We will spend what is necessary to maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of our weapons. By JOE BIDEN The Wall Street Journal January 29, 2010 The United States faces no greater threat than the spread of nuclear weapons. That is why, last April in Prague, President Obama laid out a comprehensive agenda to reverse their spread, and to pursue the peace and security of a world without them. He understands that this ultimate goal will not be reached quickly. But by acting on a number of fronts, we can ensure our security, strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, and keep vulnerable nuclear material out of terrorist hands. For as long as nuclear weapons are required to defend our country and our allies, we will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal. The president's Prague vision is central to this administration's efforts to protect the American people and that is why we are increasing investments in our nuclear arsenal and infrastructure in this year's budget and beyond. Among the many challenges our administration inherited was the slow but steady decline in support for our nuclear stockpile and infrastructure, and for our highly trained nuclear work force. The stockpile, infrastructure and work force played a critical and evolving role in every stage of our nuclear experience, from the Manhattan Project to the present day. Once charged with developing ever more powerful weapons, they have had a new mission in the 18 years since we stopped conducting nuclear tests. That is to maintain the strength of the nuclear arsenal. For almost a decade, our laboratories and facilities have been underfunded and undervalued. The consequences of this neglect like the growing shortage of skilled nuclear scientists and engineers and the aging of critical facilities have largely escaped public notice. Last year, the Strategic Posture Commission led by former Defense Secretaries William Perry and James Schlesinger warned that our nuclear complex requires urgent attention. We agree. The budget we will submit to Congress on Monday both reverses this decline and enables us to implement the president's nuclear-security agenda. These goals are intertwined. The same skilled nuclear experts who maintain our arsenal play a key role in guaranteeing our country's security now and for the future. State-ofthe art facilities, and highly trained and motivated people, allow us to maintain our arsenal without testing. They will help meet the president's goal of securing vulnerable nuclear materials world-wide in the coming years, and enable us to track and thwart nuclear trafficking, verify weapons reductions, and to develop tomorrow's cutting-edge technologies for our security and prosperity. To achieve these goals, our budget devotes $7 billion for maintaining our nuclear-weapons stockpile and complex, and for related efforts. This commitment is $600 million more than Congress approved last year. And over the next five years we intend to boost funding for these important activities by more than $5 Page 20

billion. Even in a time of tough budget decisions, these are investments we must make for our security. We are committed to working with Congress to ensure these budget increases are approved. This investment is long overdue. It will strengthen our ability to recruit, train and retain the skilled people we need to maintain our nuclear capabilities. It will support the work of our nuclear labs, a national treasure that we must and will sustain. Many of our facilities date back to World War II, and, given the safety and environmental challenges they present, cannot be sustained much longer. Increased funding now will eventually enable considerable savings on both security and maintenance. It also will allow us to clean up and close down production facilities we no longer need. Our budget request is just one of several closely related and equally important initiatives giving life to the president's Prague agenda. Others include completing the New START agreement with Russia, releasing the Nuclear Posture Review on March 1, holding the Nuclear Security Summit in April, and pursuing ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We will by these initiatives seek to strengthen an emerging bipartisan consensus on how best to secure our nation. These steps will strengthen the nonproliferation regime, which is vital to holding nations like North Korea and Iran accountable when they break the rules, and deterring others from trying to do so. Reflecting this consensus, Sen. John McCain has joined the president in endorsing a world without nuclear weapons a goal that was articulated by President Ronald Reagan, who in 1984 said these weapons must be "banished from the face of the Earth." This consensus was inspired by four of our most eminent statesmen Messrs. Henry Kissinger, William Perry, Sam Nunn and George P. Shultz. Some critics will argue that we should not constrain our nuclear efforts in any way. Others will assert that retaining a robust deterrent is at odds with our nonproliferation agenda. These four leaders last week in these pages argued compellingly that "maintaining high confidence in our nuclear arsenal is critical as the numbers of these weapons goes down. It is also consistent with and necessary for U.S. leadership in nonproliferation, risk reduction and arms reduction goals." This shared commitment serves our security. No nation can secure itself by disarming unilaterally, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, all nations remain ever on the brink of destruction. As President Obama said in Prague, "We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it." Mr. Biden is Vice President of the United States. Page 21

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND NEW START TREATY Key Point: The New START Treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs or current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities. The United States is developing and fielding missile defenses to defend the United States, our forces abroad, and our allies and partners against the threat of ballistic missile attack. The New START Treaty contains no limits on our ability to continue developing and fielding missile defenses. The Treaty does contain a statement in the preamble acknowledging the interrelationship of missile offense and missile defense, as President Obama and President Medvedev agreed in their Joint Statement of July 2009. This provision is not a binding obligation. As was done in the case of START, Russia has made a unilateral statement regarding missile defenses. Its statement is not legally binding and therefore does not constrain U.S. missile defense programs. In fact, we have also made a unilateral statement, making clear that nothing in the Treaty will limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. Such unilateral statements are documents associated with the Treaty, but are not part of the Treaty. These statements will not be subject to Senate advice and consent, though they will be shared with the Senate. The Treaty prohibits the conversion of ballistic missile defense interceptor launchers to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or submarine- launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and vice versa. This provision has no effect on our ability to develop and field missile defenses. The United States is currently building 14 Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) silos at Ft. Greely, Alaska. New construction of silo launchers for missile defense purposes at Ft. Greely, Vandenberg Air Force Base, or anywhere else is not limited by the New START Treaty. The five existing GBI silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base, which were converted from ICBM silos prior to treaty signature, are grandfathered under the Treaty, and thus are not constrained by the Treaty. The United States will continue to invest in improvements to both strategic and theater missile defenses, both qualitatively and quantitatively, as needed for our security and the security of our allies. The Administration s approach to sustaining and enhancing our ballistic missile defense program is detailed in the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report and reflected in the FY 2011 $9.9 billion request for missile defense, almost $700 million more than FY 2010. Page 22