Readiness Checklist for Plague V Country: Date:

Similar documents
Consolidated Ebola Virus Disease Preparedness Checklist

WHO REGIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR EVD OPERATIONAL READINESS AND PREPAREDNESS IN COUNTRIES NEIGHBORING THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

IHR Core Capacities Overview and Monitoring

Self-Assessment Tool: Are Health Facilities Capable of Managing Cholera Outbreaks?

Ebola virus disease preparedness strengthening team. Côte d Ivoire country visit October 2014

Step 1A: Before entering patient room, be sure you have all the material ready and available:

WHO and the IHR(2005) in public health event management in air travel

Madagascar. Highlights. Plague Outbreak Situation Report 30 October 2017

IHR Implementation in the Western Pacific Region

International Health Regulations. Core capacities requirements and assessment tools for its implementation at Points of Entry

Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Mauritius: Plague Preparedness

Joint external evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Uganda. Executive summary June 26-30, 2017

International Health Regulations (IHR) Implementation status in the Americas

Sammy Makama Head, Port Health Services Unit MOH, Kenya

Emergency contingency planning at designated Points of Entry

GOARN Request for Assistance: Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa

Training on Hospital Management for Ebola Virus Disease: Workshop

Self-Assessment Summary Report 2017 Accreditation

Checklists for Preventing and Controlling

Infection Control Care Plan for a patient with Group A Streptococcus

Ebola Preparedness and Response in Ghana

Incident Planning Guide: Infectious Disease

Guidance for contingency planning

DRAFT VERSION October 26, 2016

StC WASH, Cholera and diarrhoeal diseases

Biosafety in Liberia 1

July 2017 June Maintained by the Bureau of Preparedness & Response Division of Emergency Preparedness and Community Support.

GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA ROADMAP FOR ETHIOPIA

Laboratory Assessment Tool

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SANITATION. National Infection Prevention and Control Policy

Service Provision Assessment (SPA) Surveys

Infection Control Readiness Checklist

Infection Control Care Plan. Patient Demographic / label. Hospital: Ward:

Infection prevention & control

Occupational safety in laboratories

Clostridium difficile Infection (CDI) Trigger Tool

Clostridium difficile Infection (CDI) Trigger Tool

SOP WP6-QUAL-04, Version 1.0, 23 February 2014 Page 1 of 8. SOP Title: Laboratory (GCLP) supervision visits

Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Central African Republic: Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic Preparedness

Emergency appeal Liberia: Ebola virus disease

Development of a draft five-year global strategic plan to improve public health preparedness and response

What happened? WHO Early Recovery in Ebola affected countries: What did we learn? 13/10/2015

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

San Francisco General Hospital INFECTION CONTROL

HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

Day 1. EBOLA BASICS AND BACKGROUND Emeritus Prof. Rick Speare (WHO) EBOLA RESTON IN THE PHILIPPINES Dr. Catalino Demetria (RITM)

EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY INFECTION CONTROL POLICY

Standard operating procedures for the conduct of outreach training and supportive supervision

Guideline: Administrative & Logistic Arrangement in Supporting The Joint Multi-Sectoral Outbreak Investigation & Response in ASEAN

MULTISECTORIAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN - CHOLERA

27 May 2018 ANNEX STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE OUTBREAK DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 2018 MINISTERE DE LA.

Ebola Virus FAQs. How will the waste be handled for urine and stool of infected patients? Waste disposal will be via the sanitary sewer system.

JANUARY Evaluation of Impact of CBEP Training Activities on the Performance of Targeted Laboratories in Iraq

ENIVD CODE OF CONDUCT for Outbreak Assistance Laboratories. CHECKLIST of major issues to address before departure and during the mission

SIMULATION EXERCISE FOR TESTING OF THE INTERNATIONAL

IHR News. The WHO quarterly bulletin on IHR implementation. 31 March 2009, No. 6

UNICEF Evaluation Management Response

INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS

Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) Elements of an Effective Program

Outbreak Management 2015

Standard Operating Procedure for Community Event-Based Surveillance for Ebola Virus Disease in Sierra Leone

IOM REGIONAL RESPONSE TO EBOLA CRISIS

Infection Prevention & Control February 22-23, 2017 Sheraton Hotel, Manama, Bahrain

Infection Control Manual. Table of Contents

ANNEX H HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES

Health workforce coordination in emergencies with health consequences

Pandemic Preparedness Planning Committee Meeting University of Virginia

ALIMA s response to Ebola Outbreak

INFECTION C ONTROL CONTROL CONTROL EDUCATION PROGRAM

Revised Emergency Appeal. Liberia: EVD outbreak

COUNTRY ROADMAP GEORGIA

Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Cote d Ivoire: Ebola virus disease preparedness. A. Situation analysis. Description of the disaster

JOINT PLAN OF ACTION in Response to Cyclone Nargis

EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY INFECTION CONTROL POLICY

NLTC-9. Supporting Your Sentinel Laboratories

ZAMBIA: CHOLERA. In Brief

Infection Control Manual. Table of Contents

Ministry of Labour Occupational Health & Safety and Infection Prevention & Control

ASIA PACIFIC STRATEGY FOR EMERGING DISEASES AND PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES

Mission. Directions. Objectives

27 May 2018 STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE OUTBREAK DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO MINISTERE DE LA. santé

This section covers Public Health Preparedness.

Infection Prevention and Control Strategy (NHSCT/11/379)

MODULE 22: Contingency Planning and Emergency Response to Healthcare Waste Spills

Infection Prevention and Control in the Dialysis Facility

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION REGIONAL RESPONSE TO EBOLA CRISIS EXTERNAL SITUATION REPORT 29 MAY 2015

World Federation for Culture Collections ICCC-12 Conference Florianopolis, Brazil, 26 Sept 1 Oct Dr Nicoletta Previsani

GUIDELINES FOR INVESTIGATION OF SUSPICIOUS BIOLOGICAL EVENTS. (guidelines for national veterinary services)

Annexe 3 HCWM procedures to be applied in medical laboratories

WHEREAS, Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) is a rare and potentially deadly disease caused

Highlights. Epidemiological status. Cross-border collaboration. Interagency Collaboration on Ebola. Situation Report No. 10 (04 November 2015)

2.13. Training for Emergency Health Management

Checklist for assessing rapid diagnostic test use

Revised Emergency Plan of Action Operation Update Madagascar: Plague (Epidemic)

NHS GREATER GLASGOW & CLYDE CONTROL OF INFECTION COMMITTEE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) GROUP A STREPTOCOCCUS (Streptococcus pyogenes)

Policy for the Control and Management of patients Colonised or Infected with Vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE)

SOP Standard. Operating Procedures. For Coordinating. Public Health Event Preparedness and Response in the WHO African Region

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) TERMINAL CLEAN OF ISOLATION ROOMS

GOVERNMENT NOTICES GOEWERMENTSKENNISGEWINGS

Subsector Analysis (Summary): Hospital Hygiene and Infection Prevention and Control. Mongolia: Fifth Health Sector Development Project

Transcription:

Readiness Checklist for Plague V3 05.10.17 Country: Date: This checklist aims to help countries to assess and test their level of readiness for a plague response, and be used as a tool for identifying concrete action to be taken by countries and how they will be supported by the international community to close potentially existing gaps. Tasks Yes / No / NA Deadline Comments Key reference documents Human Resources Equipment / Infrastructure / Materials 1 - WHO Readiness WHO Country Offices have systems, information and equipment ready to provide immediate support to a plague outbreak in the country. 1.1 WHO Incident Manager Identified with key Incident Management functions identified and communicated to Regional Office ERF WHO Incident Manager Primary and backup communication tools and ICT equipment (e.g. spare mobile phones with payment plans, mobile office/satellite equipment, laptops, and chargers) are available for surge operations and are tested. 1.2 Public health risk assessment conducted with health sector IDSR WHO Technical lead Access mechanisms (standard operating procedures) to strategic emergency stockpiles are known. 1.3 Health Sector Contingency Plan developed and tested with partners outlining immediate preparedness actions and response strategy IASC Contingency plan template Health sector/cluster partners Health Sector Contingency Plan 1

1.4 Emergency stocks pre-positioned at the sub-regional or country level WHO Logistician Plague rapid diagnostic kits, Personal protective equipment, antibiotics etc. 2 - Coordination National Incident Management System (IMS) including multi-sectoral stakeholders in place to ensure a coordinated response to potential outbreak. 2.1 Identify and designate a National Focal Point / Incident Manager for plague who will be responsible for leading any preparedness and response actions. Plague Surveillance & Control in Sub-Saharan Africa: Operational Guidelines National Incident Manager / Focal point 2.2 Identify, train and designate Incident Manager and Incident Management Team WHO PHEOC Manual National Incident Management Team National Public Health Emergency Operations Centre 2.3 Designate an IMS organigram for plague at the national level. WHO PHEOC Manual National Incident Management Team 2.4 Establish a national taskforce /committee to coordinate and implement national preparedness actions through technical subcommittees. Plague Surveillance & Control in Sub-Saharan Africa: Operational Guidelines National Incident Manager; Dedicated representatives from line / technical ministries; Health Sector partners. National Public Health Emergency Plan 3 - Planning and resources Ready to respond through consolidated national emergency preparedness and response planning process based on the current risk profile. 3.1 National Contingency Plan for plague developed and tested. Plague Surveillance & Control in Sub-Saharan Africa: Operational Guidelines National Incident Manager; Dedicated representatives from line and technical ministries; Health Sector partners. National Contingency Plan 2

3.2 National Contingency Plan includes costed actions for preparedness, response and recovery 3.3 Identify funding sources, including allocation of domestic resources and mechanisms to raise additional resources if necessary, and ensure mechanisms for accessing funding sources are known. Donor agencies. 3.4 Identify the process to transfer money from central level to local emergency use. Administration and Finance. 3.5 In plague endemic countries, develop Standard Operating Procedures for plague. National Incident Manager; Dedicated representatives from line and technical ministries; Health Sector partners. SOPs 4 - Epidemiological and laboratory surveillance Ready to detect cases through early warning and surveillance systems for the detection, identification, and reporting of events, leveraging existing mechanisms, with a strong community surveillance component. 4.1 Develop national case definitions for human surveillance of plague including at the health facility and community levels, and establish plague as an immediately notifiable disease. Surveillance teams, clinicians, community health workers, Red Cross/Crescent volunteers, NGOs, midwives, healer, leaders etc. Epidemiology surveillance materials including investigation forms, line list templates, and printed case definition 4.2 In plague endemic countries, establish surveillance for human cases of plague. 4.3 Provide specific training on the use of case definitions, how to identify suspect and probable cases on a clinical basis as well as initiate early antimicrobial management and on contact tracing. Plague Surveillance & Control in Sub-Saharan Africa: Operational Guidelines District health teams (district health officer, surveillance/investigation officer) Surveillance teams, clinicians, community health workers Epidemiology surveillance materials including investigation forms and printed case definition Training material for surveillance and contact tracing 4.4 If a public hotline is available, train staff on alert processes and requests for information related to plague. Hotline staff working by shift Public Health emergency hotline number 3

4.5 Strengthen existing data and collection reporting system to ensure data flow is timely. District to National level surveillance teams Strengthen (or establish if not already existing) a reporting system that captures case-based data at all levels 4.6 4.7 Make available laboratory equipment at the health facility level (including Rapid diagnostic Tests if available, equipment for sample collection) Designate a national referral laboratory responsible for analysis or specimen handling of plague specimens and ensure that referral and feedback procedures are known at national, sub-national and facility levels. Laboratory staff and technicians Laboratory staff and technicians Items for collection and transport of specimen: Disposable syringe, Disposable needle (18 g), Alcohol pad for cleansing the puncture site, Adhesive plaster, Plastic container, Sterile Cary-Blair transport medium, Small sponge, Chlorine pad for cleaning any work. Sterile swab. Items to perform Rapid Diagnostic Test: Calibrated plastic tube for dipstick assay, Eppendorf tube with sterile phosphate buffered saline (PBS). Biosafety Level II environment and precautions RDTs first line test at field level, if available. Specimens can be referred to national level for culture, serology, PCR testing. 4.8 Ensure laboratory personnel are trained on safety procedures and IPC for specimen collection, packaging, labelling, referral & shipment (including for specimens collected from bubonic, pneumonic, septicemic and post-mortem cases) Laboratory staff and technicians Training material for sample collection, packaging and shipment 4.9 If required, establish stand-by arrangements and agreements with WHO Collaborating Centres for confirmatory testing of plague and, if required, with relevant airline agreements to ship samples internationally. International laboratories Biosafety Level II environment and precautions 4.10. Ensure at least 3 staff are certified for shipment of hazardous and highly infectious biological materials (IATA certification). Staff accredited for sample shipment 4.11 Ensure that the contacts of shipping companies and other service providers are up-todate and valid. Shipping companies PPE Triple packaging Vehicles/motorcycles 5 - Rapid Response 4

Readiness to deploy Multidisciplinary Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) to support early detection, control, and response to public health events in support of the local health system. 5.1 5.2 Team leader(s) and multidisciplinary members of national and regional RRTs assembled, equipped and ready to deploy within 24 hours of an alert. Provide specific training provided on (i) plague contingency plan, (ii) IMS, and (iii) technical guidelines (including case definitions, case management,safe and dignified burial, disinfection, risk communications, situation reports, incident management). Plague Surveillance & Control in Sub- Saharan Africa: Operational Guidelines Plague kits including in RDTs, PPE, Medical supplies including antibiotics for plague treatment, Case Investigation Forms and Case definition, case management and vector control guides, Lab materials, IEC materials, Vehicles 6 - Risk Communication and Community Engagement Readiness to engage with key stakeholders for timely sharing of information; coordination of interventions; dynamic communication surveillance including conducting operational research to monitor perceptions, fears and concerns of the affected and at risk populations; for effective response to the public health event through the use of multiple communication interventions including but not limited to public communications, social mobilization, health promotion, and engagement. 6.1 Develop and train spokespersons on a comprehensive public communication outreach targeted to high risk groups for plague across mainstream and social media and social mobilization in communities. 6.2 Map out and tailor key interventions, partners and stakeholders and messaging. 6.3 6.4 6.5 Establish community outreach, engagement and empowerment, including use of interpersonal communication, focused group discussions, and new and traditional media like community radio, theatre, etc. Develop tools / processes to incorporate active listening, management of rumours and misinformation Into the overall outbreak response. Gather existing information and baseline data on language preferences, media and social media outreach, mobile phone coverage, trusted messengers for public awareness campaigns. Plague Knowledge Resource at OpenWHO: Knowledge resources for plague responders EN https://openwho.org/courses/knowledgeresources-plague Knowledge resources for plague responders FR https://openwho.org/courses/ressourcesconnaissances-peste Secretariat for coordinating the Communications plan Rooms for convening meetings, platforms for sharing information, and other miscellaneous supplies, including office supplies. Budget for public communication (e.g. public service announcements, campaigns, IEC materials..) Budget for hotlines, community radios, regular TV or radio programmes, etc. Budget for training a workforce on mobilization and community outreach. Budget mechanisms to monitor public perceptions and concerns (media monitoring, operational researches and surveys, etc.) Budget for conducting community outreach activities 5

6.6 Develop simple material particularly for travelers or other high-risk groups, translating into local languages. 7 - Safe service delivery and case management Readiness to provide safe care for all patients in appropriately equipped facilities. 7.1 Designate a reference centre at the national level with adequate equipment & supplies to provide care to plague cases, including isolation for pnuemonic cases. 7.2 Strengthen infection prevention and control guidelines and SOPS in all health facilities. 7.3 Provide detection and clinincal management guidance on bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic plague cases to all health facilities 7.4 Train healthcare providers in all high-risk areas on case management 7.5 Equip and adequately train health-care workers including environmental health personnel, hygienists / cleaners on IPC measures and waste management processes, particularly for pneumonic cases. Plague Surveillance & Control in Sub- Saharan Africa: Operational Guidelines At national and subnational levels teams (preferably staff from the national reference hospital), each comprising: Physicians Nurses/midwives Nutritionists Psychosocial experts Ward attendants Cleaners/hygienist Security Waste management personnel For each identified health centre: Power and running water Waste management facilities Intravenous fluids Essential Drugs Food for personnel and patients Training materials and job aids for IPC, clinical care PPE kits Disinfectants Hygienist protection materials Triple packaging kits for transporting specimens 7.6 Identified, recruit, train and equip community members to form a burial team and ensure identification of supervisor for safe burial. 8 Zoonotic Reservoir and Vector Management 6

Animal-based plague surveillance programs monitor the occurrence and spread of Y. pestis infections in: rodent reservoirs, flea vectors, and non-reservoir mammalian species that seroconvert following infection 8.1 In plague endemic countries, strengthen or select an appropriate plague surveillance strategy in animals to monitor occurrence / spread of Y. pestis in animal reservoir and vector populations Plague Surveillance & Control in Sub- Saharan Africa: Operational Guidelines At national level Veterinarians/Entomologists Data managers/clerks Investigation officers Supervisors In high-risk areas/districts: Veterinarians/Entomologists Data clerks District health teams Vector control guides Database management system Vehicles/motorcycles Phones and credit Gloves and sanitary equipment Standard WHO bioassay procedures and kits 9 Logistics and procurement Logistics capacities in place to provide cross functional support. 9.1 9.2 9.3 Conduct a logistics assessment in the context of plague, detection and control and in the management of its complications. Preposition essential stocks required under the Plague Contingency plan at the district level. Establish clear supply chain and replenishment and procurement mechanisms for perishable or disposable items. At national level Logistics coordinators Procurement officer Supply officer Fleet manager Warehouse manager At subnational level /field level Logistics officers / Storekeepers Transport means; Telecommunications devices; Computers; PPE; Stock management system 10 - Points of Entry (PoE) 7

Ready to detect and manage cases who present at Points of Entry 10.1 Ensure that a health emergency contingency plan is in place at high risk PoE (ports, airports, and ground crossings) 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 Equip and appropriately staff sites for health assessments and management of suspected ill travellers at all PoE Avail SoPs to identify, manage and refer suspected ill patients from PoE to designated hospitals /isolation facility Review and test current communication system between health authorities and conveyance operators at PoE, and national health surveillance systems Sensitize public health authorities at PoE of the disease, review their roles and processes for handling, reporting and for referral of suspected cases International Health Regulation (2005) At each point of entry and official border crossing. Nurses / staff trained in case identification Disinfection staff Relevant PoE stakeholders identified in the PoE contingency plan. At each point of entry and official border crossing. Basic hygiene sanitation, disinfection and protective equipment (gloves, soaps, chlorinated water, disinfectant, waste disposal, etc.) PPE Medical equipment, forms for screening Infrared thermometers Observation/isolation room: if possible a separated room, if not, a separated area Ambulance. 10.6 Avail SOP for implementing exit screening in the event of a confirmed outbreak 8