Delayed Detonation After Projectile Impact

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ARMY RESEARCH LABORATORY Delayed Detonation After Projectile Impact Vincent M. Boyle Steven R. Stegall Harry E. Bates, Jr. NOV 1 8 1993 ARL-TR-298 November 1993 REFERENCE COPY! DOES NOT CIRCULATE! ^ :?'?i^jr^a»^:i^, ' ^ f-s-f^ai^jiify-^.jvi;^ijkij;s.tf:;:-i; APPROVED FOR PUBUC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNUMITED.

NOTICES Destroy this report when it is no longer needed. DO NOT return it to the originator. Additional copies of this report may be obtained from the National Technical Infomiation Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents. The use of trade names or manufacturers' names in this report does not constitute indorsement of any commercial product.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved 0MB No. 0704-0188 PuDlic recwrrmc buraen for this colleaion of information is estimated to a-zeraqe i nour oer resdonse. including the time for reviewing instruaions, searcning existing data source*, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing tne collection of information. Send comments regarding this Durden estimate or any other asoect of this colleaion of information, including suggestions for reducing this Duroen. tc Washington Heaoauarters Services. Direaorate for information Operations and Reoorts. 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204. Arlington, va 22202-4302. and to the o'flceof Management and Suoget. Paperwork Redualon Projea (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE November 1993 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Delayed Detonation Afta Projectile Impact 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final, Decl991 - Mar 1992 5. FUNDING NUMBERS PR: 1L162618AH80 6. AUTHOR(S) Vincent M. Boyle, Steven R. Stegall, and Harry E. Bates Jr. 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAM (S} AND AOOR SS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER U.S. Army Research Laboratory AITN: AMSRL-WT-TB AbCTdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5066 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Research Laboratcsy ATIN: AMSRL-OP-CI-B (Tech Lib) AbCTdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5066 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER ARL-TR-298 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) In an effort to undo^tand the mechanisms which cause munitions impacted by firagments to detonate, we conducted a test SCTies in which we impacted 105-mm HEP warheads (Comp B loaded) by flat-faced cylindrical steel projectiles. The velocity of the projectile was varied in order to detonune a 50% velocity for detonation. We instrumented our test with an external blast pressure {xobe and an internal carbon resistor gage so that we could discriminate between detonations and low-order e;q>losive reactions. In addition, wimess plates were used to record the fragmentation pattern of the los-mm rounds. We have obso^ed three Ixoad categories of explosive reaction which are a function of the velocity of tiie impacting projectile: (1) prompt detonation at fragment velocities above 1,150 m/s (3,773 ft/s), (2) delayed detonation at fragment velocities around 1,150-900 m/s (3,609-2,952 ft/s), and (3) no detonation at fragment velocities below 900 m/s (2,952 ft/s). For any given fragment velocity, th^e was a wide variability in the measured delay time for explosive reaction. We attribute this variability to possible differences in hit location of the flat-nosed projectile on the cylindrical surface of the wailiead, which would cause differences between the impact shock loadings even though the fragment velocity was the same. 14. SUBJECT TERMS delayed detonation, fragment impact, noniht>mpt detonation, ammunition fragments, explosion effects, fragment velocity 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 22 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSU>1HD 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES v L INTRODUCTION 1 2. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 1 3. RESULTS 3 4. DISCUSSION 3 5. CONCLUSIONS 9 6. REFERENCES 11 DISTRIBUTION LIST 13 HI

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LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Experimental arrangement (overhead view) 2 2. Cross-section view of a carbon resistor gauge in a 105-mm HEP-T warhead 2 3. Fragment velocity vs. the time after impact that the carbon resistor gauge detects a signal 5 4. Carbon resistor gauge records for detonation 7 5 Carbon resistor gauge records for nose-only detonations 8 6. Carbon resistor gauge records for nondetonations 8

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1. INTRODUCTION The response of explosive-filled munitions to fragment attack is important both from a vulnerability aspect and also because a better understanding of the parameters that influence explosive reaction could lead to improved munitions. The prompt detonation response of bare explosive to fragment impact is well described by the critical energy concept (Gittings 1965; Walker 1969) and various refinements to this concept (Bahl, Vantine, and Weingart 1981). When the explosive is confined (e.g., in a munition), other initiation mechanisms can become important so that a reacting explosive can eventually build to a detonation, given the additional time which confinement provides. These "nonprompt" detonations can require as much as 100 ps in our experiments whereas prompt detonations obtained from wedge test data (Gibbs and Popolato 1980; Dobratz and Crawford 1985) appear to occur within 10 ps or less. 2. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE In order lo investigate delayed detonations, we used the experimental arrangement shown in Figure 1. A Comp B-filled 105-mm HEP-T wariiead was placed about 127 mm (5.00 in) above a steel armor witness plate supported by a heavy armor table. A 1-in smoothbore powder gun accelerated a 19-mm-diameter (0.75 in) x 38-mm-long (1.5 in) steel projectile weighing 76 g (0.17 lb); the gun was aimed so that the projectile would impact the warhead on its cylindrical surface at the midline and centered on the round. The flat-faced steel projectile impacted the round at a normal obliquity. Although the yaw was not measured in this test series, we had previously performed similar firings using this projectile and the yaw appeared to be reproducible within ± 5 degrees. The projectile velocity was determined using velocity screens, and the initial impact on the waiiiead was obtained from a shorting screen taped to the body of the warhead. This screen provided the zero reference lime for both the carbon resistor gauge (McAfee 1989; Ginsberg 1991) and the free-field blast probe. The actual hit point of the projectile on the wariiead varied within approximately 9.5 mm (0.375 in) of the aim poinl We used a carbon resistor gauge in order to determine the time after impact that a reaction wave or a detonation reached the base of the round where the gauge was located. The distance between the impact point and the gauge was 145 mm (5.71 in), as shown in Figure 2. The carbon resistor gauge configuration that we used in these tests differed from that described in McAfee (1989) and Ginsberg (1991). Our gauge consisted of a 1/8-W, 470-ohm resistor made by the Allen Bradley Company. We epoxied it within a polyethylene cylinder so that there was a 3.2-mm (0.125-in) layer of polyethylene between the gauge 1

BLAST PROBE IMBEDDED CARBON GAGE IMPACT SCREEN GUN BLAST SHIELD WARHEAD - WFTNESS / PLATE VELOCITY SCREENS SMOOTH BORE GUN ARMOR BARRICADE Figure 1. Experimental arrangement (overhead view). > To Carbon Resistor Gage Circuitry Imbedded Carbon Resistor Gage 145mm \ Impact Point Wall Thickness = 5 mm Figure 2. Cross-section view of a carbon resistor gauize in a 105-mm HEP-T warhead.

and the explosive fill when the gauge was inserted into the warhead, as shown in Figure 2. The encapsulated gauge was held in a machined cavity in the base plug of the warhead, and the lead wires came out through a small diameter hole drilled through the base plug. We basically followed the procedures described in McAfee (1989) for the gauge circuitry and analysis of the gauge records. We also used a free-field blast pressure probe in order to measure the side-on pressure associated with explosive reaction of the warhead. The probe was positioned 4.6 m (15 ft) from the impact point in all these tests. In addition, we used a steel armor witness plate as an indicator of warhead detonation. 3. RESULTS Our experimental results are listed in Table 1. The carbon gauge arrival time is the time after impact that the gauge responds to an explosive reaction, whether that reaction is a detonation or a milder event which may increase pressure at a much lower rate. The blast probe gives a good far field indication of the level of explosive reaction. 4. DISCUSSION We have plotted our results for fragment velocity vs. time after impact in Figure 3. We have observed several modes of warhead response to fragment impact: 1. Nondetonation, generally characterized by recovered explosive or possibly large case fragments (large in comparison to fragments associated with detonation) 2. Detonation, both prompt and nonprompt, which produce characteristic high pressure and small fragment size 3. Nose-only detonations, where apparently only the nose section of the warhead detonated generating a typical fragmentation pattern in that region only and no fragmentation pattern in the remainder of the round. The blast pressures associated with these nose-only detonations appeared to be even higher than those measured for the detonation mode.

Table 1. Delayed Detonation Test Results Carbon Gauge Blast Probe Shot No. Projectile Velocity (m/s) (ft/s) Arrival Time (ps) Pressure (kpa) (psi) Arrival Time (ms) Reaction Level 1 907 (2,975) - 76.5 (11.1) 6.2 nose detonation, no HE recovered, large case frags 2 952 (3,122) 132 11.7 (1.7) 10.8 explosive reaction, large pieces of HE recovered 3 1,017 (3,338) 63 79.9 (11.6) 6.1 nose detonation, no HE recovered, large case frags 4 1,104 (3,621) 54 59.9 (8.7) 7.4 detonation 5 1,077 (3,533) 62 64.1 (9.3) 7.1 detonation 6 901 (2,955) 68 14.5 (2.1) 10.4 explosive reaction, melted and powdered HE recovered 7 782 (2,565) 71 14.5 (2.1) 10.5 explosive reaction, HE recovered 8 1,673 (5,489) 22 74.5 (10.8) 7.2 detonation 9 1,385 (4,543) 23 49.6 (7.2) 7.3 detonation 10 1,091 (3,578) 88 23.4 (3.4) 9.0 explosive reaction, no HE recovered, small case frags 11 1,183 (3,881) 62 52.4 (7.6) 7.3 detonation 12 1,238 (4,063) 27 50.3 (7.3) 7.3 detonation 13 1,208 (3,963) 26 56.5 (8.2) 7.5 detonation 14 1,155 (3,789) 41 55.8 (8.1) 7.6 detonation 15 1,173 (3,849) 38 48.3 (7.0) 6.9 detonation 16 1,148 (3,765) 72 54.5 (7.9) 6.9 detonation 17 1,122 (3,682) 66 60.0 (8.7) 6.9 detonation 18 1,106 (3,628) 110 71.7 (10.4) 6.5 nose detonation, no HE recovered, small case frags 19 1,146 (3,761) 31 57.9 (8.4) 7.1 detonation

Table 1. Delayed Detonation Test Results (Continued) Carbon Gauge Blast Probe Shot No. Projectile Velocity (m/s) (ft/s) Arrival Time (MS) Pressure (kpa) (psi) Arrival Time (ms) Reaction Level 20 1,159 (3,802) 63 62.1 (9.0) 7.2 detonation 21 1,291 (4,234) 35 51.7 (7.5) 7.2 detonation 22 1,243 (4,077) 52 64.1 (9.3) 7.2 detonation 23 1,398 (4,585) 56 54.5 (7.9) 7.3 detonation 24 1,418 (4,651) 39 56.5 (8.2) 7.2 detonation 25 1,439 (4,722) 26 56.5 (8.2) 7.4 detonation 26 1,457 (4,779) 24 54.5 (7.9) 7.4 detonation V) ti IMU - O DETONATION 120- O NON-DETONATION 100-80- 60- + + NOSE ONLY DETONATION o O +. * a; 40- \^ o o ^^ ^ -t-.. NO DETONATION \ NON-PROMPT DET. PROMPT DET. 700 900 1100 1300 ' r 1500 1700 Fragment Velocity (m/sec) Figure 3. Fragment velocity vs. the time after impact that the carbon resistor gauge detects a signal.

In Figure 3, there is a wide variability in the explosive response time for a given fragment velocity. We attribute this to differences in the impact shock loading, caused by variability in the hit point and the projectile yaw. Although we have not done a detailed analysis of the impact shock loading, it appears reasonable to assume that if the hit point occurs off the midline of the cylindrical waiiiead the severity of the impact shock would be decreased and if the fragment were appropriately yawed there would be an additional degradation of the impact shock. With this assumption, we have drawn a boundary curve through our experimental points. This curve relates the time after impact that a reaction wave arrives at the gauge to the velocity of a nonyawed fragment impacting the cylindrical surface at the center of its midline. The minimum response time of 22 ps for a fragment velocity of 1,673 m/s (5,489 ft/s) corresponds to an immediate detonation of the warhead upon fragment impact At about 1,150 m/s (3,773 ft/s), the response time is around 31 ps corresponding to a detonation delay of about 9 ps; we interpret this to be the velocity at which an idealized impact would cause a nonprompt detonation response of the warhead. There are two nose-only detonations shown in Figure 3. A third nose-only detonation (without a carix)n gauge record) is listed as Shot No. 1 in Table 1. The impact velocity for this shot was very low, 907 m/s (2,980 ft/s). We estimate that the nondetonation response of the warhead occurs at an impact velocity of around 900 m/s (2,953 ft/s), as indicated in Figure 3. The nose-only detonation represents a very marginal detonation since only the nose portion of the warhead appears to detonate, yet the blast probe measurements (peak pressure and shock arrival time) give values indicative of a response stronger than a standard detonation in which the entire warhead detonates. The reason for this anomalous behavior is unknown. Table 2 correlates explosive response and blast probe measurements. Table 2. A Correlation of Explosive Response and Blast Probe Measurements Explosive Response Averaged Peak Shock Pressure (kpa) (psi) Averaged Shock Arrival Time (ms) Nondetonation 16.0 (2.32) 10.2 Detonation 60.2 (8.73) 7.2 Nose-Only Detonation 76.0 (11.0) 6.3

In shots where the warhead detonated, the carbon gauge records gave good arrival time data and wide variability in the peak pressure. This is shown in Figure 4 for Shot Nos. 17 and 26. For the nose-only detonations, the carbon gauge records in Figure 5 indicate the same trend in level of explosive reaction as shown in Table 1 for Shot Nos. 3 and 18. In a similar manner, the carbon gauge records for nondetonations show the same trend; higher pressures correspond to a higher level of explosive reaction as evidenced by the smaller size of the recovered fragments. Figure 6 shows two carbon gauge records for nondetonation, Shot Nos. 7 and 10, which can be compared to the reaction level in Table 1. Also, in these shots, the pressure and the pressurization rate both increase as the velocity of the impacting fragment increases. We do not have enough carbon gauge data to say if this is generally true; in addition, the occurrence of "non-ideal" impacts may obscure any relationship between the fragment velocity and the carbon gauge data. All the carbon gauge records are eventually perturbed as the gauge begins to short out or break. Detonations 26 24-22 - 20-18 - 4)26 a. O u 16 14 12-10 - 8-6 - 4 2 H 0 20 1 40 Time (oucrosec) I 60 80 100 Figure 4. Carbon resistor gauge records for detonation.

26 24 H 22 20 18 - Mis 0. 16 14-12 10-8 6-4 2 O 40 80 1 r 120 160 200 «3 n 240 Time (mlcrosec) Figure 5. Carbon resistor gauge records for nosk-onlv detonations. 0- O t IG 200 400 Time (mlcrosec) Figure 6. Carbon resistor gauge records for nondetonations.

5. CONCLUSIONS Although the variability in our data necessarily make our conclusions to be somewhat qualitative, they may serve as a guide for future investigations into nonprompt detonation phenomena. For the idealized lower boundary data curve (Figure 3), nonprompt detonations start at an impact velocity of about 1,150 m/s (3,773 ft/s). In practice, we observe nonprompt detonations at higher velocities also, but we attribute this to nonideal impact (due to variability in fragment yaw and hit location). These nonprompt detonations occur as much as 80 ps later than a prompt detonation. We estimate that the idealized nondetonation response occurs around an impact velocity of 9(X) m/s (2,953 ft/s) and below. The concavity of the inner steel surface of the warhead in the nose region may promote nose-only detonation by focusing internally reflected shock waves.

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6. REFERENCES Bahl, K. L., H. C. Vantine, and R. C. Weingart. "The Shock Initiation of Bare and Covered Explosives by Projectile Impact." Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium (International) on Detonation, NSWC/MP-82-334, pp. 325-335, June 1981. Dobratz, B. M., and P. C. Crawford. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Explosive Handbook. UCRL-52997, 31 January 1985. Gibbs, T., and A. Popolato, editors. Explosive Property Data. University of California Press, 1980. Ginsberg, M. J., and B. W. Asay. "Commercial Carbon Composition Resistors as Dynamic Stress Gauges in Difficult Environments." Review of Scientific Instruments, vol. 62, no. 9, September 1991. Gittings, E. F. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium (International) on Detonation, pp. 373-380, October 1965. McAfee, J. M. "The Response of Propellant to Hypervelocity Attack: Part II, The Development of Carbon Resistors as Stress Gauges for Heterogeneous Beds." Los Alamos National Laboratory draft copy, 18 July 1989. Walker, F. E., and R. J. Wasley. "Critical Energy for Shock Initiation of Heterogeneous Explosive." Explosivstoffe. Nr. 1, pp. S^13, 1969. 11

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