A Model for Port State Control of LNG Ships

A Model for Port State Control of LNG Ships by Captain Joel R. Whitehead, U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port, Boston

Background The Port of Boston, Massachusetts is the site of the first and most active Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) importing terminal in the United States. Since 1971, more than 400 discharges of LNG cargoes have taken place, each ranging from 60,000 m 3 to 125,000 m 3. In the last several years, the number of cargoes arriving has steadily risen and current projections show only more growth in LNG demand in the United States. This demand for LNG has occurred for a variety of reasons, including: increasingly stringent clean air requirements that require many electrical power generation plants to reduce emissions severely; a reduction in nuclear power plant licenses in the United States; increasing competition for the use of fossil fuels, specifically for other energy needs such as automobile fuel; and, the availability of LNG supplies closer to home, especially from Trinidad and Tobago and Latin America. It is, of course, a priority for the U.S. Coast Guard to ensure the safety of LNG transits and cargo discharges in an urban setting such as Boston, Massachusetts. At the same time, it is also necessary to facilitate other maritime commerce within the port such as harbor ferries and passenger vessels, tankers, container vessels and auto carriers. While solving this dilemma is still a work in progress, it is well on its way to resolution. The U.S. Coast Guard in Boston and Cabot LNG Corporation 1, parent corporation of the Distrigas of Massachusetts Corporation, the LNG terminal in Everett, Massachusetts, have taken a novel approach to this problem through creation of Port Vision 2000: The Port of Boston Partnership for LNG Safety. The partnership s goal is to accommodate the very real increase in LNG shipments with existing resources while maintaining the same high level of safety. The Port Safety Triad: Legal Authority, Port State Control and Partnerships In the opinion of this author, the safety and security of any port is greatly enhanced when three conditions coexist. The first of these is that the port state must have strong laws and regulations with respect to ship safety, vessel traffic management, crew competency and pollution prevention and response. Needless to say, there must also be effective enforcement programs in place and a well-trained force to carry out the legal and regulatory requirements of a given port state. A third and final element that can further enhance the safety of the port is the existence of vibrant and active partnerships among the enforcing agencies, port authorities, shipping agents, terminal operators, ship charterers, pilots, recreational and environmental organizations. The importance of this last condition cannot be overemphasized: when willing partners with common interests work cooperatively, improved levels of safety are much more likely to be attained. Legal Authority Among the nations of the world, the United States is somewhat unique in that it has assigned authority for almost all aspects of port safety and security, ship safety and crew qualifications almost exclusively in the hands of one agency: the U.S. Coast Guard. In that role, the U.S. Coast Guard exercises expansive legal and regulatory authority through the Commanding Officer of the local Marine Safety Office. That individual, with few exceptions, exercises broad legal powers under three separate roles in U.S. law and regulations. In the role of the Captain of the Port (COTP), he or she is responsible for port safety and security, and marine environmental protection throughout a specifically assigned geographic zone. 2 There are 45 COTPs located within the waters of the United States. In addition, the Captain of the Port is usually designated as the federal On-Scene Coordinator. In that role, he or she is responsible for the Whitehead 1

effective and immediate removal of discharges of oil and hazardous substances within the specific geographic zone of responsibility, as well as preventing the threat of such a discharge. 3 The final role is that of the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI) 4. The OCMI is responsible for the inspection of U.S. and foreign flagged ships within U.S. waters, and U.S. vessels in foreign waters to ensure the safe operation of machinery, navigation equipment, lifesaving devices and to ensure compliance with international maritime safety conventions to which the United States is signatory. The OCMI is also responsible for the investigation of marine casualties and accidents, and for the licensing and documentation of merchant mariners, including certification under the International Convention on the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW). In most cases, the Commanding Officer of the local Marine Safety Office carries out all three roles. This effectively places all federal responsibility for prevention of marine related accidents and the federal response to them within the hands of one local U.S. Coast Guard office. Within the port of Boston, Massachusetts these responsibilities fall to the Commanding Officer of Marine Safety Office Boston. 5 Port State Control Armed with this far-reaching legal authority, the Coast Guard must operationally manage risk within U.S. waters. The U.S. Coast Guard accomplishes this through a variety of initiatives, but one of the most important and effective of these is the Port State Control program. As the demographics of worldwide shipping have changed, it has become quite apparent that the greatest potential threat to U.S. ports and waterways comes from foreign ships: foreign ships now account for 95% of the passenger ships and 75% of the cargo ships operating in U.S. waters. As international safety and environmental protection standards implemented under conventions such as SOLAS and MARPOL have become more strict, port states have amassed greater enforcement authority as well. The U.S. Port State Control program 6 is currently the primary risk-management methodology to ensure port safety and to allocate scarce inspection resources. The Port State Control mechanism is key to managing the safety of all ships in U.S. waters, including LNG tankers. In Boston, as in many ports, the Port State Control Officer accomplishes this assessment on a Boarding Priority Matrix that numerically assesses an individual vessel s risk based upon five criteria: the owner, the ship s flag, the responsible Classification Society, vessel history and ship type. Future modifications to the Port State Control program are anticipated in early 2001 when the U.S. Coast Guard will announce Quality Ship 21, an initiative to recognize and reward a small percentage of truly high quality foreign ships by reducing inspection burdens on them. In many ports, official or unofficial partnerships exist among members of the public and private sector whose purpose is to further communication and to enhance safety. Within the Port of Boston, there are three partnerships of particular interest that influence the safe carriage of LNG. The first is the Port Operators Group that has been in existence for over ten years in Boston and is similar to Harbor Safety Committees found in many U.S. ports 7. The Port Operators Group, co-chaired by the Director of the Massachusetts Port Authority and the U.S Coast Guard Captain of the Port, meets monthly and serves predominately as a communications forum for all members of the maritime community. Members come from all industry segments and include shipping agents, pilots, terminal operators, harbormasters, local passenger vessel operators, as well as federal, state, and local government representatives such as the Coast Guard, NOAA, U.S. Navy, MASSPORT, Massachusetts Coastal Zone Management, and City of Boston agencies. A second important partnership with special relevance to the carriage of LNG in Boston is the Maritime Incident Resources Training Partnership (MIRT). 8 This partnership was begun by local firefighters to help train coastal Massachusetts fire departments in emergency maritime incident procedures consistent with the National Fire Protection Standard 1405 (Guide for Land-Based Firefighters who Respond to Marine Vessel Fires). Participants include MASSPORT, Marine Safety Office Boston, Massachusetts Whitehead 2

Emergency Management Agency, the Massachusetts Fire Academy as well as numerous firefighters from coastal communities. The main goal of the MIRT is to provide training for local fire departments and support agencies that are called upon to respond to shipboard fires and other emergency maritime incidents that might occur in Massachusetts waters. An emergency maritime incident is one that would require the involvement of multiple agencies in a shipboard or waterfront accident and which could reasonably be expected to overwhelm any single individual agency s capabilities. Another goal of MIRT members is to expand current response capabilities and enhance maritime safety through regular training and field exercises utilizing the Incident Command System 9. The Incident Command System is a standardized emergency management system through which several organizations will have shared authority to respond. To date, over 1,600 local firefighters have received maritime firefighting training under the sponsorship of the MIRT. The most important and final partnership with relevance to LNG carriage in Boston is the subject of this paper: Port Vision 2000: The Port of Boston Partnership for LNG Safety. The partnership s roots began in the mid-1990 s as many port users became increasingly aware that the growing numbers of LNG tanker arrivals might very well constrain other uses for the port. Because of safety concerns with LNG transits, the U.S. Coast Guard had historically stopped all traffic within a two-mile safety zone around an incoming LNG tanker and enforced this with Coast Guard escort vessels. The projected increases in LNG arrivals from less than 13 arrivals per year in 1996 to as many as 50 arrivals by 1998 were clearly expected to affect other commercial and recreational uses of the port: oil tankers and barges, container vessels, auto carriers, and recreational boaters, among others. Moreover, the growth in transits was straining the resources of the Coast Guard to escort transits and monitor the cargo discharge. Under the leadership of then Captain of the Port John Grenier, and R. Gordon Shearer, Chairman of Cabot LNG Corporation, the partnership was formalized with a simply stated mission: To manage an increase in the annual number of LNG cargoes with no reduction in the current level of protection of life, property and the environment while optimizing resource utilization and minimizing impact on other vessel traffic. Port Vision 2000 In keeping with the U.S. Coast Guard s Prevention Through People program 10, a systems approach to risk analysis was used in Port Vision 2000. The Project was lead by a Guidance Team consisting of the Captain of the Port and the Chairman of Cabot LNG. They empowered the Project Team to examine systems, explore and reengineer processes, meet as needed, conduct studies, collect data, communicate freely with stakeholders, and develop solutions for implementation by the sponsors. The Project Team consisted of representatives of Marine Safety Office Boston and Distrigas. Because of the impact of LNG operations in the port, many stakeholders were active participants in the development of Port Vision 2000, including: Industry: Ships agents, pilots, ship masters, commuter boat operators, commercial fishing vessel operators, cruise ship operators, tug and towing operators Federal agencies: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Customs Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Federal Aviation Administration State agencies: MASSPORT, Massachusetts State Police, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection Local agencies: Everett Fire Department, Boston Fire Department, Boston Harbormaster, and Boston Police. Whitehead 3

To understand the changes brought about by the Port Vision 2000, it is necessary to understand generally what the LNG practices within the port were before the agreement. Once the Coast Guard had received the required 24-hour notice of arrival, the vessel would be directed to anchorage in Broad Sound, outside the port proper, where a full inspection of the ship was carried out by Marine Safety Office Boston. Once this was satisfactorily completed, the vessel could transit the harbor enroute the Distrigas terminal, but only in daytime hours and with strict restrictions on visibility (2 mile minimum), tides and maximum winds. Enroute the terminal, the vessel would be accompanied by U.S. Coast Guard escort vessels that enforced a two-mile moving safety zone around the LNG carrier. On board the tanker, the Coast Guard stationed a Vessel Movement Officer who was in constant communication with the nearby Coast Guard vessels in the event other vessels came too close or invaded the safety zone. In conjunction with the pilot, the Vessel Movement Officer also kept an eye on meeting, crossing or overtaking situations with other vessels. Once the vessel was safely at dock, the Coast Guard observed the cool-down process and continuously monitored the entire cargo transfer operation, a period lasting between 24-30 hours. In consultation with the port s stakeholders, the Project Team sought to streamline these procedures so that the vessel could transit the harbor quickly, discharge its cargo and leave the port, all the while maintaining an equivalent level of safety. The Captain of the Port and Cabot LNG both acknowledged that the PSC matrix was a useful mechanism to screen vessels upon arrival for their participation in a streamlined process. Priority One vessels (the most deficient vessels under the Port State Control program) would be required to undergo a full boarding and inspection in the anchorage prior to transiting the harbor. After months of work, the Team agreed upon new procedures that were found acceptable to the Guidance Team. These procedures were ultimately published in a document entitled The Port of Boston Partnership for LNG Safety: Policies, Procedures and Guidelines. Some of the key changes in the procedures were: Notice of Arrival: Federal regulations require LNG carriers to provide the Coast Guard with 24-hour notice of arrival in a U.S. port. The Project Team agreed that it would be mutually beneficial for the tanker s Master to provide Distrigas, the ship s agent and the Coast Guard with 72-hour notice of arrival. This not only assisted the terminal and agent in its planning for receiving the tanker, but it also assisted the Coast Guard by providing additional time to review the vessel history, determine boarding priority and communicate any special requirements with the Coast Guard inspectors. It also provided sufficient lead time to notify appropriate Coast Guard units who would assist in escorting the vessel through the port. Notification of deficiencies: At the time of the 72-hour notice of arrival, the Master would provide certification that there were no known casualties to this vessel or its machinery which might affect its seaworthiness; that all cargo containment, cryogenic handling, vapor detection, emergency systems, and fire-fighting equipment were in proper operating condition; and that they had been operating satisfactorily for the duration of the voyage. In addition, the Master would certify whether all crew and officers met the training and certification requirements of STCW, and whether any Classification Society or Coast Guard safety requirements were outstanding on the vessel. Provided that there were no deficiencies noted and the vessel had a clear history, it would generally be allowed to proceed directly into the port and not have to anchor beforehand. A Coast Guard inspection team and Vessel Movement Officer would, however, board the vessel outside the harbor entrance while it was enroute the terminal. If, on the other hand, discrepancies were reported, the Marine Safety Office would analyze them and develop a plan of action prior to boarding. All Priority One vessels under the Port State Control targeting matrix would proceed directly to anchorage for inspection prior to port entry. Whitehead 4

Authorized Escort Vessels: Given the projected increase in LNG arrivals in the port, the Project Team anticipated that a Coast Guard escort vessel might not always be available. So as not to delay a loaded LNG tanker from its intended transit, they provided for the use of other escort vessels (such as the Boston Harbormaster, State Police or other law enforcement agencies), provided that a Coast Guard representative was on board and in communication with the Vessel Movement Officer. However, since the Port Vision 2000 agreement has been signed, Coast Guard vessels have always been made available for escorts. Night-time transits: Prior to the Port Vision 2000 agreement, only daytime transits were allowed and then only with dedicated assist tugs alongside. However, as the Project Team worked with port stakeholders (including local pilots), it became clear that a safe transit could be made at night under certain circumstances: wind must be less than 20 knots in velocity; no vessel greater than 400 in length could be moored at the facility adjacent to the Everett terminal; and a blue steering light had to be installed on the forward masthead so the pilot could more easily view the bow swing as the vessel turned. Finally, the Master, harbor pilot and docking pilot must concur that a night-time transit is appropriate given the conditions at the time. Training: In addition to individual mariner training required under STCW, Distrigas agreed to sponsor training for other individuals directly or indirectly involved in the Boston LNG trade. LNG Basic Information Training is offered to school groups and community representatives. Local emergency responders many affiliated with the MIRT are trained at the terminal itself and frequently at an annual Hampton Roads Marine Firefighting Symposium. Boston pilots and docking masters, and other federal, state and local personnel are trained in basic terminal and LNG operations as well. Drills: Drills are required at several levels to ensure the readiness of individual and team responders. Shipboard drills are conducted by the Coast Guard at a given vessel s Annual Examination, or at any other time as warranted. Terminal drills are conducted at least semiannually and a combined drill is carried out annually that involves terminal, shipboard and firefighting personnel. Oversight and Continuous Improvement: To ensure that the Port Vision 2000 agreement remains a vibrant one, two oversight committees were formed. An Executive Committee, cochaired by the Captain of the Port and the President and CEO of Distrigas, meets semiannually to oversee LNG operations in the port of Boston. A Management Committee meets quarterly and reviews vessel-specific performance, effectiveness of current policies, and oversees continuous improvement activities. It reports to the Executive Committee and is also tasked with devising and directing community outreach and seeking stakeholder input to LNG operations in the port. Whitehead 5

Conclusion The author believes that the safe and efficient transportation of hazardous cargoes such as LNG can be carried out, especially when port states have effective laws and competent authorities to enforce them, enforcement mechanisms that work such as the Port State Control program, and effective industry and governmental partnerships. Port Vision 2000 is one such example of this type of partnership. While each port has its own unique characteristics and personalities that will affect the potential for creating and maintaining cooperative relationships such as this, it has worked well in Boston, Massachusetts where as many as 60 LNG transits may occur in 2000. Author s Note: This article represents the opinion of the author only and is not the official policy of the U.S. Government or the U.S. Coast Guard. 1 Cabot LNG Corporation recently sold Distrigas of Massachusetts Corporation to Tractobel, Inc., a multinational utilities corporation based in Belgium. 2 The specific duties of the Captain of the Port and the geographic boundaries of specific COTP Zones can be found in Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, 1.01-30 and Part 3, respectively. 3 The role of the federal On Scene Coordinator, specifically with respect to enforcement of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990, is discussed in Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, 1.01-80. 4 The specific duties of the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection and the geographic boundaries of specific OCMI Zones can be found in Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, 1.01-20 and Part 3, respectively. 5 More information on Marine Safety Office Boston can be found at their website: http://www.uscg.mil/d1/units/msobos 6 More information on this program can be found at the U.S. Coast Guard s Port State Control Web Page: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g%2dm/psc 7 The U.S. Coast Guard has recently initiated renewed emphasis on Harbor Safety Committees, as these are seen to be very effective means of promoting port safety and dialogue within a given port. More information on Harbor Safety Committees and the broader Marine Transportation System initiative can be found at the U.S. Coast Guard s Waterways Management Directorate website: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/mw/index.htm 8 More information on the MIRT can be found at the MSO Boston website and at http://www.mirtboston.com 9 In 1996, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard mandated that Captains of the Port adopt the Incident Command System as the standard for development of their response organizations for federally directed oil and hazardous materials releases. ICS has become the de facto method of planning for responses to all emergencies in which the Coast Guard takes a primary role. More information on the Coast Guard s use of the ICS can be found at the U.S. Coast Guard s National Strike Force website: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/nsfcc/nsfweb/nsfcc/ops/ics.html 10 The Prevention Through People program is an approach to marine safety and environmental protection that systematically addresses the root cause of most accidents - the human element. It recognizes that the major portion of these problems come from organizational errors and promotes a cultural change to develop a "do it right" mindset. More information on PTP can be found at the Coast Guard s PTP website: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g%2dm/nmc/ptp/index.htm Whitehead 6