U.S Assistance for Basic Education

2010/ED/EFA/MRT/PI/36 Background paper prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010 Reaching the marginalized U.S Assistance for Basic Education George M. Ingram 2009 This paper was commissioned by the Education for All Global Monitoring Report as background information to assist in drafting the 2010 report. It has not been edited by the team. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the EFA Global Monitoring Report or to UNESCO. The papers can be cited with the following reference: Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2010, Reaching the marginalized For further information, please contact efareport@unesco.org

U.S ASSISTANCE FOR BASIC EDUCATION George M. Ingram Vice President, AED Global Monitoring Report July 13, 2009 A) U.S. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION Rationale, Goals, Priorities, & Levels US foreign assistance programs have always been closely tied to US foreign policy and national security. But within the themes of national security -- most notably containment of communism during the Cold War and containment of terrorism after September 11, 2001 -- there has been considerable leeway for development cooperation. Increasingly development is recognized as an important US foreign policy objective. US foreign aid is segmented into military and economic assistance. Economic assistance is divided into three broad categories: development, humanitarian, and diplomatic/security. Development assistance covers a range of programs designed to alleviate poverty and promote economic, social, and political development. Humanitarian assistance relieves human suffering resulting from natural and man-made disasters. Diplomatic/security programs are designed to promote specific US foreign policy and security goals; ESF (Economic Support Funds) is economic assistance to countries in which the United States has strategic interest or that have recently emerged from conflict and is often used like development assistance; other diplomatic/security programs are designed to combat narcotics and human trafficking, nuclear proliferation, and terror. Military assistance is used for military education and training and the transfer and sale of military equipment. Relative levels of US economic assistance have fluctuated from an historic high during the Marshal Plan of 3.1% of GNP in FY 1 1949 ($8.3 billion in 1949 dollars), to a low of 0.15% in FY 2001, and to 0.19% in FY 2008 ($26.67 billion). 2 Total US foreign aid (economic and military) grew from $16 billion in FY 2000 to $29 billion in FY 2008 3. Despite the policy and rhetorical focus on the war on terror and the growth in assistance for that purpose in the years immediately following 2001, there has been a decided shift by the latter part of the decade toward development and humanitarian assistance, which together grew from 33% of the budget in FY 2000 to 55.4% in FY 2008 (35.5% for bilateral development assistance, 5.5% for multilateral 1 FY refers to fiscal year. 2 Much of the data on levels and distribution of foreign assistance are taken from a Congressional Research Service publication, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy, February 2009; my appreciation to the authors, Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson, for this tremendous compilation and overview of foreign assistance; and to Larry Nowels for helping to update some of the data. 3 There was a one year spike in assistance of $ 38.7 billion in 2004 caused by a surge in assistance to Iraq. 1

development assistance, and 14.4% for humanitarian). The proportion of assistance for diplomatic/security assistance dropped from 35.9% of total assistance in FY 2000 to 27.1% in FY 2008, and military assistance declined from 25.8% to 17.5% The notable shift to development/humanitarian assistance is largely accounted for by significant levels of funding for two new initiatives, Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and PEPFAR (HIV/AIDS and malaria initiative); an increase in assistance for Africa; and a gradual, planned reduction in economic assistance to Egypt and Israel. In addition, the Bush Administration narrowed the distinction between development assistance and ESF as evidenced by the increase in development assistance to countries in which the US has a dominant security interest. These numbers and trends account only for assistance provided through civilian agencies through funds appropriated to the international affairs funding account. They do not account for parallel funding through the Department of Defense (DOD), which due to US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan saw a spike in DOD funding of civilian type development activities that in 2005 accounted for 22% of U.S. economic assistance as reported to the DAC. Attention is often focused on what are considered the core development accounts USAID Development Assistance, USAID Global Health and Child Survival, the MCC, and State Department PEPFAR which collectively grew from a funding level of $1.9 billion in FY 1998 to $9.6 billion in FY 2008. Besides the dramatic growth in funding for HIV/AIDS and malaria, other areas which received significant increases are basic education, water and sanitation, and microenterprise. Sectors for which funding declined are agriculture and natural resource management and global environmental protection. The United States provided assistance to over 150 countries in FY 2008. Figures 1 and 2 provide a regional breakdown for FY 1998 and FY 2008. What is noteworthy in the regional distribution is that the Middle East continued to receive the largest (but reduced) share, the decline in funding to Europe/Eurasia, substantial growth in funding to Africa and South Asia, and more modest growth for East Asia and Latin America. Figures 3 and 4 present the top fifteen recipients of US assistance for FY 1998 and FY 2008. Of note is that Israel and Egypt remain at the top, five countries appear on both lists, and most of the countries were emerging from or facing some form of security threat or transition. Comparing FY 2008 to FY 1998, the amounts of assistance to those countries below the top several recipients are dramatically larger in FY 2008, and there are five countries in Africa in FY 2008 compared to only one in FY 1998. Fiscal Years 2009 & 2010 The general parameters of the allocations of assistance for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 are known (as of mid-july 2009). The regular and supplemental FY 2009 international affairs appropriations funding has been approved by the Congress, so the overall funding level and the program and country allocations are known but adjustments will be made during the year. The President has submitted an FY 2010 budget request and the annual 2

congressional budget resolution enacted, but the Congress still has to enact the appropriations bill. The total level for international affairs for FY 2009 is $52.7 billion (this includes the regular appropriation bill and two supplemental appropriations bills), of which $34.5 billion is for foreign assistance. The President proposed funding of $53.9 billion for international affairs for FY 2010, of which $34.8 is designated for foreign assistance. The first stage of Congressional consideration enactment of the annual budget resolution reduced the total amount for international affairs by $2.9 billion, to $51.0 billion. The second stage, enactment of the annual appropriations bill, began with the House Committee on Appropriations recommending (and the full House approving) a total of $48.8 for the international affairs account, the equivalent of $50.6 billion, as this bill does not include $1.9 billion for food assistance that is carried in another appropriations bill. Subsequently, the Senate Committee on Appropriations approved a funding level of $48.7 billion. So, the level of funding for international affairs for FY 2010 is likely to be approximately $3 billion less than the President s request. A review of the House and Senate bills indicates that the funding level for foreign assistance will be at a level of approximately $33 billion (compared to the President s request of $34.8). 4 4 The process of the Congress appropriating funds for international affairs account has been more complicate and confusing in 2009 than usual. There are two principal methods by which the Congress appropriates funds the regular annual appropriations bills, which are subject to the budget ceilings established by the annual budget resolution, and supplemental bills, which circumvent those budget ceilings for funding unexpected emergencies. The supplemental process was employed in FY 2002, the first year of reconstruction emergency assistance, as a mechanism to fund the un-planned US engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Subsequently, the supplemental appropriations process was adopted as the mechanism for funding the large but generally expected levels of military activity and assistance for these two countries, with other unexpected and expected funding also included in the supplemental bills. The Obama Administration, attempting to end this abnormal procedure, submitted an FY 2010 budget that was based on both the regular FY 2009 appropriated level for international affairs and the two FY 2009 supplemental bills (one of which was then under consideration), plus an 8.5% increase. When the Congress in the FY 2010 budget resolution reduced international affairs funding by $2.9 billion (from the requested level of $53.9 billion), Congressional leaders decided to make up part of the difference by increasing the level of funding in the second FY 2009 supplemental bill that was then under consideration in the Congress. Roughly $1.9 billion of the FY 2009 supplemental appropriations can be considered "forward funding of FY 2010 activities. This forward funding of certain FY 2010 programs accounts for the total funding for international affairs for FY 2009 being higher ($52.7 billion) than the likely final funding level for FY 2010 (in the range of $51 billion). 3

The only way to look at specific trends and likely allocations is to work from the requested levels. The special priorities for the Administration, as set forth in the budget 5, are: Food security -- a doubling of funding for agriculture, to over $1 billion (the increase is reduced somewhat in the House and Senate bills) Climate change a doubling of funding (to $579 million) and two multilateral climate investment funds (the level is fully funded in the Senate bill and cut in half in the House bill) Health small increases in funding for FY 2010, but a substantial long-term commitment of $63 billion over six years (supported in both bills) Basic Education 26% increase in funding, to $981 million, and consideration of a Global Education Fund (House bill places the funding at $1 billion and the Senate at $800 million) USAID Staffing hiring a substantial number of additional employees (supported by both House and Senate bills) Tables 5 and 6 present the top fifteen recipients (again, these figures are tentative, but do reveal Administration priorities) for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Fourteen countries appear on both lists. There appears to be little change in priorities from the FY 2008 Bush budget, to the FY 2009 Bush/Obama budget, to the 2010 Obama budget. The top five on the list for FY 2008 (table 4) appear in the top six for FY 2009 and are the same top five for FY 2010. Over the decade, the principal regional shift is that five of the top fifteen recipients in FY 1998 were in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but only one in FY 2008, and none in fiscal years 2009 and 2010; whereas representation from Africa moved from one in FY 1998 to five in FY 2008 and six in the following two years. Dynamics The political dynamics of US foreign assistance programs are complex and not easy to deconstruct. The American people have a long history of supporting development and humanitarian assistance, but have demonstrated less interest in assistance for diplomatic/security purposes, with the exception of Cold War assistance for anti- Communism and more recently anti-terrorism assistance. The foreign policy establishment has been the principal proponent of political/diplomatic assistance. Particularly significant during the Bush presidency (2001-2008) was the expansion of an understanding within political circles of the important role assistance (including development assistance) plays in promoting US national security and humanitarian values and the emergence of broad bipartisan support in the Congress for foreign assistance. Also noteworthy were the well-received initiatives on HIV/AIDS and malaria (PEPFAR) and increased assistance to Africa, and the some what mixed reception for the MCC. However, the bureaucratic location of PEPFAR and MCC outside of USAID was criticized as a further dispersion of responsibility for development programs. The 5 Larry Nowels, FY 2010 International Affairs Budget Request presentation, US Global Leadership Campaign, May 2009, and updated in July 2009 communication. 4

attempt late in the Bush Administration to install some coherence through the new Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance in the Department of State, while recognized for improving transparency and information on assistance, was criticized for micromanagement and over-centralization of decision making, the absence of a coherent strategy, and not encompassing all USAID and the Department of State programs, much less the myriad of other US government agencies involved in assistance activities. Over the last several years foreign aid reform has become a cottage industry in Washington, not just among the development community, but also among those interested in the broader areas of foreign affairs and national security. The dominant concerns are an overall perception of weakness, the dispersion of assistance programs across more than 25 government agencies, and the lack of coherence (both within foreign assistance programs and between development policies and other US international policies). Other themes are inadequate levels of funding and the loss of human capital and expertise at USAID; funding, policy, and regulatory constraints that hinder responsiveness to needs on-the-ground; insufficient collaboration in-country and internationally; a proliferation of priorities and absence of an overarching strategy; and the inability of the US Government to speak with a single voice on development. These short comings were the drivers behind more than 20 studies and reports on reform of foreign assistance issued during 2007-2009. A synthesis 6 of the reports identifies seven themes that run through all or most of them: Formulate a comprehensive national security or global development strategy that articulates and elevates the role of development and diplomacy alongside defense Increase substantially funding and resources for civilian-led agencies and programs, especially through USAID and the State Department Elevate and streamline the U.S. foreign assistance apparatus to improve policy and program coherence and coordination Reform Congressional involvement and oversight, including revamping the Foreign Assistance Act Integrate civilian and military instruments to deal with weak and fragile states Rebalance authorities for certain foreign assistance activities currently under the Department of Defense to civilian agencies Strengthen U.S. support for international organizations and other tools of international cooperation. The 2008 election brought to office a President with a deep understanding and interest in development. In the campaign he committed to streamlining and bringing coherence to US foreign assistance, to doubling assistance levels, and to a range of specific development initiatives. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton also has a strong background of support for development and foreign assistance. The stars would appear aligned for significant reform and elevation of the development function within the US government. President Obama s first significant action in this arena, his proposed FY 2010 budget, 6 Center for US Global Engagement, Putting Smart Power to Work, March 2009, pages 2-3. 5

was evidence of a determination to fulfill his campaign commitments to substantially raise assistance levels and to expand staffing of USAID. But the prospects for foreign assistance reform and funding levels are uncertain and beset by a troubling environment. The global financial meltdown and the spiraling US budget deficit are constraining funding levels. The President s campaign commitment to double foreign assistance has been stretched from 2012 to 2015. The immediacy of urgent foreign policy matters -- country-specific and global crises are distracting policy maker s attention from the fundamental reforms needed in the management of US development cooperation programs. Certain members of Congress and leaders of civil society are ready to engage the Administration in the task of modernizing US foreign assistance law and programs. The first indication of the Administration s thinking of how to approach the modernization of foreign assistance was the July 10 th announcement by the Secretary of State of the commencement of work on a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, and that review is intended to feed into a broader governmentwide review of global engagement directed by the National Security Council. As noted above, many of the studies and reports on aid reform have called for the US to issue a strategy outlining the US approach to global development, so this is seen by many as a positive step. B) EDUCATION STATUS 1) US Agency for International Development USAID and the Congress define basic education broadly from early childhood education and care through secondary education, including training of teachers, literacy, numeracy, and basic skills for adults and out-of-school youth. The current USAID strategy for education was issued in 2005. 7 The core rationale and priority are revealed in two statements in the strategy: adequate investments in education facilitate the achievement of most other development goals and at the heart of the strategy is basic education. Special focus is placed on improving access for underserved groups and the quality and relevance of education. The two overarching objectives of the strategy are to (1) promote equitable access to quality basic education and (2) enhance knowledge and skills for productivity. The first covers access to primary and secondary schooling, including replacing school fees with adequate public funding, quality, systemic reform (finance and curriculum), instruction, institutional reform, infrastructure, and a special focus on girls. The second covers workforce development and higher education. The principles to guide the strategy are: allocate resources according to country need and commitment, support sector wideapproaches, promote efficiency and sustainability, collaborate, and support innovation. 7 US Agency for International Development, Education Strategy: Improving Lives Through Learning, April 2005. 6

A meta-analysis 8 of USAID basic education programs from 2003-2005, confirmed by a 2009 compilation 9 of USAID activities in basic education from 2002 to 2006, identified that the bulk of US funding has gone to five areas: Education policy and system strengthening Community involvement and public demand and support Instructional quality School and institutional management and leadership Strengthening systems for the education sector With lesser funding to: Curriculum and materials development Infrastructure Supply of learning materials Measuring learning outcomes It must be recognized that, while the formal strategy sets forth the guideline of allocating resources according to country need and commitment, a sizeable portion of US assistance is allocated to meet foreign policy and national security goals, and this applies to the allocation of assistance for basic education. In FY 2010 two countries are designated to receive more than a third of total US assistance for basic education -- Pakistan at $296 million and Afghanistan at $74 million. In the prior two years (FY2008/2009) together these two countries will receive 22%. In contrast, in FY 2006 the countries of Africa received $210 million of total US assistance for basic education of $520 million, or 40%; in fiscal years 2007-2010 Africa has or will receive just under than a third of US assistance for basic education 10. Only in recent years has basic education been a priority in US development assistance. The funding allocation for basic education rose from $67 million in FY 1990 to $135 million in FY 1992 and 1993, but fell to $98 million for FY 1997-2000. A steady increase in funding began in 2001, with funding moving from $103 million in that year to $700 million in FY 2009. The administration has proposed a level of $981million for FY 2010. The House Appropriations Committee has raised that number to an even $1 billion and the Senate Appropriations Committee has approved a level of $800 million. So, what is likely to be a tenfold increase in funding over ten years evidences a significant increase in the priority for basic education. Yet, assistance to the education sector represents less than 3% of total US assistance. 8 USAID, EQUIP Associate Awards: Project Analysis, First Three Years, 2003-2005 ; 2007 9 USAID, Survey of Basic Education Activities, February 6, 2009 10 In FY 2007 Africa received $190 million of a total of $602 million (32%); in FY 2008 Africa received $250 million of $765 million (32 %); in FY 2009 Africa is to receive $257 million of $785 million (32%); and in FY 2010 Africa is designated to receive $288 million of $981 million (29%). 7

There is no clear and simple explanation as to why US support for basic education languished during the 1990s and then rose over the next decade. Reasons for the lack of attention include the greater apparent immediacy of health needs and the ability to demonstrate life saving results from investments in health, child survival programs, and family planning; excitement about micro-enterprise and other new development interventions; the assumption that basic education is relatively simply and what developing countries need is assistance with more advanced education. Among factors that have changed perceptions are the spotlight focused on education by the Dakar EFA commitments and the follow-on advocacy for basic education both internationally and within the United States; a greater understanding that education is fundamental to the accomplishment of other development goals; and concern over the regional stability and national security ramifications from poorly or wrongly educated populations. The right person in the right place is another explanation for the greater priority given to basic education over the past decade. Nita Lowey, Representative from New York, first as the ranking minority member and now as the chair of the appropriations subcommittee that handles foreign assistance, has made basic education her signature initiative and is largely responsibly from gradually increasing the funding over the past ten years. 2) US Government-wide USAID is not the only US government agency providing assistance to basic education. An accounting across the US government identified six government agencies that as of September 30, 2008, were providing a total funding of $1.760 billion to basic education assistance 11. The focus of the assistance provided by each of those agencies is: USAID programs assistance across the range of interventions for basic education; provides more limited support for work force and higher education Department of State the MEPI programs provides to the countries of North Africa and the Middle East the same range of program as provided by USAID Department of Labor focus is on the intersection of education and child labor in countries with a high rate of exploitative child labor, with programs designed to educate working and at risk children and strengthen awareness and national policies and institutions on education and child labor. Department of Agriculture uses food assistance to low-income, food-deficit countries to provide school meals and take home rations and through the sale of food commodities to support basic education programs in communities. MCC Seven of the countries with which the MCC has compacts have education components; most of the activities have been in the areas to school construction/expansion and technical/vocational training. Department of Defense focus on constructing new and rehabilitating school facilities. In 2007 the Congress directed the Administration to create a senior position to coordinate basic education policies and programs across the US government 12. The office was filled 11 As most funding is spread over multiple years, this is not funding from a single year. 12 Coordinator of Basic Education 8

in the fall of 2007. One product was a brief October 2008 US government-wide strategy statement that focused on access and learning, most specifically on early grade reading competence. This was the first attempt to obtain a whole-of-government strategy for basic education, but it was not completed or fully vetted before the end of the outgoing Administration and is likely non-operative. MOVING FORWARD PROSPECTS The starting point for looking at the near and medium term prospects for US assistance for basic education is the political environment. As a candidate, President Obama proposed a $2 billion Global Education Fund. Hillary Clinton, prior to being appointed Secretary of State, was the principal Senate sponsor of an EFA bill that would raise over several years the funding level for basic education to $3 billion annually. Support in the Congress, and in the Executive Branch, for basic education has grown considerably over the past decade. Issues of importance to the new Administration include under-addressed basic education needs such as those in weakened states, states in crisis, and states with a significant youth bulge, and an emphasis on learning outcomes and measuring the results of education sector support at the country level. The Global Education Fund as proposed by candidate Obama was not defined beyond the suggested funding level of $2 billion. The term Global Fund appears to have been used more to capture the concept of working internationally rather than to suggest creation of a new specific global fund. Discussions within the interested US community have focused on whether this would be a bilateral or a multilateral program. Proposals are circulating within the US government and by others suggesting improvements to the FTI and a multilateral approach with multiple channels of funding, thus allowing donor nations to either coordinate bilateral funds or pool funds. Discussions within the US basic education implementing community have noted that new international funds often replace rather than add to other funding (as appears to be the case with the FTI Catalytic Fund); entail high opportunity costs to establish in terms of political capital and time; may not address the importance of aid harmonization at the country level; and are often operationally cumbersome. As a result, the discussions have focused on bilateral funding that emphasizes local ownership, harmonization, collaboration with local and international actors, and a modest contribution to an international fund. The strong support and enthusiasm of the new Administration and the Congress for basic education is moderated by financial and economic realities the overriding priorities for the US political system are to stem the financial tsunami and create US economic activities and jobs, all in the context of an historic fiscal deficit. Even supportive members of Congress are beginning to ask questions about whether the significant increase in funding for basic education is producing results why are there still 73 million children out of school? So, while further increases in funding for basic education can be expected, economic realities and concerns over results and effectiveness may moderate the levels and slow the speed of reaching levels of US funding of $2 billion or more. 9

USAID began a strategic planning process in the August 2008 that is intended to produce a new Agency education strategy in 2009. The planning was divided into the three categories into which the US segments education policy and programs basic education (K-12), higher education, and workforce development. The themes that have emerged from this process include: education as a critical factor to national security and to the achievement of other US development goals; the importance of lifelong learning and the ability of learners to respond to changing environments; the need for equitable access to quality learning; the need for system-wide approaches to education; the role of the private sector; institutional capacity building; learning in conflict and post-conflict settings; and the importance of monitoring and evaluation. Basic education will continue to be the dominant priority for US funding for education. The principles of the Paris Declaration began receiving attention at the end of the Bush Administration and are being given even more credence in the Obama Administration. Given statements by President Obama as a candidate and some of his key policy officials and interested members of Congress, one can expect an emphasis on out-of-school youth and the quality of learning, local ownership and collaboration with local partners, and greater donor coordination and harmonization. While the US is mostly likely to continue to rely principally on bilateral funding mechanisms, there also is likely to be a shift to greater collaboration locally and internationally and with the Fast Track Initiative and other international initiatives. Greater collaboration could entail (1) greater coordination and harmonization at the country level, with US assistance programs being consistent with the national education strategy and coordinated with other donors; (2) modest contribution to FTI or other international funding mechanism; (3) US exercising a more collaborative leadership role in FTI governance. More difficult for the US will be harmonization through coordinated donor reporting mechanisms, given the specific nature of US reporting requirements and the growing demand on and from policy makers for evidence that US assistance is producing results. Equally difficult will be use of host country funding instruments given the demand in the US that the US government be accountable for the expenditure of US funds. 10

Figure 1. Regional Distribution of Aid, FY 1998 From: Congressional Research Service, "Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy", 2009. Figure 2. Regional Distribution of Aid, FY 2008 From: Congressional Research Service, "Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy", 2009. 11

From: Congressional Research Service, "Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy", 2009. From: Congressional Research Service, "Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy", 2009. 12

Figure 5. Top Foreign Aid Recipients, FY 2009 Estimate (appropriations in millions, US$) 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 Israel Afghanistan Pakistan Egypt Palestinians Jordan Mexico Kenya Ethiopia South Africa Nigeria Colombia Sudan Uganda 790 730 600 580 540 540 470 390 1,040 1,020 1,860 2,120 2,690 3,110 Source: USAID and State Department, and Congressional Supplemental Appropriations Bill From: Compiled by Larry Nowels Figure 6. Top Foreign Aid Recipients, FY 2010 Request (appropriations in millions, US$) 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 Afghanistan Israel 2,230 2,750 Pakistan Egypt 1,240 1,580 Kenya Nigeria 660 560 South Africa 550 Ethiopia Colombia 550 510 Palestinians Iraq 500 500 Sudan Uganda 430 430 Tanzania Jordan 390 390 Source: USAID and State Department From: Compiled by Larry Nowels 13