Centre for Land Warfare Studies CLAWS Issue brief No. 75 March 2016 Have Pakistan s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) Served its Policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence? General Col Surya Bhanu Rai is a serving officer of the Indian Army currently pursuing research in CLAWS. Key Points On April 19, 2011, Pakistan tested the nuclear capable Nasr (Hatf-9) Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM), reportedly having a range of 60 km. 1 Later, as part of a series of tests of the Nasr, Pakistan conducted successive launches of four missiles (salvo) from a stateof-the-art multi-tube launcher on November 5, 2013. 2 Pakistani sources described the Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) as a low yield battlefield deterrent, capable of inflicting damage on enemy mechanised forces within Pakistani territory. According to analysts, the development of the Nasr is yet another action, as part of Pakistan s overall effort since 2004, to counter India s so-called Cold Start strategy and is aimed at targeting Indian Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) executing the Cold Start doctrine. 3 Adil Sultan, a retired Pakistan Air Force officer, explained the existence of TNWs as a strategy of assured deterrence as in response to limited military incursions by the Indian forces, the threat to destroy New Delhi and Mumbai seemed incredible and disproportionate. 4 Pakistan s former Ambassador to the US, Maleeha Lodhi, further substantiated this so- 1. The development of the Nasr is yet another action, as part of Pakistan s overall effort since 2004, to counter India s so-called Cold Start Strategy and is aimed at targeting Indian IBGs executing the Cold Start doctrine. 2. TNWs can be defined as weapons designed to engage objects in the tactical depth of enemy deployment (up to 300 km) to accomplish a tactical mission. Under certain conditions, tactical nuclear weapons may be involved in operational and strategic missions. 3. As per conservative estimates, the US still possesses 500 TNWs, while the Russian Federation has 2,000 of these. 4. There would be a minimum inescapable requirement of 436 TNWs to stop an armoured division. 5. A TNW will require close to 15 kg of Pu for a sub- KT yield. Hence, if Pakistan is likely to have Pubased warheads on the Nasr, its numbers could be only be around 30 by the year 2020. 6. Pakistan believes that contrary to India s stated doctrine, the use of low yield TNWs would not be seen as provocation enough by India or the international community to merit massive retaliation. The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi, is an autonomous think-tank dealing with national security and conceptual aspects of land warfare, including conventional and sub-conventional conflict and terrorism. CLAWS conducts research that is futuristic in outlook and policy-oriented in approach. Website: www.claws.in Contact us: landwarfare@gmail.com
2 CLAWS Have Pakistan s Tactical Nuclear Weapons... called verity, While Pakistan s capacity for a tactical response was already under development, the emerging Indian military posture [read IBGs executing the Cold Start strategy] constrained Pakistan to take the decision to develop delivery systems for Full Spectrum Deterrence. 5 Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, former head of Pakistan s Strategic Plans Division (SPD) portrayed the TNW as Pakistan s efforts to pour cold water on Cold Start. 6 As per the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), 7 Pakistan s National Command Authority (NCA), in its meeting of September 05, 2015, reiterated the national resolve to maintain Full Spectrum Deterrence Capability in line with the dictates of Credible Minimum Deterrence to deter all forms of aggression. And with its shoot and scoot attributes, the Nasr contributes to the full spectrum deterrence against threats in view of the evolving scenarios. What is a TNW The US State Department s Glossary of Terms for arms control and disarmament, defines TNWs as weapons designed to engage objects in the tactical depth of enemy deployment (up to 300 km) to accomplish a tactical mission. Under certain conditions, tactical nuclear weapons may be involved in operational and strategic missions. 8 However, their latest field manuals prefer to refer to these weapons as non-strategic nuclear weapons. The People s Liberation Army(PLA) of China, refers to TNWs (zhanshu hewuqi) as weapons which are used to support troops in combat and to directly affect the enemy s actions. The term TNWs, hence, in the closest approximation, refers to battlefield nuclear weapons, for battlefield use, and with deployment ranges and yields consistent with such use. Thus, a TNW pertains to a nuclear weapon with the following characteristics: Short-range, covering less than 300 km. Low-yield (<10KT). Intended for battlefield use in a theatre setting. Employability is more diverse than that of strategic nuclear warheads. Smaller in size and more portable than strategic nuclear weapons. History TNWs, also known as non-strategic nuclear weapons, 9 were a large part of the peak nuclear weapons stockpile levels during the Cold War. The development of TNWs by the US in the early 1950s was an outcome of the success of the US in creating miniature nuclear explosive devices. These mini-nukes were the basis of nuclear munitions, including gravity bombs, short-range missiles, artillery shells, landmines, depth charges, and torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare. Smaller man-portable (sometimes referred to as suitcase nukes), and truck portable weapons, like the special atomic demolition munitions and the Davy Crockett recoilless rifles, had limited utility due to the difficulty of combining sufficient yield with portability. By the early 1970s, the US TNW arsenal was estimated to comprise more than 7,000 warheads, the majority deployed in Europe to defend against a potential Soviet attack and to demonstrate US commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). During the same period, Soviet TNWs were deployed, starting in 1954, with a small bomb to be carried by the Il-28A tactical jet bomber. In the period 1975-1990, the Soviet Union was believed to have over 20,000 TNWs, their growth driven by the Red Army doctrine that favoured their use if war came to Europe. The waning of the Cold War brought about a drastic reduction in Russian and US TNWs. The implementation of the bilateral Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 eliminated all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges in the US and Russia. Additionally, the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, which consisted of the unilateral declarations by Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George HW Bush on shorter-range nuclear-capable missiles, essentially eliminated ground-based launch capability. Sea-based missiles were also reduced, first by the US and, later, gradually by Russia. In the early 1990s, after the US reduced active tactical deployments on European territory by more than half, Russia made a unilateral pledge to eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions and warheads intended
CLAWS 3 warfare studies land for Centre for tactical missiles while removing tactical weapons from ships and submarines. Russia pledged to further eliminate one-third of its remaining seabased tactical weapons and to halve its arsenal of ground-to-air missile warheads and its airborne tactical weapons. Because there were no formal agreements on verification or transparency, it is unclear how much reductions were actually made by the Russians and the US. 10 Despite the US reductions, the Administrations of Bill Clinton and George W Bush asserted that TNWs remained important to the US nuclear posture, with the Clinton Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) stating that tactical weapons were necessary for maintaining US nuclear commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities to meet various regional contingencies. That ability continues to be an important means for deterring aggression, protecting and promoting US interests, reassuring allies and friends, and preventing proliferation. 11 Current Status of US-Russia Arsenals of TNWs The US now has approximately 760 non-strategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the US. Estimates vary as some experts believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal, 12 while others give a conservative estimate of the US still possessing 500 TNWs, with the Russian Federation having 2,000 of these. 13 Pakistan s TNWs A TNW requires a single, high thrust, solid propellant rocket motor, with mid-course guidance system, along with terminal guidance for near pin-point accuracy for its effective use in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA). The most difficult part of making a TNW is to develop a compact, miniaturised Plutonium (Pu)-based fission boosted sub-kiloton (KT) nuclear warhead. There is a requirement of having sophisticated technology to produce this compact nuclear warhead. The issue of miniaturising the warhead to fit into the Nasr missile with a 30 cm diameter is a complex engineering problem. While detailing the technical aspects of the Nasr, Dr Rajaram Nagappa aired similar views while commenting on Pakistan s TNWs, The design, performance and reliability of such devices remain open to question in the absence of confirmatory tests. The limited damage potential, limited production capability of plutonium and the priority of allotment between the cruise missiles and tactical weapons, all point to the fact that this might just be a showcase weapon[ in Pakistan s inventory]. 14 AH Nayyar and Zain Mian, in November 2010, pointed out that 80 nuclear weapons of 15 KT each would be necessary to disable or kill the crews in a force of 1,000 tanks. 15 As per another calculation, there would be a minimum inescapable requirement of 436 TNWs to stop an armoured division a clearly absurd number that leaps higher still if one assumes lower yield weapons and more dispersed Indian formations. 16 Moreover, the efficacy of Pakistan s TNWs was further questioned, as Michael Krepon wrote, Pakistan lacks the real-time surveillance capabilities to destroy [moving] armoured columns, except where they are funneling into bridge crossings of water barriers. 17 Further, the reported accelerated production of plutonium from Pakistan s three military dedicated reactors in Khushab and a fourth yet to be operationalised, would result in production of 450 kg of plutonium by 2020. As per Nagappa, a TNW will require close to 15 kg of Pu for a sub-kt yield. 18 Hence, if Pakistan is likely to have Pu-based warheads on the Nasr, its numbers could be around 30 by the year 2020. Till the time it is not amply clear whether Pakistan has mastered this technology, its claim of developing TNWs will always be under a cloud of suspicion. However, many experts believe that Pakistan has achieved this capability and has many times tested all the sub-sytems of the weapon system other than the live detonation of the nuclear core. Another group of analysts believes that Pakistan may be having a gun type, uranium-based TNW,not very efficient but capable of meeting the requirement of its Army of halting the IBGs.
4 CLAWS land warfare for Centre studies TNWs also signify Pakistan s attempt at lowering of the nuclear threshold. Through the threat of TNWs, Pakistan may be conveying that the purported red lines have been so advanced, that even a limited action may trigger a nuclear response, in view of the fact that the command and control of TNWs are likely to be delegated to the Operational Commanders for their timely employment. Indian Response to TNWs Pakistan believed that development of TNWs would bring into focus the need for change in the strategy of nuclear war-fighting. But did that happen? The answer is in the negative. Pakistan did succeed in drawing the attention of the world to the Indian subcontinent and some termed this action as confirmation of the hypothesis that the Indian subcontinent is the nuclear flashpoint. But, no knee-jerk reaction was seen from the Indian point of view. India has stuck to its doctrine based on credible minimum deterrence, no first use and massive retaliation against a first use nuclear strike. What is baffling is that the proponents of the nuclear flashpoint are unabashedly causing an imbalance and an arms race in the subcontinent. Sanction by the US for delivery of eight F-16 aircraft which can carry TNWs, ostensibly to fight the terrorists in Pakistan, is one such case. 19 Pakistan s threat of use of TNW is based on two suppositions: firstly, the perceptible nature of Indian politics would make India choose war-termination over escalation. Secondly, the international community will prevent India from undertaking massive retaliation due to the threat of escalation. Threat of use of TNWs, thus, aims to bring about a psychological shift in India s stance. Pakistan believes that contrary to India s stated doctrine, the use of low yield TNWs would not be seen as provocation enough by India or the international community to merit massive retaliation. While the second assumption may have some substance, Pakistan s perception about the Indian political leadership is totally off the mark. There is no reason not to believe that our policy, as stated in the draft nuclear doctrine, would not be followed by the political leadership in a time of crisis and at the point of decision. Our nuclear doctrine states: Any adversary must know that India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces. 20 The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) Note of January 2013 further strengthens the resolve by amplifying, Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. 21 Pakistan s dilemma is that with the introduction of TNWs, it tried to squeeze the space for conventional operations and add another rung in the nuclear escalation ladder. India, having seen through this bluff, has stuck to its nuclear doctrine and reiterated that nuclear weapons are not instruments for warfighting but a political tool for deterrence. The signalling includes that the use of even a single TNW (even on Pakistan s soil) would attract massive retaliation that could possibly destroy the Pakistani state. From India s point of view, all nuclear weapons are the same, irrespective of their yield or nomenclature. Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, had expressed similar sentiments in his speech: 22 The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective. A limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms. Any nuclear exchange, once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level. Pakistan would be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently, by developing, and, perhaps, deploying theatre nuclear weapons. Lt Gen Balraj Nagal (Retd), Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) and former Strategic Forces Command (SFC) Commander and Chief of the Strategic Programme Staff, has articulated: India has chosen a strategy of strategic deterrence and does not have an inventory of TNWs which implies that India does not intend to engage in a localised nuclear battle conducted with TNWs. 23 Further, he has outlined the problems of deploying TNWs with the following arguments: 24
CLAWS 35 warfare studies land for Centre Creating a large inventory of nuclear weapons to be deployed in forward areas, the numbers depending on the area and density of coverage required. Delegation of authority, and command and control moving down the chain to local commanders whose perception of the battle will be limited and who will seek employment of nuclear weapons for restoration of local reverses or limited defeats. Due to range and sector requirements, far too many nuclear weapons will be available in the forward battle zone, creating grave security and protection concerns. It is not in the best interest of raising the threshold, conversely the threshold will be lowered to meet lower level battle requirements. Escalation control in a nuclear war is not an established principle. Fault Lines in Pakistan s TNWs Strategy In order to lower the nuclear threshold, Pakistan has threatened to use these TNWs on its own soil; but these can have serious repercussions viz the capability to handle a large segment of own population exposed to a nuclear fallout. That any government or military leadership in Pakistan would be prepared to take this sort of risk, is difficult to predict. There are other dilemmas associated with TNWs like the weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors and terrorists during transportation or deployment. There are dangers of accidental, inadvertent, premature and unauthorised use of TNWs due to decentralisation of command and control. Pakistan would need huge finances to ensure the safety and security of its TNWs, which, in the given circumstances and the state of its economy, is a tall order. Hence, it would not be wrong to say that Pakistan s gamble in relation to its TNWs providing it strategic gains as part of full spectrum deterrence, has failed and been reduced to merely shadow-boxing. Conclusion Use of TNWs against Indian forces on its own soil will comprise brinkmanship by Pakistan to keep India, in particular, and the international community, in general, on edge. The presumption behind this brinkmanship is that India would be deterred to use its conventional forces on Pakistani soil, especially in response to the terrorist attacks, as the risk of escalation would be too high. The signalling from India that a few TNWs cannot halt the Indian forces from conducting operations, as they are equipped and trained for this, has blunted Pakistan s full spectrum deterrence strategy. Further, any category of use of nuclear weapons, anywhere, on Indian forces, may result in catastrophic damage to, and decimation of, the adversary. Thus, India has endeavoured to convey a clear message to Pakistan that it would not make any sense to challenge or threaten India with the use of TNWs. However, these signals need to be sent more often in the form of issuing of White Papers, Strategic Posture Reviews, etc based on periodic exercises of examining strategic issues, assessment of threat scenarios, the adversary s capabilities and own response options. References 1. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Press Release PR94/2011, April 19, 2011, http://www.ispr.gov.pk /front/main. asp?o=t-press_release &id=1721. Accessed on February 11, 2016). 2. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Press Release PR179/2013-ISPR, November 05, 2013, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/ front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2409&search=1. Accessed on February 16, 2016. 3. The National Interest, Pakistan Wants Battlefield Nukes to Use Against Indian Troops, February 06, 2015 http:// nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/pakistan-wants-battlefield-nukes-use-against-indian-troops-12200. Accessed on February 01, 2016. 4. Adil Sultan, Pakistan s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Impact of Drivers and Technology on Nuclear Doctrine, Strategic Studies (ISSI), Vol. 32-33, Nos. 4 and 1, Winter 2011 and Spring 2012, available at http://www.issi.org.pk/ 5. Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan s Nuclear Compulsions, The News, November 22, 2012.
CLAWS Victory through vision 6 CLAWS... Served its Policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence? 6. David O Smith, The US Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia, p. 32, available at http:// www.stimson.org. Accessed on February 20, 2016. 7. Web site of ISPR, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/ 8. www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng-nuclear/nuc_glos-e.pdf. Accessed on January 30, 2016. 9. Hans M Kristensen, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists (FAS), October 2013, p. 8. 10. Alexei Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned From Kosovo and Chechnya, Marshall Centre Papers No.2, July 2008, www.eng.yabloko.ru/books/arbatov/rus-military.html. 11. Federation of American Scientists, Nuclear Posture Review, n.d., www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/95_npr. htm. Accessed on January 21, 2016. 12. Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, CRS Report- RL32572, February 23, 2015, available at https://www.fas.org/ sgp/crs/nuke/rl32572.pdf. Accessed on February 16, 2016. 13. Daryl Kimball, Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, Arms Control Association, August 2015,http://www. armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclearweaponswho has what. Accessed on February 14, 2016. 14. Contribution of Dr Rajaram Nagappa in Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria, eds., Pakistan s Tactical Nuclear Weapons Conflict Redux (New Delhi: KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2013), pp. 167-68. 15. AH Nayyar and Zain Mian, The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan s Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large Scale Indian Conventional Attack, Pakistan Security Research Unit, Brief No 61, November 11, 2010, pp. 1-10. 16. Shashank Joshi, New Year, New Problem? Pakistan s Tactical Weapons, The Diplomat, January 02, 2013. Accessed on February 18, 2016. 17. Michael Krepon, Pakistan s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/ research-pdfs/krepon_-_pakistan_ Nuclear_ Strategy_ and_deterrence_stability.pdf. Accessed on January 11, 2016. 18. n 14, p.167. 19. Varghese K. George, US to Sell 8 F-16s to Pakistan, The Hindu, February 13, 2016. http://www.thehindu.com/news/ international/obama-administration-notifies-congress-of-sale-of-f16s-to-pakistan/article8231790.ece. Accessed on February 14, 2016. 20. Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, August 17, 1999, http://www.mea.gov.in/ in-focus-article.htm?18916/ Draft+Report+ of+national+security+advisory+board+on+indian+nuclear+doctrine. 21. CCS Note on India s Nuclear Doctrine, January 04, 2013, http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20131/ The+Cabinet+Committee+on+Security+Reviews+perationalization+of+Indias+Nuclear+Doctrine. 22. Shyam Saran, Is India s Nuclear Deterrence Credible?, speech at India Habitat Centre, April 14, 2013. 23. Lt Gen Balraj Nagal (Retd), India s Nuclear Strategy to Deter: Massive Retaliation to Cause Unacceptable Damage, CLAWS Journal, Winter 2015 (ISSN 2319-5177), pp.16-17. 24. Ibid. The contents of this Issue Brief are based on the analysis of material accessed from open sources and are the personal views of the author. It may not be quoted as representing the views or policy of the Government of India or Integrated Headquarters of MoD (Army). Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) RPSO Complex, Parade Road, Delhi Cantt, New Delhi 110010 Tel.: +91-11-25691308, Fax: +91-11-25692347, Email: landwarfare@gmail.com Website: www.claws.in CLAWS Army No. 33098