Similar documents
Questions and Answers on the CMS Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model

The Pain or the Gain?

CPAs & ADVISORS. experience support // ADVANCED PAYMENT MODELS: CJR

4/9/2016. The changing health care market THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKET. CPAs & ADVISORS

paymentbasics The IPPS payment rates are intended to cover the costs that reasonably efficient providers would incur in furnishing highquality

HOSPITALS & HEALTH SYSTEMS: DATA-DRIVEN STRATEGY FOR BUNDLED PAYMENT SUCCESS 4/19/2016. April 20, 2016

Chapter 6 Section 3. Hospital Reimbursement - TRICARE DRG-Based Payment System (Basis Of Payment)

Quality, Cost and Business Intelligence in Healthcare

Summary and Analysis of CMS Proposed and Final Rules versus AAOS Comments: Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model (CJR)

Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) Readiness Kit

Regulatory Advisor Volume Eight

Episode Payment Models Final Rule & Analysis

Pay-for-Performance. GNYHA Engineering Quality Improvement

MEDICARE COMPREHENSIVE CARE FOR JOINT REPLACEMENT MODEL (CCJR) Preparing for Risk-Based Outcomes of Bundled Care 8/12/2015.

Data-Driven Strategy for New Payment Models. Objectives. Common Acronyms

PREPARING FOR RISK-BASED OUTCOMES OF BUNDLED CARE

MEDICARE UPDATES: VBP, SNF QRP, BUNDLING

Summary of U.S. Senate Finance Committee Health Reform Bill

Swapping, Kickbacks, Fair Market Value: Risks for a Post-Acute Provider

Bundled Payments KEY CAPABILITIES. for working with the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model

Chapter 7 Section 1. Hospital Reimbursement - TRICARE Inpatient Mental Health Per Diem Payment System

CJR Final Rule: Policy Changes and Strategies for Bundled Payment Success

September 6, RE: CY 2017 Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems Proposed Rule

REPORT TO ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

3/16/2016. Swapping, Kickbacks, Fair Market Value: Risks for a Post-Acute Provider. AKS designed to prevent improper referrals, which can lead to:

Distribution of Post-Acute Care under CJR Model of Lower Extremity Joint Replacements for MS-DRG 470

SNF * Readmissions Bootcamp The SNF Readmission Penalty, Post-Acute Networks, and Community Collaboratives

Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR): Understanding the CMS Mandatory TJR Bundling Webinar

Medicare Advantage PPO participation Termination - Practice Name (Tax ID #: <TaxID>)

Structuring Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacements Collaborator Agreements

HEALTH CARE REFORM IN THE U.S.

LESSONS LEARNED IN LENGTH OF STAY (LOS)

Indiana Hospital Assessment Fee -- DRAFT

2017/2018. KPN Health, Inc. Quality Payment Program Solutions Guide. KPN Health, Inc. A CMS Qualified Clinical Data Registry (QCDR) KPN Health, Inc.

Redesigning Post-Acute Care: Value Based Payment Models

Patient Selection, Optimization and Disposition: Tools for Success in Orthopedic Bundles

June 18, 2009 Page 1

paymentbasics Defining the inpatient acute care products Medicare buys Under the IPPS, Medicare sets perdischarge

State of Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services Department on Aging Kansas Health Policy Authority

Understanding Hospital Value-Based Purchasing

Medicare Skilled Nursing Facility Prospective Payment System

DC Inpatient APR-DRG Payment for Acute Care Hospitals

FY 2014 Inpatient Prospective Payment System Proposed Rule

The President s and Other Bipartisan Proposals to Reform Medicare: Post-Acute Care (PAC) Reform. Summary

DOCUMENTATION OF MANAGED SPECIALTY SERVICES AND SUPPORTS WAIVER CAPITATION RATES QUARTERS 1 AND 2 OF STATE FISCAL YEAR 2016

PROPOSED POLICY AND PAYMENT CHANGES FOR INPATIENT STAYS IN ACUTE-CARE HOSPITALS AND LONG-TERM CARE HOSPITALS IN FY 2014

Program Summary. Understanding the Fiscal Year 2019 Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program. Page 1 of 8 July Overview

Medicare Value Based Purchasing August 14, 2012

Report to Congressional Defense Committees

Inpatient Quality Reporting Program

MEDICARE FFY 2017 PPS PROPOSED RULES OVERVIEW OHA Finance/PFS Webinar Series. May 10, 2016

Medicare Home Health Prospective Payment System (HHPPS) Calendar Year (CY) 2013 Final Rule

Medicare P4P -- Medicare Quality Reporting, Incentive and Penalty Programs

Using the Hospice PEPPER to Support Auditing and Monitoring Efforts: Session 1

Reducing Readmissions One-caseat-a-time Using Midas+ Community Case Management

Our comments focus on the following provisions of the Proposed Rule:

MIPS, MACRA, & CJR: Medicare Payment Transformation. Presenter: Thomas Barber, M.D. May 31, 2016

Uniform Data System. The Functional Assessment Specialists. June 21, 2011

Exhibit 1. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Year 1 Performance of Participating Accountable Care Organizations (2013)

Making CJR Work for You. A Roadmap for Successful Implementation of Medicare Bundles

Final Rule Summary. Medicare Home Health Prospective Payment System Calendar Year 2016

Medicaid Hospital Incentive Payments Calculations

Value Based Care in LTC: The Quality Connection- Phase 2

BCBSM Pay-for-Performance Measure Technical Document (Version 2.0)

Troubleshooting Audio

Medicare Quality Based Payment Reform (QBPR) Program Reference Guide Fiscal Years

American Health Lawyers Association Institute on Medicare and Medicaid Payment Issues. History of the Physician Fee Schedule

Alternative Payment Models and Health IT

Topics to be Ready to Present if Raised by the Congressional Office

Paying for Outcomes not Performance

Payment of hospital inpatient services. (A) HPP.

Medi-Pak Advantage: Reimbursement Methodology

Surgical Directions

Estimated Decrease in Expenditure by Service Category

Piloting Bundled Medicare Payments for Hospital and Post-Hospital Care /

COMPREHENSIVE CARE JOINT REPLACEMENT MODEL CONTRACTING TOOLKIT

ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT MODEL CONTRACTING GUIDE

Quality Based Impacts to Medicare Inpatient Payments

HIMSS Southern California David Sayen March 28, 2017

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) The Harvard Pilgrim Independence Plan SM

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICE. Hospital-Based Physicians and the Value-Based Payment Modifier (Resolution 813-I-12)

Working Paper Series

Medicaid Supplemental Hospital Funding Programs Fiscal Year

I. Cost Finding and Cost Reporting

Home Care and Hospice: Payment and Reimbursement Update: AHLA Institute on Medicare and Medicaid Payment Issues

National Provider Call: Hospital Value-Based Purchasing

Chapter 9 Section 1. Ambulatory Surgical Center (ASC) Reimbursement

Improving Care Transitions

Transitions of Care from a Community Perspective

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON VALUE- BASED PURCHASING

GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA SESSION SENATE DRS15110-MGx-29G (01/14) Short Title: HealthCare Cost Reduction & Transparency.

CMS Quality Program- Outcome Measures. Kathy Wonderly RN, MSEd, CPHQ Consultant Developed: December 2015 Revised: January 2018

Minnesota Statewide Quality Reporting and Measurement System: Quality Incentive Payment System

Comparison of Bundled Payment Models. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4. hospitals, physicians, and post-acute care where

Medicare Home Health Prospective Payment System

Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program:

Learning Objectives. CMS Plans to Transform Healthcare. Leveraging CDI to Improve Performance Under Alternative Payment Model (APM) Methodology

Final Rule Summary. Medicare Skilled Nursing Facility Prospective Payment System Fiscal Year 2017

Emerging Issues in Post Acute Care Trends

The Role of Analytics in the Development of a Successful Readmissions Program

Transcription:

Report to Congressional Defense Committees on Pilot Program on Incentive Programs to Improve Health Care Provided Under the TRICARE Program In Response to: Section 726 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of Defense (DoD) is approximately $3,290.00 for the 2017 Fiscal Year. This includes $50.00 in expenses and $3,240.00 in DoD labor. Generated on August 29, 2017 RefID: 8- FDE349D REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1) Executive Summary...2 2) Background...2-3 3) Discussion...3-4 4) Conclusions...4 1

Pilot Program on Incentive Programs to Improve Health Care Provided Under the TRICARE Program 1) Executive Summary: This report summarizes the Department of Defense s (DoD) efforts to date regarding the value-based demonstration, which was implemented on March 23, 2016, consistent with section 726 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 (Public Law 114-92). Since that date, the Defense Health Agency (DHA) has been conducting the Lower Extremity Joint Replacement or Reattachment (LEJR) demonstration in the Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida market, using a modified version of the Comprehensive Care Joint Replacement (CJR) program which was implemented by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in April 2016. 2) Background: Section 726 of the NDAA for FY 2016 required a demonstration project to determine whether value-based payment incentives could effectively reduce the rate in increase of health care spending, improve health care quality, and enhance the beneficiary experience of care in the TRICARE program. Pursuant to that section, the DoD is required to submit interim reports to the congressional defense committees prior to each year s anniversary of the enactment of the Act (November 25, 2015), and no less frequently than once each year thereafter until the termination of the pilot program. The LEJR demonstration is designed to encourage hospitals, physicians, and post-acute care providers to work together on an episode of care basis to improve health care quality and optimize coordination of services from the initial hospitalization through the recovery period. The pilot aggregates payments for LEJR surgeries without major complications or comorbidities (Diagnosis Related Group 470) and 90 days of related post-operative care at certain hospitals in the Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida market and rewards hospitals that can lower costs while maintaining high quality. Seven demonstration hospitals have been identified, along with a control group cohort consisting of all other hospitals in the Tampa market, and target episode prices have been calculated for each demonstration hospital based on historical TRICARE claims data. Target episode prices are adjusted annually for inflation and also to reflect changes in the rate blend over time (hospital-specific vs. market-wide prices). In Demonstration Years One and Two, the blended rate for the target episode price is based on two-thirds hospital-specific data and one-third market-wide data. In Demonstration Year Three, the target episode price will be based on one-third hospital-specific data and two-thirds market-wide data. To ensure fair cost comparisons between hospitals, adjustments are also made for Indirect Medical Education costs and extreme cost outliers (i.e., episodes with a total cost higher than 2 Standard Deviations (SD) above the Tampa-wide average are truncated at the 2 SD threshold). Beginning in Demonstration Year One (May 23, 2016, through September 30, 2017), hospitals are eligible for gain-sharing payments if they achieve and maintain a favorable quality performance rating and if actual episode costs are lower than the target episode price. This 2

approach ensures that hospitals do not sacrifice health care quality in order to lower overall costs. Quality performance ratings are derived from the CMS composite quality score for their CJR program. The CMS composite quality score is a hospital-level summary quality score reflecting performance and improvement on the quality measures adopted for Medicare s CJR model (Total Hip Arthroplasty/Total Knee Arthroplasty) complications measure and the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems patient experience survey measure. Hospital-level incentives (in the form of gain-sharing payments) are based on total TRICARE allowable charges for LEJR surgeries in comparison to the target episode price for each hospital. Gain-sharing payments in Demonstration Years One and Two will be equal to five percent of the total-cost savings for a particular demonstration hospital during the applicable year. This amount increases to 10 percent in Demonstration Year Three. Hospitals may also incur loss-sharing penalties if actual episode costs exceed the target episode price. Loss sharing is zero percent in Demonstration Year One, five percent in Demonstration Year Two, and 10 percent in Demonstration Year Three. 3) Discussion: Historically, approximately 100 TRICARE beneficiaries receive LEJR surgery in the Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida market annually. During the first six months of the demonstration (May 23, 2016, through November 30, 2016), there were 53 LEJR admissions in the demonstration and cohort hospitals (30 and 23, respectively). Additional admissions have occurred since that time; however, the nature of this episode-based demonstration (hospital admission plus 90 days of post-operative care, plus claims submission and processing time) creates a significant lag time before all data are available. TRICARE providers are subject to a one-year timely filing rule for claims, but, most claims are submitted more quickly and TRICARE claims processing is faster than industry averages. For this demonstration, the DHA is anticipating an average of two to three months for claims runout, and an additional 30-45 days for TRICARE Encounter Data receipt, plus an additional 15 days for the data to be visible in enterprise data systems. This means that demonstration cost data cannot be evaluated until approximately 240 days from the activating event (LEJR surgery). Based on LEJR admissions through November 30, 2016, total episode costs for LEJR surgeries at demonstration hospitals are higher than those at cohort hospitals (average of $20,688.00 vs. $18,903.00, respectively). However, it should be noted that the demonstration hospitals ran comparatively higher trends prior to the demonstration. Also, there was significant volatility in the annual cost trends, both for the demonstration and cohort hospitals, in the years preceding the demonstration (based on an analysis performed by Kennell & Associates for FYs 2013, 2014, and 2015). Prior to the introduction of the LEJR demonstration, annual cost trends for demonstration hospitals went up by 9 percent and then down by 5 percent, while cohort hospitals went up by 6 percent and then down by 12 percent. Finally, the number of completed episodes to date is still quite low, and, therefore, average costs per episode can be swayed by one or two admissions in comparison to the overall total. For these reasons, it would be premature to draw conclusions about the impact of the LEJR demonstration on cost trends. 3

Based on the information that is currently available, four of the seven demonstration hospitals are delivering care where the total episode cost is lower that the target episode price. Three out of the four hospitals have achieved and maintained a satisfactory composite quality score, which was based on CMS analysis published in April 2017. Since this was the first year that CMS produced these performance ratings, it is not possible to draw any conclusions about quality performance trends at this time. However, if these cost and performance trends hold through the end of Demonstration Year One, three of the seven demonstration hospitals will be eligible for five percent gain-sharing incentive payments. The remaining four hospitals will be ineligible for gain sharing because they failed to meet the quality standards and actual episode costs exceeded the target. 4) Conclusions: The number of admissions for the first six months of the LEJR demonstration is still low (30 demonstration hospital admissions and 23 cohort hospital admissions through November 30, 2016). Therefore, average costs per episode in either group can be swayed by a change of a few more or less readmissions in the demonstration period relative to the historical year. It is difficult to confidently reconcile pre-demonstration differences in the cost trends because there was great volatility in the annual cost trends in the years preceding the demonstration, both for the demo hospitals (up 9 percent and then down 5 percent) and the cohort hospitals (up 6 percent and then down 12 percent). It is also not possible to draw conclusions about quality performance trends at this time, since CMS did not publish CJR composite quality scores before April 2017 (retrospective to April 2016). Finally, since this is an episode-based demonstration, cost evaluations include the activating event (surgery) plus 90 days of post-operative care, and demonstration cost data cannot be evaluated until approximately 240 days from the activating event. Given all of the above, the DHA concludes that it is too soon to draw any conclusions about whether or not there is any initial cost or quality impact from the demonstration; additional data is needed. The DHA will continue to monitor demonstration cost trends on a quarterly basis and as the total pool of completed episodes expands over time, more definitive analysis and evaluation will be possible. 4