Northrop Grumman s Enduring Role in the ICBM System

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Northrop Grumman s Enduring Role in the ICBM System Dr. Simon Ramo Father of systems engineering and one of the founding members of the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, a heritage Northrop Grumman company.

Origins of the ICBM Program As the United States raced to develop new military technologies in the 1950s, a number of technical and geo-strategic shifts accelerated the pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). But perhaps the most important catalyst was the arrival of two influential Air Force leaders. First, in February 1953, Trevor Gardner became Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development. Supported by then-retired Air Force legend Lt. Gen. James Doolittle, Gardner believed ICBMs offered the US a major nuclear advantage that would eclipse existing Soviet capabilities. Second, in March 1953, Bernard Schriever was named Assistant for Development Planning under the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, and would soon be promoted to Brigadier General. A leading member of the service s nascent research and development community, and a protégé of Hap Arnold, he came to be known as the father of the ICBM system. Within a few months of taking office Schriever and Gardner had joined together to promote emerging ICBM technology within the Air Force. They quickly convened a subcommittee of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board s (SAB) Nuclear Weapons Panel to validate their approach. To make the case for ICBM development, Gardner and Schriever seized upon recent advances in thermonuclear weapons. While these warheads were not the only missing ingredient to the successful development of ICBMs, they were a powerful catalyst to accelerate the ICBM program. Gardner and Schriever s subcommittee completed its study in October 1953. The final report argued that the size, shape, and yield of thermonuclear weapons were perfectly suited to an ICBM, and that such weapons could have a meaningful impact on the incipient Atlas long-range missile program that was already underway at the time. With this clear endorsement, the stage was set for more ambitious ICBM development. The subcommittee s findings suggested the need for a comprehensive review of the Air Force s existing long-range missile programs Snark, Navaho, and Atlas. With the blessing of Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott, Gardner assembled 11 leading scientists and engineers from academia and industry to participate in the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee, better known by its codename: the Teapot Committee. Lonnquest, John C. and David F. Winkler. To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program. Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program: 1996. Pages 34-35. Lonnquest, John C. and David F. Winkler. To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program. Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program: 1996. Page 36. Lonnquest, John C. and David F. Winkler. To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program. Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program: 1996. Pages 36-37. Top left: Gen. Bernard Shriever; Bottom right: Legacy ICBMs on display (U.S. Air Force photo)

Origins of the Ramo-Wooldridge and USAF Partnership Gardner contracted the newly formed Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation to administer the work of the Teapot Committee. The founders, Simon Ramo and Dean Wooldridge, served as full members of the committee. They had previously worked at Hughes Aircraft, where they earned acclaim for their work on the Falcon missile system, the Air Force s first operational air-to-air guided missile. Ramo-Wooldridge became TRW in the 1960s and was later acquired by Northrop Grumman, where its employees continue their groundbreaking work on the nation s strategic space and missile systems to this day. The Teapot Committee concluded that the Atlas program should be accelerated. For Schriever, this path forward required a unique setup and a close partnership with Ramo-Wooldridge. The company was made to order for the big job. Its employees understood both the key technical requirements of ICBM system and the personal views of relevant Air Force leaders, while also bringing an array of talents and skills that could not be found elsewhere. In short, Ramo-Wooldridge was uniquely suited to the task because it combined the system engineering and design capabilities of an industrial contractor with the research strengths of an academic organization. In September 1954, formal approval and authorization was given for this unique partnership between the Air Force and Ramo-Wooldridge to proceed. Although neither side knew it at the time, they had laid the foundation for a mutually beneficial partnership that, in one form or another, would be sustained not only for the duration of the Atlas project, but in fact for every future Air Force ballistic missile program: Thor; Titan I and II; Minuteman I, II, and III; Peacekeeper; and Small ICBM. The processes and insights derived from these programs drive Northrop Grumman s ICBM support to this day. As such, Schriever put the firm in charge of Systems Engineering and Technical Direction (SE/TD). Until then, Ramo-Wooldridge had performed specific contractual tasks for the Air Force, but now it was to become a key part of the service s overall design and integration effort. As described by Schriever, Ramo-Wooldridge would, in effect, become part of the Air Force family for this project. He used them to create specifications, oversee development, and coordinate between the Air Force and numerous sub-contractors. In doing so, it would provide crucial support to the Air Force and became its indispensable partner. Dyer, Davis. Necessity as the Mother of Convention: Developing the ICBM, 1954-1958. Journal of Business and Economic History. 22:1 (1993). Pages 196-197. Kennedy, W.S., S.M. Kovacic, and E.C. Rea. Solid Rocket History at TRW Ballistic Missiles Division. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics: 1992. Page 4. Dyer, Davis. Necessity as the Mother of Convention: Developing the ICBM, 1954-1958. Journal of Business and Economic History. 22:1 (1993). Page 202. Top left: Gen. Bernard Shriever and Si Ramo (U.S. Air Force photo) Bottom right: Time Magazine cover from April 1957 with Dean Wooldridge and Simon Ramo, right.

Atlas The development and integration of the first ICBM system involved four overlapping phases, defined in collaboration between Ramo-Wooldridge and Schriever s Western Development Division (WDD). The crucial outcome of the first phase concerned the design of the nose cone for the Atlas missile. Ramo-Wooldridge was able to decrease nose cone weight by half (from 7,000 to 3,500 pounds), which in turn reduced the required size of the launch vehicle from 460,000 to 240,000 pounds and the number of engines from five to three. By early 1955, the basic design of Atlas was set, and the Air Force was prepared to award contracts for the missile s structure and major subsystems. During this second phase, Ramo-Wooldridge evaluated contractor bids and made recommendations to the Air Force. While the firm played a crucial role coordinating the work of the many contractors, its most important contribution during this period concerned how to speed up the program. Such improvements, which are estimated to have saved more than a year of development time and a quarter of the missile s total cost, did much to confirm Ramo-Wooldridge s bona fides as the systems engineering and technical direction (SE/TD) partner to the Air Force. The third major phase of Atlas development lasted from from mid-1955 until mid-1958. During this time, which Schriever called the real development effort, Ramo-Wooldridge oversaw the practical implementation of concurrency developing many interdependent weapon system Johnson, Stephen B. The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation, 1945-1965. Air Force History and Museums Program: 2002. Page 71. Dyer, Davis. Necessity as the Mother of Convention: Developing the ICBM, 1954-1958. Journal of Business and Economic History. 22:1 (1993). Page 204. Dyer, Davis. Necessity as the Mother of Convention: Developing the ICBM, 1954-1958. Journal of Business and Economic History. 22:1 (1993). Page 205. components in parallel via the development, fabrication, and testing of the emerging ICBM. Ramo-Wooldridge supervised the development, creation, and testing of key system components. In particular, the company instituted a rigorous hierarchy of checks to ensure that actual flight testing was only conducted after exhaustive ground testing. The goal was to significantly reduce risk by decreasing the number of parts that could only be tested through costly and potentially hazardous flight testing. The final phase of the Atlas project lasted from mid-1958, when Atlas was first deployed, until the fall of 1959, when it first became operational. The successful deployment and operation of Atlas was a major victory for the Ramo-Wooldridge and Schriever s WDD. Top left and bottom right: Atlas missiles being tested for use as ICBMs.

Titan Development and integration of the Air Force s next ICBM, Titan I, began in mid-1954, when a series of Air Force studies recommended that the newly created WDD explore alternate missile configurations. As during Atlas development, Ramo-Wooldridge provided vital guidance and direction to the many contractors involved,, reviewing and coordinating their work, and ensuring that all the pieces came together effectively in the complete system. Ramo-Wooldridge also brought crucial design insights to Titan. Most significantly, it was instrumental in helping to conceive of, design, and develop the revolutionary two-stage propulsion system. Unlike Atlas stage-and-a-half system, when Titan s first and second stages were exhausted, the engines and fuel tanks broke away, thus meaningfully decreasing the weight of missile. This made the vehicle much more efficient, which allowed for a longer range of the missile and the capacity to carry a larger payload. Titan II corrected the two major deficiencies of Titan I, and Ramo-Wooldridge provided the technical and managerial direction for these major system innovations. Following successful test flights, in June 1963 the first Titan II missiles went on operational alert. The continuing partnership between Ramo-Wooldridge and the Air Force was clearly proving effective. Ramo-Wooldridge s SE/TD efforts and continuing partnership with the Air Force led to Titan I completing its first successful test launch in January 1960, eventually becoming operational in April 1962. Even as the first Titan I missiles themselves a major improvement over the first-generation Atlas were rolling off the production line, the Air Force was searching for an inproved system to overcome Titan I s two major weaknesses: its cryogenic propellant (which was volatile, needed to be stored at extremely low temperatures, and required time to be pumped aboard the missile before being fired) and its radio-inertial guidance system (which was vulnerable to jamming). Top left and bottom right: Titan missiles used by the U.S. Air Force, became operational in 1962. (U.S. Air Force photos) Lonnquest, John C. and David F. Winkler. To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program. Department of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program: 1996. Page 70.

Minuteman Out of necessity, the first generation of ballistic missiles (Atlas, Titan, and the intermediate ballistic missile, Thor) employed liquid-propellant rockets. By 1957, the Air Forced seemed to be on the verge of a breakthrough: the combined trends of reduced weight, increased warhead yield, improved accuracy, and solid motor development argued in favor of a new, solid-fuel ICBM. Ramo-Wooldridge was intimately involved with many of these important advances, especially those associated with re-entry vehicle technology. Early re-entry vehicle designs used massive copper heat sinks to shield the vehicle during atmospheric re-entry, but Ramo-Wooldridge helped develop a much improved material that eventually provided equal heat protection at one-third the weight. Such critical developments provided strong support for the Air Force s efforts to gain backing for a new, solid-fuel ICBM system. Ramo-Wooldridge computer studies provided crucial evidence demonstrating the feasibility of solid-propellant rockets and outlining suggestions for new approaches to meet their unique technical challenges. These studies were seized upon by Air Force Col. Edward Hall, who had been researching solid-propellants at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Propulsion Laboratory. Working together, Hall and a special Ramo-Wooldridge study group developed the preliminary design and specifications for a solid-propellant ICBM. Ramo-Wooldridge employees performed computer studies of missile sizing, weight, performance characteristics, staging tradeoffs, trajectories, and subsystem requirements. These initial studies proved instrumental to advancing solid-propellant research. Ramo-Wooldridge was also intimately involved in rocket motor case design and fracture mechanics studies. Its investigations into heat treatment and fracture toughness of high-strength materials provided the critical data and design direction necessary to assess the specific tradeoff between an increase in strength and a decrease in capability. Ramo-Wooldridge was also crucial in overcoming one of the most technically challenging parts of Minuteman design: the development of movable rocket motor nozzles. Thanks to these and other major advances, a solid-propelled, threestage Minuteman was successfully launched on its very first full flight test in February 1961. That the missile flew without incident on its first complete attempt was testament not only to the remarkable technological progress that had been made in such a short period of time, but also to the effective managerial systems used by Ramo-Wooldridge and its partners. Top left and center right: Minuteman ICBM incorporated many enhancements that made them more reliable than previous systems. (U.S. Air Force photos) The firm also provided vital Long-Range Service Life Analysis (LRSLA). Using a combination of laboratory tests and analytically derived models, Ramo-Wooldridge now TRW was able to design an approach to validate service life. Not only did this technique validate plans under design (and identify previously unknown failures), but it came to serve as the basis for modern service life estimates that are critical to the military s long-term development planning. TRW s early technical and process innovations later proved invaluable to Northrop Grumman s work sustaining and modernizing the ICBM force under the ICBM Prime Integration Contract effort. Overall, the entire Minuteman system was far superior to Atlas, Titan, and Thor. It was so successful that the Air Force was able to retire all of its older generation missiles other than Titan II earlier than expected. Kennedy, W.S., S.M. Kovacic, and E.C. Rea. Solid Rocket History at TRW Ballistic Missiles Division. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics: 1992. Page 13.

Peacekeeper + Small ICBM Despite the successful Minuteman III deployment, US fears of Soviet strategic advances led to efforts to design two new missiles in the 1970s and 80s: the Peacekeeper, with the largest missile to date carrying the most warheads, and the Small ICBM with a smaller missile and payload and mobile launch options. As the ballistic missile domain knowledge within the Air Force matured, it grew more capable. As a result, during the 1970s, TRW moved from being an SE/TD lead to a Systems Engineering, Technical Assistance (SETA) contractor. TRW effectively carried out its SETA duties on Peacekeeper, which Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger later labelled the most successful ICBM program in Air Force history. Perhaps most importantly, TRW defined the sizing of the overall missile system and its various stages. Using computer modeling, TRW developed a method to compare proposed designs and evaluate how they would affect key metrics like range and payload. While Peacekeeper was eventually fielded in small numbers, the end of the Cold War terminated the Small ICBM program. Kennedy, W.S., S.M. Kovacic, and E.C. Rea. Solid Rocket History at TRW Ballistic Missiles Division. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics: 1992. Pages 21-23. Minuteman III Sustainment and Modernization In December 1997, the Air Force transitioned management of its ICBM program now just Minuteman III missiles to a team of subcontractors reporting to a single prime integrator. It awarded its ICBM Prime Integration Contract (IPIC) to TRW, which was soon acquired by Northrop Grumman, bringing this expertise to the company and continuing its 50-year ICBM legacy. And in 2017, the Air Force selected Northrop Grumman to develop new designs to replace the Minuteman III system as part of its Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program. At the peak of IPIC, over 600 Northrop Grumman employees at over 10 US locations were tasked on the contract. These individuals provided essential program management, assessment, and engineering services to maintain and modernize the weapon system s readiness, reliability, availability, accuracy, and hardness. Broadly speaking, Northrop Grumman led all of the system engineering and requirements design activities in support of the Air Force s objectives. Through its work on IPIC, Northrop Grumman touched every element of the current force s systems and ground infrastructure, gaining intimate knowledge of their components and interactions. Kennedy, W.S., S.M. Kovacic, and E.C. Rea. Solid Rocket History at TRW Ballistic Missiles Division. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics: 1992. Page 13. Over the last 20 years, the Air Force has modernized or engaged in servicelife extension programs for the most critical elements of the ICBM system. Through the IPIC contract, Northrop Grumman led efforts to upgrade or replace propulsion, guidance, structure, re-entry vehicles, nuclear payloads, and ground infrastructure. This work continues today with Northrop Grumman s performance on the Ground Subsystems Sustainment Contract. IPIC and its follow-on contracts have allowed Northrop Grumman to build on TRW s extraordinary successes. Through these continued sustainment and modernization efforts, Northrop has preserved and expanded core skills in its ICBM workforce. With over 60 years of excellence in designing, developing, and sustaining the nation s ICBM force, Northrop Grumman is advancing its legacy.

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