The Role of the Canadian Armed Forces In the North Major Pascal Sévigny 2 March 2015
The Arctic UNCLASSIFIED
Outline The role Canada First Defence Strategy Historical Background Human Activity Arctic Challenges Spectrum of Operations & Challenges Canadian Armed Forces activity Support JTFN NOH NHRK Future in the Arctic UNCLASSIFIED
Canada First Defence Strategy National Defence primarily contributes to the sovereignty pillar of the Northern Strategy through the CFDS Directs the CAF to Demonstrate a visible presence in the region Have the capacity to exercise control over and defend our Arctic territory Provide assistance to other government departments and agencies when called upon Investments under the CFDS banner National Defence activity is not military posturing, but is intended to preposition Canada to meet safety and security challenges
Directives DND/CF Arctic Regional Strategy Jun 09 Canada s Northern Strategy Oct 09 CDS/DM Directive For The DND/CF In Canada s North Apr 11 Northern Employment and Support Plan JTFN 5-year Ops Plan - 2012 CJOC 5-year Northern Plan Feb 2015
Historical Background Role of the armed forces in the Arctic Traditional roles of the CAF Search and rescue NORAD Cold War Region of confrontation between Soviet Union and NATO Détente followed by renewed tension 1987: Murmansk Initiative Post-Cold War Canada and other Arctic states downsized military presence in the region Arctic Council formed in 1996
Historical Background Recent changes Regional tensions: 2006-2011 Perceived efforts to re-militarize the Arctic Cooperation: as of 2008 Northern Chiefs of Defence Arctic Security Forces Roundtable Deterioration of relations with Russia Situation in Ukraine Canada, Norway, and the United States have suspended bilateral military cooperation Increased Russian cooperation with China
Arctic Council Countries Canada s Arctic Council Priorities: - Responsible Arctic Resource Development - Safe Arctic shipping - Sustainable circumpolar communities Working Draft For Official Use Only 1 8 Arctic Circle Canada s Arctic 9
Human activity Consequences of Climate Change Anticipated changes in the volume and nature of human activity in the region Rising sea levels and agricultural concerns Increased commercial shipping
Arctic challenges Distance Environment Harsh, cold, austere Topographical, and solar/geo-magnetic features Access to waterways Infrastructure Sparsely populated Concentrated in a few cities Logistics Communications Regional differences
Distances Two compe*ng air services fly Boeing 737 between the main centers in the AOR The 737 s are adapted to carry cargo and passengers and are equipped to land on gravel airfields One airline uses a stretch C- 130 to fly between centres and the Diamond mines in the NWT Military C- 130 supply flights operate between Winnipeg, Trenton and CF Sta*on Alert Commercial Dornier, Dash 7 and Dash 8 are capable of transi*ng between most centres without re- fuelling
Infrastructure Infrastructure in the north is difficult to maintain The structures that exist are often remnants of old military facilities or scientific research stations New stations such DRDC s Northern Watch are under construction NORAD s Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) are located in Iqaluit, Rankin Inlet, Yellowknife and Inuvik - The Rankin Inlet FOL is currently inactive JTFN HQ is located in Yellowknife Limited infrastructure and road systems Lack of redundancy UNCLASSIFIED
The North Warning System remains opera*onal (most sta*ons are automated) UNCLASSIFIED NORAD Infrastructure NORAD currently operates short and long range radar sta*ons across the AOR All sta*ons are self sustained with on site genera*ng capabili*es and their own aircrar runways The majority of the sta*ons are placed with marine access for fuel replenishment New contract with NasiTuq being drared
Gravel runways dominate airstrips above 66.5 N UNCLASSIFIED Airfields There are a large number of opera*onal and abandoned runways throughout the AOR Virtually all communi*es depend upon air travel to commute to the major centres Many large mining facili*es have their own airstrips The largest mines, the diamond mines, can accommodate larger jets such as the Boeing 737
Major consideration for air mobility support UNCLASSIFIED C-177 Capable Airfields & CC-138 Combat Radius There are a total of 10 airfields in the JTFN AOR that are capable of accommodating the CC-177 Globe Master in the JTFN AOR CC-138 Twin Otter very reliable in operating throughout the JTFN AOR
Communica*ons are very challenging in the North UNCLASSIFIED Communications Divided in the following manner: 1. Nunavut - 26 communi*es that are reliant on satellite Communica*on Fibre upgrade underway 2. NWT - 34 communi*es: northern are reliant on microwave towers southern are reliant on fibre 8 are reliant on satellite 3. Yukon - 15 communi*es: northern are reliant on microwave towers southern are reliant on fibre 1, Old Crow, is reliant on satellite
Northern Spectrum of Operations and mission partners Safety Security Defence SAR incidents - Maritime (CCG, CAF) - Air (CAF) - Ground (RCMP, EMO, CAF) Maritime disasters (CCG, DFO, CAF) Air disasters (CAF) Natural disasters (EMO, CAF) Environmental disasters (EMO, EC, CAF) Health threats / Pandemics (EMO, PHAC, CAF) Man Made Disasters (All) Terrorism (RCMP, CAF) Espionage (CSIS) Counter Drug (RCMP, CAF) Smuggling (CBSA, RCMP, CAF) - Human - Goods Cyber (All) UNCLASSIFIED Sovereignty challenges (CAF) - Air incursion (CAF) - Maritime incursion (CAF, CCG) - Surface - Sub-surface - Land incursion (CAF, RCMP, CBSA) - Cyber attack (CAF)
Arctic challenges: Safety Threats to safety are a growing concern in the Arctic. Major threats can include anything from forest fires to flooding to pandemics. Search and rescue incidents also present persistent safety challenges.
Arctic challenges: Security Security threats are an emerging concern New opportunities for exploitative individuals and groups such as criminals and terrorist organizations. CAF not the lead for security threats, but contribute to a whole-ofgovernment approach to operating in this spectrum. CAF often play a supporting role to Canadian partners, such as by providing logistical, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
Arctic challenges: Defence Bottom line: We do not see an immediate conventional military threat in the North, nor the emergence of one in the foreseeable future. Despite this, we remain vigilant in our core mandate to defend Canada and its sovereignty. Important to sustained strategic deterrence, mainly with partnerships such as NORAD. Continually engage in dialogue with our international Arctic partners, both bilaterally and multilaterally. These efforts achieve a low risk, low tension environment in the Arctic region.
Arctic challenges: Defence, cont d Notable Arctic challenges to defence: The size of the region makes monitoring and identification of targets of interest challenging. This, as well as geographical size, also pose challenges to scalable responses. NORAD is a prime vehicle through which to mitigate these two challenges. Exercises, persistent northern presence, and infrastructure such as the North Warning System, provide additional relief. New technologies may also help.
Arctic challenges: Defence, cont d China: Russia: Attracted to energy and resources in the Arctic, as well as shipping potential. These lawful activities do not constitute a threat to Canada. The only country with a viable military capacity to challenge Canada in the Arctic region. Currently improving its military infrastructure and capabilities in its Arctic region. However, we do not view these efforts as a precursor for offensive military action against us. These initiatives are consistent with longstanding Russian government policy in the Arctic
CAF activities in the North Joint-Task-Force North Area of Responsibility includes 4 million square kilometres Coordinates and supports CAF activities in the North Works closely with various levels of government and Aboriginal communities Canadian Rangers Our eyes and ears in the Arctic Critical to exercising Canada s Arctic sovereignty Providers of key support to CAF Arctic activities
CAF activities in the North UNCLASSIFIED
CAF activities in the North Arctic search and rescue: Unique challenges to SAR missions in the North. Of 377 SAR incidents north 55 during 2013, the CAF conducted 38 SAR missions. Volunteers are an important piece of our SAR response capability. CAF actively cooperate and coordinate with Arctic international partners, including through exercises.
Canadian SAR Zones Shared responsibility among federal, provincial/territorial and municipal organizations, as well as volunteer SAR organizations Ground SAR (GSAR) is different from aeronautical and maritime SAR Primary responsibility of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is the provision of aeronautical SAR and the coordination of the aeronautical and maritime SAR system CAF resources may assist in GSAR efforts, medical evacuations and other humanitarian incidents if requested by the responsible provincial/territorial or municipal authority Divided into 3 x Zones each with a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre UNCLASSIFIED
CAF activities in the North Other routine activities: Routine surveillance flights Regular flights to Canadian Armed Forces Station Alert and other Defence locations for resupply Regularly provide assistance to our federal partners in the North
JTFN Forces Headquarters 47 pers Det YT (3) Det NU (4) 2005 Personnel 104 Reg 21 Pres 1850 Rangers 30 Civ 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (1 CRPG) 46 pers 1850 Rangers 60 communi*es Area Support Unit North (ASU(N)) 55 pers Junior Canadian Rangers (JCR) 1300 JCR 40 communi*es 440 (Transport) Sqn 50 pers 4 x Twin OTers
JTFN Timelines for Support Commander s Assessment Team (CAT) 8 hrs Canadian Rangers Recce 8 hrs / Vanguard 12 hrs / Main Body 24 hrs Immediate Reaction Unit (IRU) Recce 8 hrs / Vanguard 12 hrs / Main Body 24 hrs JTFN Command Element 24 hrs Arctic Response Company Group (ARCG) Recce 10 days / Advance Party 25 days / Main Body 30 days
Role and Functions of NOH Role To enable rapid force projection as well as the conduct and sustainment of CJOC operations in the North What they deliver Support projection of deployed force to forward location, C2, sustainment and redeployment for up to 30 days Coy Gp (H1) Bn (H2) Transition from strategic to tactical airlift Reorganization and equipping of deployed elements
Primary Hubs Alternate Hubs Whitehorse Inuvik Yellowknife Resolute Bay Cambridge Bay Alert Hall Beach Rankin Inlet Iqaluit Northern Operations Hubs Alternate Hubs selected based on existing infra, C17 accessibility, and identified gaps in Twin Otter / rotary wing coverage Minimal investment at Alternate Hubs Hubs are designed for response to emerging crisis but can be utilized for exercises as a means to exercise and validate
NOH Functions delivered to TF Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) of all pers deploying in the AO Materiel management, which may include storage, and materiel consolidation / de-consolidation Local procurement and contracting of services Transport: Local transport and coordination of forward movement. In the context of a light deployment, as expected for Northern Operations, necessary contracting to support tactical movement of the pers deploying will be undertaken by the NOH pers and subject to the limitations of the area Sp to aircraft services, such as fuelling and in-flight feeding Strategic CIS support, including secure and non-secure communications Engineering support, such as real property management, and environmental services Personnel services such as mortuary affairs Financial services pertaining to contracting and procurement Integral HSS for hub pers Theatre logistical sustainment and reach back Movement control
NHRK Enables the NOH to be activated quickly. Activation Component: One set will be purchased and centrally located to allow rapid deployment. It is designed to activate the Hub and set up the Ops centre. Contingency Component: Contains a Relocatable Temporary Camp (RTC) that can be deployed rapidly on short notice. Used in the event the FOL/PAB has to be occupied by NORAD, or if capacity of existing infra is exceeded.
Anticipated challenges UNCLASSIFIED
Future defence challenges Situational Awareness Maintaining a visible presence Preparing Forces Providing timely and credible response Providing a robust sustainment system
Looking ahead Continued acceleration of interest and activity in the North means that Canadian Armed Forces will play increasingly vital role in the region. North will remain challenging environment in which to operate. Addressing capability gaps in communications, surveillance, infrastructure and sustainment will continue to be top priority. Growing demands and costs of operating in the region mean that strengthening cooperation with territories, OGD, industry and international partners will be increasingly important.
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