Enlistment Policies and Recruitment into the Nigerian Army during the Nigerian Civil War: A Case Study of North-West Nigeria, 1967-1970 Abstract Hussaini Jibrin Military institution is important as other institutions that explain the existence of a sovereign state throughout human history. The Military is comprised of all actors that execute warfare. Such include archers, cavalry, and suppliers of logistics among others. This remains so even with the emergence of modern African states. Enlistment and recruitment into military service differed from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods in Africa. During the pre-colonial period, both enlistment and recruitment were almost compulsory upon all able-bodied men (sometimes including women) in the defense and expansion of areas of jurisdiction. On the other hand, with the colonial administration and subsequent post-colonial administration in Africa, more formal enlistment and recruitment into the military service (war) were introduced. This paper examines both enlistment and recruitment into the Nigerian Army during the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 with emphasis on the North-west geo-political zone of Nigeria. The enlistment and recruitment of able-bodied youths to execute the war for survival of the country as a single geo-political entity was carried out under the auspices of the Nigerian Army, the largest force that fought the war to its end, in 1970. Thus, the paper surveys a brief history of the Nigerian Army, background to the Nigerian Civil War, nature of enlistment during the Nigerian Civil War, nature of recruitment during the Civil War and finally, conclusion. It also adopts both primary and secondary sources of reconstruction of history through interviews with stake holders as well published works. Introduction The areas refer to as North-west Nigeria, today, consist of Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara and Jigawa state. During the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (the Nigerian Civil War) which is the most unfortunate event in the 20 th century history of the country, large number of people from the North-West were enlisted and recruited to defend the unity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Enlistment was the mobilization of the youth from their various places of origin or places of work to the recruitment centers for real military training and onward taking to different war fronts. In the course of doing so, the standards (policies) which governed the recruitment into the Nigerian Army were compromised using different war propaganda in order to win the minds of the young people to be enlisted and fight in the war. A Brief History of the Nigerian Army (NA) The Nigerian Army is the oldest among the three arms of the Nigerian Armed Forces (the Army, the Navy and the Air Force). Its origin pre-dated the emergence of Nigeria as a sovereign nation. According to the Nigerian Army Public Relations Department in 1973, the Nigerian Army was born out of the circumstances that happened in Nigeria s coastal areas as a result of abolition of trans-atlantic slave trade. Prior to 1771, with the judicial ruling of Chief Justice Mansfield of 81
Britain that slavery was not permissible by law and subsequent British government s prohibition of the trade in 1807, it became illegal as from 1 st March, 1808 for any Briton to engage in international slave trade. 1 Consequently, some of the white merchants found recourse Africa s commodities like palm which was observed as a lucrative trade. The route to the hinterland was through the River Niger which had already been explored by Mango Park. As this trade got momentum, the white merchants tried to have control on areas where it was produced. Thus, they saw the need for an armed protection. At that time, the pro-slavery European merchants collaborated with some prominent African leaders such as Oba Kosoko of Lagos, king of Dahomey and some chiefs of Porto Novo against the British efforts. In 1849, the British government appointed John Beecroft as the British consul for the Bight of Benin and Bight of Biafra after his service to the queen of Spain in Fernando Po. Within two years of his appointment, British approach to the control of all ports shifted from pacificism and persuasion to active intervention and military conquest. The quests to totally suppress the slave trade and establish legitimate trade, however, remained the pretext for this military intervention. 2 In this face, Beecroft ordered Commander Forbes of the Bight squadron to attack king Kosoko in 1851. Thus, Akintoye, the former king was re-installed. However, in 1853, Kosoko staged a counter armed invasion in a bid to regain his lost territory but it was unsuccessful. Akintoye died three weeks later and his son Dosumu was installed with the British support. This angered Kosoko who continued with the proslave trade and British activities. Similarly, he made sure that Dosumo never had early smooth reign for he continuously contended against his installation as king. This conflict continued up till 1861 when the British persuaded Dosumu to sign an agreement declaring Lagos a British possession in return for a pension. He signed it, hence, Lagos was created as a colony of the British in 1862. In October 1862, Stanhope Freemen, the then Governor of British West African possessions wrote to the Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, asking for the creation of a local constabulary for Lagos. The nature of this proposed force was para-military and would take over the guard duties from the troops of the West India Regiment, protect legitimate commerce and ensure that all live in safety. 3 In the wake of Freeman s moves, John Glover, the Lieutenant Governor of Lagos was mandated to raise an indigenous constabulary force. 4 This is what after series of transformations finally became the Nigerian Army (NA) in 1963. This force had no doubt served gallantly in Lagos and Gold Coast constabularies before establishment of Royal Niger Company Army (RNCA). Through their performance in various battles, they established a great reputation for themselves and were in constant demand to fill the vacancies in the colonial forces established along the west coast of Africa. As the RNC extended its authority into the lower reaches of Hausaland, it was in a good position to tap this human resource for its own Army. From 1897, after the Bida and Ilorin campaigns, it began to receive requests from the Gold Coast and Niger Coast Protectorates governments for the recruitment of Hausa men into their forces. The RNC complied with these requests the best way it could but only after it had satisfied its own needs in this direction. With the establishment of the West African Frontier Force (W.A.F.F), the RNC cooperated in the recruitment of the Hausa as well as the carriers needed to maintain the new force in the field. It was this satisfaction with the performance 1 The Nigerian Army Public Relations Department. The Nigerian Army, Lagos: NAPD, 1973, p.5 2 Ibid, pp. 5-7. 3 Ibid. pp. 8-9 4 Ibid, pp. 6-7 82
of the Hausa, which caused Goldie to recommend that an army made up of them (the Hausa) should be established and used for imperial purposes throughout West Africa. At that time, Great Britain relied too much on Indian troops for tropical climates, according to Goldie. 5 After the Royal Niger Company was granted a charter, in 1886, which enabled it to establish its authority over the Niger Delta and the valleys of Niger and Benue, it raised in the same year the Royal Niger Constabulary with its headquarters in Aboh, near Asaba. 6 This force grew from 150 men in1886 to 1,000 men at the end of 1899. 7 The growth was brought about by the company s need to subdue the local population, as it sought to impose its will on the indigenous peoples in areas which it claimed control. 8 An important step in the transformation of the Nigerian Army was taken in 1897 when the British Government needed a more effective military force to counter German and French incursions in some parts of West Africa which she claimed were under her control. The British Government, therefore, considered it necessary to raise a new force altogether to match what the French had in the area. Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary floated the idea of forming a West African Frontier Force (WAFF), and with the concurrence of the British War Office, appointed Lieutenant Colonel Lugard to raise and command this new force of between two thousand (2000) and three thousand (3000) men to be quartered in the present day Northern Nigeria. Thus, the WAFF, became a child of circumstance. 9 For more effective actions of the force, in 1898, a suggestion was made that Niger territories should be amalgamated into one political entity. 10 The WAFF was to absorb the Royal Niger Company s Constabulary in Northern Nigeria and the Oil River Irregulars later known as the Niger Coast Constabulary in Eastern Nigeria. 11 These forces were indeed strongly instrumental to the British occupation of the Nigerian areas. For instance, in Northern Nigeria, from 1898-1903, the entire Kanem-Bornu empire, the Sokoto caliphate and the rest of the small chiefdoms in the region were overran by the British through the force of the WAFF. 12 During the WW I in the name of the British crown, about 13,980 Nigerian soldiers were recruited and fought in Cameroon, Togo, Tanzania and Zinder. 13 Another remarkable progress of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) during the colonial period was the re-organization of the force in 1938 in anticipation of the break out of the World War II. The force was re-organized into three Battalions at war strength, two Battalions at peace time lower establishment and an enlarged 5 U. Faruk, The Victors and the Vanquished of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: Triumph of Truth and Valour over Greed and Ambition, Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 2011, p. 271. 6 Ibid. 7 N. J. Miners, The Nigerian Army 1956-166, London: Longman, 1971, p. 36. 8 Nigerian Army Museum (NAM), History of the Nigerian Army in Pictures, Kano: Joah-Co. Nigeria Limited, 1987, p. 9. 9 S.C. Ukpabi, The Evolution of the Nigerian Army Under Colonial Rule, in Gbor, W.T.J. (ed.), Military History: Nigeria From Pre-Colonial Period to Present, Ibadan: Longman, 2003, p. 116.. 10 Ibid, pp. 118-119. 11.Nigerian Army Museum (NAM), History of the Nigerian Army, p. 115. 12 For more detail information about this, See, O. Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria, O. Ikime, (ed), The Groundwork of the Nigerian History, Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980. R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906: The Sokoto Caliphate and its Emirates, Ibadan: Longman, 1971, M. Crowder, The Story of Nigeria, London: 1962, M. Crowder, West African Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation, London: Hutchinson, 1978, among numerous others. 13 J. Osuntokun, The Nigerian in the First World War, London: Longman Group Limited, 1979, p. 169. 83
signal section. When the war eventually broke out in 1939, the regiment was expanded from five Battalions to thirteen, located at various convenient areas all over the country to engage in training. 14 As the war progressed, other auxiliary units were formed to act as carriers. And as time went on, the need for Nigerian troops for the war became obvious. 15 As such, about 121, 652 Nigerian soldiers made up of twenty eight Battalions were used by the Britain to prosecute the war in Kenya, Italian Somaliland, Ethiopia, Burma and the Middle East. 16 In July 1956, the centralized command under the WAFF was terminated and the armies of each of the four British colonies in West Africa became directly responsible to the British Army Council. In effect, the four military forces which previously structured under a single command, now became independent of one another but subject to the oders of the British Army Council in London. Following this development, the only indication of the former defence system coordination between British West African territories was the training school at Teshi, Ghana which continued to operate under a joint Board until Nigeria set up her Military Training College in 1960. With the termination of the centralized command under WAFF, the Nigeria Regiment was redesignated as Nigerian Military Forces (NMF). During her visit to Nigeria in 1956, Queen Elizabeth II of England, was so impressed with the various contribution which the Nigerian Army had been rendering to her country that she re-named the forces Queen s Own Nigerian Regiment (QONR). 17 At the London Conference of 1957, the British Government announced its readiness to relinquish its control of the QONR from April 1, 1958. This was done and from this day on ward, the Nigerian Government took control of the Army. From then, onward an ambitious scheme of Nigerianization of the officer corps began in full. When Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960, the Queen s Own Nigerian Regiment became known as Royal Nigerian Army (RNA). However, on October 1st, 1963 when Nigeria became a republic, the Royal appellation was removed leaving the Nigerian Army. 18 Background to the Nigerian Civil War Several factors were responsible for the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War in August, 1967, so much so that, scholars have classified them into remote 19 and immediate 20 causes and they are 14 O. Obasanjo, Nzeogwu: An Intimate Portrait of Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1999, p. 39. 15 Ibid. 16 V.A Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of 67 17 V.A Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of 67 18 Ibid. 19 The remote causes can be traced back through the long period of British colonial rule in Nigeria to the period of the collapse of the first republic, 1966. This can be seen especially with the amalgamation of the three different British protectorates in 1914 as a single political entity known as Nigeria by Fredrick Lugard which some scholars up till date see it as great colonial mistake, development of colonial constitutions in the country, 1953 constitutional conference which gave birth to Kano riot in same year, nature of party politics during the colonial rule, nature of the government that constituted the first republic, census crisis 1963, western region political crisis 1964-1965 and first military coup d état 15 th January 1966. 20 While the immediate causes of the war can be considered as Ironsi s decrees No.1 and No. 24 of 1966, his failure of not punishing the coup plotters of January 1966, the counter coup of July 1966, Igbo s progrom in Northern Nigeria, 84
adequately treated by many scholars that details of the factors may not be required here. Events that followed the January and the July 1966 coup d états in Nigerian history could not stop the attempts of some fellow Nigerians from the then Eastern Region to secede from the Federation of the state. 21 The final whistle blown to start the conflict was the release of the final Aburi Communiqué signed on 5 th January, 1967 when General Ankrah, the Ghanian Head of State mediated in the crisis between Nigerian government and Lt. Colonel Ojukwu, the Governor of the Eastern Region. 22 Each of the representatives of the Nigerian government and Eastern region had different interpretations of the agreement reached about the future of Nigeria at Aburi. The secessionists worked hard to prepare the minds of the Ibos through posters, organizing lectures and bombastic orations. As a result of this, the people were fully mobilized. 23 According to Gowon, the Accord had preserved the unity of the country, while Ojukwu claimed that, the Agreement gave him more powers to control the Government of the Eastern Region. He therefore, announced taking over control of all Federal departments in the Region. 24 This was further well aggravated by seizing the revenue due to the Federal Government, F. 27 plane of the Nigerian Airways, trains and expulsion of non-easterners from the Eastern Region. A further acceleration occurred on 27 May, 1967 when the Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces announced the breaking of the federation into twelve states. The warring Eastern Region was divided into three states: South Eastern, Rivers and East Central. The first two are minorities in principle but ecologically were well placed as they lie in the oil-rich and oil-producing areas. In a lightening and preconceived manner, and with the mandate of the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly, Lt. Colonel Ojukwu declared on 30 th May, 1967 the Republic of Biafra as an independent and a sovereign nation; 25 thus, making it the 54 th country in the continent of Africa. In response to this situation, the Nigerian Federal Government under Luitenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon declared that to keep Nigeria ONE is a task that must be done. This small chaos that started like a personal grudge involving the two leaders, Yakubu Gowon and Odumegwu Ojukwu culminated to thirty month bloodshed from 1967 to 1970 when the war ended as a result of the surrender of the Biafran Armed Forces. 26 By May, 1967 preparation for the war had already been set in motion on the Nigerian side. All soldiers of Northern, Western and Midmisinterpretation of famous Aburi Accord by Eastern region s government and subsequent declaration of the independent state of Biafra. 21 These issues have been widely expressed by many writers in various academic disciplines such as History, Political Science, Sociology, Public Administration, Education Philosophy and so on. For example, in History, A.M. Adejo, The Nigerian Civil War: Forty Years After, What Lessons, Makurdi, Aboki Publishers, 2008, in Political Science, A. Adedeji, (ed), Comprehending and Mastering African Conflict: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance, London: Zed Books, 1991, in Public Administration, J.O. Ojiako, Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and?, Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers Nigeria Limited, 1981 and in Education Philosophy, O. Nduka, The Root of African Underdevelopment, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2006. 22 J.J. Oluleye, Military and Leadership in Nigeria, Ibadan, University Press Limited, 1985, p. 42. 23 Ibid, pp. 42-43. 24 Y. Balogun and Wole Soyinka, The Third Force and the Nigerian Civil War, in (ed) O. Adesina and Others, Critical Perspectives on Peace, Conflict and Warfare in Africa: Festchrift in honur of Siyan Oyeweso, Ili-Ife: OAU University Press, 2012, p.260. 25 J.J. Oluleye, Military and Leadership in p. 42-43. 26 See, J.P. Dada, The Federal Armed Forces in the Nigerian Civil War, Minland Press, Jos. 85
western origin had been withdrawn from the Eastern region and redeployed. Mobilization of the ex-servicemen was ordered by the Commander-in-Chief. About seven thousand of them were called up and increased recruitment from the personnel of the Nigerian Police Force was embarked upon. 27 Policies of Enlistment into the Nigerian Army during the Civil War Policies concerning enlistment into the Nigerian Army, before the Nigerian Civil War especially from 19 th century through the colonial period were basically diplomatic. Diplomatic in the sense that, the Europeans having abolished the trans Atlantic slave trade, they encouraged slaves to run away from their masters to them. The Europeans paid for their freedom and in return, the slaves be enlisted into the white men military service. Similarly, during the colonial period, people that became indebted or became aggrieved in their societies as a result of one thing or the other went to British military enlistment camps especially in Zaria. The colonial officers stood for them and in the end be enlisted into their military service. However, after the independence of Nigeria, few free or non-slave Nigerians took themselves to enlistment centers for defence of their country. Enlistment means to register, to conscript, to hire or to take volunteer into service of armed forces. 28 In the context of this paper, it means enrolling the able bodied men within a particular period of time 29 before taken to the Nigerian Army Depots Zaria, Kaduna and Abeokuta as well as other smaller training centres for onward dispersal to different war fronts (One Division, Two Division and Three Marine Commando). 30 In an attempt to explore the policies used by the Federal Government of Nigeria to win the minds of youth to volunteer to join the Army around this period, we can understand that, the government used the institution of the Native Authority in today North-west Nigeria. The policies included the followings: use of district heads (Hakimai) who were very influential in the society forcefully or diplomatically, use of Native Authority s clerical staff in different departments such as, forestry, agriculture, mechanic and so on, use of grown up school boys in different post-primary schools in districts, use of important personalities (rich people) in the society such as merchant class, use of criminals that were under custody of different prisons because of one case or the other and finally volunteer groups as in the case of some people that felt politically persecuted due to political differences. These policies can be best appreciated under the subsequent paragraphs. Before 1967, enlistment and recruitment into service of the Nigerian armed forces was not widely recognized as a job career to many people among Northern Nigerian communities. That was the reason why, when Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu became the first native Minister of Defence after independence, discovered that, a large number of technicians in the Nigerian Army were people 27 A. A. Atofarati, The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies and Lessons Learnt, Student, United States Marine Command and Staff College, 1992, p. 18. 28 M.H. Manger, (ed), The Chambers Thesaurus: The Ultimate Word Finder, Edinburgh: England, Chamber Harrap Publishers, 2004, p. 656. 29 When the war started, able bodied men were kept at the enlistment centres for two weeks or more defending on the space or vacancy available at the Depots where they would be trained and taken to the war front. 30 Group interview with some veterans of the Nigerian civil war under chairman, Ahmad Gafai, 68 years, Nigerian Legion Office, Katsina branch 2/02/2013. 86
of the southern Nigeria origin. Hence, he mounted a campaign through the Native Authorities for enlistment of northerners that would be trained in the Army depot Zaria for nine months as clerks, engineers, in communication, in signals etc. Through this, considerable number of people from different emirates and chieftaincies of the Northern Region were enlisted. 31 With regards to the role played by district heads, the contribution of late Madawakin Kano, Alhaji Shehu Ahmad cannot be over-emphasized. Under the instruction of Kano Native Authority, he went round the districts of Kano province such as metropolitan Kano, Bichi, Gwarzo and so on to come to Kano at the then, 5 Battalion of the Nigerian Army (now Bukavo Barracks, Katsina road) for enlistment into the armed forces. 32 In Sokoto division, there was Magajin Garin Shinkafi (district head of Shinkafi town) 33, being an influential figure in the area assisted the yan doka in every market day. They went round the market with loud speaker advertising the government interest and Magaji s campaign for enrolment into military as a result of the conflict situation, the country found itself. Able bodied men from neighboring towns such as Zurmi, Moriki, Sabon Birnin Gobir and so on were registered; they were given two dollars for feeding of the day and were usually informed that they would be taken to Gusau for medical examination. After the medical examination, the successful ones would be taken to the depot while the unsuccessful ones would be given transport fares back to their various destinations. 34 Similarly, in Katsina emirate, in 1967, the Katsina Native Authority used district heads to persuade youth through village heads to volunteer and be enlisted. For instance, Sarkin Sullubawa, Alhaji Sule Na-Kulema 35 sent his courtiers all over Kaita district for this mission. In Yandaki town, which was and still under the Kaita district, the then head of the village, Galadima Abubakar invited young able bodied men to his palace and informed them that Sarkin Sullubawa was looking for them at Kaita. On their arrival there, they were briefed that they were selected on competency to serve in the military considering their historic bravery. 36 From there, they were taken to Katsina, gathered with other youth from different parts of the emirate at a place called Sabon Gida along Jibia road, close to present 35 Battalion of the Nigerian Army. They spent four weeks there and later taken to Kaduna where they spend two months also for training at the depot. 37 In this exercise, police were also used in the enlistment centers together with the few available Regimental Sergeant Majors (RSMs) in teaching some preliminary basic para-military activities such as parade and some other simple physical training before taken to the different Army Depots. 38 31 Interview with Corporal Kasim Mukaddas, 60 years, member, Nigerian Legion, Kano State Branch, Katsina Road Kano, 18/04/2014. 32 Interview with Corporal Rabiu Abdullahi, 69 years, member, Nigerian Legion, Kano State Branch, Katsina Road Kano, 18/04/2014. 33 Shinkafi town is today, the headquarters of Shinkafi Local Government in Zamfara state and is a historic market town that gathered merchants of different commodities especially, ground nut, cotton, hides and skin and cattles. 34 Interview with Sule Abara Sabon Birnin Gobir, demobilized soldier 67 years, Nigerian Legion office Gusau, 28/03/2014. 35 He was younger brother of General Hassan Katsina, the military administrator of old northern region under General Aguiyi Ironsi 1966-1967 and the chief of Army Staff under General Gowon up to 1967-1973. 36 Interview with Corporal Lawal Bala, Civil War veteran, 69 years, Yandaki town, 26 September, 2014. 37 Ibid. 38 Interview with RSM Ahmed Gafai, 68 years, Chairman Nigerian, 87
At the heat of the conflict, instructions were also passed to Native Authority departments and units through their respective heads that they should forward names of able bodied staff under them for enlistment into the army for emancipation of the country from the secession of the Biafrans. As a result of this, departments such as agriculture, health care, town planning, forestry and so on lost most of their experienced staff who acquired skills under the colonial officials. This had considerably created an adverse impact on the general developments of these services in the North. More so, school head masters were also instructed to persuade and enlist names of old aged pupils in their schools for the military service to the nation. 39 It is doubtless to say that important personalities in towns especially businessmen and Native Authority staff contributed immensely towards convincing able bodied men to be enlisted into the Army around this period. In Sokoto division, there was one prominent Native Authority staff called Baba Mai Dala who played a significant role during the exercise of enlistment of youth into the Nigerian Army 1967-1968. He was responsible for paying the able bodied men the sum of two dollars after being medically examined. He claimed total figure of what he spent from the federal government through the Native Authority at the end of enlistment of any batch. His house also became a centre where people from Yauri and Gwandu were short listed. After being examined and recorded, people within Sokoto city and nearby villages were asked to go and come back by the exact period when they would be taken to Zaria. Those from far away areas would stay at that point playing cards (karta) and different games in order to wipe out time. 40 With time, and in order to reduce burden of training ofthe civilians into military service at the Depot, in Sokoto, the famous Giginya field or filin sukuwa was used as a training ground for the enlisted people. 41 After the preliminary training of the enlisted people, an accommodation was secured to them at the present site of Federal Government College Mabera, Sokoto. This means that, the enlisted people of outside origin of Sokoto were accommodated at the Mabera area before taking to Zaria or Kaduna for real military training. 42 In Zuru Emirate (Kebbi state presently), there was popular late Baba Maza-Maza, who played an important role as far as enlistment of Zuru people into military during the Nigerian Civil war was concerned. 43 This was an important figure in the society who fed information to villagers concerning the time that the RSM would come to Zuru for enlistment. Just like Baba Mai dala in Sokoto, Maza-Maza encouraged many people with his influence within Zuru town and the environs of Dakarkari to enlist into Nigerian Army for service to their fatherland. After the enlistment from Zuru, the people were transported to Minna by Bus and from there conveyed by train to Kaduna or Zaria depots. 44 In Kaura Namoda, there was Alhaji Dankulu, a famous merchant 39 Interview with Sergeant Buba Hamman Mubi, Civil War veteran, 65 years, Nigerian Legion office Kano, Katsina Road Kano 17/04/2014. 40 Interview with Hussaini Gado, 65 years, demobilized NA soldier, Nigerian Legion office, Kebbi state, 27/02/2014. 41 This field is the place where British forces under Lord Lugard defeated the forces of the famous Sokoto caliphate under Sultan Attahiru I in March 1903 in the British attempt to establish colonial rule in the caliphate. With this, we can say the field was a battle ground 63 years ago. 42 Interview with Sergeant Iliya Ma a, 67 years, demobilized NA soldier, Nigerian Legion office, Sokoto state, 26/02/2014. 43 Interview with George H. Bongo, retired NA soldier, 62 years, Nigerian Legion office, Kebbi state, 27/02/2014. 44. Ibid. 88
class who provided a place to Native Authority Police ( yan doka) for enlistment of people for the war. 45 It is important to note at this juncture that, apart from the above explained factors that aided the massive enlistment of people into military service as a result of the Nigerian civil war, there was another salient factor which could be termed as a push factor in the North-West, Nigeria. This is attributed to enlistment of some people that, at that time, their life became frustrated in the society as a result of one crime or the other they committed. 46 Such crime include, stigma of stealing, profligation, kwartanci, (chasing married women) loan addicts and related offences. This category of people saw the period of enlistment into the service of the nation as a waiver of leaving their society, hence, they took themselves for enlistment into the service of the nation. 47 Similarly, just like what happened in the eastern Nigeria with the declaration of the Republic of Biafra that, the secessionists used religion as a war propaganda in order to win support from Christian dominated countries of the world especially in Africa, the same religious propaganda was also used in the North-west Nigeria in order to persuade the able bodied men to be enlisted into the military service. This made many youth to answer the call thinking that they were to wage a religious war in which if they were killed, they would be rewarded with paradise by Almighty God. 48 In addition to this, there were considerable number of people who took themselves to enlistment centres during the Civil War as a result of too much political persecution they found themselves in their different societies especially in Kano province. Around that time, there was sharp division of political interest between the Northern People Congress (NPC) and Northern People Progressive Union (NEPU). Members of the latter political party were maltreated openly in the society, so much so that, to avoid this persecution and coupled with expectation that if they joined military service, they could one day come back and retaliate what was done to them. With the eruption of the civil war which was accompanied with the high demand of man power to execute the war, they decided to volunteer to join military career. 49 From the above, it is pointed out that, as a result of too much demand of man power to execute the war, the Nigerian Army as professional as it was then, had to compromise with its established enlistment procedures in order to meet up with the demands of the Divisions and Battalions at war fronts. So also it happened with regards to the recruitment procedures as will be seen below. Recruitment into the Nigerian Army during the Nigerian Civil War 45 Interview with Corporal Danladi Anaruwa, demobilized soldier, 67 years, Nigerian Legion office Gusau, 28/02/2014. 46 Interview with group of demobilized soldiers of the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Legion office, Sokoto branch, 27/02/2014. 47 Ibid. 48 Sergeant Isah Shu aibu testified this because by August 1967, he was on his way back from his native town, Argungu to Kano (where he studied holy Quran) in search for advance level of Islamic education when he had a public announcement calling for youth to volunteer to join military service in defence of religion of God as against the domination of the southern Nigerian Christians. For that announcement, he became keenly interested and without consultation of his parent, he joined the service. 49. Interview with retired Staff Sergeant Inuwa Isa, Civil War veteran, Nigerian Legion office, Kano state branch, Katsina Road Kano, 18/04/2014. 89
Recruitment into the service of the Nigerian Army is as old as the emergence of the force in the nineteenth century. 50 However, during the WW1, recruitment into the service of the Nigerian Regiment had almost entirely been from Hausas and Yorubas who had earned for themselves a high reputation as soldiers. At the outbreak of the war, three-fifth of the Regiment was composed of Hausas and Yorubas. The line up according to groups was Hausas 1,300, Yorubas 1,156, Kanuris 380, Fulani 351, Nupe 91, Igbos 21, and representatives of twenty two other tribes and unclassified groups, 400. 51 At this period, Colonel Carter was so interested in recruiting from non- Islamic groups such as the Tiv and the Dakarkari who easily acquired Hausa, the language of instruction. He also pointed out that, the non-muslims were not likely to support Islamic revolts. Another explanation was that recruitment among the non-muslims hill tribes of Nigeria had not taken off properly because of their backward state of civilization which militated against their enlistment to a great extent. Therefore, this could also be seen as a deliberate attempt by Lugard that, according to him, the force should consist of Hausas who by universal consensus of opinion, are the best fighting men and the most amenable to discipline. 52 At the beginning of the Nigerian Civil War in 1967, there were two Nigerian Army Depots for the recruitment into the war: the famous Nigerian Army Depot Zaria and the Nigerian Army Depot Abeokuta. 53 The former was the first official recruitment centre of the NA which was firstly established in 1918. 54 The idea of its establishment started from Zungeru, shortly before the WW1 ended. The Northern Protectorate having established its headquarters in Zungeru, for some time, thought it necessary to have a skeleton force in Lokoja. This resulted in transferring the depot training team that was hitherto in Zungeru to Lokoja. When responsibilities of the then Northern government began to expand, the need for firm security became apparent. However, with time Lokoja terrain became unsuitable for the demand of training troops. 55 There arose the need to ensure an environment conducive to a military training and the depot was thus finally moved to its present site in Zaria on 1 st August, 1924. 56 Before this period, recruits were picked up from villages and flunked into battalions unprepared and taken to war front. However, the nature of the inter war periods economy in western Europe around 1920s made the West African Frontier Force to disband about 5 battalions of their force in 1922. Thus, by 1924, an official Regimental Depot and Signal Training was opened in Zaria with Major Hassel DSO as its first Officer Commanding 50. But from 19 th century up to 1945 after the second world war, the basic criteria for recruitment into the service of the imperial powers was eligibility to fight and defend the interest of the employer at any time and at whatever circumstances called to do so. But from 1945, onward, there was no demand for recruitment of people into the military service, rather, demobilization of the soldiers that participated during the Second World War. 51. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School (NAECS), History of the Nigerian Army, Abuja: NAECS, 1994, p. 36. 52. Ibid. 53. It is important to note that, when the Federal Government of Nigeria discovered that the war was beyond how they estimated it and there was serious demand for manpower for re-enforcement of the soldiers at the theatres of the war, more recruitment centres apart from famous Nigerian Army Depot Zaria and Abeokuta were established such as in Kaduna, Makurdi, Benin, Igobe, Ikeja and even at the battle fields. This means that, as soon as the Federal troops liberated towns and villages especially in the reverrine areas, their able bodied men volunteered to the service of their fatherland. Through this, many recruitment centres were established. 54. Nigerian Army Public Relations Office Lagos, The Nigerian Army, Lagos: NAPRO, 1977, p. 169. 55. Ibid. 56. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, History of the Nigerian Army, Abuja: NAES, 1994, p. 210 90
(OC). 57 Around this period, (1924) recruits were trained for six month but by 1936, the demand for recruits in the battalions was so great that the 26-week Recruit Course gave way to that of 17- weeks and the squads were entered at monthly interval. It is in the light of this training that the forces produced an impressive result during the WW II especially in Burma, Abyssinia, India and so on. 58 After this period, the Depot continued to train soldiers to be physically fit to withstand all strains, to foster comradeship among themselves and more importantly to train soldiers in filed crafts, skills at arms and drill to section level. As a result of pressing demand for re-enforcement during the war, the Depot reduced its duration of training from eight months to four weeks at least to enable it train more soldiers. 59 The next most important Depot of the Nigerian Army during the Nigerian Civil War was the Nigerian Army Depot Nyangao Abeokuta. The depot was established on 1 st February, 1967 and Major Daramola (later Major General) was its first Commanding Officer (CO). When the rebellion of Odumegwu Ojukwu was declared in June 1967, training began in the depot to accommodate all ethnic groups within the federation. At the depot, training of the recruits which used to be for twenty eight weeks as mentioned above was reduced to eight weeks and further reduced to six weeks under a crash programme. 60 The time spent on the Depots for training the soldiers before taken to war varies from time to time during the war (defending on the need for re-enforcement), so also the nature of the rigorous training acquired. For instance, in the case of the ex-servicemen of the WWII and some fresh recruits that were first mobilized at the beginning of the conflict, especially before the Biafrans invasion of Mid-West region, they received a good training ranging from parade, weapons handling, weapons repair, general discipline required for a soldier as well as spending about 15 weeks and above. 61 This same case applied to all these soldiers recruited in all parts of the recruitment centres nationwide at this period. 62 With regards to the nature of the training at the recruitment centres when the tempo of the war became heated, however, the quality of the training and drill were shattered away. Recruits were trainedonly how to shoot at close and distance ranges. No parade, no skills for assembling riffles in case they got hooked while in action or how to get out of certain difficulties that inevitably occurred during any war. More so, the time spent at the training centres was from two at minimum to eight months at maximum depending on the need of the situation. 63 The compromise in the standard policies for the recruitment into the Nigerian Army during the Nigerian Civil War is no 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid, pp. 210-212. 59. Nigerian Army Public Relations Office Lagos, The Nigerian..., 60 This information is obtained from a paper titled Closing Down Souvenir which was produced on July 1974 during the closure of the Nigerian Army Depot, Abeokuta. I am grateful to Sergeant Auwal Mukhtar of the Intelligent Unit of the 13 th Brigade of the Nigerian Army Calabar who got the document to me from their Archive. 61 Interview with Sergeant Buba Hamman...ofcit 62 Most of these recruits were the ones who served under the largest and the most disciplined Division according to General Yakubu Gowon, the 1 st Division under the command of Colonel Muhammad Shuwa and later Colonel MB Haruna. 63 This has been the view of many veterans of the Nigerian Civil War in almost all places visited by the researcher in the course of the research. 91
doubt was among other factors that prolonged the crisis to three years (1967-1970). In other words, lack of effective training given to both officers and men of the force as a result of the situation. Conclusion The paper highlighted the evolution of the Nigerian Army and the transformations it underwent from Glover s Hausas through decades up to the Nigerian Army. It examined the roles played by the force to the British in the establishment of the colonial Nigeria. It explored a brief background to the Nigerian Civil War, the various policies upon which the Nigerian government in collaboration with traditional rulers and some important personalities in the various communities of north-west Nigeria persuaded able bodied youth to volunteer for enlistment into the military job during the Civil War. Finally, the nature and quality of training in the Nigerian Army from the beginning in the 19 th century and how it was compromised as a result of the challenges of the Nigerian Civil War were traced. From the discussion so far, the Nigerian policy makers, academics and public affairs commentators may understand that, there is the need for having a reservists soldiers in the Nigerian defence system that could always mobilized for reinforcement during war periods instead of mobilizing fresh civilians that are giving compromised training to face the enemy. That only prolongs the conflict instead of defeating the enemy within short period of time as happened during the Civil War. Absence of the reservists in the service of the Nigerian Army is what led to the demand of the service of the Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF) in the current war with Boko Haram in the North East Nigeria. Therefore, the importance of reservists force cannot be overemphasized as far as defence of nations against both internal insurgency and conventional warfare with other countries are conncerned. 92