We Produce the Future Think Tank Presentation Space Weaponization A Blended Approach to Nuclear Deterrence Capt Joey Aguilo Space Acquisitions Program Manager Capt Samuel Backes Cyberspace Operations Officer Capt Kenneth Carpenter Space Weapons & Tactics Officer Capt Nicole Cowan Intelligence Officer Capt Michael Eibling Operational Test Engineer Capt Chad Gagnon Electronic Warfare Officer Capt Jeremy Granow Pilot Capt Christopher Logue Civil Engineer Capt Joshua Schulze Targeting Intelligence Officer Capt Joseph Silvio Space Acquisitions Program Manager Think Tank Falcons
We never want to go to war with nuclear weapons, and we never want to go to war in space or cyberspace either. The war that extends into these domains is bad for our country, bad for our allies, bad for the world, but in order to keep the peace, we must be ready and willing to fight these kinds of wars if called upon. - Gen. John E. Hyten, U.S. Strategic Command Commander 2
Proposed Deterrence Model Maintain Nuclear Arsenal (ICBMS, SLBMS + Strategic Bombers) Space Based Weapons COA: Prioritize and develop offensive and defensive capabilities in space 3
Deterrence Strategy w/conflict Pyramid Cost Imposition Adding Cost deters an adversary from committing an undesired activity Benefit Denial Denying Benefits Lessens the benefit an adversary received from an undesired activity 3 Shifting the COR fulcrum to the right increases the effectiveness of US cost imposition and benefit denial 1 Space Conflict Nuclear Conflict Major Combat Operations Lesser Combat Operations Insurgency Terrorism Consequence of Restraint [COR] (Inaction) 2 Successful deterrence is maintained by countering an adversary s perceived benefit with credible cost (1) or by denying the adversary benefits that may have been gained (2). The US can also induce adversary restraint by taking actions to shift the fulcrum (3) 4
Assumptions Current space treaties will be honored until new or updated treaties are ratified Adversaries (e.g. Russia, China, North Korea, Iran) Developing terrestrial & space based weapons Leveraging space & cyber capabilities before nuclear capabilities Uses cyber intrusion to understand U.S. capabilities Accelerating Space RDT&E Nuclear Capable Countries (e.g. US, UK, France, Israel, Pakistan, India, Russia, China, North Korea) Will not give up current capabilities Modernizing nuclear arsenals United States Can only afford to modernize nuclear triad or weaponize space not both Relies on PNT, ISR, Comm, and EW for force multiplying effects Behind on space capabilities Adversaries Collecting data on U.S. capabilities Knows of US reliance on space Knowns United States Space is an achilles heel Acquisition process slow to implement 5
Space Kinetic & Non-Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (NNEMP) Technology COA: prioritize and develop both NNEMP and kinetic technology to provide a scalable method of deterrence Kinetic: capabilities require less time to deploy which can provide rapid defense of vulnerable space assets. NNEMP: capabilities provide a scalable, non-lethal means capable of directing at soft and hard targets Ground Segment Threats Communications (Link) Segment Threats Space Segment Threats NNEMP & Kinetic Technology can affect all three segments of a space architecture Physical/Direct Attack Computer Network Intrusion/Network Attack Jamming Cyber Attack/Hacking Electronic Attack Electromagnetic and Directed Energy Uplink Jamming Downlink Jamming Spoofing Kinetic Energy Weapons Directed Energy Weapons - laser, RF, particle beam Laser Weapons - coherent radiation - aligned waveform Radio Frequency Weapons Particle-Beam Weapons Interceptor Types - low altitude/direct-ascent - low and high altitude, short-duration - long duration orbital 6
Proposed NNEMP & Kinetic Technology Budget Allocation Propose NNEMP & Kinetic Technology Budget Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the plans for nuclear forces would cost $348 billion over the next decade Utilize projected modernization budget (2017-2023) to fund NNEMP & Kinetic Technology but keep sustainment and operation funds to maintain nuclear arsenal Source: Congressional Budget Office 7
2 nd and 3 rd Order Effects Space Weaponization (NNEMP & Kinetic) + Maintain Nuclear Triad 2 nd Order Effects Other Nations increase in Space Situational Awareness Forces adversaries to defend and target multiple factors stretching their resources Tensions Causing Political Fall Out Other nations will increase development in space weaponization Private Sector Competition Because emerging high value investments 3 rd Order Effects Increase in Diplomatic and Military Means against US Adversary will likely negotiate or bargain de-escalation Sanctions or other means of deterrence to prevent capability Accelerated Space Arms Race Decrease Cost and Drive Innovation 8
Recommendation Reprioritize nuclear modernization funds to develop space NNEMP and Kinetic technology to begin a more scalable deterrence strategy for the US and its Allies 9
Questions? 10
Space Operations in the Future 11
COA Space Weaponization using Directed Energy and Kinetic Covert Implementation Defensive Payload Masked by Primary Payload Incorporated in Recapitalization of Sat Programs Type AOR Pros Cons Directed Energy Kinetic NNEMP Laser/Microwave Tungsten Rods Space to Ground Area of Effect Scalable Space to Space No Debris Rapid Deployment with Limited Posturing Space to Space Space to Ground Scalable Not Mature Power Limitations Space Debris 12
EMP Technology Scalability 13
Proposed EMP & Kinetic Technology Budget Allocation Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024 Proposed EMP & Kinetic Technology Budget Source: Congressional Budget Office Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the plans for nuclear forces would cost $348 billion over the next decade Utilize projected modernization budget to fund EMP & Kinetic Technology 14
Current Deterrence Model ICBM, Bomber & Submarine Operations Nuclear Weapons Sustainment & Control Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration The prevention from action by fear of the consequences.... a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) 15
Our Assumptions Current space treaties will be honored until new or updated treaties are ratified Adversaries (e.g. Russia, China, North Korea, Iran) Develops terrestrial & space based weapons Leverages space & cyber capabilities before nuclear capabilities Uses cyber intrusion to understand AF capabilities Accelerates Space RDT&E Nuclear Capable Countries (e.g. US, UK, France, Israel, Pakistan, India, Russia, China, North Korea) Will not give up current capabilities Modernized nuclear arsenals United States Prioritization of Investments Relies on PNT, ISR, Comm, and EW for force multiplying effects Behind on space capabilities 16