Jane's Intelligence Review Iranian missile development defies restrictions [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly for full article] Iran is advancing its ballistic missile programme despite restrictions imposed by the UN. Ian J Stewart and Paulina Izewicz examine the nature of those restrictions in light of the JCPOA nuclear agreement, and Nick Hansen analyses the debut of two Iranian missiles. On 11 October 2015 - as the Iranian parliament considered whether to approve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on its nuclear programme agreed with the EU and the P5+1 group of countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) - Iran announced the test of a new terminally guided missile, called the Emad. Just three days later, after the Iranian parliament ratified the nuclear deal on 13 October, Iran also released video footage of an underground missile complex at an unknown location. Comparison of a still taken from the video footage of the unnamed launch site for the Fateh-313 test released by Iran (left) with Airbus satellite imagery from 29 October 2015 (right) has enabled IHS Jane's to identify the launch site, located near Qom, for the first time in open sources. (MEHR News Agency & CNES 2015, Distribution Airbus DS / 2015 IHS) 1641868 Nuclear risk Ballistic missile development is at best problematic and at worst destabilising. International concern about ballistic missiles is not limited to the potential delivery of conventional payloads - Page 1 of 7
although it is notable that the new Emad missile may have the ability to strike Israel despite missile defences - but is also derived from the risk that they might be used to deliver nuclear warheads. The head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, centre, ends his speech in an open session of the Iranian parliament discussing the JCPOA on 11 October 2015. Iran has sought to keep its ballistic missile programme distinct from the terms of the JCPOA. (1634741) 1634741 The Iranian ballistic missile programme has been almost as controversial as the country's nuclear programme. Concerns about the í'possible military dimensions' to the Iranian nuclear programme, outlined in the November 2011 board report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were prompted in part by Western allegations that Iran had undertaken work to fit nuclear warheads to a Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). It may have been for this reason - at least in part - that the UN Security Council ordered Iran to freeze its development of ballistic missile technology, along with nuclear technology, and subsequently adopted sanctions against both programmes. Weakened prohibitions On 20 July 2015, the UNSC passed Resolution 2231, which operationalises the non-proliferation mechanisms of the JCPOA. As the resolution also contains missile prohibitions, countries such as the US may feel the need to speak out against Iran's ballistic missile development or risk signalling a potential lack of enforcement for the nuclear aspects of the JCPOA. Yet the missile prohibitions contained in UNSCR 2231 are somewhat equivocal, stating, "Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons." The wording of UNSCR 2231 is problematic for several reasons, not least of which is the use of the term "called upon" as opposed to "decides" - which had been used in the previous resolution Page 2 of 7
regulating the matter (UNSCR 1929) that stated that the UNSC "decides that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology". Given the new terminology, whether the missile restrictions in UNSCR 2231 are legally binding remains a matter of debate. Iran has already claimed that its missiles are not "designed to be capable" of delivering nuclear weapons - the wording used in UNSCR 2231 - likely to justify an evasion of the resolution's call for Iran to refrain from missile testing. Illicit trade Where UNSCR 2231 is more explicit, however, and where its provisions will likely be more effective, is with restrictions on the supply of missile-related technologies in order to curtail Iran's ballistic missile development. Despite similar restrictions already in place and adherence to the MTCR by most potential suppliers, Iran has engaged in extensive illicit trade to procure items for its nuclear and missile programmes since sanctions were imposed in the mid-2000s. On 2 September 2015, the US Department of State added 23 entities to its Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act sanctions list. One of the entities, United Arab Emirates-based Eliya General Trading, may have been sanctioned in relation to a June 2009 sale to Iran of a titanium alloy - suitable for use in the country's missile programmes - described in a 7 August 2009 US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks. Notably, Eliya General Trading was sanctioned by the United States after more than six years had passed since the reported transaction - suggesting that either the íentity's illicit actions had continued beyond 2009 or that the US decision constituted a signal of strict future enforcement action in relation to the Iranian missile programme. Calibrated messages To underscore its position that its missile programme is de-linked from the implementation of the JCPOA, Tehran has since August 2015 released a video showing the existence of an underground missile complex and debuted two new missile types, the Fateh-313 and a variant of the Shahab-3, called the Emad. On 14 October, Iran released the footage of an underground tunnel complex containing numerous ballistic missiles and transporter erector launchers (TELs) at an unknown location in Iran. Interior images of the tunnel complex, previously unseen in open sources, were broadcast by semi-official state media outlet FARS News Agency. The release likely reflected Tehran's desire to assert the ídevelopment of its missile capabilities in spite of its agreement to nuclear restraints under the JCPOA. No information was officially released regarding the location of the tunnel complex, the number or type of missiles it contained, or the date when the video was filmed. However, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Commander of the Aerospace Force in the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), stated that "the missiles are only one trigger away from being launched in case of any threat against the Islamic Republic" and that they lay 500 m below a large mountain. Page 3 of 7
A Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 missile mounted on a TEL draped with a propaganda poster typical of those used in military parades in Tehran, suggesting that the underground tunnel complex is unlikely to house operational missile units. (SIMANEWS/Russia Today) 1641873 Despite Hajizadeh's assertion, analysis of the video by IHS Jane's suggests that the missile complex may not contain operational missile units. In the footage, the tunnel complex appears to consist of at least one entrance tunnel, and a U-shaped tunnel about 250 m long on each side with at least 100 m separating the two side tunnels. A third tunnel is situated between the side tunnels (it appears dark in the video with red and white lights near its entrance) and a fourth tunnel (also unlit in the video) branches off the right side tunnel. Page 4 of 7
A Sejil-2 MRBM and TEL parked on the right side of a tunnel in the released tunnel video. (Press TV) 1641874 Fateh-313 launch An earlier symbol of Iran's resistance to UN-imposed missile restrictions came with the unveiling of the new Fateh-313 SRBM on 22 August at the National Day of the Defence Industry in Tehran. The display included a Fateh-313 missile and its TEL, several posters featuring the missile, and video footage of a Fateh-313 launch. Iran claimed that the single-stage solid-fuelled missile had improved accuracy and a range of 500 km - longer than that of the 300 km-range Fateh-110B. The Fateh-313 is the latest version of the Fateh-110 series of SRBMs, which themselves are a variant of Iranian Zelzal-2 SRBMs. Individual Fateh-313 missiles are identifiable by the numbers painted on their sides. The missile displayed at the August 2015 defence exhibition was F313-94-00 (possibly a pre-production model). The poster at the exhibition featured missile F313-03-04; this missile was also shown mounted on a TEL in the video footage. However, another missile was used for the actual flight test shown in the footage, namely FF-93-03. No information was released regarding the date and time of the missile test, the launch site, or the impact area. However, analysis of the released video footage by IHS Jane's has revealed that the Fateh-313 was launched from a test range near Qom at 34.513N, 51.266E. Furthermore, the missile was launched in the morning (local time), most likely during Iran's summer months from June to August. Since the Qom test site predates the first commercial satellite imagery collected by DigitalGlobe in 2003, its start-up date remains unknown. However, the launch site was likely built to support the development of the Fateh-110 SRBM, which began flight-testing in May 2001. Since then, the missile series has undergone four rounds of upgrades before the development of the Fateh-313, which likely entered testing in 2014 or 2015. It is also possible that the Qom test site was initially built for testing earlier Zelzal SRBMs. The site still appears to support these types of missiles and also hosts major 'Great Prophet' military exercises, as well as research and development activities for the Soumar cruise missile. If the Fateh-313 is as capable as Iran claims, it raises the important question of how Iranian engineers achieved a range increase of approximately 200 km without significantly increasing the size of the basic Fateh-110 design. One possible explanation is the introduction of a higher-energy propellant. The only evidence for this is the black exhaust smoke evident in the video footage of the purported Fateh-313 launch (the exhaust of the Fateh-110 was consistently light-coloured). Also notable in the footage of the purported Fateh-313 test is a distinct black missile contrail in view of the impact site. Since the solid rocket would have burned out several minutes prior to impact, the black contrail may have been generated by a warhead manoeuvring engine. The size of the impact cloud indicates an explosive warhead was used for the missile test, but the exact location of the impact site remains unknown. Another piece of calibrated messaging came on 11 October, when Iran claimed that it had successfully test-launched an MRBM with a precision guidance system, called the Emad. The Page 5 of 7
announcement was accompanied by the release of video footage of the launch, although few details of the missile or the test - such as the date, time, or location - were officially declared. However, IHS Jane's analysis of the video footage has revealed significant information about the Emad launch and Iran's development of precision-guided missiles. Enlargement of the Emad's warhead taken from the launch video released by Iran. (FARS News Agency) 1641870 Outlook The international community has so far responded to Iran's indigenous development of ballistic missiles primarily through applying sanctions. The US has declared that it will continue to do so, but with UN missile restrictions generally weakened under Resolution 2231, it may end up being alone - or working with only a small number of like-minded states - in those efforts. Although the missile issue has been separated from the nuclear issue in the JCPOA, both are closely linked. The fate of one may well relate to the fate of the other. The international community will therefore need to be vigilant for any potential violations on either front if the progress made in establishing the JCPOA is to be sustained. For the full version and more content: Page 6 of 7
IHS Jane's Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre, which delivers comprehensive and reliable country risk and military capabilities information, analysis and daily insight. IHS country risk and military capabilities news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Intelligence Review. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Intelligence Review online, offline or print visit http://magazines.ihs.com/ For advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team Page 7 of 7