the IASC transformative agenda IASC Principals Meeting 13 December 2011
CRITICAL VIEWS There were two major humanitarian disasters in 2010, which required international humanitarian assistance the earthquake in Haiti and the floods in Pakistan. In both cases, the international humanitarian system showed itself to be less than the sum of its parts and the responses were characterised by weak leadership, poor coordination and a slow response. UK Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
LESSONS LEARNT FROM HAITI: Dec 2010 IASC Principals discussion the Principals expressed strong concerns that several aspects of the system were underperforming and initiated a transformative agenda
January to April 2011 diagnosing
RAPID RESPONSE TO A LEVEL 3 EMERGENCY In every major emergency there must be sufficient capacity within the system to ensure senior, experienced humanitarian leadership immediately and in key functions. Leadership and Coordination ICVA and UNICEF, February 2011
LEADERSHIP The humanitarian system needs to further invest in the HC position so that it is desired by the best and the brightest, given that it is widely perceived as risky, thankless, and unmanageable. Leadership and Coordination ICVA and UNICEF, February 2011
ACCOUNTABILITY Country representatives of cluster leading agencies need to recognize that the HC has the authority to lead and coordinate humanitarian action in complex emergencies There is currently little possibility for members of the HCT to hold an RC/HC accountable for his/her performance in leading the humanitarian operation Accountability for Performance InterAction and UNHCR, April 2011
COORDINATION The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), led by the HC, is not always seen as the primary venue for humanitarian decision making and strategic planning. Clusters have become overburdened by process rather than focusing on improved results. Leadership and Coordination ICVA and UNICEF, February 2011
July to November 2011 the process
AN INCLUSIVE PROCESS A truly constructive dynamic with: IOM the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 3 NGO consortia 6 Humanitarian Coordinators 9 UN agencies 13 donors
December 2011 recommending
RAPID RESPONSE TO A LEVEL 3 EMERGENCY IASC Principals to meet within 48 hours and decide whether to: activate a common Level 3 response deploy an Emergency Humanitarian Coordinator for 3 months activate the Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism Strategic Plan / Framework to be developed by the HCT, under the leadership of the HC Annual inter-agency training for rapid response staff
LEADERSHIP Enhanced authority to be given to HC for initial period of 3 months in 'megaemergencies'. ERC and UNDG Chair to meet before final recommendation to SG on RC appointments RC assessment to become RC/HC assessment Organizations to commit to release highest calibre candidates Organizations to review internal human resources policies / practices to enable / incentivize HC deployment and return
ACCOUNTABILITY Corrective action to be taken in cases of under-performance (performance assessed by HC) Concise, simple and flexible Strategic Plan / Framework to be adopted 360 degree accountability to be implemented through mutual performance appraisal CAPs / CHAPs to become more strategic RTEs to be more targeted (coordination and leadership) and timely (actual real-time ) Emergency Directors to conduct annual review of country operations
COORDINATION Implement lessons learned from good practice model in South Sudan Cluster activation to be needs-driven rather than mandatedriven Annual review of cluster numbers and necessity to be undertaken in each field and continuation to be justified to ERC Strategic management (cluster meetings with key operational partners) to be separated from information-sharing and fund distribution Information management forums and mechanisms to be strengthened (HICs) Focus on coordination solutions at the sub-national level
Decisions
IASC Principals Decisions Broad endorsement of the enhanced response to 'megaemergencies'. Concurrence to test principles in South Sudan and possibly Somalia. Field test principles in an actual emergency in 2012 (probably 1 st test in a lower level emergency). Establish a new (lighter) process to consider additional reforms in 2012 (e.g. protracted emergencies). Briefing of donors January 2012. Charge to a restructured IASG Working Group in Jan 2012.