UNCLASSIFIED Defense Technology Security Administration Mr. James Hursch Committee on Homeland Security and Export Controls March 2, 2010 UNCLASSIFIED
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Defense Technology Security Administration POLICY Director, Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), Acting Deputy Director DTSA Military Assistant Licensing Directorate Technology Directorate Policy Directorate International Security Space Directorate Management Directorate -- License Reviews -- Commodity Jurisdictions -- Voluntary & Directed Disclosures -- Regulations -- Aeronautical -- Electronics -- Information & Communications -- Sensors & Lasers -- Missiles & Space -- NBC/Land/Naval/ Materials/Machine Tools -- Space Monitoring -- Regional Policy -- Negotiations/Liaison -- Capabilities/Systems -- Assessments/CFIUS -- Secretariat NDPC -- FG Disclosure Policy -- Security Surveys -- General Security Agmt -- NATO Security Policy -- FN Pers Assgn Policy -- Monitor Int l Sec Prgm -- Int l Sec Tng Oversight -- License Monitoring -- Tech Exchanges -- Tech Data Reviews --Personnel --Security --Logistics --Comptroller --Info Technology --Info Assurance 6 As of 30 Apr 2009
Department of Defense Role in Export Controls State (Munitions) Commerce (Dual-Use) Defense 7
DoD Technology Security Policy Defense Trade & Technology Transfers Assessing Impact on National Security Factors Considered: Policies (region, country & technology) Level of technology (U.S. systems and countermeasures) End-user & end-use history Military operational impact Inter-operability requirements Bilateral, multilateral and international agreements Foreign availability of comparable systems Classified data transfers 8
Munitions 2009 License Review Dual-Use Approve >63% Approve 1% Approve with Conditions 25% Objection <1% Other (RWA, etc) 11% Approve with Conditions 89% Other (RWA, etc) 2% Objection 8% 38,374 Licenses Reviewed 16,280 Licenses Reviewed 9 1 Jan - 31 Dec 2009 License Review 9
DoD Review Statistics Caseload Average Age 10 10
DTSA and Homeland Security Issues DTSA Licensing Officers review certain Pre-Trial and Trial certifications for State/DDTC. Many of these certs originate from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) investigations involving arms smuggling. On occasion, our staff provides additional support to ICE special agents. We assist in determining the proper jurisdiction for items that have been seized by customs at a port of export. For example, we reviewed a commodity jurisdiction (CJ) request for a 60-foot high speed craft that could be used by drug smugglers or pirates. In such cases, we factor the DHS considerations into the final national security position. 11
DTSA and Homeland Security Issues DoD cooperates with DHS in reviews of Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) cases when there are national security equities. For cases that reveal a threat to national security, it is often DHS and DoD working hand-in-hand to mitigate national security concerns and monitor compliance with security agreements. DTSA and DHS are members of interagency committees that review sanctionable arms transfers under U.N. Resolutions and U.S. non-proliferation laws (e.g., Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act). Review of exports for police/border patrol applications that have military/national security applications (e.g., Hong Kong harbor patrol licenses). 12
DTSA and Homeland Security Issues Civil Aircraft Protection Measures: DTSA has provided technical support for development of LAIRCM export policy in support of transfers to NATO and other allies. DTSA technical personnel have been working with DHS for more than 4 years on the DHS counter-manpads program, and this work has led to the new "Electronic Warfare Policy Statement" that incorporates Airborne Infrared Countermeasures. Export licensing of these sensitive systems is one of the program's greatest challenges. DTSA continues to work closely with DHS to assess all facets of civil aircraft protection using complex military countermeasure systems and technology to ensure public safety and welfare while protecting critical technology. 13
Export Control Reform Initiative Secretary Gates has made export control reform a high priority for the Department. Current system and shortcomings: U.S. has a robust export control system, but it is rooted in the Cold War. o System must be updated to address current threats. Current system may not allow for timely or flexible cooperation with allies or partners. Interagency Infighting o Commodity Jurisdiction clashes: whether Department of State or Department of Commerce issues the license. Reforms to date have nibbled around the edges for too long. o Short term reform efforts at the detriment of fundamental reform. We may have squeezed all efficiencies out of current system. A dedicated NSC/NEC Task Force has been working on a comprehensive set of recommendations. (DoD and DHS were the only agencies that dedicated two individuals to this effort.) 14
Export Control Reform Initiative Basic principles for a new system: Protect the crown jewels of U.S. technology Maintain important technological advantages Certain countries and entities should not receive U.S. exports Deny all resources possible to terrorists, adversary states, and proliferators Retain the legal authority to impose unilateral sanctions Fulfill international export control and nonproliferation obligations Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime Expedited technology sharing and cooperation with allies and partners Enhanced enforcement 15
Questions DTSA Website: http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/dtsa/index.html 16