Appendix E. Subterranean Operations

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Appendix E Subterranean Operations Knowledge of the nature and location of underground facilities is valuable to both the urban attacker and defender. 1. Tactical Value. Fighting in MOUT is multidimensional. Larger cities may have subterranean features that include sunken garages, underground passages, subway lines, utility tunnels, sewers, and storm drains (Figure E-1). Most of these features allow for the movement of units. Even in smaller European towns, sewers and storm drains permit Marines to move beneath the fighting and surface behind the enemy. Figure E-1. Potential Underground Passages a. Subterranean passages may provide the attacker with covered and concealed routes into and through built-up areas. This may allow an enemy to launch his attack along roads that lead into the city while infiltrating a smaller force into the defender s rear. An enemy unit in the defender s rear area may disrupt his defense and obstruct the avenues of withdrawal for his forward defense. b. An attack along a subterranean avenue of approach could become the main effort. Even if the subterranean effort is not immediately successful, it forces the defender to fight on atleast two levels and to extend resources to more than just street-level fighting. c. The existence of subterranean passages forces the defender to defend the built-up area above and below ground. While these passages are usually more of a disadvantage to the defender than to the attacker they may offer some advantages in the defense. When thoroughly reconnoitered and controlled by the defender, subterranean passages provide

E - 2 MCWP 3-35.3 excellent covered and concealed routes to move reinforcements or to launch counterattacks. They also provide ready-made covered lines of communication for the movement of supplies and evacuation of casualties and provide places to cache supplies for forward companies. Subterranean passages also offer the defender a ready-made conduit for communications wire, with protection from armored vehicles and indirect fires. 2. Denial to the Enemy. Subterranean passages are useful to the defender only to the extent that the attacker can be denied their use. The defender has an advantage in that, given the confining, dark environment of these passages, a small group of determined Marines in a prepared position can defeat a numerically superior force. a. Tunnels afford the attacker little cover and concealment except for the darkness and any manmade barriers. The passageways provide tight fields of fire and amplify the effects of grenades. Obstacles at intersections in tunnels support excellent ambush sites and may turn the subterranean passages into a maze. These obstacles can be created quickly by using chunks of rubble, furniture, and parts of abandoned vehicles interspersed with M18 claymore mines. b. A thorough reconnaissance of the subterranean or sewer system is required. To be effective, obstacles must be located at critical intersections in the passage network so that they trap attackers in a kill zone but allow defenders freedom of movement (Figure E-2). 3. Subterranean Reconnaissance Techniques. The mission of local reconnaissance for a platoon- or company-sized area of responsibility should be given to a squad-sized element. a. The squad leader tasks one fire team with providing forward security. One fire team follows in support, and one fire team provides rear security (Figure E-3). The squad leader moves directly behind the pointman and records data collected by the patrol. If available, an engineer should be with the lead fire team. The rear security fire team protects the groundand subterranean-level point of entry. This fire team is responsible for detecting enemy movement on the patrol s rear and serves as the communications link between the squad leader and higher headquarters. Organization of the patrol may vary based on METT-T. b. The squad leader should carry a map, compass, street plan, and notebook in which he has detailed the information that he must gather. One Marine is assigned to carry the tools needed to open manhole covers. If the patrol is to move more than 200 to 300 meters, or if the platoon leader directs, the squad may carry a sound-powered telephone (TA-1) and wire dispenser (XM-306A) for communications. Radios are often unreliable in this environment. Marines (especially the pointman, squad leader, engineer, and fire team leaders) should be equipped with night vision devices to maintain surveillance within the sewer. Thermal night devices are also useful as there may not be enough ambient light for accurate visibility with night vision devices.

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain E - 3 Figure E-2. Defense of a Sewer System Figure E-3. Organization of the Patrol Unit

E - 4 MCWP 3-35.3 c. Marines entering the sewer should carry a sketch of the sewer system that includes magnetic north, azimuths, distances, and manholes. They should also carry protective masks, flashlights, gloves, and chalk (or chemiluminescent lights) for marking features along the route. The patrol should also be equipped with a safety rope to which each man is tied. To improve their footing in slippery sewers and storm drains, the squad members may wrap chicken wire or screen wire around their boots. d. A constant concern to units conducting a subterranean patrol is chemical defense. Enemy chemical agents used in tunnels may be suddenly encountered in dense concentrations with little dispersion. The pointman should carry an automatic chemical agent alarm system to provide instant warning of the presence of chemical agents. M8 detector paper can also be used to detect chemical agents. At the first indication that harmful gases are present, the squad should mask. e. In addition to enemy chemical agents, noxious gases from decomposing sewage can also pose a threat. These gases are not detected by chemical agent alarm systems, nor are they completely filtered by the protective mask. Physical signs that indicate their presence in harmful quantities are nausea and dizziness. The squad leader should be constantly alert to these signs and know the shortest route to the surface for fresh air. Some sewer gases deplete oxygen, a situation against which the field protective mask provides no protection. f. Once the squad is organized and equipped, it moves to the entrance of the tunnel. This may be a manhole. With the manhole cover removed, the squad waits 15 minutes before entry to allow any gases that may be present to dissipate. The pointman then descends into the tunnel to determine whether the air is safe to breathe and whether movement is restricted. The pointman should remain in the tunnel for 10 minutes before the rest of the squad follows. If he becomes ill or is exposed to danger, he can be pulled out by the safety rope. g. When the squad is moving through the tunnel, the pointman moves about 10 meters in front of the squad leader. Other squad members maintain 5-meter intervals. If water in the tunnel is flowing faster than 2.5 meters per second or the sewer contains slippery obstacles, those intervals should be increased to prevent all patrol members from falling if one man slips. All squad members should stay tied into the safety rope so that they can easily be retrieved from danger. The last Marine in the patrol marks the route with chalk or chemiluminescent lights so other units can find the squad. h. The squad leader should record the azimuth and pace count of each turn he takes in the tunnel. When he encounters a manhole to the surface, the pointman should open it and determine the location, which the patrol leader then records. The use of recognition signals (Figure E-4) prevents friendly forces from accidentally shooting the pointman as he appears at a manhole.

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain E - 5 Figure E-4. Recognition Signals i. Once the patrol has returned and submitted its report, the platoon leader must decide how, or whether, to use the tunnel. In the offense, a tunnel might provide a covered route to move behind the enemy s defenses. In the defense, a tunnel might provide a covered passage between positions. In any case, the squad members that provided the reconnaissance should act as guides along the route. j. If the tunnel is to be blocked, the platoon may emplace concertina wire, early warning devices, and antipersonnel mines. A security force should be established at the entrance of the sewer (Figure E-5) to provide warning against any enemy trying to approach the platoon s defense. It should be equipped with command-detonated illumination. The overpressure from grenades, mines, and boobytraps exploding in a sewer or tunnel can have adverse effects on friendly forces, including ruptured eardrums and wounds from flying debris. Also, gases found in sewers can be ignited by the blast effects of these munitions. For these reasons, small-arms weapons should be employed in tunnels and sewers. Friendly personnel should be outside of tunnels or out of range of the effects when mines or demolitions are detonated. 4. Psychological Considerations. Combat operations in subterranean passages are similar to night combat operations. The psychological factors of night operations reduce confidence, cause fear, and increase a feeling of isolation. This feeling of isolation is further magnified by the tight confines of the tunnels. The layout of tunnels could require greater dispersion between positions.

E - 6 MCWP 3-35.3 Figure E-5. Security Position Established at the Entrance to a Sewer a. Leaders must enforce measures to help dispel the feelings of fear and isolation experienced when operating in tunnels. These measures include leadership training, physical and mental fitness, sleep discipline, and stress management. b. Leaders maintain communication with Marines manning positions in tunnels either through personal visits, messengers, or field telephone. Communication increases situational awareness and provides insight into the mental state of Marines. Marines manning positions below ground should be given as much information as possible on the organization of the tunnels and the importance of the mission. They should be briefed on contingency plans and alternate positions should their primary positions become untenable. c. Physical and mental fitness can be maintained by periodically rotating Marines out of tunnels so they can stand and walk in fresh air and sunlight. Stress management is also a factor of operations in tunnels. Historically, combat in built-up areas has been one of the most stressful forms of combat. Fighting in continuous darkness and restricted maneuver space causes even more stress to Marines than street fighting.