Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Overview April 2012
The IED Is a Global Threat //FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mumbai, 13 Jul 2011 Multiple explosions (26 Killed / 130 Wounded) Nigeria, 12 Apr 2012 SVBIED (11 Killed / Dozens Wounded) Target: Catholic church Bangkok, 12 Jan 2012 Recovered: 10,000 lbs Urea / 38 liters AN (No casualties) Bangkok, 14 Feb 2012 Sticky Bomb Recovered: 4,000 kg Urea More than 600 IED events occur each month outside Afghanistan //FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Link Between IEDs & Threat Networks The Threat Continuum An overlapping consortium of networks Locally and readily available explosives materials Free-market, ubiquitous access to dual-use-components Combat-experienced IED-makers and facilitators Expansive communications through the internet and social media Interacting and operating in a complex environment of tribal loyalties, endemic corruption and relatively open borders IED threat to domestic security ranging from homegrown terrorism to foreign threat organizations worldwide The IED is the weapon of choice along the entire threat continuum
The Threat s Strategic Advantage PLANNING RECRUITING IM, Chat, social networking, virtual world, video conferencing, internet Rehearse operations in 3D virtual apps Communicate, conduct business, pass guidance Transfer funds internationally TRAINING/BOMB MAKING FUNDRAISING ATTACKING FLASH MOBS (Arab Spring) Their centers of excellence are virtual, flat and unencumbered
IEDs Are Weapons with Tactical Effect Inflict casualties Isolate population from contact with friendly forces Explosive Filler Switch Initiator IED Main Charge Initiating System Power Sources Operational Effect Isolate population Disrupt freedom of movement Create perception of insecurity Casing Containers Strategic Effect Influence national will Create perception of lost cause Use insecurity to delegitimize host nation The IED is the battlefield
Three Lines of Operation The decisive endeavor Mitigate the effect of IEDs Critical to lowering effective attacks and casualties C-IED A well-trained force is our best counter-ied tool Enable freedom of maneuver Cannot focus on one approach all three must work together
Areas of Strategic Focus Support the Current Fight Homemade Explosives (HME) Precursor Interdiction: Enable a whole-of-governments approach to restrict availability of HME precursors to threat networks Effective Training Methodology: Conduct comprehensive and tailored C-IED training to produce battlefieldready units and individuals Effective Requirements, Acquisition and Assessment Process: Identify, develop, acquire and integrate the most effective C-IED enablers Identify/Anticipate Threat Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP): Collect, analyze, exploit and disseminate information on current, emerging or changes to threat technologies and TTPs Enable Counter-threat Network: Provide expeditionary and scalable analytical capability for accurate, timesensitive information and counter network support Pre-detonation of IEDs: Identify, develop and acquire the capability to trigger IEDs at the time and place of the warfighter s choosing Reduce effective attacks! Source: Ms. Kelly Porter, STRATCOM, 601-4053; As of 9 April 2012
Areas of Strategic Focus cont. Prepare for Future Threats Whole-of-Governments Approach: Synchronize counter threat network actions among joint, interagency, and international stakeholders Training: Develop and define C-IED training standards for Joint forces and build partner capacity Rapid Acquisition and Fielding: Anticipate, identify, develop, and integrate emerging technologies into effective fielded C-IED solutions Weapons Technical Intelligence: Synchronize whole-of-government efforts to collect, analyze, exploit, and disseminate current and emerging IED technologies Operations-Intelligence-Information Fusion and Analysis: Sustain an expeditionary and scalable analytical capability to provide accurate, time-sensitive information, and counter network support Pre-detonation of IEDs: Identify, develop and acquire the capability to trigger IEDs at the time and place of the warfighter s choosing Respond to Future Threat/Create Enduring Capabilities
Applying a whole-of-governments approach to address the homemade explosives (HME) threat in Afghanistan PROBLEM: In Afghanistan, calcium ammonium nitrate produces more than 80 percent of HME-based IEDs THE HME STRATEGY/HME TASK FORCE: Develop a robust common intelligence picture that fills existing gaps Disrupt the threat supply chain, including the transfer of IED manufacturing expertise into Afghanistan Reduce the use of HME IEDs against Coalition forces, ANSF and civilians Partner with the Government of Pakistan, multi-national and U.S. interagency partners to limit the availability of HME precursors to threat networks WHOLE OF INDUSTRY: Bringing together international fertilizer industry to develop: Universal dye program Non-detonable substitute for ammonium nitrate Effective industry-wide standards, regulations, and safeguards for production/distribution of nitrogen fertilizers Global education and awareness campaign Synchronizing and leveraging the tools and authorities of ALL partners An Example: Countering the Homemade Explosives Threat
Parting Thoughts There is no silver bullet to this problem The U.S. Department of Defense s counter-ied effort is organized and resourced to: Rapidly respond to warfighter requirements Provide forward presence in support of Combatant Commanders Must deal with the HME threat Dual-use, off-the-shelf components are a significant threat Security against this threat requires integrated whole-of-government s approach IEDs will remain an enduring global threat operationally and domestically. The IED is the artillery of the 21 st Century
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