Banning Ballistic Missiles? Missile Control for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Jürgen Scheffran Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation The Article VI Forum Dublin Castle, Ireland, March 26-28, 2008 p. 1
Delivery systems in NPT and Model NWC NPT Preamble: the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (1997/2007) I. General Obligations 1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: e. To develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, deploy, stockpile, maintain, retain, or transfer nuclear weapons delivery vehicles; 2. Each State Party undertakes: f. To destroy or convert for purposes not prohibited under this Convention all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and nuclear weapon components p. 2
Weapon delivery methods Air-breathing vehicles Aircrafts Cruise missiles Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) Rocket-propelled vehicles Land-based ballistic missiles Submarine-based ballistic missiles Surface ship-based ballistic missiles Space-based ballistic missiles Short range rockets (no guidance) Other delivery Artillery/howitzers Land mines Torpedoes Man-portable air-defense systems Cars, trucks, ships, containers, suitcases p. 3
The German V2 missile program p. 4
Proliferation network of ballistic missiles Germany Brazil South Africa UK Egypt Afghanistan Israel USA Iraq Soviet Union/Russia Taiwan South Korea North Korea Yemen France Argentina Syria India Pakistan Iran Bulgaria China Libya Vietnam Saudi-Arabia p. 5
Dual use: Titan ballistic missiles and space launchers p. 6
Dual use: Evolution of China s Long March space launcher p. 7
Soviet Scud missiles and derivatives Soviet Scud-B Missile (based on German V2) Range: 300 km Iraqi Al-Hussein SRBM Range: 600 650 km p. 8
Scud missiles and derivatives Pakistan s Ghauri MRBM and transporter (range 1,300 km). It is almost identical to North Korea s No Dong MRBM, which is based on Scud technology that North Korea got from Egypt in the 1970s. p. 9
Three classes of the missile threat Scud barrier INF barrier p. 10
Ballistic Missile Ranges Cirrincione, Deadly Arsenals, 2002. p. 11
Critical missile components Accurate accelerometers and gyroscopes Advanced composite technology for rocket nozzles Reentry vehicles Solid rocket fuel Thrust vector controls Advanced testing and manufacturing technologies p. 12
Recent missile test programs United States: 11 ICBM tests from June 2004 to September 2006 and one SLBM test Russia: seven tests of ICBMs and 11 tests of SLBMs China: three tests of ICBMs and two of SLBMs India: about a dozen tests of short (less than 1,000 kilometers) and medium (1,000 3,000 km) range missiles Pakistan: nine tests of short- and medium-range missiles DPRK: seven ballistic missile tests in July 2006 Iran: several tests of a medium-range missile p. 13
Characteristics of ballistic missiles across wide range of distances with high speed little warning high accuracy probability of penetration power and prestige weapons of terror limited effectiveness (V2, Iran Iraq, 1991 Iraq war) p. 14
Security impacts of ballistic missiles Regional vs. global missile threat Non-state actors (Hezbollah) Connects regional and global conflicts (Iran) Link between horizontal and vertical proliferation Deterrence, counterproliferation and preemptive strikes New arms races and instabilities Disruption of regional balances Obscure threshold between conventional + WMD Military escalation and increased probability of war Risk of nuclear war by accident, hair-trigger alert p. 15
Links to space warfare Satellites Missile defense Explosive Laser Impacts Electronic ASAT Nuclear Collision Ballistic Missiles Space launchers p. 16
Overlapping control regimes Space Outer Space Treaty Moon Treaty Rescue agreement Liability/Registration Conv. Nuclear NPT CTBT NWFZ Missiles INF-Treaty START 1+2 Moscow Treaty Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Missile Defense ABM-Treaty
Recent initiatives for missile control US-Russian Joint Data Exchange Centre (JDEC): Notification of Missile Launches, early warning Russian Global Control System (GCS) and Global Monitoring System (GMS) to improve multilateral transparency and risk reduction Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: "responsible missile behaviour (MTCR) UN Panel of Governmental Experts (UNPGE) on missiles (UNGA resolution 55/33A): missile report: "comprehensive approach towards missiles, in a balanced and nondiscriminatory manner Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Preemptive interdiction of transport of weapons of mass destruction and missiles (land, sea, air) Global INF Treaty: US-Russian talks p. 18
Options for missile control Confidence building measures Code of Conduct Unilateral reductions Partial limitations Missile test restraints, freeze Missile free zones Comprehensive disarmament (Zero Ballistic Missiles) New ABM Treaty Integration into a regime for space security p. 19
Instruments for monitoring and verification Space weapon On-board sensors Inspections Reconnaissance satellite Space tracking UV Lidar Radar Infrared Electro-optical Missile track Aerial overflights Ground/shipbased sensors Non-intrusive detectors (gamma, x-ray, neutron) Societal verification Whistle blowing On-site inspections Data exchange Organisational verification
Activities vs. monitoring capabilities p. 21
Dual-use of ballistic missiles & space launchers Similarity of civilian and military rockets Functional differences and operational characteristics to distinguish missiles and space launchers (deployment mode, test procedures, payload, flight path, guidance, reentry) Risk reduction: Prevent transformation of space technologies for ballistic use Safeguards of space systems: critical items unter international control International space cooperation p. 22
Space launch sites p. 23
The US Space Surveillance Network p. 24
Can we get rid of the missile threat? p. 25