Introduction to Nuclear Security and Threats of Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Charles D. Ferguson, Ph.D. Board Director, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board cferguson@nas.edu March 16, 2018 Presentation to Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation and Hudson Institute s Nuclear Security Course for Congressional Staff The views are the presenter s own.
What is Nuclear Security? The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines nuclear security as The prevention and detection of and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities. This also includes protection of nuclear weapons from theft, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or malicious acts.
Foci of this presentation What are the types of nuclear and radiological terrorism? Terrorist threats to access nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and/or radioactive sources to use in malicious acts chain of causation to do these acts Types of terrorist groups and likelihood of incidents Challenges to conventional wisdom The terrorist groups might also have help either voluntary or coerced from insiders.
The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism Intact Nuclear Weapon Improvised Nuclear Device Attacks on or Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities such as Nuclear Power Plants or Spent Fuel Pools Radiological Weapon such as Dirty Bomb
Simple: Nuclear Weapons Types Gun-type [focus of concern about nuclear terrorism improvised nuclear device] Implosion type Sophisticated Boosted (fission-fusion) Thermonuclear
Explosive Yields Typical conventional military bomb: 1,000 pounds of TNT explosive equivalent, or ½ ton. Low-yield nuclear weapon: 5 kilotons or 5,000 tons Hiroshima bomb: 13 kilotons or 13,000 tons Typical nuclear weapon in U.S. arsenal: 100 to 300 kilotons or 100,000 to 300,000 tons
Gun-Type Nuclear Weapon Subcritical piece of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is fired rapidly into another subcritical piece forms supercritical mass Rate of assembly 100s of meters/sec Assembly time of about 1 millisecond. Can only use HEU not plutonium Several hundred metric tons of HEU are stockpiled worldwide.
Implosion Bomb Rate of assembly in microseconds; can also use HEU.
About 15,000 worldwide in nine countries More than 90 percent in Russia and the U.S. Typically highly secure but Could, for example, North Korea give nonstate actors nuclear warheads? Permissive action links, but not on all weapons or used in all countries Intact Nuclear Warhead 9
Radiological Weapons Dirty bombs are only one type of RDD, radiological dispersal device Do not need conventional explosives to disperse certain types of radioactive material, e.g. cesium chloride RED: Radiation emission device could think of as a motionless RDD Radiological Incendiary Device Mobile Cesium Irradiators
Why Attack a Nuclear Power Plant or Other Nuclear Facilities? Exploit Public Fear of Radiation Destroy Symbolic Target Contaminate Property Cause Financial Damage Inflict Casualties Restoration Ecology?
Chain of Causation for Radiological or Nuclear Terrorism 1. Terrorists must be motivated to launch an unconventional attack using radiological or nuclear means. 2. They must have or must acquire the requisite technical expertise. 3. They must acquire radioactive or fissile materials and build the weapon or acquire an intact weapon and know how to trigger it. 4. They must be able to plan the attack without being detected and caught. 5. They must finally be able to carry out the attack by delivering the weapon to the target.
Is Nuclear or Radiological Terrorism Inevitable? I don't want to fan hysteria but... a dirty bomb attack is all but inevitable in the coming years, as quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle, September 5, 2004 Who said this? Charles D. Ferguson Why hasn t the attack happened? 13
Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism In the judgment of former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, the likelihood of a single nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height of the Cold War. Nuclear Terrorism [his book published in 2004] states my own judgment that, on the current trend line, the chances of a nuclear attack in the next decade are greater than 50 percent. --Graham Allison, April 16, 2007 14
Another Expert s Assessment Matthew Bunn of Harvard has created a probability model that estimates the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack over a tenyear period to be 29 percent. An assessment made about 12 years ago. 15
What is the risk? Can we quantify it? Risk = Probability X Consequence Large uncertainties Lack of data: few or no attacks Relative vs. absolute risk assessment Probability = Function (Motivation, Intention, Capability) Risk = Function (Motivation, Intention, Capability) X Consequence Black swan events 16
Relative Risk Assessment: Least to most likely? Intact Nuclear Weapon Improvised Nuclear Device Attacks on or Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities such as Nuclear Power Plants or Spent Fuel Pools or Reprocessing Plants Radiological Weapon such as Dirty Bomb
Knowing the Mind of Nuclear Terrorists We know more of the interior of the atom than we do of the interior of the mind of the terrorist, Dr. Jerrold Post, 1987 18
Terrorist Motivations Those who study terrorist motivations are underwhelmed by the probability of such an event [radiological or nuclear terrorism] for most but not all terrorist groups. Jerrold Post, IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001 Psychological and political factors would constrain most groups. 19
Rise of Mass Casualty Terrorism since 1980s 20
Not a New Phenomenon Late 19 th Century and early 20 th Century anarchists Some wanted to cause mass casualties against the bourgeoisie They had dynamite but fortunately not nuclear weapons Emile Henry, anarchist who wanted to blow up Paris in 1894 21
Terrorists are People, Too Dhiren Barot a.k.a. Issa al-hindi
Bale of Marijuana Argument Learn from the drug smugglers: They bring in bales of marijuana every day into the United States Nuclear terrorists can do the same with fissile material or even a fully built nuclear explosive Think Again: Drug smugglers know that the cost of doing business is several seizures of marijuana, but they stay in business because there is plenty of supply Nuclear terrorists would likely have paid a dear price for nuclear materials or weapons they would be extremely reluctant to run a significant risk of seizure
No Gold is Lost from Fort Knox Graham Allison has recommended the gold standard for nuclear security. All we need to do is lock up all of the fissile material in Fort Knox-like compounds. As we all know, no gold has been lost from Fort Knox. While probably true, gold, like fissile material, is used in plenty of places that are not as protected as Fort Knox. But certain countries will continue to use highly enriched uranium for weapons, naval fuel, and perhaps for civilian purposes.
Al Qaeda s Superbomb Documents [David] Albright has cautioned there is no indication that al Qaeda's nuclear work has gone beyond theory. To create a nuclear weapon, Albright said a designer must learn a whole set of manufacturing steps not mentioned in al Qaeda's manual and develop confidence in the weapon's design. "Even a terrorist group that's going to go to the trouble of working on a nuclear weapon wants to have some certainty that it's going to explode as a nuclear explosive and not just explode as a high explosive," Albright said. From a CNN January 2002 story
We Have to Succeed Every Time But terrorists would only have to succeed once. Think Again: Nuclear terrorists would have to succeed with every step of a complicated plan. Many terrorists also fear failure. They fear disappointing their leaders and most importantly their higher power if they believe in such.
Terrorists are cool, calm, and cold-blooded murders, right? But nervous terrorists have revealed their plots. For example, the Millennium bomber was detained at the border crossing between Canada and the United States. Some terrorists have also often show themselves to be bunglers. For example, the medical doctors who botched the bombings in Great Britain.
Insider Threats: Lessons from Bunn and Sagan s Essay Be aware of the attitude: Not in my organization Background checks won t solve the problem. Red flags will not always be read properly. Insider conspiracies are possible. Don t rely on single protective measures. Be alert to employees disgruntlement and organizational culture. Insiders may know security measures and work around them. Security rules are not always followed. Don t assume that only consciously malicious insider actions matter. Pay attention to prevention and mitigation.
Some National Academies Studies on Reducing Risks of Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (2002) rapid response to 9/11 Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage (2006) identified ways to reduce vulnerabilities of spent fuel to terrorist attacks Radiation Source Use and Replacement (2008) underscored risk of CsCl irradiators and highlighted alternative technologies
Major National Academies Studies to Reduce the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium Medical Isotope Production without Highly Enriched Uranium (2009) done in response to Sec. 630 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors (2016) congressionally mandated to provide status of progress toward eliminating HEU in these reactors
Some Other Notable Studies on Nuclear Security Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk (2010) DHS, working with cooperating agencies and national laboratories, should plan and implement a sustainable, effective nuclear forensics program Performance Metrics for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (2013) provided advice to DHS/DNDO and other GNDA agencies and partners Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident for Improving the Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants: Phase 2 (2016) sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and focused mostly on security threats to nuclear plants and spent fuel storage
How to Obtain Additional Information For the Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board s activities and staff s contact info: http://dels.nas.edu/nrsb To contact Charles Ferguson, email cferguson@nas.edu For any National Academies publications, please go to the following URL for free downloads: https://www.nap.edu/