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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3 RD EDITION) VOLUME III.12 COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES Version 1.2 08 January 2015 Prepared by: Operations (Ops) Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG) Document Custodian: Ops MIWG Document Review: Annually

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ENDORSEMENT During the June 2014 MIC Principals meeting and its post-meeting actions, the MIC Steering Group (SG) representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment. The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation s national defense headquarters/staff operations branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation. The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC s work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations include: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations. i P age January 2015

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RECORD OF CHANGES Version Number Effective Date Responsible Organization Version 1.0 07 November 2012 Ops MIWG Version 1.1 07 July 2014 Ops MIWG Version 1.2 08 January 2015 Ops MIWG Summary of Changes: 1. Minor formatting and grammar edits 2. Review to institutionalize lessons identified from Afghanistan 3. Updated national data of USA Review Cycle: Annual Distribution: Unlimited distribution; electronic copy of publication can be found on the MIC All Partners Access Network (APAN) website at https://community.apan.org/mic/ iii P age January 2015

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TABLE OF CONTENT ENDORSEMENT... i RECORD OF CHANGES... iii TABLE OF CONTENT... v Considerations... 1 Australia (AUS)... 4 C-IED Initiatives... 4 C-IED Governance Structure and Lead Point of Contact... 5 Canada (CAN)... 6 C-IED Initiatives... 6 C-IED Governance Structure and Lead Point of Contact... 7 France (FRA)... 8 C-IED Initiatives... 8 C-IED Governance Structure and Lead Point of Contact... 9 Germany (DEU)... 10 C-IED Initiatives... 10 C-IED Governance Structure and Lead Point of Contact... 11 Italy (ITA)... 12 C-IED Initiatives... 12 C-IED Governance Structure and Lead Point of Contact... 13 United Kingdom (GBR)... 14 C-IED Initiatives... 14 C-IED Governance Structure and Lead Point of Contact... 15 United States of America (USA)... 16 C-IED Initiatives... 16 C-IED Governance Structure and Lead Point of Contact... 17 v P age January 2015

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CONSIDERATIONS The evolution of threats in the contemporary operating environment has resulted in considerable change to the conduct of operations by coalition forces. In recent years, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in their various forms has become one of the weapons of choice for insurgencies in operational theatres, as well as representing a global threat. The IED has become a feature of the modern battlefield and is likely to remain a serious challenge in the future. In responding to this challenge, coalitions must remain adaptable and flexible while developing robust and effective Counter-IED (C-IED) policies and procedures. As a result, C-IED activities must be widely understood and integrated within the whole of government / comprehensive approach (CA) and across all levels of command. The combined joint environment within which C-IED is conducted forms part of the coalition s CA. The IED threat permeates all aspects of the CA, affecting the cohesion of the coalition and the willingness of civil actors including host nation, International Organisations (IO), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and many others supporting the coalition s CA to remain in theatre. At the strategic level it is likely that early withdrawal of such agencies would undermine the CA and necessitate the provision from other sources of the humanitarian and reconstruction support that they provide. When combined with influence activities, IEDs can also have a disproportionate effect on the opinions of locals and amplify the strategic level issues. Therefore, the creation of a secure environment and the provision of education and training are key considerations. The adaptive IED challenge will remain a threat across the full range of coalition operations. Consequently, integrating C-IED activities and enablers (people and equipment) for defensive (Defeat the Device) and offensive (Attack the Networks) operations require clearly documented and practised staff processes. Stove-piped C-IED expertise and operations have proven unreliable in supporting overall operational objectives and theatre campaign plans working together. Therefore, C-IED operations should and must be fully integrated into the national and coalition force strategic objectives. Designing an operation to defeat the IED threat requires a comprehensive strategy that integrates and synchronizes series of actions and tasks from the tactical to the strategic levels of command and requires interaction with non-military organizations and the populace. The proliferation of IED use has resulted in a wide range of national, multinational, and coalition activities intended to find ways of addressing the threat. While often effective in developing approaches to deal with the IED threat in its current form, these activities risk duplication of effort and limited visibility between different programmes and projects. Consequently, the need to establish shared awareness of C-IED efforts through better coordination, ideally at the same time avoiding the creation of more network nodes, has been recognised at national and multinational levels. In an attempt 1 P age January 2015

to bring transparency to this issue, each MIC nation identified their engagement to C- IED Initiatives and their respective C-IED Governance Structure and Lead Point of Contact. The following is a list of ongoing C-IED programmes / initiatives: a. NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA). Provides overall oversight of C-IED progress and acts as the overall integrator in the provision of NATO military capability acting as the coordinating body for driving forward C-IED packages. Also arranges regular workshops to bring together NATO representatives to take forward C-IED capability. b. NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). NATO clearing house for C-IED material and equipment, producing a Material Roadmap to integrate individual member states initiatives into a clear and coherent programme, delivering interoperability and sharing best practice. c. NATO C-IED Task Force. Established by the recognition for the need of a cohesive and coordinated effort throughout NATO organisations, structures, components, and nations. In implementing an agreed C-IED Action Plan, the Task Force (TF) coordinates efforts to validate strategic, operational and tactical requirements and works towards ensuring that the management of technological developments and industrial solutions is conducted through appropriate NATO bodies. It also addresses coherent, mutually reinforcing capability requirements with the European Union (EU). d. NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1. Agreed on 24 October 2013. NATO C- IED Action Plan Revision 1 envisages an End State in which NATO has a full understanding of the IED threat, and is properly prepared to conduct activities to minimize the impact of the IED and the networks which employ them. To achieve this it puts in place the process to define, review and update the Alliance's C-IED capability, to institutionalize C-IED in the NATO Command and Force structures and to support nations efforts to institutionalize C-IED. It does this by examining eight lines of effort: Defence Planning; Concept Development and Standardization; Knowledge Development; Education and Training; Organization; Material and Resources; Co-operation; and Policy. The Annex to the Action Plan provides the detailed tasks required against each of the eight lines of effort to define, develop, and institutionalize C-IED within NATO across the three pillars of Attack the Networks, Defeat the Device and Prepare the Force. Implementation of the revised Action Plan is managed by the C-IED Task Force led by ACT's C-IED IPT. e. NATO C-IED Procurements Initiative. In support of NATO s C-IED Action Plan this initiative will engage Allies and Partners in a substantive debate to 2 P age January 2015

identify projects that can deliver operational benefits and economies of scale. f. NATO C-IED Centre of Excellence (CoE). A further focusing of C-IED effort across the Alliance is provided by the NATO-accredited C-IED CoE. One of a number of independent, NATO-accredited CoEs (including the Joint Air Power Competence Centre) whose activities are coordinated by the Transformational Network Branch of Allied Command Transformation, the C- IED CoE offers independent expertise and capacity, complementing and supporting the NATO C-IED TF, Alliance members and partner nations. g. European Defence Agency (EDA) C-IED Project Team. Established to support its Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities. C-IED is one of the top priorities of the Agency. The agency has established a C-IED Project Team that is taking a holistic approach to all aspects of C-IED in an effort to achieve a systematic and harmonised EU approach to the topic. h. US Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was established in 2006 by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense to rapidly respond to the IED threat to U.S. forces along three lines of operation: Defeat IED Devices; Attack the Networks that facilitate or employ IEDs, and Train the Force to counter IEDs and attack threat networks. In 2013, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that JIEDDO leverage its capabilities to contribute to the Department of Defense efforts against counter-terrorism, counter-transnational organized crime, counter-weapons of mass destruction and other specified mission areas as well as counter-ied. 3 P age January 2015

AUSTRALIA (AUS) C-IED INITIATIVES AUS Existing CIED Initiatives 1 Attack the Network Defeat the Device Prepare the Force NATO Spanish sponsorship into NATO CNAD CIED Working Group UK Regular 5 eyes classified Government only symposiums and working group meetings coordinated through the 1* International CIED Steering Committee (ICSC) chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN/NZL Bilateral information exchange agreements NZL Regular 5 eyes classified Government only symposiums and working group meetings coordinated through the 1* International CIED Steering Committee (ICSC) chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN/NZL Bilateral information exchange agreements CAN Regular 5 eyes classified Government only symposiums and working group meetings coordinated through the 1* International CIED Steering Committee (ICSC) chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN/NZL Bilateral information exchange agreements USA Regular 5 eyes classified Government only symposiums and working group meetings coordinated through the 1* International CIED Steering Committee (ICSC) chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN/NZL Bilateral information exchange agreements Permanently assigned staff within US Joint IED Defeat Organisation (JIEDDO) DEU Irregular bilateral information exchange meetings FRA Irregular bilateral information exchange meetings Other CIED Fora Regular bilateral information exchange meetings Bilateral information exchange agreements 1 Activity IAW ADF CIED International Engagement Plan 2010 and Joint Capability Instruction 07/11, Countering IEDs (Aug 11) 4 P age January 2015

CANADA (CAN) C-IED INITIATIVES NATO UK AUS USA CAN Existing CIED Initiatives Attack the Network Defeat the Device Prepare the Force Full participation in the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1, CIED Centre of Excellence (Madrid), EOD Centre of Excellence (Slovakia), NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) & Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), EOD & CIED WG 5 eyes conferences, symposiums and agreements, coordinated by the International C-IED Steering Committee (ICSC), chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN/NZ, ABCANZ EOD WG/HOD See above See above, and numerous bilateral agreements & liaison through permanently assigned staff (e.g. National Ground Intelligence Centre (US Army G2) / JIEDDO) and bespoke conferences (e.g. CENTCOM, USMC, Home Made Explosives, JIEDDO), Countering Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) 6 P age January 2015

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT Role Defence Proponent CIED SRO CIED 2 Lead Lead Point of Contact Lead Chief of Defence Staff Commander Canadian Army Chief of Staff Land Strategy Chief of Staff Land Operations Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force Operations Officer Policy Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) Doctrine and Concepts Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Command Structures Vice Chief of Defence Staff (Director Defence Program Coord)/Directorate Land Force Development Operational Requirement Canadian Joint Operations Command Expeditionary Operational Requirements Canadian Joint Operations Command Domestic Equipment Director Land Requirements 9 Intelligence Canadian Forces Intelligence Command/ Land Force Intelligence Centre IM/IX and Ops IS Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Services) Attack the Network Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force Attack the Network Section Defeat the Device Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force Defeat the Device Section Prepare the Force Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force Prepare the Force Section Indigenous Force Development Canadian Joint Operational Command and Canadian Defence Intelligence Global Engagement Strategy in CIED Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force Operations Officer Capacity Building Science and Technology Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force Prepare the Force Section (includes Electronic Counter Measures) Exploitation Land Force Intelligence Centre Deployable Technical Analysis Laboratory (Level II Exploitation), Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (Level III Exploitation) 7 P age January 2015

FRANCE (FRA) C-IED INITIATIVES FRA Existing CIED Initiatives Attack the Network Defeat the Device Prepare the Force NATO Full participation in the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1, Centre of Excellence (Madrid), NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) & Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) EU Liaison with European Defence Agency UN Development of LTT to inform positioning of IEDs as an illegitimate use of force, as agreed by UNAMA (Jul 11) UK 5 eyes conferences, symposiums and agreements, coordinated by the International C-IED Steering Committee, chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN AUS See above CAN See above USA See above, and numerous bilateral agreements & liaison through permanently assigned staff (e.g. JIEDAC / JIEDDO, US Manoeuvre Support) and bespoke conferences (e.g. CENTCOM, USMC, Home Made Explosives, JIEDDO) DEU Through NATO FRA A joint EOD Warfare structure was created on 1st of July 2011 in Angers; this is an expertise, doctrine and training centre. IOC MN TEL in October 2011. and leadership of this capability. Increasing number of EOD in the forces deployed in Afghanistan. Integration of an EOD training period before deployment in an hostile country ITA Other CIED Fora Through NATO Numerous individual bilateral agreements and liaison (e.g. Israel, Denmark, Estonia) and Op MONOGRAM training (e.g. Pakistan, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco) UK training (military & contractor) provided through numerous initiatives, including Op MONOGRAM training delivered in host countries and EOD training at UK sites. 8 P age January 2015

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT Role CIED SRO CIED 2 Lead Lead Point of Contact Joint chief of staff (Paris) Joint chief engineer (Angers) Joint EOD warfare center Lead Policy Doctrine and Concepts Structures Operational Requirement Expeditionary Operational Requirements Domestic Intelligence Prepare the Force Indigenous Force Development Expeditionary Capacity Building Information Operations Science and Technology Joint chief of staff (Paris) Joint doctrine centre (Paris) Joint chief engineer (Angers) Joint chief of staff (Paris) For the Navy : FRA Navy Staff (Paris) and FRA Naval Action Force MW department (Brest) For the Air force : FRA Air Force Support Command EOD department (Bordeaux) For the Army : FRA Army Staff (Paris) Military Intelligence Directorate For the Army : Land Forces Command (Lille) For the Navy : Naval Action Force (Toulon) For the Air Force : Air Force Command (Metz) FRA CIMIC Group (Lyon) General Procurement Agency Joint Public Relation and Information Department FRA Military Intelligence Agency 9 P age January 2015

GERMANY (DEU) C-IED INITIATIVES NATO EU UN Others CIED Fora DEU Existing CIED Initiatives Attack the Network Defeat the Device Prepare the Force Full participation in the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1 including Clearinghouse Mechanism and Material Roadmap Sponsoring Nation of the Centre of Excellence C-IED (Madrid) Participation in the European Defence Agency C-IED PT Support of UNMAS by one DEU Staff Officer/ Military Expert C-IED as VNC Bi-Multilateral Info Exchange 10 P age January 2015

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT Role Lead Defence Proponent Ministry of Defence Strategy and Operations Directorate I 3 Policy Ministry of Defence Strategy and Operations Directorate I 3 Doctrine and Concepts Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Center Structures Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Center Operational Requirement Bundeswehr Joint Force Command Expeditionary Operational Requirements Army Command Domestic Intelligence Federal Intel Service, Strategic Intelligence Command, Bundeswehr Joint Force Command Strategic Intel Comd, Information Centre C-IED Prepare the Force Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Center Information Operations Bundeswehr Operational Communication Center Science and Technology Ministry of Defence Directorate-General for Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support Exploitation Ministry of Defence Strategy and Operations Directorate I 3 Ministry of Defence Directorate-General for Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support 11 P age January 2015

ITALY (ITA) C-IED INITIATIVES NATO NATO NATO EDA EDA EDA EDA Other C- IED Fora ITA Existing CIED Initiatives Attack the Network Defeat the Device Prepare the Force Full participation in the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1, NATO C-IED Working Groups, NATO EOD Working Group, Workshops and Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) Full participation in the NATO Smart Defence Working Group (WG) on Attack the Network Information Sharing and Fusion (NATO Smart Defence Project 2.89) Development of the Route Clearance Capability; contribution to NATO Doctrine revision and taking part to MILENG COE NATO Route Clearance Workshop(s); participation to NATO Systems Concepts and Integration (SCI) Exploratory Team (ET) 011 Technology Roadmap(s) FOR Future Route Clearance Capability Member of the European Defence Agency C-IED Project Team (PT); starting from 2015 ITA is holding the Chairmanship of the EDA C-IED PT Lead Nation for development of the Military Search (MS) Capability (5 years plan project) Lead Nation for development of the Future Route Clearance Capability (FRCC) Participating Nation, expressing two permanent positions in the Joint Deployable Analysis Exploitation Laboratory (JDEAL) Irregular bilateral information exchange meetings Additional details: FRCC. The FRCC is defined as the capability elements (Personnel, Procedures, Doctrine and Equipment) required to allow the Manoeuvre Commander to enhance freedom of movement (FoM) with regard to IEDs / Mines or Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs), in spite of the adversary s action. The aim of the Future Route Clearance Capability is to establish that a route is free from explosive hazards (IEDs, UXOs or mines), by detecting the presence of such devices, removing the threat, remediating the route to allow continued FoM. A Route Clearance Capability supports the overall C-IED effort by defeating the device. MS. Military Search provides the expert advice and co-ordination required for systematic and flexible assurance to determine an absence of devices, or to indicate the location of suspect devices. Military working dogs and other C-IED enablers are often integral to search activities. The techniques of military search can be applied to all manner of search tasks to include combinations of personnel, buildings, venues, areas, routes, vehicles, vessels and aircrafts. 12 P age January 2015

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT Role Defence Proponent CIED SRO CIED 2 Lead Lead Point of Contact Lead Vice Chief of Defence General Staff Chief of Defence General Staff III Division Vice Chief of Defence General Staff III Division Italian Defence General Staff III Division Policy Italian Defence General Staff III Division Doctrine and Concepts Italian Defence General Staff III Division Centre for Defence Innovation Structures Italian Defence General Staff IV Division Operational Requirement National Joint Operational HQ J3 Expeditionary Operational Requirements National Joint Operational HQ J3 Domestic Intelligence Italian Defence General Staff II Division IM/IX and Ops IS National C-IED CoE Prepare the Force National C-IED CoE Indigenous Force Development Italian Defence General Staff III Division Centre for Defence Innovation Expeditionary Capacity National Joint Operational HQ J3 Building Science and Technology National Armaments Directorate Exploitation Italian Defence General Staff III Division General Planning Branch 13 P age January 2015

UNITED KINGDOM (GBR) C-IED INITIATIVES GBR Existing CIED Initiatives Attack the Network Defeat the Device Prepare the Force NATO Full participation in the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1, Centre of Excellence (Madrid), NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) & Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). NATO EU Liaison with European Defence Agency UN Development of LTT to inform positioning of IEDs as an illegitimate use of force, as agreed by UNAMA (Jul 11) UK 5 eyes conferences, symposiums and agreements, coordinated by the International C-IED Steering Committee, chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN AUS See above CAN See above USA See above, and numerous bilateral agreements & liaison through permanently assigned staff (e.g. JIEDAC / JIEDDO, US Manoeuvre Support) and bespoke conferences (e.g. CENTCOM, USMC, Home Made Explosives, JIEDDO) 14 P age January 2015

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT Role Defence Proponent CIED SRO CIED 2 Lead Lead Point of Contact Policy Doctrine and Concepts Structures Operational Requirement Expeditionary Operational Requirements Domestic Equipment Intelligence IM/IX and Ops IS Prepare the Force Indigenous Force Development Information Operations Science and Technology Exploitation Lead Vice Chief of Defence Staff Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Military Strategy and Operations Assistance Chief of Defence Staff Operations Force Protection 1 Joint Capability MOD London Assistance Chief of Defence Staff Operations Assistance Chief of Defence Staff Doctrine Concepts and Development Assistance Chief of Defence Staff Strategy and Policy Permanent Joint Headquarters Chief of Staff Operations Directorate Director Battlespace Manoeuvre Head DIFC (Afghanistan) Director Information Superiority Headquarters Land Forces Permanent Joint Headquarters Assistant Chief of Staff J7 Head Targeting and Information Operations Dstl Programme Director Assistance Chief of Defence Staff Intelligence Capability 15 P age January 2015

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA) C-IED INITIATIVES NATO EU UK AUS CAN NZ Others CIED Fora USA Existing CIED Initiatives Attack the Network Defeat the Device Prepare the Force Full support of the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1, the C-IED Center of Excellence, (Madrid), NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA), and Conference of National Armaments Directorate (CNAD). U.S. leads NATO Smart Defence projects to develop capabilities in jammers, threat network information sharing and fusion, entry control point suites, and persistent surveillance Irregular engagement with European Defence Agency. 5 eyes conferences, symposiums and agreements, coordinated by the International C-IED Steering Committee, chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN. Numerous bilateral agreements & liaison through permanently assigned staff in JIEDDO Same as Above Same as Above 5 eyes conferences, symposiums and agreements, coordinated by the International C-IED Steering Committee, chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN Irregular bilateral information exchange meetings 16 P age January 2015

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT Role Defence Proponent CIED SRO CIED 2 Lead Lead Point of Contact Deputy Secretary of Defense Director, JIEDDO Deputy Director, JIEDDO Coalition Branch, J5, JIEDDO Lead Policy Doctrine and Concepts Structures Operational Requirement Expeditionary Operational Requirements Domestic Intelligence IM/IX and Ops IS Prepare the Force Indigenous Force Development Expeditionary Capacity Building Information Operations Science and Technology Exploitation Deputy Secretary of Defense Deputy Secretary of Defense Deputy Secretary of Defense US Combatant Commands (CCMDs) US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I) JIEDDO, Joint Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange website (JKniFE), J6, C-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center (COIC) JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) US Combatant Commands JIEDDO JCOE N/A (COIC does Intel/Info Fusion) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD-AT&L); JIEDDO Deputy Directorate for Rapid Capability Delivery (DDRCD) Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) 17 P age January 2015

MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL (MIC) EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT J-3 / MOD 3000 Joint Staff, The Pentagon Washington D.C. js.mic.es@mail.mil https://community.apan.org/mic

Version January 2015