INSEC Surveillance System on Explosive Devices Incidents Report On Casualties of Victim-Activated Explosions Nepal January-December 2010 Prepared by: Krishna Prasad Subedi Subekshya Karki
Table of Contents Summary 3 1. Introduction 4 2. Methodology 5 2.1. INSEC Surveillance Methodology 5 2.2. Case Definitions 6 2.3 Types 6 2.4. Active Surveillance 7 2.4.1. Overview 7 2.4.2. Coverage 7 2.4.3. Range of Information 8 2.4.4. Limitation 8 2.5 Glossary 8 3. Number of Incidents and Casualties 9 3.1 Trends in Civilian Casualties and Incidents 9 3.2 Death rate 10 4. Location of Victim-activated Explosions 11 4.1 Incidents and casualties by location 13 4.2 Incidents and casualties by setting 16 5. Circumstances of Victim-activated Explosions 18 5.1. Type of Explosive Device causing Incidents 18 5.2. Cause of Incidents 19 5.3. Activation of the Device 19 6. Profile of the Civilian and Casualties 20 6.1 Age and Sex of Civilian Casualties 20 6.2 Description of injuries 21 6.3. Occupation of Civilian Casualties 22 6.4 Prior Knowledge of the Risks 24 7. Conclusion 26 2
SUMMARY This annual report has been prepared on the basis of information gathered through INSEC s Surveillance System. It records the effects of explosive devices in Nepal from January December 2010. During the reporting period, the Surveillance System identified 41 new casualties from a total of 22 incidents caused by improvised explosive devices (IED), landmines and other explosive devices (ED). Out of these 22 incidents, all 41 people were injured. The number of casualties has decreased to 41% in comparison to last year. Four regions had incidents of victim-activated explosions, with the highest number of incidents (7) in Mid- Western Region and highest number of casualties (13) occurring in the Eastern region. Out of these 17 districts affected by victim-activated explosions, Sunsari district of the eastern region and Parsa of central region had the highest number of casualties (6). During this period, the most affected districts were all located in the southern part of the country the Terai plains. This indicates the fresh contamination of IEDs used by armed groups in this area. The highest number of incidents and casualties occurred in the month of April resulting 4 incidents and 8 casualties. The highest number of casualties (22%, 9) occurred in homes. 88% of the total number of casualties was caused by IEDs, mainly sutali bombs (58%),socket bombs (20%) and steel box bomb (10%). The main cause of casualties for this period was playing with the explosive devices (34%, 14). Out of the 14 casualties caused as a result of playing with the explosive devices, 13 were children. Children accounted for 49 percent (20) of the total number of casualties whereas adult accounts for 51 percent (21) of the total number of casualties.10-14 years age group was the most affected age group with 12 casualties. Males were 63% (26) and females were 37% (15) of the total casualties. Most of the casualties belonged to either the lowest or low economic category. This indicates that the majority of the casualties will most likely be unable to afford medical treatment, or even in some cases evacuation to the closest medical facility. They may also face financial difficulty in any follow-up treatment required. 90 % ( 37) casualties were not aware that the area where the explosion occurred was dangerous. Also 90% (37) casualties did not know that their activity at the time of the incident was dangerous. 95% incidents occurred in places where there was no danger signs posted. 95 % ( 39) of the casualties reported that they have not received MRE before the incident. 3
1. INTRODUCTION This report is the 20 th of its kind, from the Surveillance System on Explosive Device (ED) incidents in Nepal, a system introduced by Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) in June 2006. It covers the period from January-December 2010, and is part of an ongoing collaborative project, to improve Mine/IED/UXO Risk Education (MRE), Victim Assistance (VA) and Advocacy, and to inform future Mine Clearance and Explosive Ordinance Disposal missions. This report provides an overview of the impact of VAE, namely Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs other explosive devices (ED), and Mines on the population of Nepal. Its publication aims to highlight the extent of the threat that EDs continue to pose to Nepali citizens. Through such a reporting process, INSEC hopes that this issue will continue to be addressed in the most comprehensive and immediate manner possible, by all the relevant stakeholders. The Active Surveillance System on which this report is based details casualties of victim-activated explosions only. It does not feature information on intentional explosions (attack, demolition, and crime), explosions without casualties. The objective of INSEC s Surveillance System is three-fold. It intends to: Collect information about casualties of victim-activated explosions in all the Districts of Nepal Create links between casualties and VA agencies Disseminate reliable information on the incidents to Mine Action stakeholders in order to improve VA and MRE, Advocacy and prioritize de-mining and IED Disposal activities. Each year millions of civilians are killed and maimed by explosive remnants of war. These are the unexploded /abandoned ordinance such as artillery shells, mortars, grenades, bombs and rockets, left behind after an armed conflict. When an armed conflict is over, the battlefields are often littered with explosive debris. Much of this debris is still dangerous, in particular stocks of weapons left behind by combatants and explosive munitions that were fired but failed to go off as intended.1 For the civilians and communities in war-affected countries the presence of these weapons represents an ongoing threat. Globally, there are millions of explosive remnants of war on the ground today affecting more than 83 countries. It is known that millions of people living in 83 countries are affected by land mines, but the size of the global landmine problem is not yet well defined. It is estimated that 10,000 civilians killed or maimed every year by landmines, a large number are children. 2 Particularly low cost and easy availability of improvised explosive devices and land mines made suitable for adoption in civil conflict, especially in developing countries. Both conflicting parties of Nepal, the CPN-Maoist had used IED as anti-tank mines to 1 http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/weapons/explosive-remnants-war/overviewexplosive-remnants-of-war.htm 2 www.clearlandmines.com/landmineprob-impact.cmf 4
target security force vehicles. Similarly, the security forces had also used fragmentation and blast type of antipersonnel mine and MOTAPM (Mines Other than Anti-Personnel Mines) massively during the period of ten years long civil war.3 Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.4 That same to happen in Nepal when the ten-year armed conflict has come to an end but it has left the threat of explosive remnants of war in its wake. Four-years ago (Nov. 21, 2006), on 5.1.4 of Comprehensive Peace Accord after signing by the erstwhile CPN-Maoist and Nepal Government, it states " both sides shall assist each other to mark landmines and booby-traps used during the time of armed conflict by providing necessary information within 30 days and defuse and excavate the within 60 days." The point was included in the CPA to exterminate the threats of explosive remnants of war by mitigating the effects of victim-activated explosions. INSEC s active surveillance system results in the collection of reliable and comprehensive data, which is vital for efficient and systematic mine action activities and programs. These mine action activities are essential to prevent future mine-related incidents and also to alleviate the damage caused by explosive devices. This comprehensive system in place ensures widespread dissemination of detailed and accurate information on victims of IEDs to all organizations, who work directly or indirectly with mine action activities. Such information is imperative for the efficient implementation of Mine Risk Education, Victim Assistance, Advocacy and Mine Clearance Programs to alleviate the dangers posed by EDs. The information from January to December 2010 is based on www.inseconline.org as a preliminary source and INSEC Active Surveillance System. 2. METHODOLOGY 2.1 INSEC Surveillance Methodology Surveillance, in the public health approach, is the ongoing and systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of health-related data essential to planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health practice. Surveillance may be active or passive, depending on the needs and resources. In active surveillance, injury cases are sought out and investigated; injured persons are interviewed and followed up. It usually requires large expenditures of human and financial resources. In passive surveillance, relevant information is collected in the course of doing other routine tasks. That is to say, the generation of data is not necessarily the primary function of the system that yields the data. The report presents results on active surveillance conducted in all 75 districts of Nepal. 3 Govt to Outline Defense Policy on Landmines, Himalayan Times, 3 February 2004. 4 Global Burden of Armed Violence, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Geneva, 2008 5
2.2 Case Definition A casualty of victim-activated explosion is described by the following sets of inclusive and exclusive criteria: Inclusive criteria People injured or killed when they activated an Explosive Device (ED) unknowingly, or without the intention to harm, hurt or terrorize. These EDs are: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) including booby-trap Anti-personnel Mines Other ED Casualties who were close to an ED activated by an animal or by natural causes (lightning, heat, landslide) Casualties who were close to those who activated the ED (bystanders) People bystanders affected by explosions due to ED manufacturing, transport or storage People who were forced by the Security Forces - or the non-state actors - to defuse or remove ED Exclusive criteria Security Forces or Maoist combatants in any situation Victims using the ED for criminal purposes Victims of command-detonated explosions (attack, demolition of infrastructure) including bombs activated by timer Victims of hurled socket bombs, artillery bombardment, aerial bombing, rocket attacks or any other sort of direct launched devices Persons who fell victim to direct or stray bullets Victims with minor physical injuries (not needing medical treatment) Any other persons not meeting the inclusive criteria as set out above 2.3 Types of Explosive Devices Mine: Ammunition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle Anti-personnel mine (AP Mine): A mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons Improvised Explosive Device (IED): a home-made explosive device usually manually placed/used and designed to injure, kill or terrorize. This definition includes booby-traps using explosive. This category includes Unexploded, abandoned and stored IEDs as well. Booby-trap: An explosive or non-explosive device, or other material, deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed 6
Other Explosive Devices (ED): In this specific context, are limited to factory-made explosive munitions (including command-detonated mines) which are either Unexploded or Abandoned. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO): Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected yet remains unexploded either through malfunction or design or for any other reasons Abandoned Ordnance (AO): An explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use. Explosive Remnants of War (ERW): Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AO) from the conflict time. 2.4 Active Surveillance 2.4.1 Overview The information presented in this report is based on Mine Action surveillance System on civilian casualties of victim-activated explosions initiated by INSEC on June 2006. INSEC district representatives were trained in data collection on incidents, identification of explosive devices, interview techniques, safe behavior and referral of survivors. Whenever an explosion affecting civilians occurs, INSEC is notified by one of its informers or partner organizations and sends one of its district representatives to investigate. Incident data collected at the district level, usually from the survivor, relatives or witnesses of the incident, is sent to INSEC Regional and Central Offices using a specific form, and then transferred to the MAJWG whenever needed. Data is checked for consistency at the central level, and then entered into an Excel worksheet. Information is analyzed in Excel and summarized in a periodic report, which is disseminated through the MAJWG. INSEC reports can also be downloaded from INSEC Website in English. 2.4.2 Coverage As INSEC has district representatives in each of the 75 districts of Nepal, the active surveillance System covers the whole country. Each of the five regional offices of INSEC acts as an intermediary between the district representatives and INSEC Central Office in Kathmandu. The Regional Offices notify the district representatives, ensure the follow up in data collection and assist the transfer of data to the central level. 7
2.4.3 Range of Information A wide range of information is collected by INSEC district representatives from the survivors, sources close to them or witnesses of the incident. Data collected can be grouped into the following main categories: - date of incident - location of incident - type of explosive device causing the incident - circumstance of the incident - profile of the casualty - description of injuries or details of death 2.4.4 Limitations There is a risk of under-reporting especially if an incident occurs in a remote area, unnoticed by media or INSEC s extended network of partner organizations. In light of this, the figures presented in this report are therefore taken to be the minimal figures, comprising all the confirmed cases. 2.5 Glossary CPA ED IED INSEC MAJWG MP MRE UXO VA VDC Comprehensive Peace Agreement Explosive Device Improvised Explosive Device Informal Sector Service Center Mine Action Joint Working Group Municipalities Mine Risk Education Unexploded Ordnance Victim Assistance Village Development Committee 8
3. NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES In the period under review, from January to December 2010, INSEC s Surveillance System identified 41 new casualties from a total of 22 incidents caused by mines, IEDs. Out of these 22 incidents, all 41 people were injured. As demonstrated in figure 1 below, IED/UXO/Mine casualty rates have continued to decrease since 2006. The decrease between 2009 and 2010 in incidents is 8 percent only but the decrease in number of casualties between 2009 and 2010 is 41 percent. 3.1 TRENDS IN INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES There has been an average of 1.8 incidents and 3.4 casualties per month during 2010. In total last year an average of 2 incidents and 5.8 casualties per month occurred. In 2010 the highest number of incidents occurred in the month of April. Figure 2 highlight the decrease in incidents since 2008. 9
Highest number of casualties (8) occurred in the month of April in this reporting period. There were no casualties in the month of august. 3.2 DEATH RATE All 41 casualties were injured. Last year sixteen victims died as a result of the lethal injuries they sustained in the explosions. 10
4. LOCATION OF VICTIM ACTIVATED EXPLOSIONS Figure 4: Map of incidents by district (Jan-Dec 2010) 11
Figure 5: Map of Casualties by District (January December 2010) 12
4.1 INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES BY LOCATION Between 1 January and 31 December 2010, a total of 22 incidents and 41 casualties have been identified through INSEC s Surveillance System. Four regions had incidents of victim-activated Region District Incidents Casualties explosions, with the Sunsari 1 6 highest number of Eastern Saptari 2 5 incidents (3) Siraha 1 2 occurring in Central Eastern Total 4 13 region and casualties Central Parsa Bara 3 2 6 3 (6) occurring in the Eastern and Central Rautahat 1 2 Makwanpur 1 1 Central Total 7 12 Gulmi 1 2 Western Myagdi 2 2 Baglung 1 1 Western Total 4 5 Dang 1 4 Mid-Western Jumla 1 2 Banke 1 1 Dailekh 1 1 Dolpa 1 1 Humla 1 1 Rukum 1 1 Mid-Western Total 7 11 Total 22 41 Table 1: Incidents and Casualties by Region and District (Jan. Dec. 2010) region respectively. Out of the 17 districts affected by victimactivated explosions, Parsa district of the Central region had the highest number of incidents (3) with 6 casualties. There was no incident in farwestern region in this reporting period. 13
Table 2: Casualties and Incidents in Terai Districts as Compared to Other Districts (January-December 2010) Terai Districts Casualties Incidents Parsa 6 3 Sunsari 6 1 Saptari 5 2 Dang 4 1 Bara 3 2 Rautahat 2 1 Siraha 2 1 Makwanpur 1 1 Banke 1 1 Sub Total 30 13 Other Districts Casualties Incidents Gumli 2 1 Jumla 2 1 Myagdi 2 2 Baglung 1 1 Dailekh 1 1 Dolpa 1 1 Humla 1 1 Rukum 1 1 Sub Total 11 9 Grand Total 41 22 Table 2: Casualties and Incidents in Terai Districts as Compared to Other Districts (Jan-Dec 2010) Within these twelve months the most affected districts were located in the southern part of the country the Terai plains. As can be seen by Table 2 the top four affected districts Parsa, Sunsari, Saptari and Dang (those with the highest number of incidents and casualties) are in the Terai region. Terai has become the most dangerous place after CPA. New armed groups are mushrooming with the flavour of political parties and they have usually used IEDs while organizing violence activities such as extortion, rape, kidnap and murder in Terai. Innocent people are caught with the EDs, which are dropped/abandoned near to industrial and commercial areas/public places to terrorize the business persons for ransom. In such situation, innocent people and children will be the victim by EDs. So the Terai plains must be prioritized for effective mine action programs, and the use of explosive devices and other arms by these Tarai groups must continue to be highlighted and strongly condemned in order to prevent the high number of VAE related casualties. Table 3: Casualties and Incidents according to Village Development Committee (VDC) and Municipalities (MP) (January 2008 -December 2010) VDC/ MP Casualties Incidents Districts Region Malakheti VDC 11 1 Kailali Far-Western Biratnagar SMP 7 3 Morang Eastern Kalaiya MP Birjung MP 6 6 3 3 Bara Parsa Central Central Ramgunj Belgachhiya VDC 6 1 Sunsari Eastern Sakhuwa Dhamaura VDC 6 1 Rautahat Central Sugarkhal VDC 6 2 Kailali Far-Western Bhandara VDC 6 1 Chitwan Central Jogbudha VDC 5 1 Dadeldhura Far-Western Lipini Birta VDC 5 1 Parsa Central Malangawa MP 5 1 Sarlahi Central 14
VDC/ MP Casualties Incidents Districts Region Nepalgunj MP 5 2 Banke Mid-Western Bardibas VDC 4 1 Mohattari Central Ghorahi MP 4 1 Dang Mid-Western Khairawa VDC 4 1 Sarlahi Central Manma VDC 4 1 Kalikot Mid-Western Bahundanda VDC 3 1 Lamjung Western Balara VDC 3 1 Sarlahi Central Basuling VDC 3 1 Baitadi Far-Western Goithi VDC 3 1 Saptari Eastern Kafalseri VDC 3 1 Bajhang Far-Western Khumel VDC 3 2 Rolpa Mid-Western Sadepani VDC 3 1 Kailali Far-Western Salempur VDC 3 1 Sarlahi Eastern Sisahaniya VDC 3 1 Bara Central Sitapur Bhangaha VDC 3 1 Mohattari Central Ajgaibi VDC 2 1 Rautahat Central Bahuarwa Bhatha VDC 2 1 Parsa Central Bhardaha VDC 2 1 Saptari Eastern Bhingri VDC 2 1 Pyuthan Mid-Western Darlamchaur VDC 2 1 Gumli Western Darling VDC 2 1 Gumli Western Garkhakot VDC 2 1 Jajarkot Mid-Western Hanku VDC 2 1 Jumla Mid-Western Jukena VDC 2 1 Arghakhanchi Western Lagadigdiyani VDC 2 1 Siraha Eastern Madar VDC 2 1 Siraha Eastern Manraja VDC 2 1 Saptari Eastern Manthali VDC 2 1 Ramechhap Central Siswani Jahada VDC 2 1 Morang Eastern Uchidi VDC 2 1 Bara Central Badabhairav VDC 1 1 Dailekh Mid-Western Bangesal VDC 1 1 Pyuthan Mid-Western Bhajani VDC 1 1 Kailali Far-Western Bhatauda VDC 1 1 Bara Central Chaulahi VDC 1 1 Dailekh Mid-Western Dhadhabar VDC 1 1 Bardiya Mid-Western Dhangadhi MP 1 1 Kailali Far-Western Dhiyal VDC 1 1 Makwanpur Central Gadaiya Dumariya VDC 1 1 Sarlahi Eastern Hattilet VDC 1 1 Mohattari Central Inaruwa MP 1 1 Sunsari Eastern Jitpur VDC 1 1 Bara Central Kachanapur VDC 1 1 Banke Mid-Western Kamdi VDC 1 1 Banke Mid-Western Khairang VDC 1 1 Bhojpur Eastern Khalanga VDC 1 1 Rukum Mid-Western Khanar VDC 1 1 Sunsari Eastern Lothar VDC 1 1 Chitwan Central Maspal VDC 1 1 Dolpa Mid-Western Narayankhola VDC 1 1 Sarlahi Central Narayanpur VDC 1 1 Dang Mid-Western Padsari VDC 1 1 Rupandehi Western PandavKhani VDC 1 1 Baglung Western RakhupipleVDC 1 1 Myagdi Western 15
VDC/ MP Casualties Incidents Districts Region Phaktep VDC 1 1 Panchthar Eastern Rajbiraj MP 1 1 Saptari Eastern Seri VDC 1 1 Dailekh Mid-Western Ranigaun VDC 1 1 Panchthar Eastern Raya VDC 1 1 Humla Mid-Western Room VDC 1 1 Dailekh Mid-Western Seri VDC 1 1 Mugu Mid-Western Suntale VDC 1 1 Khotang Eastern Takam VDC 1 1 Myagdi Western Tandi VDC 1 1 Sindhuli Central Total 184 84 Table 3: Casualties and Incidents according to Village Development Committee (VDC) and Municipalities (MP) (January 2008 -December 2010) Table 3 shows the VDCs/Municipalities affected by victim-activated explosions, ranked from those most affected to those least affected. This covers the period from January 2008 December 2010. The highest number of casualties occurred in a single incident in 2009 which resulted in 11 casualties. This occurred in Malakheti VDC of kailali district. The explosion took place at the house of Harka Bahadur Mahatara where three people died and eight were injured. Biratnagar Sub-metropolis and Kalaiya municipalities had the highest number of incidents (3) with 7 and 6 casualties respectively. Sugarkhal VDC and Bhandara VDC were each affected by 2 incidents with each 6 casualties in the period January 2008 December 2010. During January-December 2010, the period which this report focuses on, the highest number of casualties (6) occurred in one single incident in Ramgunj Belgachhiya VDC of Sunsari district where 6 children got injured when they were playing with apparently a discarded box found near the entrance of the sub-health post. This table can be used to prioritize the implementation of mine action programs. The VDCs/Municipalities with recurring incidents will especially need to be targeted, particularly for mine risk education (MRE) and mine clearance programs. 4.2 INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES BY SETTING Setting Incidents Casualties Adult Child Total Home 6 3 6 9 Agriculture 5 5 4 9 Government Office 2 5 2 7 Near Health Post 2 1 6 7 Forest/Jungle 2 1 1 2 Near SF base 2 1 1 2 Road 1 2 0 2 Factory 1 2 0 2 Market 1 1 0 1 Total 22 21 20 41 Table 4: Incidents and Casualties by Settings (Jan-Dec, 2010) As shown in table 4 and Figure 7 below, the highest number of incidents (27%,6) occurred in home. It has been observed that civilians, especially children, often bring explosive devices from the surrounding area to their homes where 16
they then start tampering/playing with the device. Six children were injured at home when they were playing with the explosive devices which they found outside and bought home taking it as a playing thing. Among the three adult casualties who were injured at home, two victims were from Humla district got injured while demolishing the old house.the second highest number of incidents in this period occurred on agricultural land (22%, 5), which resulted to 9 casualties. The same number of incidents occurred both on government office, near health post, forest/jungle and near Security Force bases. Two incidents took place at government office one at district police office of Dang where four people were injured while cleaning the room. Another incident took place at Goiti VDC office of Saptari where three persons including two children were injured when the children threw mud balls at the device that was hanged by an unidentified group at entrance of Goiti VDC office. Two incidents took place near the health post, one at Saptari district where six children got injured and another at Bara district where one woman was injured. As seen in the figure 7, highest number of casualties took place at home and agriculture (22%) followed by government office and health post (17%). 17
5. CIRCUMSTANCES OF VICTIM ACTIVATED EXPLOSIONS 5.1 Type of Explosive Device Causing Incidents Table 5: Incidents and Casualties by Explosive Device (January December 2010) Table 5 and Figure 8 below show that 17 incidents (77%) were caused by Improvised Explosive Devices mainly sutali bomb (36%), socket bomb (32%) and tiffin bomb (9%). Type of Casualties One incident Name of Device Incidents Device Adult Child Total involved mine in Sutali Bomb 8 11 13 24 the Mid-Western IED Socket Bomb 7 3 5 8 region, near the TiffinBomb(Steel) 2 4 0 4 Mahindra Dal Mine Claymore 1 0 1 1 Battalion. The Other ED Detonator 1 0 1 1 explosion Unknown Unknown 3 3 0 3 occurred when Total 22 21 20 41 the girl, who had gone to collect firewood near the army base, stepped on the landmine. Types of devices in 3 incidents Table 5: Incidents and Casualties by Explosive Device (Jan-Dec, 2010) were unknown. One incident occurred in Baglung district where one person was injured while he was walking in the jungle to collect firewood and mistakenly stepped on the explosive devices. Another incident occurred in Myagdi district at Ghumaune Tal which is 4 Km far from district headquarter Beni. Another incident occurred at the Dailekh district when a army personnel was injured while demining. As demonstrated in the table and pie chart, IEDs (88%) were the main cause of casualties in Nepal for this period. 18
5.2 Cause of Incidents Figure 9: Casualties by Cause of Incident (January-December 2010) As Figure 9 shows, the main cause of casualties for this period is the playing with the explosive devices (34%, 14). Out of 14 casualties who were injured while playing, 13 are children. Children, who are naturally more curious and have less knowledge of the risks involved, are more prone than adults to the dangers these devices pose. The second highest number of casualties resulted from the explosive device is tampering/handling (22%, 9) where 5 children and 4 adult were injured. 5 incidents resulting in 8 casualties were caused while walking nearby the explosive devices. Four policemen were injured in one single incident at Dang while they were cleaning the room. Risky behaviors such as working nearby, throwing and stepping on IEDs, accounted for 12% of casualties. These activities are carried out by those who are ignorant to the dangers. Such incidents could be mitigated through effective MRE. Cause of explosion in one incident where army personnel was injured is unknown. 5.3 Activation of Device Who Activated the Device Adult Child Total Victim 16 15 31 Someone 5 5 10 Total 21 20 41 As seen in Table 6, around 75 % (31) of casualties activated the explosive devices themselves. 25% (10) casualties were close to or beside the person who activated the device. Table 6: Activation of devices (Jan Dec, 2010) 19
6. PROFILE OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 6.1 Age and Sex of Civilian Casualties Age and Sex Casualties Boy 12 Girl 8 Man 14 Woman 7 Total 41 Since 2006, INSEC s records have continuously highlighted the disproportionate number of child casualties resulting from such explosions. Table 7: Age and Sex of Casualties (Jan Dec, 2010) As demonstrated in Figure 10 and Table 7, children accounted for 49 percent of the total number of ED casualties in 2010. It was 54 % (39) and 64% (46) in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Similarly, it is found that 21 adults (7 women) were injured by VAE in 2010. Figure 11 details the ages of all casualties resulting from explosive devices. 20
The graph clearly identifies the most affected age group for this period, as those children between 10-14 years, and followed by between 25-29 years. According to INSEC s statistics reflecting the period in question, these age groups were most vulnerable to unexploded and abandoned ordinance, including IEDs, the majority of which were sutali bombs and socket bombs. The majority of child casualties resulted from children handling/tampering and playing with the explosive devices to satisfy their curiosity. It is because children are curious and like to outdoors. In addition, children are responsible for tending cattle and sheep in many societies. They often follow their livestock into new areas in search of new grazing land. One child casualty resulted from the child accidentally stepping on the device near a Security Force base. As seen in Figure 12, male accounted for 63 % (26) of total casualties whereas female accounted for 37% (15) of total casualties. Last year, male accounted for 69% and female accounted for 31% of total 70 casualties. 6.2 Description of Injuries Figure 13 and 14 (below) show the type of injuries sustained by all casualties. In this reporting period most of the casualties suffered from shrapnel wounds and burns to the face, chest, arms, hands and legs, indicating that they were facing the explosive device at the time of the incident. One victim from Jumla lost her right hand completely below elbow bomb when she was demolishing her old house for maintenance. Figure 13: Description of Injuries Figure 14: Description of Injuries 21
6.3 Occupation of Civilian Casualties Table 8 and figure 15 (below) identify that the majority of casualties in 2010 were students (36%). Out of the remaining casualties; 32% (13) were farmers, and 20% (8) Occupation Adult Child Total Student 0 15 15 Farmer 13 0 13 Employee 8 0 8 Infants and children not attending school 0 5 5 Total 21 20 41 employee. Out of eight employee, seven are police while one is army.12 % (5) of casualties are listed as infants and children not attending school, where two children were below school going age at the time of the incident. Table 8: Occupation of Casualties Prior to Incident (Jan Dec, 2010) The fact that such a large majority of casualties were students indicates an urgent need for more school-based MRE. Communities where farmers reside, also require greater attention so that risktaking behavior can be identified and in this way reduced. 22
Language Adult Child Total Nepali 14 7 21 Bhojpuri 6 3 9 Theti 0 6 6 Maithali 1 4 5 Total 21 20 41 Table 9: Language of Casualties (Jan Dec, 2010) As seen in Table 9, most of the casualties (51%, 21) speak Nepali. 22% (9) of the casualties speak Bhojpuri, 15% (6) of the casualties speak Theti and 12% (5) of the casualties speak Maithali. Developing MRE tools in each of the local languages listed would be effective in order to limit casualties. Child Adult Total Literate Casualties % Casualties % Casualties % Yes 15 37% 14 34% 29 71% No 5 12% 7 17% 12 29% Total 20 49% 21 51% 41 100% Table 10: Literacy of Casualties by Age (Jan Dec, 2010) In terms of literacy, as shown in Table 10, 71 % (29) of casualties were literate. Out of 20 children 37 % (15) were literate and 12 % (5) were illiterate. Among the five illiterate children, two were infant (below the schooling age). A total of 34 % (14) of adult casualties were literate, and 17 % (7) of adult casualties were illiterate. All the casualties who were illiterate were farmers. MRE tools must be developed which effectively reach illiterate members of communities vulnerable to explosive devices. The economic status of casualties is assessed by INSEC district representatives during their initial interviews with the victim, their family or Economic Status Casualties their neighbors. This status is determined by the type Lowest Lower Middle High Unknown Total 24 4 6 6 1 41 of housing, clothing and employment of the victim, and whether or not they own land. As evident from Table 11, during the period under review most of the casualties were assessed as belonging to lowest economic category. This indicates that the majority of the casualties will most likely be unable to afford Table 11: Economic Status of Casualties (Jan Dec, 2010) medical treatment or evacuation to the closest medical facility, and will face financial difficulty in any follow-up treatment required. 23
Marital Status Casualties Married 18 Single 2 Unknown 1 Total 21 Table 12: Marital Status of Adult Casualties (Jan Dec, 2010) As seen in Table 12, 86 % (18) out of the total adult casualties were married. From an analysis of INSEC s active surveillance, it can be deduced that each married casualty for the period in question had an average of 2 dependants; this includes a spouse, children or other family members. This figure demonstrates the serious and far reaching socioeconomic implications that one incident may have on a larger number of people other than the victim alone. Figure 16 (below) identifies the Madeshi caste as those amongst whom the highest number of casualties occurred for the period. The second highest number of casualties occurred amongst the Chhetri followed by Janajati indigenous group. 6.4 Prior Knowledge of Casualties on Dangers As seen in Table 13, most of the casualties (90%) were unaware that the area where the explosion occurred posed any threat Knowledge of Adult Child Total to their safety. Furthermore, 90% of the Danger casualties were unaware of any danger Yes 3 0 3 concerning the activity in which they No 17 20 37 were engaged at the time of the incident Unknown 1 0 1 (see Table 14). Total 21 20 41 Table 13: Knowledge of Casualties on Danger of Area (Jan Dec, 2010) 24
Knowledge of Adult Danger Child Total Yes 3 0 3 No 17 20 37 Unknown 1 0 1 Total 21 20 41 Table 14: Knowledge of Casualties Concerning Danger of Activity (Jan Dec, 2010) Two policemen knew that their entry into the brick factory for searching the arms was dangerous (Siraha). Another policeman who was injured while bringing the explosive devices out of the market which was placed under the stairs of Public Development Bank at Rungata Market was also aware that his act was dangerous (Parsa). Mark Casualties Yes 1 No 20 Unknown 1 Total 41 As seen in Table 15, 20 incidents occurred in places where there was no danger signs posted. One incident that occurred near the Mahindra Dal Battalion of Nepal Army (Rukum) was clearly marked. Table 15: Marking of Place of Incident (Jan Dec, 2010) Received MRE Adult Child Total Yes 1 0 1 No 19 20 39 Unknown 1 0 1 Total 21 20 41 Table 16: Casualties who Received MRE Prior to Incident (Jan Dec, 2010) As shown in Table 16, 39 casualties reported that they had received any MRE prior to the incidents. One policeman had received MRE training prior to the incident. The current MRE campaigns in Nepal need to be better targeted in terms of population and area, and coverage in affected areas must be greatly improved. 25
7. CONCLUSION In spite of the progress achieved by Nepal through demining and IED disposal activities, the recurrence of victim-activated explosions especially in Terai region with the mushrooming of armed outfits especially in Terai belt is a serious challenge to the fragile peace process in Nepal. This report highlights the fact that the highest number of victim-activated explosions occur in home where people presume it to be the safe place. Also the number of adults and children injured are almost same. It is therefore vital that MRE programs should be targeted to both adults and children. Children between the ages of 5 and 14 are identified as those who are most vulnerable. The report cautions that all MRE programs should be intelligently devised in as systematic a manner, in order to avoid risk posed by explosive devices. The children should be equipped with sufficient knowledge on how to act should they come across a potential explosive device. The number of incidents and casualties resulting from victim activated explosion in each year is decreasing. Decreasing number of incidents and casualties with no death rate in the year 2010 is a positive sign. Although the numbers are in decreasing trend in whole, there is an increasing trend in the number of incidents in the terai region. Post-conflict period is generally considered fertile ground for breeding the criminal activities. Nepal as passing under the transition period, in such a situation, it is essential with effective coordination among the organ of state especially security organs to cope with the prevailing situation. 26