Battery Elmer J. Wallace and the Ammunition Supply Experiment

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Volume 24, Issue 2 The Coast Defense Journal Page 4 Battery Elmer J. Wallace and the Ammunition Supply Experiment Bolling W. Smith After the world became engulfed in the great World War in 1914, the Corps of Engineers built 15 two-gun batteries for 12-inch M1895 guns on M1917 barbette carriages.(1) The new carriages and their batteries represented a considerable shift in American coast defense policy while the magazines were bombproof, the guns and their crews were entirely without protection. With the exception of the two single emplacements on Corregidor Island, in Manila Bay, the design of the batteries was relatively consistent. One battery, however, was built quite differently. In view of the world war then in progress, and considering the increased range of the newest battleship guns, the U.S. Army became increasingly concerned about the defenses of San Francisco. Unlike most cities, San Francisco, located directly on the ocean, was vulnerable to distant bombardment from ships far at sea, and from well to the north and south of the city along the coast, where existing seacoast batteries could not effectively reach them. An additional concern was the locations where a force could come ashore to attack the city by land. On June 8, 1915, the War Department Board of Review adopted the proposal of Gen. Erasmus Weaver, chief of coast artillery, that the defenses of San Francisco be strengthened by the addition of two 16-inch guns, at or near either Fort Miley or Fort Barry.(2) On July 20, after considering the report of the district engineer officer, the board approved one battery of four mortars and one battery for two 16-inch guns at Tennessee Point, north of Fort Barry, in Marin County on the north side of the Golden Gate. These were in addition to other batteries approved both north and south of the city. However, Maj. Gen. Arthur Murray, commanding general of the Western Department and perhaps equally important, former chief of coast artillery, objected. Murray s September 27 indorsement disputed the entire basis of the plan. First, he believed the odds were negligible that any of the handful of warships able to outrange American 12-inch (M1890) mortars would appear off San Francisco. In addition, outlying batteries would be vulnerable to attack by landing parties. Murray argued that neither 16-inch guns nor 12-inch mortars would be as effective as older short 12-inch guns (3) mounted as howitzers, with a range of nearly 32,000 yards (18 miles). Even more cost effective than batteries would be one or two submarines. He urged the secretary of war to order studies of both submarines for coast defense and the conversion of short 12-inch guns into howitzers. The adjutant general replied on October 26, 1915, for the secretary of war. General Murray s recommendation was disapproved, for a number of reasons, but the adjutant general did note that on March 6, the chief of coast artillery had called for mounting reserve 35-caliber 12-inch guns as howitzers and the Board of Review approved so mounting 32 of these guns. He added, almost in passing, that on September 14, the board had revised the San Francisco project, eliminating the 16-inch battery and substituting a battery of two 12-inch guns mounted for long-range (howitzer) fire, in place of the mortar battery.(4) The chief of engineers notified the district engineer officer, Lt. Colonel Thomas Rees, in San Francisco on November 1 that the board had modified its project, and requested Rees submit a location for the 12-inch battery after consulting with the artillery authorities. The guns were to be used in lieu of mortars, and the emplacements were to be along the lines of the latest designs of mortar emplacements, except that only a single gun will be mounted in each pit and the guns would be able to fire at elevations as low as 10 degrees.(5)

May 2010 The Coast Defense Journal Page 5 12-inch M1895 gun on M1917 long-range barbette carriage. Ordnance Doc. 1722 On December 28, 1915, Colonel Rees reported that there was really only one suitable location on Fort Barry for the 12-inch battery, at an elevation of about 222 feet on a knoll immediately southeast of Battery Alexander. About 800 yards from the ocean, it overlooked the Bonita Channel and the north approaches to the Golden Gate, as well as the south channel and a portion of the sea inside Point Lobos. The distance from the center of Pit B, Battery Alexander, to the center of platform No. 1 of the 12-inch battery would only be 134 yards, while 12-inch Battery Mendel was about 450 yards away. The War Department decided in 1915 to emplace a pair of 12-inch guns at Fort Barry, on the north side of the Golden Gate. NARA

Volume 24, Issue 2 The Coast Defense Journal Page 6 This concentration of major gun batteries was the sole undesirable feature of the site, but in light of it, Colonel Rees submitted an alternative location, off the present reservation, some 600 yards east of Tennessee Point and 280 yards inland. The knoll there would give the battery an elevation of about 350 feet. However, the acquisition of land from the estate of the recently deceased Antoine Borel was tied up with the question of a reliable water supply for Forts Baker and Barry.(6) Meanwhile, on December 31, Colonel Rees submitted an estimate of the cost to build the 12-inch battery near Battery Alexander. The engineer cost, exclusive of guns, carriages, and ammunition, was estimated at $214,157.90, with an additional $22,220 for the plant to construct the battery. The chief Original plans for Battery Wallace, January 30, 1917. NARA Cartographics

May 2010 The Coast Defense Journal Page 7 of engineers estimated that constructing the battery at the alternate site near Tennessee Point would increase the cost by $22,000. General Weaver favored the site already owned by the government.(7) In a March 25, 1916, letter to General Weaver, Gen. William Black, the new chief of engineers, discussed the importance of containing costs in view of the large expenditures necessary to strengthen the coast defenses. One possible economy might be to provide central storage of ammunition for groups of batteries of the same caliber. Small service magazines close to the guns would be resupplied by rail or by auto trucks. General Weaver concurred, suggesting service magazines only provide one hour s allowance. The Taft Report gave this for 12-inch guns as 45 rounds per gun. Subsequent discussion of this subject centered on ammunition supply for projected 16-inch batteries, making no further reference to 12- inch batteries.(8) A year later, on January 30, 1917, Colonel Rees submitted a modified design and cost estimate. The orientation of the battery was adjusted to improve the field of fire and the platform elevations were to be increased 13 feet, to 235 feet above M.L.L.W. In what appears to be a relatively new development, Rees provided for basket reinforcement, steel bars at right angles about six inches below the surface of the concrete. Rees noted that this technique, standard today for reinforced concrete, had recently been used for batteries in the defenses of Manila Bay. This feature was sufficiently innovative that a separate estimate was included for the reinforcing steel. Elimination of interior damp-proof walls and hot-air passages and ducts would save space that could be used to house an additional motor-generator, if desired. Since the Ordnance Department was proposing to issue powder in single sections, which would obviously be longer and heavier, powder trolley hoists were to be provided. Other features were relatively standard. The 12-foot oil-surface macadam road behind the magazine would be linked to the nearest main road by an 18-foot roadway. Each loading platform was to be illuminated by three cone-reflector clusters on poles. Communication within the magazine would be by 3-inch speaking tubes. The engineers total cost for the battery, with 8-foot front and side traverse walls, but exclusive of the splinterproof rolling doors along the rear corridor and of the guardroom and basket reinforcement, was $201,434.75. The additional estimate for the guardroom was $1320, for the splinterproof doors, $9,350, and for the basket reinforcement, $1989.90.(9) In the interest of economy, on February 28, 1917, Col. Edward Burr, the San Francisco district engineer officer, requested the transfer of the construction plant no longer needed at Los Angeles. After overhaul, it was shipped in July to San Francisco to construct the 12-inch battery.(10) Before the plant was shipped, however, Colonel Burr recommended a radical change. On March 6, 1917, he reported to the chief of engineers that he had carefully inspected the site for the 12-inch battery, along with the coast defense and district commanders for the coast artillery, Col. Richmond P. Davis and Gen. William L. Sibert. The two coast artillery officers were in agreement. As Burr summarized, they believed the guns should be mounted as simply and inexpensively as possible, with the bulk of the ammunition stored in a sheltered location as near the guns as possible and supplied to the guns by motor truck. Storage for only the minimum necessary ammunition would be provided at the guns, with facilities for rapid handling. The district commander also recommended screening the guns from horizontal view. Burr agreed fully with all of these recommendations. Burr urged the advantages of the new proposal. Assuming the guns would be primarily used at long range, rapid fire was not necessary. Obviously, there would be a considerable saving in construction cost from substituting simpler and less expensive structures for the bombproof magazine. Screening the guns and eliminating the distinctive magazine would conceal the battery more effectively than the current plans, in which the guns were to be in full view in the open.

Volume 24, Issue 2 The Coast Defense Journal Page 8 At the guns, other than the gun blocks and loading platforms, the only requirements would be projectile tables with light protection from the weather and trespassers, a similar storage room for reserve powder, and necessary battery rooms, all constructed of inexpensive corrugated metal in sheltered positions behind the battery. The bulk of the ammunition would be kept in a storage magazine farther from the guns, again, only protected from the weather. On March 16, General Black forwarded the report, with his indorsement, to the attention of General Weaver. Black believed the proposed battery design would, in general, prove most unsatisfactory, but if it should be suitable for any locations, construction costs would be substantially reduced. If the War Department approved, he would instruct the district engineer officer to build only the gun blocks and loading platforms, storing the ammunition in nearby Battery Alexander. The idea could then be given a fair trial. If, as Black believed, the results were not favorable, the bombproof magazine between the guns could then be built for little more money than if built at the same time as the gun blocks and loading platforms. General Black, however, emphasized that construction costs were far from the only factor. Referring to his comments on batteries in the Canal Zone, Black stressed that the proposed scheme would require more men, and in addition, motor vehicles, which must be kept always ready for service. The scheme would save about $100,000 per gun in initial construction cost. Assuming a 25-year life for the battery, and a 3 percent rate of inflation, the savings would be about $7,000 per gun per year. This would pay for all the costs of no more than a dozen enlisted men. Therefore, less than a dozen men would have to be necessary for each gun to produce any savings, and that figure did not even include the cost to build and maintain the power and plotting rooms and the light magazine structures, to maintain the roadways, nor to buy and maintain the trucks. As for Colonel Burr s assumption that the guns would not be used for horizontal fire, this had indeed been the first assumption, but on December 5, 1916, the Board of Review had concluded that all 12-inch guns should be sited so they could be fired horizontally. General Weaver concurred with General Black on April 3, agreeing that just the gun blocks and loading platforms should be built at present, while making provision for completing the type emplacement if the experiment should prove unsuccessful. Based on the recommendations of the chief of engineers and the chief of coast artillery, the secretary of war approved the plan on April 19, 1917, and General Black directed the district engineer officer to construct the minimal battery.(11) On May 21, 1917, Colonel Burr submitted a detailed estimate for the gun blocks and loading platforms, totaling $80,394. In addition, the construction plant was estimated at $21,136, making a total of $101,530. Burr proposed to build the battery with hired labor, as most advantageous to the government. The requested sum was allocated on May 25 and June 4, 1917. Burr estimated the total cost to construct the battery with isolated magazines at $150,000, compared to $214,000 for the standard design.(12) Already, the projected cost saving for the new design were shrinking. On November 21, Col. William H. Heuer, now district engineer officer, reported the gun blocks and loading platforms near completion, and submitted plans and estimates for the isolated magazines and service rooms for the battery. These conformed to Colonel Burr s letter of March 6, 1917, except that somewhat greater protection was given to the magazines and shell rooms. It was now proposed to locate the two plotting rooms and battery commander s stations near the flanks of the natural earthen traverse between the guns. The floors of the plotting rooms were to be below road level, so the battery commander s stations would not project unduly above the natural slope of the ground. A rammer room for each gun was to be constructed adjacent to the plotting rooms. The necessary service rooms were to be behind the traverse, between the concrete road and the oil macadam road.

May 2010 The Coast Defense Journal Page 9 Proposed plan for emplacements for Battery Wallace, October 27, 1917, submitted November 21, 1917. NARA Cartographics Proposed plan for magazine for Battery Wallace, October 27, 1917, submitted November 21, 1917. NARA Cartographics

Volume 24, Issue 2 The Coast Defense Journal Page 10 Also to be located in this area were shell and powder shelters, with light reinforced-concrete roofs and side openings closed by steel rolling doors. Each shell shelter was to accommodate ten 720 lb. and ten 1000 lb. shells. The powerhouse was to be on the reverse slope behind the battery road, for the best protected against frontal fire. This location would remain suitable even if a full magazine was subsequently constructed, and would eliminate noise and fumes in the galleries. One 25 kw motor-generator set would supply power to the battery and isolated magazines, with the second as a reserve. As an alternative, Heuer enclosed a plan of the coast artillery district commander, who proposed separating the two powerplants, with one at the location proposed above and the second adjacent to the isolated magazines. While increasing the cost by approximately $2,000, this would lessen the chance of the entire power supply being destroyed by hostile fire. The isolated magazines, approximately 1000 feet from the guns, were to have reinforced-concrete roofs 2 to 2½ feet thick, with an earth cover. The capacity of the magazines would be the same as for the standard type plans. To make them less conspicuous, the earth above the structure was to be replaced, leaving the contour of the hill relatively unchanged. Shell tables for rapidly handling projectiles would be provided at the front of each room. Since condensation was not a great problem in this climate, separate structures inside the magazine would not be necessary, but an air passage would be built behind the front wall. The front openings to the shell and powder rooms would be closed with steel rolling doors to protect against weather and mischief. The distance from the battery, with the cover provided by the hill, was thought ample protection. Officers and enlisted latrines, and a small storeroom, all of light reinforced concrete, were the only other structures to be constructed near the magazines. A nearby bunkhouse used by men detailed for stable duty could serve as a guardhouse. A macadam road with oiled chip surface would lead to the isolated magazines, where a concrete road would be constructed, with a circular turn at its end for the motor trucks. The estimate for the isolated magazines, with accompanying features and a single engine room, was $156,262.80. Providing two engine rooms would increase this by $1961. This, of course, was in addition to the $101,350 for the gun blocks and loading platforms, making a total of $257,792.80 (plus an additional $1961 for separate engine rooms). This striking 72-percent increase was attributed to the greatly increased cost of materials and labor, and to the unsatisfactory boat service to the Fort Barry wharf. Heuer suggested, however, that the cost to complete the battery to the standard plan would be increased even more, estimating that at $205,974, for a total of $307,504. Thus, the savings would be $47,750 or $49,711.20, depending on the number of engine rooms. This would scarcely pay for 6 additional men, a far cry from the dozen men per gun originally assumed to be necessary. Colonel Heuer admitted that the cost savings for the experimental battery now appeared less than anticipated. The original plan had been to subject the experimental plan to a service test. If the experiment was judged a failure already, based on the reduced price savings, and the trial was to be omitted, he recommended completing the battery while the construction force remained at the site. In the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Gen. E. Eveleth Winslow forwarded Heuer s report to the chief of coast artillery on December 10, 1917, expressing his disappointment at the reduced savings. He predicted that separating guns and magazines by 1200 to 1500 feet would not prove advantageous in actual service. At the suggestion of the chief of coast artillery, a copy of the report was sent to General Sibert, who now commanded the Southeastern Department. Sibert, in January 18, 1918, remained committed to his original concept, advancing several arguments. He felt that the chance of a hit on a magazine well

May 2010 The Coast Defense Journal Page 11 removed from the battery and protected by natural topography was so remote that the structures need not be bombproof, especially for shells. In addition, the current trend was toward mobile seacoast defense, except for the most important harbors. The ammunition for these mobile guns would necessarily be without protection, and there was no reason why fixed fortifications would require any greater degree of protection. At the Fort Barry battery, he recommended a reinforced-concrete magazine for 300 shells behind the hill where the isolated magazine was proposed. The powder could be stored in the magazines at Forts Barry and Baker; if necessary, the shells already there could be stored in outside buildings. The tunnel being built between the two forts would facilitate this. Lastly, the purpose of the battery was to prevent warships bombarding the city or its defending batteries from beyond the range of the existing armament. It would not require a great chance of being hit to deter warships from approaching close enough to require rapid fire. The chief of coast artillery responded on January 29. He recommended the coast artillery district commander be directed to conduct the service test as originally envisioned, as soon as the guns could be mounted. No doubt in light of the escalating cost of the isolated magazines, this test should be held before proceeding with any further construction. As General Black had suggested, the magazines of Battery Alexander could serve as the isolated magazines, at least for the purpose of the test.(13)on January 18, 1918, Colonel Heuer stressed the importance of an early decision as to the design of the battery, so the present work force and equipment could be maintained. Replying on February 1, the chief of coast artillery repeated his January 29 recommendation for a service test of the new design. On January 5, 1919, Col. Charles L. Potter, the new district engineer officer, reported the battery ready for the service test. The gun blocks and loading platforms had been built, with temporary shell and powder tables for handling the ammunition. Roadways connected the loading platforms and led from the battery to the main reservation road. The Ordnance Department had mounted the guns on the carriages and proof fired both guns. The Test This information was forwarded to the chief of coast artillery, who directed the coast defense commander, Col. Alfred M. Hunter, to proceed with the test. A board of officers, chaired by Col. William H. Menges, CAC, was duly appointed on March 3. A 4-ton truck would haul 24 cast iron shells and powder charges in five loads from Battery Mendell to the yet unnamed 12-inch battery. The reason for substituting Battery Mendell for Battery Alexander was not given. Battery Alexander was much closer to Battery Wallace than Battery Mendell, and a road went right by the mortar battery, but the road the trucks would probably have to take to the rear of Battery Alexander was much longer. In addition, overhead ammunition-handling rails at Mendell extended out over the roadway, which would have facilitated loading projectiles directly onto trucks. At Alexander the rails terminated inside the corridor, which would have required the use of ammunition carts to load the truck. The board was instructed to record the time to load, transport, and unload the projectiles, as well as the time to return the empty truck to the magazine. The test was conducted March 14, 1919. The average time to load the trucks was 6 minutes, 42 seconds. The trip to the battery averaged 8 minutes, 12 seconds, and unloading averaged another 5 minutes, 30 seconds. The return trip averaged 8 minutes 16 seconds. The slightly longer time to return empty was attributed to the cramped space available to back the truck to the loading platform. Six enlisted men were used at the magazine, with an additional three men and one NCO at the battery. The distance between the magazine and the battery was 1364 yards, and the roads were described as

Volume 24, Issue 2 The Coast Defense Journal Page 12 ½ good; ½ muddy, bad. Eight and three-quarter gallons of gasoline were expended, with less than a pint of oil. Battery design as used for test, March 14, 1919. NARA

May 2010 The Coast Defense Journal Page 13 The board commented that the temporary shell and powder tables were so placed, and the road behind them was so narrow, that it was impossible to unload the projectiles on them in their original position. This could only be done from the rear of the truck, but the road did not permit backing to the tables. Two tables were moved to a better position nearer No. 2 gun, where there was more room to maneuver the truck. The tables and roadway were intended for specially designed trucks that unloaded from the side, rather than the rear. As instructed, the board identified two possible locations for the isolated magazines. The first, which the board recommended, was near the QM stables, approximately 350 yards by road from the battery. The second, on the road between the stables and Battery Rathbone, was 1000 yards from the battery. Colonel Hunter submitted his report on April 3, 1919. He reported that the ammunition detail for a 12-inch gun called for 13 men. The number of men used in the test was 11, including the truck driver. (Not exactly in agreement with the board report.) Based on the test, Colonel Hunter concluded that 14 men, including four truck drivers, could deliver one round in 1 minute 26 seconds from the magazine at Battery Mendell. To increase the rate of delivery to one round in 49 seconds would require 24 men, including four truck drivers. However, the maximum rate of aimed fire for a 12-inch gun on M1917 carriage was estimated at two rounds per minute. The isolated magazines would call for an increase in personnel of 12 men per gun, including truck drivers. This might be reduced somewhat by keeping a reserve supply of projectiles at the battery and only delivering powder charges during an emergency. Substituting a narrow-gauge railway would save money for material and maintenance, but one fortunate shot from the enemy could seriously derange either road or railway. Hunter concluded that the experimental system would require increased personnel, with all the associated costs; that details would probably not be able to supply ammunition rapidly enough to support rapid fire in an emergency; and that the initial cost of the isolated magazines, power rooms, and ammunition handling appliances was not that much less than for a fully protected magazine. For these reasons, Colonel Hunter recommended against isolated magazines, and recommended constructing the standard magazine between the two emplacements. Gen. Frank K. Fergusson, commanding the South Pacific Coast Artillery District, concurred on April 19, advising the chief of coast artillery five days later that he had carefully reviewed the plans submitted by the district engineer officer and found them satisfactory. There was no protection for the magazine against fire from landward, but since the guns themselves were unprotected, Fergusson did not believe protection for the magazine to be justified. However, if both guns were fired at the same target, it was desirable to draw the ammunition from the same magazine to ensure uniformity. He therefore recommended omitting the partitions between the magazines for the two guns. (When built, the magazines were separated by partitions with doors.) In something of an understatement, he also noted that concealment from aerial observation was apparently not considered when the plans were developed, but would have to be worked out later, probably by the troops.(14) Ten days later, Gen. Frank W. Coe, chief of coast artillery, recommended building a standard magazine at the battery, blending the earth fill with the surrounding terrain to make the battery as inconspicuous as possible. On May 8, Colonel Winslow wrote General Coe that the Office of the Chief of Engineers had about $280,000 on hand to commence construction of the 16-inch battery at Fort Michie, in Long Island Sound. Would General Coe prefer the funds go to Fort Barry or Fort Michie? Five days later, Coe advised that he considered the work at Fort Barry more urgent. This information was forwarded to the adjutant general, who reported July 2, 1919, that the secretary of war had approved the allotment of $230,000 from the appropriation for Construction of

Volume 24, Issue 2 The Coast Defense Journal Page 14 Gun and Mortar Batteries, 1919-1920, to complete the 12-inch long-range barbette battery at Fort Barry. With this final approval on July 19, Colonel Potter was instructed to begin constructing the large concrete and earth-covered traverse magazine. Battery with central traverse magazine, completed March 16, 1921. NARA Cartographics Meanwhile, the engineers continued to wrestle with the question of handling the powder charges. In an effort to improve the consistency of the muzzle velocity, the Ordnance Department had previously decided to issue propelling charges in single sections. However, little progress had been made in this regard, and the engineers questioned how the long and heavy charges would be stored and handled. On July 7, 1919, Colonel Potter noted that no steps had been taken to design or procure mechanical appliances to handle single-section charges. The delay in finalizing the powder handling was of increasing concern to the district engineer. Single-section charges, if adopted, would probably be heavy enough to require overhead trolley rails. However, in October 1919, Colonel Potter had to report he would soon be pouring the ceilings of portions of the powder rooms in the magazine, but he had yet to be informed of the size of the powder containers and the method for handling them - in particular, whether or not trolley rails would be required in the powder room. Col. Clarence O. Sherrill, in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, could only reply that the tests had not been completed, and the districts would be advised when they were, hopefully within two weeks. If this came too late, he could only advise setting the anchor bolts for the trolley tracks. The same size I-beams used for projectiles should be employed, so that trolleys would be interchangeable. Similar trolley tracks had been built at other 12-inch long-range batteries. Still, on March 27, 1920, Colonel Rees, once again district engineer, advised the chief of engineers that the design of the trolley system for the powder rooms at the battery had been deferred, pending receipt of more information. In the end, the single-section charges, while possessing certain advantages, were deemed impractical, eliminating the need for trolley rails in the powder rooms. However, examination of Battery Wallace suggests that the bolts were imbedded in the ceilings, at least outside the powder rooms.(15)

May 2010 The Coast Defense Journal Page 15 Fort Barry, 1920. NARA Cartographics Battery Wallace, Report of Completed Works, 1921. NARA Meanwhile, on May 12, 1919, the battery was named Battery Elmer J. Wallace, in honor of Colonel Wallace, a coast artillery officer who died of wounds received in France during World War I.(16) The district engineer, Col. Herbert Deakyne, reported the battery complete on March 16, 1921, except for trolleys in the powder rooms and mechanical data transmission devices (neither were ever installed), and he proposed to transfer the battery without them. The total engineer cost was $300,130, from four allotments from appropriations for Gun and Mortar Batteries. The 1917 appropriation of

Volume 24, Issue 2 The Coast Defense Journal Page 16 $91,350 covered only the gun plugs and platforms. The 1919 allotment was for $230,000, of which $51,739.38 was returned, leaving $178,260.62 for magazines, storerooms, etc., plus $11,000 for additional reinforcement. The final allotment, $19,520 in 1920, completed the work. Battery Wallace from the rear, 1938. NARA The engineers transferred the battery to the coast artillery in June 1921. The October 1, 1921, report of completed works says the battery was transferred June 24, 1921, at a cost $273,464.41. However, Colonel Deakyne s July 18, 1921, 2nd indorsement to his March 18, 1921, letter to the chief of engineers lists the date of transfer as June 11, 1921. The difference in cost may simply be due to including expenses in one report not included in the other, but the difference in dates appears to be a typographical error. Epilogue Battery Wallace s armament was two M1895M1 guns, Nos. 61 and 68, manufactured at the army s Watervliet Arsenal. They were mounted on M1917 barbette carriages, Nos. 2 and 3, from Watertown Arsenal. Gun No. 68 was damaged when the battery was fired in 1928, and it was replaced by No. 75. Between the wars, like most continental defenses, Fort Barry and Battery Wallace were in caretaking status. In 1939, Guns 44 and 63, after being relined at Watervliet Arsenal, were shipped Fort Barry as spares for Battery Wallace.(17)

May 2010 The Coast Defense Journal Page 17 Batteries Wallace and Alexander, 1938. NARA Battery Wallace, 1938. NARA Just before WWII, the United States built two casemated 16-inch batteries to defend San Francisco, one on each side of the Golden Gate, and all subsequent 16-inch batteries were built casemated.

Volume 24, Issue 2 The Coast Defense Journal Page 18 12-inch gun on M1917 carriage, before being casemated. NPS Battery Wallace casemated, 1943. NARA With the success of this design, it was decided to casemate the 12-inch long-range batteries. Almost all those batteries were casemated, and in addition, three new casemated batteries were built. Battery Wallace was casemated, which essentially extended overhead concrete from the magazine to the guns, and gasproof doors were installed in the magazine. During this modification, one gun was kept available

May 2010 The Coast Defense Journal Page 19 for action at all times. In addition, a new powerplant was built, and prison type bunks were installed. This work was completed in 1943, at a cost of over $750,000.(18) After WWII, the Harbor Defenses of San Francisco, including Battery Wallace, were soon inactivated, and before long, the guns were cut up for scrap. Fort Barry, including Battery Wallace, remained in army hands until transferred to the National Park Service, which maintains and interprets the battery today. Footnotes 1. One more battery in Boston Harbor, originally built for 12-inch guns, received 16-inch guns. The two single-gun emplacements on Corregidor, originally considered one battery, were later divided into separate batteries. Three additional 12-inch batteries were built 1939-44. 2. Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, RG 77, Entry 103, File No. 26995/72, NARA, Archives I, Washington, D.C. 3. The 35-caliber M1895 was the most common model of American 12-inch gun. Watervliet Arsenal manufactured 75 M1895s and M1895MIs; Bethlehem Steel manufactured 15 M1895MIs, for a total of 90 guns. Bolling W. Smith, Seacoast Guns and Carriages, CDSG Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Nov. 1998), pp. 105-06. 4. RG 77, Entry 103, File No. 26995/74, Archives I. 5. RG 77, Entry 103, File No. 26995, Archives I. 6. RG 77, Entry 103, File No. 26995/103, Archives I. It was not until March 12, 1919, after much consideration and a report by a board of officers, that the chief of engineers finally reported that the Marin Municipal Water District now provided a satisfactory supply of water, eliminating the need to purchase the bulk of the Borel estate. 7. RG 77, Entry 103, File Nos. 26995/110, /111, Archives I. 8. RG 77, Entry 103, File No. 95991/50, Archives I. 9. RG 77, Entry 103, File No. 26995/133, Archives I. 10. RG 77, Entry 103, File No. 26995/141, Archives I. 11. RG 77, Entry 103, File Nos. 26995/143, /144, /145, Archives I. 12. RG 77, Entry 103, File Nos. 26995/176, /177, /178, /245, Archives I. 13. RG 77, Entry 103, File Nos. 26995/245, /246, /247, Archives I. 14. RG 77, Entry 1009, Decimal File 471.88 SF-Barry, F1; RG 177, Entry 8A, D.F. 662/28C, Archives II, College Park, MD. Unsigned and undated document circa 1920, in Records of U.S. Army Coast Artillery Districts and Defenses, 1901-1942, RG 392, Entry 370, File No. 353.17, Southeast Regional Archives, Morrow, GA. The concept of isolated, undefended magazines, protected only by dispersion, was to be revived. The first 16-inch barbette gun batteries, at New York, Oahu, and Panama, were built to this plan, as was the battery for four 16-inch howitzers at Fort Story, VA. Not until 1933 was this concept first rejected. Bolling Smith, The 16-inch Batteries at San Francisco and the Evolution of the Casemated 16-inch Battery, Coast Defense Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Feb. 2001), pp. 26-27. 15. RG 77, Entry 1009, D.F. 471.88 SF-Barry, F1, Archives II. Battery examination and slide pictures by John Martini. 16. W.D. GO 63, AGO, May 12, 1919. 17. Report of Completed Works, Battery Elmer J. Wallace, Oct. 1, 1921, RG 77, Entry 1009, San Francisco, D.F. 600.912; Entry 1007, D.F. 662B (SF-Barry)-F17 (Box 149); Ordnance Dept. Gun and Carriage Cards, RG 156, Entry 712, Archives II. 18. Report of Completed Works, Battery Elmer J. Wallace, December 1943, RG 77, Entry 1009, San Francisco, D.F. 600.912, Archives II.