Trends in Security Competition

Transforming Defense Trends in Security Competition Arthur K. Cebrowski Director, Force Transformation 15 June 2004

Trends in Security Competition Information Age Short Cycle Time New Competencies Adaptive Planning Interdependence Globalization II (1947 199X) Developed Rules Mature Markets Narrowing Customer Base Security = Defense Globalization III (199X 20XX) Emerging Rules Market Opportunities New Customer Base Emerging Security = All Else + Defense Industrial Age Long Cycle Time Well Developed Tools / Processes Deliberate Planning Tortured Interoperability

Transformation Meeting the Challenges of the New Competitive Landscape Information Age Connectedness Globalization II Globalization III Containment Industrial Age

Global Force Balance Security = All Else + Defense Domain of Cooperative Engagement Winning / Maintaining the Peace Social Intelligence All Sources of Power Domain of Political Victory Maximum Complexity The Commons: The Strategic Imperative High Seas & Air Above Space Cyberspace Hegemonic Strategies Global Stability Winning the War Local Stability Denial Strategies The Close Fight: Decisive Operations Land Littorals Low Altitude Domain of Strategic Primacy Winning the Battle / Combat Military Intelligence Combat Power Domain of Military Victory

VULNERABILITY Security Environment Four Challenges Irregular Those seeking to erode American influence and power by employing unconventional or irregular methods (e.g., terrorism, insurgency, civil war and emerging concepts like unrestricted warfare ) Likelihood: very high; strategy of the weak Vulnerability: moderate, if not effectively checked Lower Traditional Those seeking to challenge American power by instigating traditional military operations with legacy and advanced military capabilities (e.g., conventional air, sea and land forces and nuclear forces of established nuclear powers) Likelihood: decreasing (absent preemption) due to historic capability-overmatch and expanding qualitative lead Vulnerability: low, only if transformation is balanced Higher Lower Catastrophic Those seeking to paralyze American leadership & power by employing WMD or WMD-like effects in unwarned attacks on symbolic, critical or other high-value targets (e.g., 9/11, terrorist use of WMD, rogue missile attack) Likelihood: moderate and increasing Vulnerability: unacceptable; single event could alter American way of life Disruptive Those seeking to usurp American power and influence by acquiring breakthrough capabilities (e.g., sensors, information, biotechnology, miniaturization on the molecular level, cyber-operations, space, directed-energy and other emerging fields) Likelihood: Low, but time works against U.S. Vulnerability: unknown; strategic surprise puts American security at risk LIKELIHOOD No hard boundaries distinguishing one category from another Higher

Security Environment Four Challenges B/U VULNERABILITY Lower Irregular Those seeking to erode American influence and power by employing unconventional or irregular methods (e.g., terrorism, insurgency, civil war and emerging concepts like unrestricted warfare ) Likelihood: very high; strategy of the weak Vulnerability: moderate, if not effectively checked Higher?? Traditional Those seeking to challenge American power by instigating traditional military operations with legacy and advanced military capabilities (e.g., conventional air, sea and land forces and nuclear forces of established nuclear powers) Likelihood: decreasing (absent preemption) due to historic capability-overmatch and expanding qualitative lead Vulnerability: low, only if transformation is balanced Lower? LIKELIHOOD Catastrophic Those seeking to paralyze American leadership & power by employing WMD or WMD-like effects in unwarned attacks on symbolic, critical or other high-value targets (e.g., 9/11, terrorist use of WMD, rogue missile attack) Likelihood: moderate and increasing Vulnerability: unacceptable; single event could alter American way of life Disruptive Those seeking to usurp American power and influence by acquiring breakthrough capabilities (e.g., sensors, information, biotechnology, miniaturization on the molecular level, cyber-operations, space, directed-energy and other emerging fields) Likelihood: Low, but time works against U.S. Vulnerability: unknown; strategic surprise puts American security at risk Higher

What Are the Issues? Resolving the Contradictions Where is the Convergence Between Effects and Political Victory? How Do We Pre-empt When We Can t Find Targets Hiding in Plain Sight? Defensive Orientation Social Intelligence vs Military Intelligence How Do We Avoid Strategic Surprise?

Identify Issues of Regret Candidates for Action Now Warfare elements Fire non-lethals; directed energy; redirected energy Maneuver lift for operational maneuver; vertical battlefield; seabasing Protection urban operations; biomedical countermeasures C2&C joint interdependency ISR demand-centered intelligence; tactically responsive space Logistics joint demand-centered logistics Risk management (creating on-ramps) Joint concept development & experimentation short cycle time / rapid iteration Joint training advanced distributed training Joint S&T strengthen joint / combined warfighting; transform joint force; optimize intel; combat WMD proliferation; fulfill homeland defense duties People (global trends and implications of exporting security) policy choices

Next Generation Weapons Do We Have the Right Weapons For the Right War? Are we making enough investment in physics and energy transfer the potential for leap vs step technologies? What is the development direction for critical materials? Do we have the networked communication and sensors necessary to support the degree of discrimination required in the future conflict environment? When will we start thinking of targets per weapon vs weapon per target in Land Warfare? When will we see speed of light weapons on the battlefield?

Transforming the Metrics Shifting value to outcomes Initial Metrics Networking Speed Numbers Information Generators Dispersal Dissuasion = f (present value of future capabilities, future value of present capabilities) Value of Time vs. Cost of Speed New Basis for Competition Create and preserve options Employ higher transaction rates Achieve higher learning rates Create overmatching complexity

Competing in the Information-Age the power of Network-Centric Operations Social Domain Cultural Awareness Conveyed Commander s Intent Information Domain Information Advantage Cognitive Domain Cognitive Advantage Process Advantage Shared Awareness Network Centric Operations Precision Force Compressed Operations Physical Domain Force Advantage Position Advantage Plan, Organize, Deploy, Employ and Sustain Cycle Speed and Access

Trends in Security Competition Back-up Slides

Security Environment Four Challenges Higher Irregular Catastrophic VULNERABILITY Lower Traditional Disruptive Higher Lower LIKELIHOOD No hard boundaries distinguishing one category from another

Next Generation Weapons Do We Have the Right Weapons For the Right War? Are we making enough investment in physics and energy transfer the potential for leap vs step technologies? What is the development direction for critical materials? Do we have the networked communication and sensors necessary to support degree of discrimination required in future conflict environment? When will we start thinking of targets per weapon vs weapon per target in Land Warfare? When will we see speed of light weapons on the battlefield?

End Slide Back-ups

Transforming Defense Networked Forces Outfight Non-Networked Forces it allowed us to make decisions and execute those decisions faster than any opponent. Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan Combined Forces Land Component Commander, OIF

Next Generation Weapons Do We Have the Right Weapons For the Right War? There is a need for more discrimination, flexibility and response in the determination of targets Prediction? Relationships/Associations? Location? Tracking? Flyout Detect Characterize Identify Decide Shoot Search Position Endgame and in the weapons we employ The Engagement Timeline is not just about time Assess

Tenets of Network-Centric Operations The new value chain A robustly networked force improves information sharing Information sharing and collaboration enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command These in turn dramatically increase mission effectiveness Quality of Information New Processes Mission Effectiveness Robustly Networked Force Information Sharing Shared Situational Awareness Self Synchronization Information Domain Collaboration Cognitive Domain Physical Domain

Strategic Approach to Cost The Need: Since this is the age of the small, fast, and many, we need organizations, processes, and a strategic approached to cost, capable of delivering the requisite capabilities. An Approach: Strategies for divestiture and devolution of capabilities Suppressing the monetary cost of war Cost imposing strategies Mitigation of cost imposing strategies Reversing the current trend of paying more for decreasing returns New metrics create opportunities for new cost dynamics!

Transforming the Metrics Shifting value to outcomes Initial Metrics Networking Speed Numbers Content Generators Dispersal Dissuasion = f (present value of future capabilities, future value of present capabilities) Value of Time vs. Cost of Speed New Basis for Competition Create and preserve options Employ higher transaction rates Achieve higher learning rates Create overmatching complexity

Industrial Age Information Age Global Trends Globalization II Globalization III

Fundamental Question What do we mean by Innovation in Defense?

Security Environment Four Challenges

Military Innovation: Historical Insight The history of innovation in carrier aviation says something of great importance about military innovation generally: it is not a process that usually proceeds in a linear way. But hindsight tends to make us think that it does. Because we try to compose coherent histories of innovation, we may actually overlook the uncertainty and chance that inevitably exist. American & British Aircraft Carrier Development: 1914-1941

Creating Competitive Advantage: Warfighting Innovation Warfare Areas Enablers New Capabilities Key Battles Land Warfare Air Power Warfare at Sea Warfare at Sea New Technology New Doctrine / TTP New Organizations New Warfighting Elite Blitzkrieg Fighter CMD Wolf Pack Carrier Aviation Battle of France Battle of Britain Battle of Atlantic Battle of Midway Technology Innovation Process Innovation Organizational Innovation Warfighting Innovation Competitive Advantage

Creating Competitive Advantage Historical Insights Land Warfare: Sustained Rate of Fire Rifle (1.8 x 10 1 rounds per minute) Machine Gun (6 x 10 2 rounds per minute) Air Warfare Precision Weapons + Precision Targeting Sorties per Target Targets per Sortie Warfare at Sea: Range of Engagement Battleship: 1.8 x 10 1 Carrier Aviation: 1.8 x 10 2

Globalization III Functioning Functioning Functioning Functioning Mostly Non-Integrating Gap Functioning Functioning U.S. Military Responses to Situations, 1990-2002 Peace/ Evac s Relief Contingency Positioning Show of Force Combat

Globalization III Major Flows Foreign Direct Investment ENERGY PEOPLE PEOPLE SECURITY PEOPLE PEOPLE PEOPLE PEOPLE SECURITY PEOPLE PEOPLE SECURITY

Globalization III Major Transactions Threat FDI Trade Security Terror Openness Ambition Energy Trade Security Terror

Commander in Chief s Perspective Building tomorrow's force is not going to be easy. Changing the direction of our military is like changing the course of a mighty ship -- all the more reason for more research and development, and all the more reason to get started right away. Yet, building a 21st century military will require more than new weapons. It will also require a renewed spirit of innovation in our officer corps. We cannot transform our military using old weapons and old plans. Nor can we do it with an old bureaucratic mind set that frustrates the creativity and entrepreneurship that a 21st century military will need. President George W. Bush Graduation Address U.S. Naval Academy, May 25, 2001

CNO s Perspective The key now is to accelerate this progress through a culture of innovation. Aggressive innovation, experimentation, and education are fundamental to meeting the challenges of an uncertain future. - CNO Admiral Vern Clark Remarks at Current Strategy Forum 2002 Naval War College, Newport, RI

Transformation Elements Continuing process Creating/anticipating the future Co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations and technology New competitive areas / competencies; revalued attributes Fundamental shifts in underlying principles New sources of power Broadened capabilities base New technology context Broadened threat context New strategic context A Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage

Meeting the Challenges of the New Competitive Landscape Information Age Globalization II Globalization III Industrial Age