SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES. for FY 2011 and beyond

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(Provisional Translation) SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2011 and beyond Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010 I. NDPG s Objective II. Basic Principles of Japan s Security III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan IV. Basic Policies to Ensure Japan s Security V. Future Defense Forces VI. Basic Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability VII. Additional Elements for Consideration Attached Table I. NDPG s Objective The Government of Japan sets out the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) for FY 2011 and beyond based on the current security environment surrounding our country. II. Basic Principles of Japan s Security 1. Japan sets out three security objectives: (1) to prevent and eliminate external threat from 1

reaching Japan; (2) to prevent threats from emerging by improving international security environment; and (3) to create global peace and stability and to secure human security. 2. Japan will achieve these objectives by promoting Japan s own efforts (IV-1), cooperation with its ally (IV-2) and multi-layered security cooperation with the international community (IV-3) in a consolidated manner. 3. Japan will continue to uphold the basic principles of defense policy including the exclusively defense-oriented policy and the three non-nuclear principles. 4. Japan will participate more actively in international peace cooperation activities. 5. To address the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will play active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and will continue to maintain and improve the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrent as a vital element, through close cooperation with the U.S. III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan 1. Number of so-called gray zone disputes (confrontations over territory, sovereignty and economic interests that are not to escalate into wars) is on the increase. 2. A global shift in the balance of power has been brought about by the rise of emerging powers and the relative change of the U.S. influence. 3. Issues such as sustained access to cyberspace, in addition to international terrorism and piracy, have become global security challenges. 4. North Korea s nuclear and missile issues are immediate and grave destabilizing factors to regional security. 5. Military modernization by China and its insufficient transparency are of concern for the regional and global community. 2

6. Russia s military activities are increasingly robust.. 7. A full-scale invasion against Japan is unlikely to occur today, but the security challenges and destabilizing factors Japan faces are diverse, complex and intertwined. IV. Basic Policies to Ensure Japan s Security 1. Japan s Own Efforts (1) Japan will constantly utilize all means to ensure its security, and will seamlessly deal with various contingencies as it unfolds. (2) Japan will improve its capability to collect and analyze information, while strengthening the information security system. (3) Japan will make coordinated and integrated response to contingencies by rapidly making appropriate decisions. (4) After examining the current organization, functions, and structure of the Cabinet related to security issues, Japan will establish a body in the Prime Minister s Office dedicated to national security policy coordination among relevant ministers and for providing advice to the Prime Minister. (5) Japan will participate in international peace cooperation activities in a more efficient and effective manner. Taking into consideration the actual situations of UN peace-keeping operations, Japan will consider how it will participate in future peace-keeping operations, by examining current policies such as the five principles for participation in peace-keeping operations. (6) Japan will build a Dynamic Defense Force which supersedes the Basic Defense Force Concept, the latter being a concept that places priority on ensuring deterrence through the existence of defense forces per se. 3

(7) Dynamic Defense Force will increase the credibility of Japan s deterrent capability through raising levels of equipment use and increasing operations tempo. It will also enable Japan to play active roles in various occasions such as international peace cooperation activities. 2. Cooperation with its Ally (1) The Japan-U.S. Alliance is indispensable in ensuring for Japan s peace and security. (2) Japan will continue to engage in strategic dialogue with the United States to further deepen and develop the Japan-U.S. Alliance. (3) Japan will promote cooperation with the United States in new areas such as cyberspace security, in addition to the existing cooperation. (4) Japan will reduce the burden on local communities where U.S. military bases are located, while maintaining the deterrence provided by the U.S. forces. 3. Multi-layered Security Cooperation with the International Community (1) Japan will create a security network combining bilateral and multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. (2) Japan will enhance security cooperation with countries such as the Republic of Korea, Australia, ASEAN countries and India. (3) Japan will promote confidence and cooperation with China and Russia. (4) Japan will also enhance cooperation with EU, NATO and European countries on global security issues. 4

V. Future Defense Forces 1. Roles of Defense Forces (1) Effective deterrence and response (e.g. ensuring security in the sea and air space surrounding Japan, responding to attacks on Japan s offshore islands.) (2) Efforts to further stabilize the security environment of Asia-Pacific region. (3) Efforts to improve the global security environment. 2. Self-Defense Forces: Force Posture In order to effectively perform the roles of the defense forces, new force posture will be provided with, among others, increased readiness and smoother joint operations. 3. Self-Defense Forces: Organization, Equipment and Force Disposition (1) While reducing Cold War-style equipment and organizations, priority functions, including those in Japan s southwestern region, will be enhanced. (2) Budget allocation among each service of the Self-Defense Forces will be subject to drastic review. (3) As regards preparations against full-scale invasion, relevant knowledge and expertise will be maintained at a minimum necessary level. (4) Priority will be placed on, among others, enhancing basis for joint operations, improving capabilities to respond to attacks on off-shore islands, strengthening capabilities for international peace cooperation activities. (5) Details of organization, equipment and disposition of Ground Self-Defense Force, Maritime Self-Defense Force and Air Self-Defense Force are provided in the NDPG. 5

VI. Basic Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability (1) Japan will utilize human resources of Self-Defense Forces more effectively and reform its personnel management system by such measures as reviewing rank and age structure. (2) Japan will procure equipment more efficiently by improving its contract and procurement systems. (3) Japan will set forth a medium- and/or long-term strategy to develop and maintain defense production capability and technological bases. (4) Japan will study measures to respond to changes in the international environment regarding defense equipment. VII. Additional Elements for Consideration The NDPG provides the vision for the defense forces for approximately the next decade. Japan will review and, if necessary, revise it in case there are significant changes in circumstances. 6

(Attached Table) Ground Self-Defense Force Maritime Self-Defense Force Air Self-Defense Force Personnel Regular personnel Ready Reserve Personnel Units Equipment Units Equipment Units Equipment Assets capable of ballistic missile defense (BMD)* Regionally deployed units Mobile operation units Surface-to-air guided missile units Tanks Howitzers and rockets Destroyer units Submarines units Minesweeper unit Patrol aircraft units Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft Air warning & control units Fighter aircraft units Air reconnaissance unit Air transport units Aerial refueling/transport unit Surface-to-air guided missile units Combat aircraft Fighters 154,000 147,000 7,000 8 divisions 6 brigades Central Readiness Force 1 armored division 7anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments Approx. 400 Approx. 400 4 flotillas (8 divisions) 4 divisions 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons 48 22 Approx. 150 4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 3 squadrons 1 squadron 6 groups Approx. 340 Approx. 260 Aegis-equipped destroyers ** 6 Air warning & control units Surface-to-air guided missile units 11 warning groups/squadrons 6 groups * The numbers of units and equipment in this row are already included in the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces major units sections above. ** Additional acquisition of BMD-capable, Aegis-equipped destroyers, if to be provided separately, will be allowed within the number of destroyers set above after consideration of development of BMD-related technologies and fiscal conditions in the future, among other factors.