MANAGING NUCLEAR MISSILE COMPETITIONS BETWEEN INDIA, PAKISTAN AND CHINA

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Transcription:

MANAGING NUCLEAR MISSILE COMPETITIONS BETWEEN INDIA, PAKISTAN AND CHINA

OVERVIEW OF MISSILE INVENTORIES

CHINA BALLISTIC MISSILES CATE-GORY DESIG-NATION RANGE PAYLOAD NOS. SRBMs (< 1000 KMS) DF-15 / M-9 / CSST -600 600 950 Kgs; 350 kt 350-400 DF-11 / M-11 / CSS-X-7 300 800 kgs; 350 kt 700-750 MRBMs *DF-3 / CSS-2 3000 2150 kgs; 3.3 MT 15-20 DF-21/21A /CSS-5 (Mod1&2) 2100 600 kgs; 350kT 60-80 IRBMs *DF- 4 / CSS-3 5400 2200 Kgs; 3.3MT 15-20 ICBMs *DF-5/5A 13000 3200 kgs; 4-5 MT 20 DF-31/ 31A 7200 / 11200 (?); 200 Kt MIRV(?) < 20 SLBM *JL1 / 1000+ 600 kgs; 350kT 12 JL2 7200 700 kgs; 300kT) 60(?)

CHINA CRUISE MISSILES CATEGORY DESIG- NATION RANGE PAYLOAD NOS. LACM ALCM+ GLCM 3000 kms (?) Kh-55 / AS-15 (KENT) HN-1/ HN-2 600 / 1500 350 kgs; 300 (?) 90 kt DH-10 1500 150-300 YJ - 63 400-500 TIANJIN - 1 600-1000(?) ASCMs YJ-62 120 STYX / CSS-N- 2 SUNBURN / SS-N-22 SIZZLER N- 27 SS- 100 100+ 50(?)

CHINA MISSILES MAIN FEATURES 1300+ missiles, majority short range, conventionally armed 40 ICBMs, ranges 7200-13000 kms 90-120 M/ IRBMs, all land-based Only SLBM (JL-1) not successful New SLBM tested, awaiting Jin Class SSBN. Missiles are not targeted at specific countries in peacetime. Prior to mutual No-targeting agreement, half of ICBM inventory was targeting US Chinese missiles based on original buy-outs from the USSR/Russia. Modern Russian-supplied ASCMs About 120 missiles of the total inventory are nuclear capable.

PAKISTAN - MISSILES TYPE DESIGNATION PROPULSION RANGE KMS PAY- LOAD NOS. SRBM HATF 1/ 1A / SOLID FUEL 60-80/100 500 HATF -2 / SHADOZ SOLID FUEL 300 500 HATF -3/DF-11 / M11 GHAZNAVI SOLID FUEL 280 800 35 85 HATF- 4 DF-15 SHAHEEN SOLID FUEL 600-800 500 (?) HATF-6/M18(?) / SHAHEEN- II SOLID FUEL 2000 500 HATFV/GHAURI /NODONG LIQUID FUEL 1200-1300 1000 12-15 *GHAURI II LIQUID FUEL 1700 *GHAURI III LIQUID FUEL 2500-3500 LACM HATF-VII/DH10 /BABUR 700 ALCM HATF VIII / RA AD 350

PAKISTAN MISSILES MAIN FEATURES Chinese and N Korean assistance Efforts under way for cruise missile- delivery systems Chinese selectively abide by the MTCR; e.g. air-launched missiles are excluded. Currently Pak still dependent on China and DPRK for propellent, critical components and technological aspects. The Ghaznavi (/M11) and Shaheen-I are believed to be operational. Shaheen II development is complete and induction and service trials may soon commence. Ghauri II development is likely to be completed soon. Pak also keeps missiles and warheads de-mated as well as separated. Warheads are believed to stored in disassembled state

INDIA - MISSILES Name/ Alt. Missile /Propulsion Warhead Payloa d Range Prithvi-I/ SS-150 Ballistic/ Liquid fuel Conv/ Nuclear 1,000 150 75-90 Prithvi-II/ SS-250 Ballistic/ Liquid fuel Conv/ Nuclear 500 250 25 Dhanush/Prithvi- III/ SS-350 Ballistic/ Liquid fuel Conv/ Nuclear NK 350 Sh / Sm Agni- (TD) Ballistic /2Stage Hybrid Nos Nuclear 1,000 1,200-1,500 10-20 Agni-I Ballistic/ Solid fuel Nuclear 1,000 700-800 NK Agni-II Ballistic/ Solid fuel Nuclear 1,000 2,000-2,500 NK *Agni-III Ballistic/ Solid fuel Nuclear NK 3,500-4,000 *Agni-V Ballistic/ Solid fuel Nuclear NK 5,000 BrahMos/ PJ10 Ballistic/ 2 Stage Hybrid Engine Conv 200-300 280-300 Sh/Sm/Gr/Air *Nirbhay Cruise Conv NK 1,000 km *K-15 Sagarika 2 stage SLBM Conv/ Nuclear 600 700 km *Shourya Ballistic/Solid/Canist erised Conv/ Nuclear > 500 600 km

MISSILE PROGRAMME DRIVERS - CHINA The Taiwan Issue China-US Relations. Relations with Russia. Japan AND South Korea. India.

MISSILE PROGRAMME DRIVERS - PAKISTAN Indo-centric threat perception Perception of Indian superiority in conventional forces Nuclear Deterrent meant to deter conventional attack Long land border, Navy irrelevant Major Indian value targets within range of fighter-bombers

MISSILE PROGRAMME DRIVERS - INDIA Long land border with both China and Pakistan History of territorial wars with both Both nuclear weapon states Strong China- Pakistan relations Transfer of missile and nuclear technology India s NFU policy Triad doctrine

MISSILE COMPETITION With China: India will cope, not compete Competition only applies to Pakistan and India Use of launches to convey political signals Ind-Pak-China triangle a complication

RISK FACTORS If Missile force over-stretched, C3 will be inadequate Political launches can be misinterpreted Conventional missile attack, nuclear response? Non state actors

EFFECT OF DOCTRINE NFU results in diversification of delivery systems First use option creates uncertainty Dispersal loosens control Dispersal strains C3, may result in predelegation

MEASURES TO CONTROL MISSILE COMPETITION Discussions to reach agreed force levels Risk reduction Centres Eschew conventional SRBMs No political launches Control non-state actors Include China

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