European Parliament Nov 30, 2010

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Transcription:

European Parliament Nov 30, 2010 1. Introduction Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen! I will very shortly remind you what MBDA is: a world leading missile system company, with facilities in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. Our Company was formed in 2001 as part of the consolidation of the missile houses owned by EADS, BAe Systems and Finnmeccanica. It is combining 50 years of experience in missile systems. MBDA today is a 3 Bn Company with 10 000 employees which: operates in all of the major world markets, offers some of the world s most advanced missiles and missile systems, has a great experience in the development and production of European collaborative programs. The objective of my presentation is to provide you with an overview of what could be the European participation to the BMD capability and mission. But to propose BMD options, one has to consider them from various angles: 1. A thorough analysis of the ballistic threat, the threat which is proliferating and which has the highest probability to occur; this analysis enables in a relevant manner to define the most appropriate defense systems. 2. The American approach has fostered the strategic thought as far as BMD is concerned; even if we feel it challenging, we cannot ignore what the US is doing. We must then ask: how could France, the European Union, contribute to BMD in complement to what the US is doing? 3. The relevant way to capitalize on what has already been done in this field both at capability and industrial levels, following an incremental approach that would minimize the costs. We can identify what France

could do, accompanied by other European nations, both on financial and technical sides. 2. The threat Since several years, we may observe that some nations deploy constant efforts in order to obtain a ballistic capability, because that kind of capability is the air force of the poor, as quoted by some. The countries inclining to appear as regional powers but not in a position to use air means, either because they don t possess any or because the air superiority lies within a coalition, they acquire offensive means that can be used at long range as palliative of an air force, hence without fielding any air platform. These offensive means are the cruise missiles or the ballistic missiles. However media coverage of ballistic missile tests like those carried out by North Korea, Iran or other proliferating countries illustrates the important gesticulation of these countries, at the core of ballistic proliferation. For it remains a gesticulation; beyond a given range you may consider around 3000km, and without the help of another nuclear power, these countries will not be able to master the technologies necessary to produce very long range missiles. So in the end and without the technological help from a Great Nuclear Power, the proliferating countries will master the short and medium range ballistic missiles that will empower them with the status of regional powers. Today Europe and the US estimates the SRBM represents 93% of the total existing ballistic missiles, while the MR threat is estimated at 6%. 2

One may thus very well understand that for the Western countries, the ballistic threat becomes real and most probable on the external theaters of operations. So, proliferating countries acquire the ballistic missiles capability for their tactical interest, and follow three main axis of operational improvement: 1. Improvement of precision, in order to optimize the effects of the conventional warheads on the targets. 2. Improvement of operational capability with easier fielding and particularly enhanced penetration capability which foils the low layer defense systems. 3. Another significant improvement is the range, improved in order to fulfill the tactical need of geographical coverage for regional conflicts. All these evolutions provide a glimpse on the ballistic missile capabilities of new generation; they will possess better efficiency and improved penetration capabilities. 3. US approach The US has fostered the strategic thought on BMD, in its political, operational, industrial and technological aspects. The new US approach to BMD in Europe presented by the new Administration, in 4 phases, enables the defense systems to be better tailored to the threat. This is why it is more and more supported by the Alliance countries, hence by NATO itself. The recent Lisbon Summit last week agreed Missile Defense as a new NATO mission. 3

The consequence is that NATO is requesting from the Allies what their level of contribution would be for this new mission. The US has already proposed to contribute with the PAA (Phased Adaptative Approach) based on the Aegis / SM-3 systems which intercept in the exoatmosphere. NATO now waits for the European answer. Besides, NATO is carrying out a NIAG study on the Industrial Dimension of NATO territorial Missile Defense, currently on-going since last May for a delivery scheduled by year end; it recommends : «NATO s territorial missile defense acquisition policy should be harmonzied with the defense industry policies of the contributing nations, but also in the European Union context, keeping in mind that the European industry involvment prevents the further widening of the defense technology gap between the two sides of the Atlantic». Actually, not being in the race would lead us to further reduce our technical and industrial rank in fundamental domains, precisely like Defense, compared to the US. It would indeed put us in greater dependence vis-à-vis US politics and industry. 4. FR, its European partners, and MBDA already involved MBDA is already involved in BMD with two types of Extended Air Defense systems: The first type is the ASTER systems, a family of land- and naval based systems, jointly developed by FR / IT / UK. the land-based version called SAMP/T : is going to be deployed in the French and Italian Forces, using the ASTER 30 Block 1 missile, 4

Is able to counter the whole range of air breathing threats and some SRBM. These mobile systems have been developed to enable the European countries to protect their deployed forces on their external theaters, and to protect the sensitive zones. By the way, in mid-october we have validated in DGA s test range the capability of our SAMP/T system against a ballistic threat; all the phases of the operational engagement and the final intercept of the target proved successful. Another version of ASTER system is the naval version, called PAAMS, is equipping the French, the British and the Italian frigates with almost the same missile than the SAMP/T. The second type of EAD systems is the MEADS system, jointly developed by the US / GE / IT (Lockheed for the US, MBDA for GE and IT). MBDA has the mastership of the fire control radar and the launchers. The current versions of the land-based ASTER system (the SAMP/T) and the MEADS are already declared as national assets to contribute to NATO ALTBMD program. However, and since the European countries have decided to develop these systems, the ballistic missile threat has significantly evolved, as we have already explained. What can we do to face the improvement of the ballistic threat? Which upper layer system can be developed and be accessible to the European countries? 5

The current naval and land-based ASTER systems have the necessary growth potential for this capability enhancement to protect the forces deployed against the threats that could limit their political and operational actions such as the ballistic missiles. In order to meet the intercept success against the SRBM and MRBM of new generation, a dedicated high altitude interceptor, ASTER Block 2, will be integrated into the current ASTER systems to deliver the complementary capability, both for the naval- and the land-based versions. This new capability will provide coverage to larger defended areas. This evolution of ASTER family system will provide capabilities against all the SRBM and MRBM threats while maintaining the good performances against air breathing targets such as cruise missiles. 5. Interest of a European participation to BMD capability BMD: a major card for industry. Ballistic missile defense is, as already said, a strategic issue, but it is also an industrial challenge. Industrial challenge because the performances expected from the defense systems, their costs, their implementation schedule are all key issues to enable appropriate and timely decision taking. Ballistic defense is a topical question. At political level, it requests a significant ability to anticipate, whilst at industrial level, it requests the ability to be ready to opt for solutions, because the time needed by industry to deliver a capability runs over a long period of time. This ability to anticipate is more than ever necessary in Europe, because of the new pace imposed by the new Obama Administration with the 4 phases of the PAA. 6

What can Industry propose? To ensure the growth potential of the BMD capability, Thales and MBDA, already partners in the current ASTER family and associated to Safran Group, have built and agreed a roadmap for an incremental development of new capabilities. The success of the recent flight test against the ballistic threat further confirms the option offered by MBDA and its partners, Thales and Safran, to incrementally enhance the ASTER family in order to face the evolving ballistic threat and to respond to the issue of European sovereignty. ASTER system new capabilities, for land and for naval versions would perfectly fit into a global NATO system, interoperable with NATO BMC3. These systems, optimized to counter threats in the upper and lower atmosphere layers, upgraded to defeat new generation of ballistic missiles, such as maneuvering targets, will be complementary to SM-3 and THAAD systems. These evolved ASTER systems can also bring a quantitative complementarity to the US systems in order to enlarge the coverage of the NATO territories, so Europe could contribute in kind rather than in cash to its defense.. This approach, allowing the European countries to participate to NATO burden-sharing for BMD capability, presents the following benefits: To increase the cooperation with the US thanks to the interoperability of the evolved ASTER systems with the US systems; To reinforce the role of a NATO BMC3; To favor the cooperative engagements between the various systems, thus enhancing cooperation between the various Allies. 7

To justify our participation in the operational engagement in the BMD mission, because if all weapon systems are American, Europe will not have a real role at the engagement level. Moreover, the European defense industry believes today interoperability in the NATO Alliance is crucial. We propose that Europe develop its own autonomous and tailored defense systems, in complement to the US PAA systems, in order to significantly and actively contribute, at political, operational and industrial levels, to NATO BMD capability.. To conclude, we hope this approach will be well received in the new frame of the Missile Defense, because we think this is the best way for Europe to cooperate with the US, and especially to ensure a real cooperative protection of the Alliance against the ballistic threat. Thank you for your attention. 1836 mots 8