ated Support for Jordan

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Transcription:

Canada s Global Partnership Program: Mitigating Threats Title Biological Goes Here January 30, 2018 Bangkok, Thailand ated Support for Jordan 11 January 2017 2/15/18 1

Overview GPP goals Current projects Opportunities Next steps 2

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons And Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) Began at the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit as a 10-year, $20 billion initiative We commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology. We call on all countries to join us in adopting the set of non-proliferation principles we have announced today. Statement by G8 Leaders in Kananaskis, June 27, 2002 Supports and coordinates projects and activities to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological (CBRN) weapons and materials More than $25 billion allocated worldwide in efforts to prevent CBRN terrorism Focus has broadened; More focus on biosecurity after initial focus on nuclear security and chemical weapons destruction Chair coincides with Presidency of G7 Current Chair: Canada 3

Global Partnership Member Countries Began as a G8 Initiative, but now includes 31 active members: Australia France Kazakhstan Spain Belgium Georgia Korea Sweden Canada Germany Mexico Switzerland Chile Hungary Netherlands Ukraine Czech Republic Ireland Norway United Kingdom Denmark Italy Philippines United States EU Japan Poland Finland Jordan Portugal Participation and implementation by key partners, including ASEAN OIE UNODA IAEA INTERPOL OPCW WHO BTWC 4

WMD Threat Reduction Priorities Nuclear and Radiological Security 1. Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials 2. Secure Transport of Nuclear Materials 3. Radioactive Security 4. Prevention of Illicit Nuclear Trafficking 5. Material Management 6. Verification and Compliance Implementing UNSCR 1540 1. Support the implementation of UNSCR1540 2. Provide legislative assistance 3. Provide CBRN training and equipment 4. Support export controls and border security related to WMDs Biological Security 1. Secure and account for biological pathogens 2. Prevent deliberate biological attacks 3. Strengthen disease surveillance and detection 4. Reinforce biological nonproliferation instruments 5. Safe and responsible conduct in the biological sciences Chemical Weapons Destruction 1. Supported CWD activities in Russia, Syria and Libya 2. Prepared to assist with destruction of newly declared CW stockpiles 3. Preventing non-state actors (NSA) acquisition and use of CW UNCLASSIFIED

Deliverable #1 Secure and account for high risk material. developing national systems for managing biological materials, including stores of pathogens/toxins, with the goal that all nations may adhere to existing international standards and/or guidelines for biorisk management and oversight appropriate to the circumstances. 6

Deliverable #2 Develop effective measures to prevent, detect and respond to deliberate misuse of biological agent. In recognition that full and effective implementation of international health regulations, standards and guidelines contribute to preventing, preparing for, detecting, reporting, and responding to biological attacks, assistance includes building and strengthening sustainable national capacities to meet these requirements, taking into account multisectoral approaches. 7

Deliverable #3 Strengthen national and global networks identify quickly and respond to biological attacks Assistance includes supporting the identification and implementation of shared approaches for deploying and strengthening coherent national and global biosurveillance, information systems, and networks to better detect, identify, confirm, and respond to biological attacks, with the ultimate goal of achieving near real-time identification and reporting for potential biological attacks 8

Deliverable #4 Strengthen principles, measures and instruments for biological non-proliferation. Assistance includes promoting the universalization and full implementation of existing non-proliferation obligations, such as under the Biological Weapons Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540, and ensuring the effectiveness of existing tools, such as the UN Secretary General s mechanism, to investigate alleged uses of biological and chemical weapons. 9

Deliverable #5 Decrease the risks for proliferation by strengthening and promoting secure and responsible handling of biological science Recognizing that, while life sciences research is essential to advances that underpin improvements in the health and safety of the public, animals, and the environment, some research may provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be misused for harmful purposes. Assistance includes supporting implementation of practicable and shared approaches to advance safe and responsible conduct in the life sciences to lower these risks. 10

Related international instruments and initiatives 1. Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 2. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 3. International Health Regulations (IHRs) 4. OIE Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) 5. Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) 11

Partnering for Health Canada s GPP has been working with WHO, OIE & FAO since 2009 to deliver programming at the health/security interface WHO: Contribution of ~$20 million since 2010 Promoting & strengthening biosafety and biosecurity Strengthening core-capacities in disease detection, surveillance, control & response Enhancing disease detection networks Provision of molecular diagnostics field kits and IATA-certified biohazard shipping containers to Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) Emerging and Dangerous Pathogens laboratory Network (EDPLN) in ASEAN Support for Security-relevant aspects of Ebola Response (2014) OIE: Contribution of ~$10M million since 2010 Promoting & strengthening biosafety and biosecurity Strengthening laboratory capacity and OIE twinning program World Animal Health Information System WHAIS Rinderpest Post-Eradication campaign Global Biological Threat Reduction Conference UNCLASSIFIED

Programming in Africa $10M for Biobanking Projects in Sierra Leone & Lagos State, Nigeria identify and consolidate all Ebola samples into secure facilities $6.5 M for Ebola support in West Africa (2014-15) $7M for Security and capacity-building upgrades at vulnerable biological laboratories in Nigeria and Ghana Programming in Africa aims to: Strengthen indigenous capacities to detect, diagnose and respond to outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases; Provide robust, sustainable and lower-maintenance solutions to ensure long-term operation and impact in resource-limited environments. UNCLASSIFIED

Programming in the Americas Strengthening capacities in the Americas to detect, diagnose and respond to a bioterror attack or incident before it can spread and threaten Canada (high-traffic area) Provision of modular BSL3 laboratory to Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) ($2.5M); Provision of molecular diagnostics field kits and IATA-certified biohazard shipping containers to Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) ($1M); High-level training on interagency preparedness and response plans provided through OAS to Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago, Bahamas, Panama, Colombia ($900k)

Programming in the Middle East >$55M to strengthen Jordanian capacities to detect, identify and respond to a CBRN attack or incident originating in Syria Chemical and biological personal protective equipment and chemical/biological weapons detection technology for the Jordanian Armed Forces and Civil Defence ministries ($10M); Establishment of a regional biological risk-management training centre at the Jordan University of Science and Technology (JUST) in Irbid. ($1.1M); Provision or Mobile Biological Laboratory to JAF Royal Medical Services and of a Modular BSL3 Lab to MoH $1M to assist to assist Iraq to Counter Threats of Chemical and Biological Weapons use by ISIL

Programming in Asia Ø $11.6 M to Mitigate Biological Threats in SEA Ø Support to strengthen Strengthening laboratory capacity for Emerging and Dangerous Pathogens in ASEAN region Ø support laboratory readiness and response of ASEAN countries for rapid detection and containment of outbreaks of emerging and dangerous pathogens, novel and acute endemic threats. Implemented by ASEAN Plus 3 Lab Network (APL) and the World Health Organization (WHO) Ø Strengthening Surveillance ( BlueDot ) Ø building regional capacity in big data predictive analytics that strengthens ASEAN s epidemic and pandemic preparedness and response capabilities to naturally occurring or man-made biological threats. Ø Stronger Networks Ø Engagement between the Asia Partnership on Emerging Infectious Disease Research (APEIR), the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance network (MBDS) and ASEAN Ø Strengthened security and multi-sectoral collaboration

ASEAN-GPP Biosafety Projects Ø Strengthening Biosafety and Biosecurity Competency Ø International Federation Biosafety Associations & Malaysian Biosafety Association Ø Enhancing Biosafety Engineering and Control for ASEAN Laboratories Ø Thailand s Department of Medical Services] Ø Strengthening Bio Threat Surveillance in CLMV Countries Ø MBDS Secretariat Ø Strengthening Biosafety and Biosecurity in Laos PDR Ø Laos PDR Ministry of Health

Next Steps Renewal of Canada s GPP Completed January 2018 ASEAN-GPP Planning meeting February 12-14 2018 Review of partnership and respective priorities Submission & consideration of new proposals Emphasis on sustainability New ASEC-GPP funding arrangement Project approvals and implementation 18

Summary Ø We have made great progress working together Ø Our next phase promises to further strengthen capabilities and partnerships Contact Person: Trevor Smith Senior Program Manager Biological & Chemical Security, UNSCR 1540 Implementation WMD Threat Reduction Program (GPP) Global Affairs Canada email. Trevor.Smith@international.gc.ca Visit the new GP website @ www.gpwmd.com 19