Lessons-learnt identified on Crisis Communication from Fukushima Nuclear Accident 1 Presentation slides on lessons-learnt of crisis communication 2011.9.27
1. Communication Cycle 2
Risk Communication about the nuclear facility after crisis Risk communication about all nuclear facilities Emergency (accident /contingency) Nuclear facility s situation Normal Communication about the nuclear facility in emergency Communication about other nuclear facilities not in emergency Crisis 3
Depending on the situation of nuclear facility, a communicator drives different types of communication to the public. This figure illustrates the difference of communication types and how to move forward communication in phase by phase of the situation at the nuclear facility. The primary communication message chosen by a communicator can be expressed in the form of a cycle. In the figure, the horizontal axis relates to the situation at the nuclear facility, varying from a normal operational mode to an emergency mode (i.e., nuclear accident or contingency) and the vertical axis relates to the risk of an emergency situation (i.e., the potential for a hazardous or otherwise detrimental situation to arise) and the crisis for a realized emergency situation. In quadrant A, a communicator works on communication activities taking into account the risk perception of the pubic. As soon as a nuclear emergency occurs, the nuclear regulator pays more attention and expands more efforts on communication activities about the nuclear facility in emergency, such as collecting current and on-going information on the accident from the emergency response team, coordination with the Incident Commander about deciding on what to say to the public and how to deliver the message through the most effective communication channels. (The phase of communication moves from quadrant A to B.) Taking into consideration the causes of the nuclear accident, new countermeasures for nuclear safety will be developed after the emergency event and applied to the nuclear facility. In this situation (quadrant C), the communicator works on communication activities regarding the legitimacy of countermeasures in accordance with technical data and social response to the emergency. The new countermeasures for nuclear safety will be applied to other nuclear facilities for the purpose of enhancement of nuclear safety. In this situation represented by quadrant D, the communicator works on communication activities regarding the legitimacy of transfer of countermeasures for nuclear safety at other nuclear facilities. The messages and delivery channels for communication move from risk communication through communication in response to emergency situation back to risk communication in a cycle, depending on the situation of nuclear facility and as the situation evolves. 4
A clear distinction between risk communication and crisis communication (communication in emergency) is described as follows: Risk communication is future oriented, because risk focuses on what may happen. Crisis communication, by its nature, is focused on a specific event that is occurring or has already occurred. Risk messages are designed to speculate about what might happen based on current knowledge. Crisis communication messages typically focus on a known event and predict about how and why the event happened. Risk messages are designed for long-term planning. Crisis communication messages focus on the relatively short term as they seek to address an immediate problem. Risk messages typically come from technical experts and scientists who use their expertise to foresee potential problems. Once an emergency has occurred, most communication comes from authoritative figures, such as government officials, who are charged with maintaining or reestablishing orders. Risk messages tend to have a personal focus, because they should be interactive so that individuals can decide for themselves, whether or not they believe a risk is tolerable. In contrast, crisis communication messages address the entire community affected by the emergency. Risk communication has the luxury of time. Full-blown media campaign, such as appeals for new construction of nuclear power plant, can be designed and implemented over an extended period of time. Crisis communication messages typically take the form of news conference, press release, speeches, and any other available means that can get the information out as quickly as possible. Risk messages can be carefully crafted (if necessary message pre-testing with target stakeholder group) and controlled. Crisis communication messages must be developed spontaneously in reaction to the emergency. 5
2. PDCA Cycle of Communication Activity 6
Develop a crisis communication plan Establish internal and external coordination Make practical arrangements in advance Create a contact list Select a spokesperson Conduct training/exercise Implement the crisis communication plan Identify effective channels based on the emergency situation Craft messages Coordinate with Incident Commander and other organizations Adjust the crisis communication plan Re-coordinate with Incident Commander and/or external organizations Monitor the reaction by news media Provide feedback from the public Evaluate the effectiveness of communication activity 7
Significance is placed on how to organize and coordinate the several important elements of crisis communication strategy on the stage of actual implementation of communication activity by a communicator. This figure illustrates a framing of the organization and coordination of these elements in a cycle. Plan is the phase of preparation for crisis communication such as development of a crisis communication plan and practical arrangements in advance. Do is the phase of implementation of communication activity by a communicator such as crafting messages and coordination with Incident Commander to decide on what to say to the public. Check is the phase of evaluation of the effectiveness of crisis communication activity such as media monitoring. Act is the phase of adjustment of communication activity based on the evaluation results in the phase of Check, and the crisis communication plan will be more fine-tuned. 8
3. Facts vs. Gaps 9
1. Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) has been institutionalized under the umbrella of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) that has a nuclear energy promotion agency- Agency of Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE). It has been explained by NISA that the independency of regulatory body is assured because NISA is functionally independent from ANRE. The public and news media have increased scepticism that NISA might hide serious information. Due to the negative memory that TEPCO had hidden factual information on safety in the past, the public and news media have increased suspicion to information released by TEPCO. 2. Since 11 March 2011 when the nuclear accident occurred, four spokespersons of Cabinet Office, Nuclear Safety Commission, NISA and TEPCO (operator) had been interacting with news media at their own press conferences separately. In order to assure consistency of information released by the four spokespersons, a joint press conference was established consisting of Cabinet Office, Nuclear Safety Commission, NISA, TEPCO and other relevant governmental authorities. The public have had confusion to see inconsistent information released separately by Cabinet Office, Nuclear Safety Commission, NISA and TEPCO. The joint press conference has gained the consistency of information released. 3. Regarding a spokesperson of NISA, four spokespersons were replaced so far. The news media have asked any information on prediction of risk based on on-going accident such as what might be occurring and will occur next on site, however, their wish to know was not realized. The public have increased their concerns to the uncertainty of accident. Communication, that merely concentrated on facts but failed to consider stakeholders perception of risk, was not sufficient. 10
4. Because communication tools such as television and radio were damaged by the earthquake and tsunami, it was difficult to disseminate information to local people in the area damaged. Police radio system was used for information dissemination. In the coincidence of natural disaster (earthquake/tsunami) and nuclear accident, it was difficult to assure communication tools to be used for disseminating information particularly urgent information such as instruction of evacuation. 5. Before a large amount of contaminated water was released into sea from the site, notification was not sufficiently made to local governments/organizations and neighbouring countries. Japanese government has received strong concerns expressed by neighbouring countries in prior notification related to nuclear safety. 11
4. Lessons-learnt 12
1. The independence of nuclear safety regulatory body is a key to gain trust. 2. The role and responsibility of communication activity should be made clear in coordination with other organizations. 3. The communication competence of communicator should be enhanced and ensured. 4. The communication tools should be assured with stakeholders as part of emergency preparedness. 5. Crisis communication strategy should be developed in advance encompassing interactions with foreign countries and international organizations. 13
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