SIGAR JANUARY. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. SIGAR Inspection Report. SIGAR IP/Camp Commando Phase IV

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SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction SIGAR 18-28 Inspection Report Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase IV: Construction Met Contract Requirements and Most Facilities are Being Used, but Are Not Well Maintained JANUARY 2018 SIGAR 18-28-IP/Camp Commando Phase IV

January 26, 2018 The Honorable James N. Mattis Secretary of Defense General Joseph L. Votel Commander, U.S. Central Command General John W. Nicholson, Jr. Commander, U.S. Forces--Afghanistan and Commander, Resolute Support Major General Robin L. Fontes Commander, Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan Colonel Matthew P. Benivegna Deputy Director, Air Force Civil Engineer Center Colonel Timothy C. Dodge Deputy Director, Air Force Civil Engineer Center The Department of Defense awarded four contracts corresponding to phases I through IV for the construction and renovation of facilities at the Afghan National Army s Camp Commando near Kabul, Afghanistan. This report focuses on the results of SIGAR s inspection of phase IV. The Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) awarded a task order for phase IV to Innovative Technical Solutions Inc., which later became known as Gilbane Federal. We found that the phase IV construction met contract requirements. For example, the barracks appeared to be well constructed and had no signs of settlement or foundation cracks, and all windows and doors were functioning properly. We also found that all light fixtures and electrical outlets in the barracks we inspected were installed and working properly, with one exception due to a maintenance issue. In addition, we found that Gilbane Federal built the newly constructed dining facility according to the size requirements, and its kitchen contained the required cooking and dish washing facilities. Further, we found that Gilbane Federal made the required improvements to the sanitary sewer system. Although most of the facilities are being used, they are not being well maintained. The $1.6 million water distribution system was not functioning and no longer supplying water to the compound, and the existing wells constructed under phases I and II barely supplied enough water. We found that Gilbane Federal built the system according to contract requirements, and we could not determine why it was not working. We also found non-functioning emergency lighting and smoke detectors, as well as missing fire extinguishers, which expose occupants to increased safety risks in the event of a fire. Because the Afghan government is responsible for operating and maintaining Camp Commando, we are not making any recommendations in this report. AFCEC provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendix II. In its comments, AFCEC stated that it concurred with SIGAR s assessment that the project resulted in wellconstructed facilities meeting contractual requirements.

We conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110 181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. John F. Sopko Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

TABLE OF CONTENTS Background... 1 Phase IV Construction Met Contract Requirements... 2 Most of the Phase IV Facilities Are Being Used, but They Are Not Being Well Maintained... 2 Conclusion... 4 Agency Comments... 4 Appendix I - Scope and Methodology... 5 Appendix II - Comments from the Air Force Civil Engineer Center... 6 Appendix III - Acknowledgments... 7 PHOTOS Photo 1 - Phase IV Barracks... 2 Photo 2 - Unused Water Well House at Camp Commando... 3 Photo 3 - Missing Fire Extinguisher in Barrack Building... 3 ABBREVIATIONS AFCEC ANA CSTC-A Air Force Civil Engineer Center Afghan National Army Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan SIGAR 18-28-IP/Camp Commando Phase IV Page iii

On July 1, 2009, the Department of Defense awarded the first of four contracts to construct and renovate facilities at the Afghan National Army s (ANA) Camp Commando in Kabul, Afghanistan. 1 The four contracts corresponding to phases I through IV of the work were funded through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and totaled $57.1 million over 5 years. 2 The purpose of these contracts was to help establish an operating base for the ANA Special Operations Command Division Headquarters, the Commando School of Excellence, the 6 th Special Operations Kandak, the Military Intelligence Kandak, and the Garrison Support Unit. 3 We reported on our inspection of Camp Commando phase II in January 2015 and have a separate, ongoing inspection for phase III. 4 The objectives for this inspection, which focused on phase IV, were to determine whether (1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) the facilities are being used and maintained. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, from August 2015 through January 2018, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The engineering assessment was conducted by our professional engineers in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers Code of Ethics for Engineers. Appendix I contains a discussion of our scope and methodology. BACKGROUND On September 27, 2013, the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) awarded a $17 million firm-fixed-price task order, number 0057, to Innovative Technical Solutions Inc. (ITSI), a U.S. company later known as Gilbane Federal, to design and construct, renovate, and demolish facilities and infrastructure under the phase IV construction of Camp Commando. 5 The phase IV contract required the construction of a new water distribution system, three barracks, 3-meter blast resistant barriers, and a drivers waiting room. The contract also required modifications to the primary and secondary entry control points that included constructing guard shacks, steel swinging gates, drop arms, and passive vehicular barriers to enable authorized personnel and vehicles to enter the compound securely. In addition, the contract required improvements to the existing electrical distribution system, central power generation plant, potable water infrastructure, and sanitary sewer infrastructure. The improvements included extending the medium voltage grid to the base guard and communication towers, and installing three 1,000-kilowatt prime power-rated diesel generators. On October 8, 2013, AFCEC issued Gilbane Federal a Notice to Proceed. Based on a January 2014 contract modification, AFCEC extended the phase IV completion date from September 27, 2014, to December 14, 2014, because Camp Commando officials would not grant the contractor access to the construction site. After five modifications, the contract amount was reduced to $14.5 million. These modifications included de-scoping the central power generation plant improvements; adding requirements to construct drop arm gates at the second entry control point, a drivers waiting room, a guard shack, concrete barriers, pedestrian walkways and gates, and blast resistance barriers; and demolish an existing guard house and three kitchens. On 1 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded the first three contracts, and the Air Force Civil Engineer Center awarded the fourth contract. 2 Congress created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund to provide the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces made up of the ANA and the Afghan National Police with equipment, supplies, services, and training, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction. 3 A kandak is the Afghan equivalent to a U.S. Army battalion and consists of between 352 and 800 personnel. 4 See SIGAR, ANA Camp Commando Phase II: Power Plant and Fuel Point Not Fully Operational Nearly Two Years after Project Completion, SIGAR 15-25-IP, January 6, 2015. 5 Task order 0057 was awarded under contract number FA8903-06-D-8513. SIGAR 18-28-IP/Camp Commando Phase IV Page 1

January 6, 2015, AFCEC transferred the completed phase IV facilities to the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A). This began the 1-year warranty period, which expired in January 2016. PHASE IV CONSTRUCTION MET CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS We visited the Camp Commando phase IV construction site on October 25 and November 13, 2016, and found that the facilities were constructed in accordance with contract requirements. For example, we found that Gilbane Federal constructed the barracks with two open bays, two sleeping rooms, and a central latrine with 10 toilets and 10 Photo 1 - Phase IV Barracks showers, as required. These buildings appeared to be well constructed, and we did not observe any settlement or foundation cracks. All windows and doors were functioning properly. The light fixtures and electrical outlets in the barracks we inspected were installed and working properly, with one exception due to a maintenance issue discussed later in this report. Photo 1 shows one of the phase IV barracks. Gilbane Federal built the new dining facility according to the size requirements, and its kitchen contained the required cooking and dish washing facilities. We also found that the contractor made the required Source: SIGAR, October 25, 2016 improvements to the sanitary sewer system, such as connecting existing and new facilities to the main sewer collection system. Gilbane Federal installed two new lateral main sewer lines to the existing system to provide access to outlying buildings. Our review of AFCEC and CSTC-A documents showed that the phase IV water distribution system improvements included (1) additional water distribution lines, (2) a new water well, (3) a new water storage tank, and (4) improvements to the existing water storage tank. In addition, the contract required Gilbane Federal to provide all the equipment needed for drilling, casing, and installing screen filtration pipes, and building the pumping system and pump house to provide a functional well system. The contract also required 0.6 miles of 6-inch pipe to connect the new well to the existing water storage system. During our October 2016 site visit, we found that Gilbane Federal constructed the water distribution system improvements according to contract requirements. However, we were unable to check the well s depth, which was required to be about 66 feet below the existing water table, because it was inaccessible to us. MOST OF THE PHASE IV FACILITIES ARE BEING USED, BUT THEY ARE NOT BEING WELL MAINTAINED During our October 2016 site visit, we found that most of Camp Commando s phase IV facilities, such as the barracks and dining facility, were being used. For example, we found that each of the three barracks was at full capacity and that the dining facility was serving three meals a day. We also found that the ANA was using the petroleum, oil, and lubricants storage area; roadways; and motor pools. SIGAR 18-28-IP/Camp Commando Phase IV Page 2

However, according to the site facility engineer, one of the water well houses number 801 was not being used because the new well stopped producing water 2 months after construction was completed (see photo 2). The facility engineer told us that the water distribution system, which includes a water well, well house, hand pump, water storage tank, chlorination system, ultrafiltration system, and pipes to connect the system to other facilities, cost $1.6 million to construct and only produced about 17,700 gallons of water during its first 2 months of operation. The facility engineer stated that the problem most likely resulted from a low water table because the water pump and motors were functioning properly. According to an ANA official, the compound s water supply system, which is mostly supplied by two water wells constructed under phases I and II, barely meets the demand of all the ANA personnel at Camp Commando. As a result, the ANA is bringing in water by truck from local sources. We also found that the phase IV facilities are not being well maintained. The Afghan Ministry of Defense is responsible for operating and maintaining Camp Commando and does so through a contract awarded to Shah Faisal Company and Mujtaba Ali Company, both Afghan companies. Shah Faisal Company is responsible for maintaining the water and sewer systems and all buildings, and has three subcontractors working throughout the facility. Mujtaba Ali Company is responsible for all electrical work throughout the compound. Together, the two companies have 46 staff on site. Photo 2 - Unused Water Well House at Camp Commando Source: SIGAR, October 25, 2016 Photo 3 - Missing Fire Extinguisher in Barrack Building The facility engineer stated that the building occupants put a lot of stress on the facilities, which has increased maintenance needs. As a result, building materials are usually purchased in bulk quantities at the expense of quality. During our site visit, we found broken door hardware, non-working smoke detectors, and non-functioning emergency Source: SIGAR, October 25, 2016 lights. Specifically, we found 8 out of 20 emergency lights in one barracks number 704 that were not functioning due to missing light bulbs or batteries. We also found four of the six fire extinguishers in this same barracks were missing (see photo 3). In addition, we found that two fire extinguishers were missing from each of the five additional enlisted barracks that we inspected. The missing fire extinguishers expose occupants to increased safety risks in the event of a fire. According to the facility engineer, the fire extinguishers were installed when the barracks were constructed. SIGAR 18-28-IP/Camp Commando Phase IV Page 3

CONCLUSION The Camp Commando phase IV construction demonstrates that well-built facilities can be the result when contractors adhere to contract requirements and technical specifications. It is encouraging to find that the ANA is using most of the new and renovated phase IV facilities. However, the $1.6 million water distribution system was not functioning and no longer supplying water to the compound. It is unclear why this occurred because Gilbane Federal appears to have built the system according to contract requirements. While the phase IV facilities are being used, they are not being well maintained despite the presence of a maintenance staff assigned to the compound. Some of the unmaintained items, such as non-functioning emergency lighting and missing fire extinguishers, can affect the safety of building occupants. Because the Afghan government is now responsible for Camp Commando s operation and maintenance, we are not making recommendations in this report. AGENCY COMMENTS AFCEC provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendix II. In its comments, AFCEC stated that it concurred with SIGAR s assessment that the project resulted in wellconstructed facilities meeting contractual requirements. SIGAR 18-28-IP/Camp Commando Phase IV Page 4

APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY This report provides the results of SIGAR s inspection of Camp Commando s phase IV facilities near Kabul, Afghanistan. For this inspection, we assessed whether (1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) the facilities are being used and maintained. Specifically, we: reviewed contract documents, design submittals, site visit reports, building codes, and other relevant project documentation; conducted engineering assessments of the project drawings and construction methods used; interviewed U.S. and Afghan government officials concerning the project s construction; and conducted site visits on October 25 and November 13, 2016. We did not rely on computer-processed data in conducting this inspection. However, we considered the impact of compliance with laws and fraud risk. In December 2014, SIGAR entered into a cooperative agreement with Afghan civil society partners. Under this agreement, our Afghan partners conduct specific inspections, evaluations, and other analyses. In this regard, Afghan engineers inspected the Camp Commando phase IV facilities in October and November 2016. We developed a standardized engineering evaluation checklist covering items required by the contract and design/specification documents. Our checklist required our partners to analyze the contract documents, scope of work, technical specifications, and design drawings. We compared the information our Afghan civil society partners provided to accepted engineering practices, relevant standards, regulations, laws, and codes for quality and accuracy. In addition, as part of our monitoring and quality control process, we: met with the Afghan engineers to ensure that the approach and planning for the inspection were consistent with the objectives of our inspection and the terms of our cooperative agreement; attended periodic meetings with our partners, and conducted our normal entrance and exit conferences with agency officials; discussed significant inspection issues with them; monitored our partners progress in meeting milestones and revised contract delivery dates as needed; and conducted oversight of them in accordance with SIGAR s policies and procedures to ensure that their work resulted in impartial, credible, and reliable information. We conducted our work in Kabul, Afghanistan, from August 2015 through January 2018. This work was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The engineering assessment was conducted by our professional engineers in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers Code of Ethics for Engineers. We conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. SIGAR 18-28-IP/Camp Commando Phase IV Page 5

APPENDIX II - COMMENTS FROM THE AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER CENTER SIGAR 18-28-IP/Camp Commando Phase IV Page 6

APPENDIX III - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Steven Haughton, Senior Inspection Manager Art Granger, Inspector-in-Charge Javed Khairandish, Engineer Abdul Rahim Rashidi, Program Analyst Yogin Rawal, Professional Engineer SIGAR 18-28-IP/Camp Commando Phase IV Page 7

This inspection was conducted under project code SIGAR-I-033. SIGAR 18-28-IP/Camp Commando Phase IV Page 8

SIGAR s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to: improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy and its component programs; improve management and accountability over funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their contractors; improve contracting and contract management processes; prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan. Obtaining Copies of SIGAR Reports and Testimonies To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to SIGAR s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publicly released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site. To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Afghanistan Reconstruction Programs To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact SIGAR s hotline: Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303 Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 U.S. fax: +1-703-601-4065 Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer Phone: 703-545-5974 Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs 2530 Crystal Drive Arlington, VA 22202