MCWP 3-16 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION IN THE GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT U.S. Marine Corps PCN 143 000059 00
To Our Readers Changes: Readers of this pubication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes that wi improve it. Recommendations may be sent directy to Commanding Genera, Marine Corps Combat Deveopment Command, Doctrine Division (C 42), 3300 Russe Road, Suite 318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917 (DSN 278-2917) or by E-mai to morgann@mccdc.usmc.mi. Recommendations shoud incude the foowing information: Location of change Pubication number and tite Current page number Paragraph number (if appicabe) Line number Figure or tabe number (if appicabe) Nature of change Add, deete Proposed new text, preferaby doube-spaced and typewritten Justification and/or source of change Additiona copies: A printed copy of this pubication may be obtained from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Abany, GA 31704-5001, by foowing the instructions in MCBu 5600, Marine Corps Doctrina Pubications Status. An eectronic copy may be obtained from the Doctrine Division, MCCDC, word wide web home page which is found at the foowing universa reference ocator: http://www.doctrine.usmc.mi. Uness otherwise stated, whenever the mascuine gender is used, both men and women are incuded.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20380-1775 FOREWORD 28 November 2001 Marine Corps Warfighting Pubication (MCWP) 3-16, Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Eement, is a framework for coordinating and empoying supporting arms in consonance with maneuver eements. Whie this pubication covers many aspects of fire support, it focuses on fire support coordination in the infantry division, regiment, and battaion. The doctrine appies across the fu range of miitary operations from humanitarian assistance to a major theater war. Fire support doctrine is based on a common understanding of the nature of war and on our warfighting phiosophy as described in Marine Corps Doctrina Pubication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting. This doctrine provides for fast, fexibe, and decisive action in a compex environment characterized by friction, uncertainty, fuidity, and rapid change. This pubication is a fied reference guide for commanders, their staffs, and fire support coordination personne. It forms the basis for specific fire support coordination tactics, techniques, and procedures. This pubication supersedes Feet Marine Force Manua (FMFM) 6-18, Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination, dated 27 March 1992. Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS EDWARD HANLON, JR. Lieutenant Genera, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding Genera Marine Corps Combat Deveopment Command DISTRIBUTION: 143 000059 00
CHAPTER 1. FUNDAMENTALS Fire support is fires that directy support and, maritime, amphibious, and specia operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and faciities in pursuit of tactica and operationa objectives (JP 1-02). Fire support coordination is the panning and executing of fires so that targets are adequatey covered by a suitabe weapon or group of weapons (JP 1-02). The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) is the Marine Corps principa organization for a missions across the fu spectrum of miitary operations. MAGTFs consist of a command eement (CE), a ground combat eement (GCE), an aviation combat eement (ACE), and a combat service support eement (CSSE). The MAGTF principay empoys fire support provided by the GCE and the ACE, but may aso receive externa fire support from other joint, combined, and coaition forces. MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING PHILOSOPHY The Marine Corps warfighting phiosophy is based on rapid, fexibe, and opportunistic maneuver capabiities. Maneuver warfare is a warfighting phiosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy s cohesion through a series of rapid, vioent, and unexpected actions which create a turbuent and rapidy deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope (MCDP 1). Fire support in maneuver warfare produces combat power and is appied through combined arms. The MAGTF and GCE are combined arms teams by the nature of their organization. The GCE s abiity to deiver fire is most effectivey empoyed when it creates a combined arms effect. Combined arms is the fu integration of arms in such a way that in order to counteract one, the enemy must make himsef more vunerabe to another. It pairs firepower with mobiity to produce a desired effect upon the enemy (MCDP 1). In addition to the typica exampe of combined arms where indirect fire suppresses an enemy, enabing either maneuver or attack by direct fire, mutipe supporting arms can create a combined arms effect. Artiery raids in the Guf War intentionay attracted enemy counterfire to enabe air attack of enemy radar and artiery units. The enemy had to suffer the effects of indirect fire or risk osing its own artiery assets. The 3d Marine air wing used a simiar technique when conducting attacks against the Iraqi integrated air defense system (IADS). Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) packages accompanied Marine aircraft conducting strikes against Iraqi positions and equipment. When Iraqi fire contro radars were activated, the aircraft from the SEAD package attacked the radars with high-speed antiradiation missies (HARMs). Once again, the Iraqis were paced in a diemma. To defend against the air attacks, they paced their fire contro radars in jeopardy. Combat power is the tota means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a unit can appy against the enemy at a given time. Combat power consists of tangibe factors such as the destructive effect of avaiabe firepower. But, just as importanty, it consists of intangibe factors such as surprise, tempo, and morae. FIRE SUPPORT TASKS Fire support functions are performed in reation to Supporting forces in contact. Supporting the commander s concept of operation. Integrating fire support with the scheme of maneuver. Sustaining fire support. Regardess of the unit supported, these tasks give the commander and his fire support representatives a frame of reference to evauate the overa effectiveness of fires. They serve as unifying factors for supporting arms. The four tasks do not change or repace traditiona missions, roes, and operations. They provide a common point of departure for a supporting arms. For exampe, nava surface fire support
1-2 MCWP 3-16 (NSFS) in genera support of a regiment does not consciousy pan to perform the four tasks. It accompishes its mission by furnishing a continuous voume of nava gunfire that supports forces in contact and the commander s concept of operation. It integrates its support with the scheme of maneuver through iaison officers who pan fire support areas (FSAs) to support the scheme of maneuver. achieve ogistics sustainment and technica support for supporting arms avaiabe to the commander. ROLE OF THE GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT Supporting Forces in Contact Prerequisite to this task is the abiity to immediatey respond to and meet the fire support needs of forces engaged with the enemy. This task enhances the friendy force s survivabiity and increases their freedom of maneuver. Individua fire support assets support forces in contact in many ways; e.g., artiery supports forces in contact by performing its traditiona roes of cose support and counterfire. Supporting the Commander s Concept of Operation This task enabes the force commander to infuence the batte with firepower. It gives him the means to create effects on enemy forces or functions that contribute to his mission accompishment. Fires can shape the battespace by attacking the enemy s center of gravity (COG) through enemy critica vunerabiities and creating decisive combat power with a combined arms effect. Integrating Fire Support with the Scheme of Maneuver Integrating fire support with the scheme of maneuver requires precise arrangement of coordinated activities in time, space, and purpose to produce the most effective fires. It provides the right attack means deivered on the right target at the right time, creating a combined arms effect. Integration must occur within the supporting arms and the other warfighting functions (maneuver, inteigence, command and contro, ogistics, and force protection). Sustaining Fire Support This task ensures fire support endurance and continuity in providing fires. It invoves the actions to Each MAGTF eement has specific roes in coordinating fire support. The CE impements the MAGTF commander s intent and normay focuses on deep operations to shape the battespace for the major subordinate commands (MSCs). The ACE is a major provider of fire support through offensive air support (OAS), eectronic warfare (EW), and unmanned aeria vehice (UAV) support. The CSSE commander is normay assigned responsibiity for the conduct of rear area operations. Since no forma supporting arms coordination agency exists within the CSSE s rear area operations center (RAOC), the CSSE may be augmented with fire support representatives. However, it is the GCE that receives the majority of fire support its own as we as fires provided by other MAGTF eements. GCE fire support coordination centers (FSCCs) interact with the CE through the MAGTF force fires coordination center (FFCC). The FFCC coordinates those matters that cannot be coordinated by FSCCs within the GCE and those matters that affect the MAGTF as a whoe. The MAGTF LF FFCC coordinates fires with higher, adjacent, and externa commands. It is the eement of the amphibious force (AF) that forms the supporting arms coordination center (SACC) with representatives from the amphibious task force (ATF). It maintains cose coordination with the GCE for integrating fire support pans of the deep and cose batte. The GCE interfaces with the ACE through the Marine air command and contro system (MACCS). Contro and coordination of direct air support is achieved through tactica air contro parties (TACPs) organic to GCE units, through the direct air support center (DASC), and through other MACCS agencies.