Modelling Missions of Light Forces

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Modelling Missions of Light Forces Karl A. Bertsche Defence and Civil Systems Domier GmbH Friedrichshafen Germany Postal Address: 88039 FriedrichshafedGermany E-mail address: bertsche.karl@domier.dasa.de Mr. Bertsche is a project leader and is presently completing a study for the German army engineers considering explosive demolition in a Peace-Keeping Mission in the military OR- Section of Dornier (a company of DaimlerChrysler-Aerospace). He has written object oriented Programs concerning minejeld effectiveness, and an analysis tool for the sustainability of German forces. He has also programmed an object oriented dynamic model of Infantry Combat. He was previously a nuclear engineer at Babcock & Wilcox in Virginia, U.S.A. He has a Masters of Engineering degree in nuclear engineering from New York University. Introduction This paper will demonstrate how the mission of light forces can be modeled using the Domier developed 3 dimensional infantry model IRIS. Using the 3 D model one is able to answer questions about the effectiveness of weapons, combat equipment and force structure. Since IRIS simulates down to the single soldier level, questions concerning infantry structure are limited to the team, squad and up to platoon level. The paper will not show any explicit results about of the study, but it will demonstrate the use of the methodology. This study was financed by the German army staff Section I11 2. Technical support was received by the German infantry school and the OR section from the Office of Studies and Training of the German army. Ob j ec tive The objective of this study is to generate a modeling method, which can be implemented for the development of a decision support tools which can be used to determine the following: suitable force structures efficient rules of engagement effective weapons and other essential combat and support equipment. By determining these fundamental factors, they can be applied to the training and assembling the force structure of light forces for a particular mission. These forces will be more capable to fulfill the expanded task spectrum for the new missions of the German army in the future. 1

Definition of Light Forces First we need to know, what light forces are and how they are defined. Light forces in the German army can consist of either mountain infantry, regular infantry, paratroopers, or special forces or any variable combination of such force structures. These forces usually have an armored personnel carrier for basic transportation and protection at their disposal. Several aspects that characterize light forces are: high mobility, easily deployable, self reliant, autonomous and therefore capable of independent actions. Such forces are especially suitable to fulfil the tasks within the framework of the expanded task spectrum of the German army. Missions of Light Forces Typical missions which light forces have been carrying out and will be carrying out more independently in the future, will be i.e.: area surveillance, securing military facilities, protection of objects, protection of convoys, searching of installations and freeing cutoff forces. In order to effectively simulate such missions, individual scenarios are generated in a 3 dimensional virtual world using IRIS. Here the individual soldiers and their weapons (i.e.: rifle, pistols hand grenades, Grenade-Pistols), motions (walking, running,) and posture (standing, prone) are represented and individually controllable within the simulation and the scenario. In IRIS the terrain is constructed in great detail by constructing ditches, embankments, trees and buildings. If buildings are constructed the floors, hallways, rooms, staircases are individually simulated with possible defensive positions located inside or outside those built structures. Determinants of a Scenario A scenario in a 3D synthetic environment like IRIS follows similar rules as those of the normal 2D scenarios. Basically the scenario starts with a particular military situation and the goals of the mission. In a 3D environment the situation must be defined for every individual participant represented within the scenario. Since the level of detail is so great, the maximum size of the military unit which can be effectively represented within a scenario is on the order of teams, squads and possibly up to platoon level. This holds true for the own but also for the adversary. The weapons, equipment, rules of engagement, command, control, communication, information, human factors and more are simulated for all participants. This allows the most accurate representation of the scenarios but on a relatively small scale. Adversary of the Future The scenarios which we will be considering in the future are completely different from those situations which have been analyzed in the past. In these new scenarios we will have a situation where our adversary will most likely be not equally structured, equipped or have similar rules of engagements as we have considered in previous analyses. The adversary we will be facing in the future may be non armed civilians, armed civilians, para-military organized gangs, rebels, warlords, guerillas, organized criminals, partisans and terrorists. Therefore the behavior of our adversary will be different from the behavior which we had assumed fiom our adversary of the past. Even though the opponents may me ill-equipped and less organized in comparison to our own force, they may be just as intelligent as we are, but maybe more brutal, ruthless and much more unpredictable as what we may expect. 2

One of the most likely mistakes leaders of a peacekeeping force can make is to underestimate the possibilities of their adversaries. Control Loop for Developing a Scenario The development of a scenario can be viewed as a control diagram with feedback of different mission control mechanisms. These mechanisms are: the mission and its various objectives, the controllable parameters and the non controllable parameters. These mechanisms enter a decision phase, where actions are then taken based on a particular situation. These go into the situation at time to and also for all other times tn. The diagram shows that the non controllable parameters always directly influence the situation and actions of the mission. The mission itself is then broken down into a large number of tasks and sub tasks according to the different types of mission objectives selected. The controllable parameters are the own capabilities, armament and equipment. In detail this means certain actions can be taken: leading, taking initiative, reconnaissance, observation, C'I, motions and actions. The non controllable parameters: climate, time of day, terrain, built-up structure, armament and equipment of the adversary, behavior of the adversary, demographic and cultural situation, economy and infrastructure are also input into the decision process. Figure 1: Control Loop Scenario development Steps for the Development Of IRIS The development of model IRIS can be represented as a staircase with different phases. The bottom step represents the scenario development phase, which has previously been described. Once the scenarios have been developed, a descriptive model is used to determine the basic functions of the model which are required to be integrated for simulation purposes. Then a completeness test assures that all necessary function required by the scenario have been considered. In a further step the level of modeling detail is determined. Here a balance of

modeling detail must agree with the resolution of the represented objects. Another very important aspect, which has not been considered in our model so far is the representation of intangibles and the possible simplifications of such phenomena. The above described stages have been integrated into our model IRIS and could feed into functional models. r Stairway of modeling IRIS / AMIRIS Figure 2.: Steps for modeling IRIS OR Study Approach Just as in the scenario development, a control loop analogy with feed back mechanism can also be generated for the approach of an OR study. The scenario steps of a particular scenario are now input into our model IRIS. With the simulation model IRIS the results are computed given a particular initial and boundary condition. The results of the simulation are then evaluated and compared. If the results of the simulation have not been satisfactory alterations in force structure and equipment are introduced, which significantly change the model results. Therefore an optimization of equipment and force structure for a particular scenario is possible. Once adequate results have been achieved for a particular scenario, the next scenario or scenario variation can be analyzed. 4

Figure 3.: Operation Research Study Approach Scenarios to be considered For our study: Missions of light forces three base scenarios were chosen to demonstrate our modeling approach. The following scenarios were chosen: Convoy protection Protection of a military supply depot Patrolling of a geographic region. For each base scenario a number of variations were considered in order to determine the sensitivities of such variations. Base Scenario: Convoy Protection The next sections will describe the initial and boundary conditions of the base scenario: Convoy Protection and the expected results. The convoy consists of 4 armored personnel carriers,7 unarmed transport vehicles, where the second to the last vehicle is a medical unit. The vehicles drive in formation meandering from the right side of the road to the left side and back again. The length of the convoy is 500 meters where the distance between vehicles is approximately 50 m. The convoy travels on a winding road with a speed of about 40!ah. Forrest exists on both sides of the road. A small video clip was designed to demonstrate, how the terrain is modeled in IRIS. The video Clip demonstrates primarily the motion of the first APC of the convoy, but it also demonstrates how individual trees and forest can be constructed using irregular polygons and texture mapping methods. 5

.'.

" I t The base situation for the scenario: Convoy Protection is the following: A column of trucks are to transport food-supplies to a town, which has been struck by famine. The convoy is protected by armored vehicles and light infantry, equipped with standard fire arms. Irregular troops are blocking the road with a barrier. These forces ambush the convoy with hand held fire arms. They also have a handheld anti-tank weapon in their possession. The main task of the convoy protection force is to get the food supplies to the town, which has been struck by famine. The plan of action of the irregular troops is to strike the convoy en route. The irregular forces use the terrain to their advantage by attacking the convoy from well camouflaged and protected positions. The ambush takes place over a short distance and with complete surprise. The action of events which occur in the base scenario are the following: 1. Convoy dnves up with the first vehicle to the barrier and stops. 2. After the convoy halts, the irregular forces open fire with the antitank weapon. 3. The rest of the irregular forces open fire on the convoy. Due to the short combat distance, the hit probability of the irregular forces is very high. Since the fire is coming from well camouflaged positions, a counter attack from the protection force is not expected. The armored vehicles of the protection force are severely damaged. The soldiers of the protection force dismount their vehicles and attempt to reach cover in the nearby woods located on the other side of the road. 4. The irregular troops aim their small arms fire toward the driver cabins of the trucks. Because of the short combat range the hit probability is very. The protection force has no chance for counter measures and is totally annihilated. Conclusion of the Base Scenario of Convoy Protection The base scenario represents the worst case situation for the protection force. Not only the larger force of irregular troops is a problem but their optimum position for the ambush leave the protection force without a real chance. Reducing the number of irregular troops only marginally improve the situation of the protection force. The mission of the protection force cannot be fulfilled. A major disadvantage for the protection force is their inability to recognize the threat. Appropriate reconnaissance equipment is essential for this mission. The irregular forces have good knowledge of the approaching protection force assigned to protect the convoy. 6

Possible Variations of the Base Scenario for the Convoy Protection forces In order to counter the enormous advantage of the irregular forces. The protection force must rely on a number of measures to achieve mission success. These measures include the use of 0 Combat Helicopter, 0 unmanned aerial vehicles, 0 varying the deployment, 0 use of multi-sensors 0 and other possible means. Possible Variations of the Base Scenario for the Irregular Forces The irregular forces also have a number of options at their disposal in an attempt to stop the convoy. These options are the use of hungry women and children begging for food to block the road. Another option would be the implementation of hungry male civilians, who would steal the food supplies. Other variation with a combination of belligerent forces and civilians are also conceivable. Overall Conclusion This ongoing study has been the first OR-study of this kind, which analyses the mission of light forces. In this study we have employed 3D model IFUS to determine the required equipment and structures required for a Peace keeping mission. The number Peacekeeping mission will most likely increase in the future and the results of this study give the first indications of the type of force structure and equipment which will be required for the successful completion of such missions. 7