CONSORTIUM FOR VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY

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CONSORTIUM FOR VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW OF THE POLICY RESEARCH THRUST Alexander Glaser Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Princeton University Paul Shambroom CVT Kickoff Meeting University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, October 16, 2014 Revision 3d

CVT POLICY RESEARCH THRUST BACKGROUND TWO WAYS OF APPROACHING THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM Technology-focused and mission-focused approach; CVT seeks to combine both; unique opportunities for synergisms given diversity of 13 + 9 CVT partner institutions and groups POLICY THRUST: A TREATY-ENABLING APPROACH Emphasizes mission-focused dimension (as defined by existing and expected future treaties); support and guide CVT technology developments toward specific treaty applications; track emerging technologies Source: www.engin.umich.edu (top) and news.kremlin.ru (bottom) 2

RELEVANT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY Bans the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-weapon states and commits the five weapon states to nuclear disarmament; verified by IAEA safeguards COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY Bans all nuclear explosions in all environments and would be verified by extensive verification mechanisms (International Monitoring System, CTBTO) FISSILE MATERIAL (CUTOFF) TREATY At a minimum, treaty would ban fissile material production for weapons purposes; Issue about treaty scope: Would it also cover existing stocks? NEXT-GENERATION NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREATIES Agreements that place limits on total number of nuclear warheads in arsenals would pose qualitatively new verification challenges 3

CONSORTIUM FOR VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY NEXT-GENERATION NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT Alexander Glaser Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Princeton University Paul Shambroom CVT Kickoff Meeting University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, October 16, 2014

GLOBAL NUCLEAR WEAPON INVENTORY 1945 2014 140,000 GLOBAL NUCLEAR WARHEAD INVENTORY, 2014 120,000 Warheads accountable under New START Additional warheads in stockpile or reserve Warheads in dismantlement queue Weapons or weapon equivalents 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 United States Russia All others 1,585 3,180 2,540 1,512 2,790 3,700 n/a 1,100 About 13,000 nuclear warheads are not currently captured by arms control agreements 20,000 Global nuclear weapons inventories and warheads in dismantlement queue (yellow) 0 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 c. 16,300 warheads Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945 2013, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69 (5), 2013, 75 81 U.S. Department of State; and H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, Worldwide Deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 70 (5), 2014 5

THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CURRENTLY NON-DEPLOYED (i.e., IN RESERVE OR AWAITING DISMANTLEMENT) W87/Mk-21 Reentry Vehicles in storage, Warren Air Force Base, Cheyenne, Wyoming Photo courtesy of Paul Shambroom, www.paulshambroom.com 6

KEY VERIFICATION CHALLENGES OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AT LOW NUMBERS WARHEAD COUNTING AND WARHEAD AUTHENTICATION Need to gain confidence in the correctness of baseline declarations using warhead counting techniques (combined with CoK/CoC) and, prior to dismantlement, high confidence in the authenticity of the warhead ART OF DEVISING FLEXIBLE VERIFICATION APPROACHES Best concepts can be initially non-intrusive, but are designed to accommodate upgrades to technologies and procedures; concepts ought to be acceptable/adequate for other weapon states Source: U.S. Department of Energy (top) and U.S. Department of Defense, www.defenseimagery.mil (bottom) 7

WARHEAD COUNTING

TAGGING TRANSFORMING A NUMERICAL LIMIT INTO A BAN ON UNTAGGED ITEMS Source: www.automoblog.net Steve Fetter and Thomas Garwin, Using Tags to Monitor Numerical Limits in Arms Control Agreements in Barry M. Blechman, ed., Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict, Washington, DC, 1989, pp. 33 54 9

COUNTING OPTIONS WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF INTRUSIVENESS AND ROBUSTNESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 Serial number on TAI UID on TAI (contact read) UID on TAI (remote read) Simple Buddy Tag Buddy Tag with serial number Buddy Tag with remote read 123456 123456 Remotely read UID 123456 Buddy Tag Buddy Tag Buddy Tag Several CVT participants are working on technologies that will help ensure Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) (including Chain-of-Custody (CoC) detectors for treaty accountable items or materials) 10

WARHEAD AUTHENTICATION

WILL YOU KNOW A NUCLEAR WEAPON WHEN YOU SEE ONE? Nuclear weapons have unique signatures but most of them are sensitive and cannot be revealed to inspectors Black Sea Experiment, July 1989 Liquid scintillator passive well counter to determine the plutonium mass in samples of unknown size Source: U-Michigan, DNNG Information barriers (e.g. using electronic components) can sanitize measured data; Certification and authentication is challenging Source: UK-Norway Initiative Several CVT participants are working on technologies that will help enable inspection systems for treaty verification (e.g. advanced detector technologies; soſtware and hardware for new types of information barriers) 12

VERIFIED WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT IMPORTANT PRECEDENTS EXIST AND FUTURE WORK CAN BUILD ON THEM Inspection System developed as part of the 1996 2002 Trilateral Initiative during a demonstration at Sarov Source: Tom Shea Visual contact with a mockup nuclear weapon during a dismantlement exercise carried out as part of the UK-Norway Initiative Source: UK Norway Initiative, David Keir Rendering of the Princeton setup using a zero-knowledge protocol with 14 MeV neutrons and non-electronic detectors Source: Sébastien Philippe 13

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES REAL-TIME SATELLITE IMAGERY, BIG DATA, AND CROWDSOURCING

QUASI REAL-TIME IMAGERY COULD SUPPORT VERIFICATION OF SEVERAL NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES Posted in February 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsw6igc4tt0 see also www.skyboximaging.com Several CVT participants are focusing on data analytics (including data fusion, event correlation, and anomaly detection) 15

VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT FACILITY AND MANAGED-ACCESS SIMULATOR WHY USE VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS? Explore different architectures and inspection protocols Encourage trial and error and learning by doing No classified information at risk PROPOSED NEW FEATURES Integration of virtual (real-time) radiation fields Enable host-vs-inspector game play Facilitate collaborations between CVT partners Source:Tamara Patton Schell, VCDNP 16

VERIFICATION CHALLENGES LEVERAGING THE WISDOM OF THE (CVT) CROWD 2009 DARPA RED BALLOON CHALLENGE Ten numbered eight-foot weather balloons deployed at public locations across the continental United States; find and submit the coordinates of all ten balloons as quickly as possible POSSIBLE VERIFICATION CHALLENGES (RELEVANT) FOR THE CVT Stack-Monitoring Challenge (proposed by Ted Bowyer, PNNL) Liſting-the-Tag Challenge Defeating-the-Inspection-System Challenge 17