Welcome Letter. Dear Delegates,

Welcome Letter Dear Delegates, On behalf of the Secretariat and all of NAMUN, I am pleased to welcome you to the 2017 North American Model United Nations Conference and am honoured to serve as your chair for the Coalition High Command and Provisional Authority (Iraq). I m looking forward to meeting you all in person in February, and am anticipating a fantastic conference. With the recent spate of terrorist attacks across America and Europe, and the battles raging across Syria and Iraq, international terrorism and counterinsurgency remain very important topics, and will probably for the immediate future. As such I m anticipating some fascinating debate and strategies as you tackle this issue staring in 2003. I hope that our committee will be exciting and a rewarding experience for all of you, and I hope that your enthusiasm and knowledge of international terrorism help make this an excellent Integrated Crisis Simulation. Warmest Regards, Shanzae Khan

Table of Contents Introduction 3 Historical Background 4 Issues 11 State of Affairs 14 Suggested Sources 15 Bibliography 15

Introduction After the 1991 Gulf War, the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 687 commanded that Iraqi synthetic, organic, atomic, and long range rocket projects be stopped and every such weapon destroyed under UN supervision. 1 The UN weapons inspectors inside Iraq verified the dismantlement of many Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and materials, but there significant compliance issues remained and the inspectors were unable to check every site and verify that Iraq had destroyed all its WMD materiel by their withdrawal in 1998. 2 Iraqi-American relations remained quite hostile throughout this period, with no-fly zones imposed over the Northern and Southern parts of Iraq. Ousting Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq also remained a priority for America; to which end they funded the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and its leader Ahmed Chalabi. 3 After the September 11 Attacks in 2001, plans were quickly laid to topple Saddam s Ba ath government and support the transition of Iraq to a democracy. By early 2003, America had transferred enormous forces to bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf and had been justifying their planned invasion by claiming to the world Saddam s government possessed WMDs. 4 Failing to achieve UN authorization, on March 20 th, 2003, US forces invaded Iraq in a highly successful operation, which was followed by problem riddled efforts at state-building and a tenacious insurgency which has contributed to Iraq s current strife. This crisis will deal largely deal with these events. Delegates, you will have an opportunity to plan and execute the 2003 invasion, and then attempt to rebuild and govern Iraq in the face of a multitude of dangers. 1 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 687, (1991), April 3, 1991. Accessed December 12, 2016. http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf 2 Charles Duelfer, WMD elimination in Iraq: 2003, The Nonproliferation Review 23, (2016): 166-172. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1179431 3 Martin Chulov, Ahmed Chalabi: Iraqi exile whose reputation waned after return, November 3, 2015. Accessed December 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/03/ahmed-chalabi-exile-reputation-waned-iraq 4 Council on Foreign Relations, Timeline: The Iraq War, 2016. Accessed December 17, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/iraq/timeline-iraq-war/p18876

Historical Background Saddam s Rise and the Iraq-Iran War In July 1979, Iraqi Vice-President Saddam Hussein forced President Ahmed Al- Bakr to resign and himself assumed the presidency. 5 One of Saddam s top concerns was the Islamist Revolution in Iran earlier that year in February which toppled the Shah from power, and resulted in Ayatollah Khomeini s accession to power. 6 Saddam was worried that the new Shia regime in Iran would attempt to destabilize Iraq by fomenting unrest amongst the large Shia minority in the south of the Iraq. 7 Saddam also though saw the Revolution as an opportunity; Iraq s long-time rival Iran had been weakened by the unrest. Its government was in the middle of a dramatic transformation, its secret services and police were busy hunting old allies and supporters of the Shah, and its military commanders were occupied with internal matters. 8 Therefore throughout 1979 and early 1980 Iraqi troops frequently skirmished with Iranian border guards and raided Iranian territory, and in September 1980 Iraqi troops launched a full scale invasion of the country. 9 The initial Iraqi invasion was largely successful, seizing significant Iranian territory. However later that year the advance began to stall as Iranian resistance stiffened and support for the Iranian government solidified. 10 Saddam had hoped his invasion would weaken support for the Ayatollah, but instead it achieved the opposite. Volunteers poured in and the Iranian army began to reorganize itself to deal with the invasion. 11 Through 1981 the war was a stalemate; both sides were dug in to trenches along the front line in scenes reminiscent of World War One, and there were few successful assaults by either side. 12 However by 1982, the Iranian army had sufficiently reorganized itself and began 5 Hal Brands and David Palkki, Conspiring Bastards: Saddam Hussein s Strategic View of the United States, Diplomatic History 36 (2012): 625-627. 6 Ibid, 635-640. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, 635-638. 9 William Keylor, A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 10 Keylor, A World of Nations. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

a vicious counterattack. They retook most of the Iranian territory the Iraqis had earlier seized, and had begun to drive into Iraq itself. 13 Throughout the rest of the war, the Iraqis remained largely on the defensive until a UN negotiated ceasefire in 1988 ended the violence. 14 The war had enormous ramifications for the Middle East and the World. Iran and Iraq suffered well over one million casualties, about half of which were civilians. 15 Both sides had committed significant war crimes, including the Iraqi usage of poisonous gas against Iranian troops and widespread Iranian usage of child soldiers. The Iranian and Iraqi economies had also been ravaged, with major infrastructure damage on both sides and large Iraqi foreign debts accrued, particularly to Kuwait. 16 Many other powers had also been involved in the war; the Soviet Union, America, France and much of the Arab world including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar provided arms, money or intelligence to Iraq. 17 This reinforced Khomeini s view that conservative Western-allied or supported Middle Eastern states, and the West itself, especially America, were opposed to Islamist Iran s existence and would continue to be hostile to them. This of course contributed to Iran s recent hostility to America, its status as a rogue nation and its pursuit of WMDs. In 1986, it was discovered that President Raegan had been illegally selling Iran anti-tank missiles and other weapons in exchange for money to fund an anti-communist insurgency in Figure 1: Iranian Revolutionary Guards during the Iran-Iraq War. Image Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/iran%e2% 80%93Iraq_War Nicaragua. Apart from causing an enormous political scandal in the US, the Iran-Contra Affair solidified Saddam s distrust of the US. 18 Always wary of American intentions towards himself and Iraq, after 1986 Saddam became convinced that the US would not allow him and his Ba ath party to rule Iraq indefinitely and would attempt to topple him 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Encyclopedia Britannica, Iran-Iraq War, September 2008. Accessed December 20, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/event/iran-iraq-war 16 Brands and Palkki, Conspiring Bastards, 652-655. 17 Brands and Palkki, Conspiring Bastards, 625-659. 18 Ibid, 640-645.

from power. 19 This conviction, a desire to strengthen Iraq through weakening an American ally and acquiring their wealth, and the fact that Iraq owed Kuwait enormous debts because of the war all factored into Saddam s decision in 1990 to invade Kuwait, prompting the First Gulf War. 20 1 st Gulf War In August 1990, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait. Iraq s forces were more experienced, often better equipped and far outnumbered the beleaguered Kuwaiti military, and within two days Iraq more or less controlled the entire country. 21 The UN Security Council and the Arab League attempted to diffuse the situation and diplomatically pressure Iraq into withdrawing its forces. While this was happening, the US had launched an enormous military build-up called operation Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia, at the Saudi King Fahd s request, and elsewhere Figure 2: Map of Coalition Movements During the First Gulf War. Retrieved from http://smattinglywarandpeace.weebly.com/first-gulfwar.html throughout the Persian Gulf. 22 This was to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia, with whom tensions had been rising, and gaining control of more than half the world s oil reserves. However, by January 1991 diplomatic efforts had reached a standstill, and an American backed coalition initiated operation Desert Strom, the effort to retake Kuwait. The coalition, while primarily American led, contained large contingents of British, Saudi, French and Egyptian troops, and many other states ranging from New Zealand to the Philippines to Pakistan provided troops, equipment or financial aid. 23 Operation Desert 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid, 645-646. 21 Council on Foreign Relations, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Gulf War, September 10, 2015. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/twenty-fifth-anniversary-gulfwar/p36954 22 Keylor, A world of Nations. 23 CNN, Gulf War Fast Facts, August 2, 2016. Accessed November 1, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/15/world/meast/gulf-war-fast-facts/

Storm was militarily an enormous success. Following several weeks of artillery bombardment, US and allied forces swept through Kuwait and by late February had ejected Iraqi forces from the country and had actually entered Iraq, inflicting tens of thousands of casualties on the Iraqi army and receiving roughly 1000 in return. 24 However, the Coalition did not advance far into Iraq, and when a ceasefire was declared on February 28, 1991, Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq, with much of his army still intact after having been allowed to retreat. 25 The 1991 Uprisings and No-Fly Zones Very shortly after the end of the First Gulf War during March and April of 1991 there were a series of uprisings in northern and Southern Iraq, largely by disaffected and historically oppressed Iraqi Kurds and Shias. These revolts achieved major early gains, but after America went back on its promises to support these groups, Saddam s army launched a series of counteroffensives which crushed the rebels. As part of this offensive, Iraq has been accused of using poison gas against rebels, reminiscent of the horrific Halabja chemical attack in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq war in which thousands of Iraqi Kurds were killed in an Iraqi military gas attack. 26 The suppression of the rebels in 1991 also triggered fears of attempted ethnic cleansings and genocides by Iraqi armed forces, and the Coalition began enforcing no-fly zones over the northern and southern parts of the country in 1992. 27 These no-fly zones would last until 2003, and were largely successful in preventing Iraqi military aircraft from operating within their limits. The Sanctions Regime As early as 1990, following Iraq s initial invasion of Kuwait, the UN imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iraq in an effort to force them to withdraw from Kuwait. Following Iraqi defeat in the 1 st Gulf War, the sanctions continued, now in an effort to 24 Council on Foreign Relations, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Gulf War. 25 Keylor, A World of Nations. 26 Hamish Gordon, Remembering Halabja Chemical Attack, Al Jazeera March 16, 2016. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/remembering-halabjachemical-attack-160316061221074.html 27 BBC News, No-Fly Zones: The Legal Position, February 19, 2001. Accessed December 15, 2016. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm

discourage Iraqi WMD production and support of terrorism. 28 The sanctions prevented the import of most goods into Iraq with the exception of medicine and sometimes food and other humanitarian supplies, which were tightly controlled. 29 Iraq was permitted to sell a limited quantity of oil to fund the purchase of food and other necessities to avoid a humanitarian crisis. However, the sanctions regime has been widely accused of causing enormous malnutrition, disease and economic problems within Iraq. 30 Some have accused Saddam s government of deliberate misallocation of food and other supplies to exacerbate the problem to breed resentment of the US amongst Iraqis and worldwide. The sanctions regime did though adversely affect the health and food security of many Iraqis, particularly amongst young children who were especially vulnerable. 31 Iraq and Global Islamic Terrorism Iraq s recent history has a major role in explaining the emergence of Al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups. While there is little evidence of major direct cooperation between Saddam s regime and Al-Qaeda, Saddam s decisions and their ramifications indirectly helped to strengthen Al-Qaeda. 32 The presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia during Operation Enduring Freedom and their continued presence as a garrison following the First Gulf War became a key grievance of Osama Bin-Laden and Al-Qaeda. 33 Saudi Arabia contains Medina and Mecca, two of Islam s holiest cities, and Bin-Laden saw the presence of major American forces in the country as desecrating a sacred space. 34 The sanctions regime and its negative impacts on the Iraqi people further served to vilify America and attract funds and recruits to Al-Qaeda, as the US was seen as its main proponent. 35 28 David Reiff, Were Sanctions Right? New York Times July 23, 2003. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/magazine/were-sanctions-right.html 29 Reiff, Were Sanctions Right? 30 Ibid. 31 Reiff, Were Sanctions Right? 32 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 47-70. August 21, 2004. https://9-11commission.gov/report/ 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The Final Report.

Iraq and WMDs Throughout the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq had been conducting several WMD production projects. 36 They were successfully manufacturing large quantities of various toxic gasses and chemical weapons, and had nuclear and biological weapons programs on the go. 37 However, Iraq s nuclear program was severely delayed following the 1981 Israeli air raid on the Osiraq reactor. Saddam used chemical weapons repeatedly against Iranian troops, and in at least once against Kurdish rebels and civilians with horrific effects. 38 Following Iraq s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the UN created the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to inspect Iraqi WMD facilities and to Figure 3: Iraqi Sarin Rockets Awaiting Destruction by UN Personnel Retrieved From http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/world/cia-issaid-to-have-bought-and-destroyed-iraqi-chemicalweapons.html?_r=0 facilitate UN efforts to destroy these weapons and end their production. 39 After the First Gulf War, the UNSCOM inspectors were reluctantly given access to many facilities by Iraq, and much evidence was found indicating enormous nuclear and biological weapons programs. During the immediate post-war years large quantities of Iraqi chemical weapons were destroyed. Iraq remained somewhat cooperative until 1998, when increasing Iraq-US tensions and a UNSCOM investigation into the testing of weaponized anthrax on prisoners by the Iraqi government caused Saddam to expel UNSCOM from the country, which was followed by an Anglo-American bombing campaign targeting WMD production facilities. 40 Iraqi cooperation with the US and the UN on disarmament after that remained extremely limited until 2003. However, American intelligence reports 36 Central intelligence Agency, Iraq s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, April 24, 2007. Accessed December 11, 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports- 1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm#key%20judgemetns%201 37 Central intelligence Agency, Iraq s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. 38 Ibid. 39 UNSCOM. United nations Special Commission, 1999. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://www.un.org/depts/unscom/general/basicfacts.html 40 Micah Zenko, Operation Desert Fox: A Blueprint for Crushing Iran's Nuclear Program? April 15, 2015. Accessed December 4, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/operation-desert-fox-blueprint-crushing-irans-nuclear-12641

over this period largely agree that Iraqi WMD production efforts seem to have ceased or significantly decreased, and that Iraq never produced a functional nuclear device. 41 However, since 9/ 11, American leadership were terrified of a doomsday scenario wherein Saddam sold or gifted extremist groups WMD material, in particular biological weapons, which would then be used to strike at the US. 42 Iraq s WMD program was used as the primary justification for invading the country in 2003. 41 Peter Taylor, Iraq war: the greatest intelligence failure in living memory, The Telegraph March 18, 2013. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9937516/iraq-war-the-greatestintelligence-failure-in-living-memory.html 42 Melvin Leffler, The Foreign Policy of the George W. Bush Administration: memoirs, History, Legacy. Diplomatic History 37 (2013): 190-216.

Issues Invading Iraq The first task delegates will face will be to actually plan and execute an invasion of Iraq, with the objectives of capturing Saddam Hussein, taking Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, Kirkuk and other major population centres. Iraq possesses a large army; close to 400 000 soldiers with more than 600 000 reservists, as well as around 70 000 elite Republican guard. 43 They re well equipped with tanks and artillery, and are in many locations dug in and fortified. There is also the possibility that invading American and British troops will encounter Iraqi Special Forces or militia using guerilla tactics to delay and harass the coalition advance. Some experts, as well as the most senior American leadership are also concerned about potential chemical attacks by Iraqi forces, but many intelligence reports are discounting that possibility. Iraqi forces do not have the capability to actually resist an invasion by a large technologically superior American and British force, but they can certainly resist long enough and inflict enough casualties that American and British publics to grow tired of the war if given the opportunity. Throughout the invasion, efforts should also be made to search for and secure any evidence of WMDs existence and production. Of key import is the balance between the speed of the invasion and risk to coalition lives and the damage to Iraqi infrastructure and population. Generally, if the invasion is to be conducted quickly and with minimal military casualties, there is a high chance of extreme damage to Iraqi hospitals, bridges, schools, mosques, factories etc. and a high chance of heavy fighting or bombing of civilian areas due to the tactics used. 44 Delegates should then bear this in mind, as following the invasion delegates will have to govern and rebuild Iraq. Reconstruction and State Building No matter how the invasion is conducted, there will be damage to Iraq s infrastructure and considerable suffering inflicted upon the civilian population. Delegates will have to repair damage done during the fighting, ensure food, water and medicine 43 Sharon Otterman, IRAQ: Iraq s Pre-War Military Capabilities, Council on Foreign Relations April 24, 2003. Accessed December 7, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-iraqs-prewar-militarycapabilities/p7695 44 The more a force focuses on speed and mitigating their own casualties, the more they tend to rely on heavy artillery and air bombardment, and with large quantities of those indirect fires, particularly around population centres, the chances of civilian casualties skyrockets.

continue to be accessible throughout the country, house and care for internally displaced persons and deal with potential unrest resulting from the breakdown of the Iraqi security and police apparatus. Iraq s economy will also be severely disrupted, and efforts must be made to strengthen it and integrate Iraq into the world economic system after a decade of sanctions and isolation. Delegates will also, if successful in their invasion, have to create a new government. Much of Iraq s bureaucracy will have been disrupted during the war, and may still be full of Saddam sympathisers and Ba athist party members. Delegates will have to decide how to proceed; should some of the old institutions remain, or should the Iraqi government be rebuilt from scratch? Should delegates aim for a well-functioning and free democracy, or should they concede to pragmatism and arrive at some mixed semiauthoritarian system? How much power should ministers in the new system have, and who will those ministers be? Delegates will have to decide these questions, rebuild the government s material capacity, and decide how much power the occupying foreign forces and leaders will exercise over the new government. Human Rights Abuses, Minorities, and Remaining Opposition The Iraqi government under Saddam perpetrated innumerable human rights abuses ranging from chemical weapons attacks against civilians to arbitrary arrest and torture to executing political opponents. 45 This has left a mark on the country, and delegates will have to do their best to help the country recover from this traumatic period, and hopefully avoid committing human rights abuses themselves. Of major importance is that opposition to Saddam came disproportionately from the Kurdish and Shia minorities in the country, and so those groups suffered more under the regime than the Sunni Arab majority. 46 As such, there is considerable alienation and hostility between these groups, potentially leading to violence and even attempts at secession or irredentism which delegates may have to deal with. 45 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses, November 2002. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_human_rights_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraq_hu man_rights.pdf 46 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses.

It is also inconceivable that in the initial invasion absolutely all of Saddam s supporters and members of terrorist groups will be captured or killed. As such, there s a good chance of some violence against occupying forces and the new government which delegates will have to deal with, probably in the form of an insurgency. Evidence suggests that Al-Qaeda does have some presence in the country, which will undoubtedly complicate the post-war situation. State of Affairs The crisis will begin in early March, 2003. Hundreds of thousands of British and American troops are stationed on ships in the Persian Gulf, in Airbases in Kuwait and Turkey, and along the Kuwaiti and Turkish borders. US and British Special Forces have entered the country, and are working with Kurdish militias in the north in preparation for assaults southward. American intelligence has been working to destabilize and compromise the morale of main line Iraqi army units. The UN Security Council continues to debate whether to authorize the invasion or not, with stiff resistance from France and Russia. With or without it, it seems inevitable that the invasion will happen.

Suggested Sources Keylor, William. A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Leffler, Melvin. The Foreign Policy of the George W. Bush Administration: memoirs, History, Legacy. Diplomatic History 37 (2013): 190-216. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 47-70. August 21, 2004. https://9-11commission.gov/report/ The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 47-70. August 21, 2004. https://9-11commission.gov/report/ Otterman, Sharon. IRAQ: Iraq s Pre-War Military Capabilities. Council on Foreign Relations April 24, 2003. Accessed December 7, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-iraqs-prewar-military-capabilities/p7695 The Accidental Guerilla, David Kilcullen. Counterinsurgency, David Kilcullen.

Bibliography BBC News. No-Fly Zones: The Legal Position. February 19, 2001. Accessed December 15, 2016. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm Brands, Hal and David Palkki. Conspiring Bastards: Saddam Hussein s Strategic View of the United States. Diplomatic History 36 (2012): 625-659. Central intelligence Agency. Iraq s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. April 24, 2007. Accessed December 11, 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports- 1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm#key%20judgemetns%201 Chulov, Martin. Ahmed Chalabi: Iraqi exile whose reputation waned after return. November 3, 2015. Accessed December 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/03/ahmed-chalabi-exile-reputationwaned-iraq CNN. Gulf War Fast Facts. August 2, 2016. Accessed November 1, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/15/world/meast/gulf-war-fast-facts/ Council on Foreign Relations. The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Gulf War. September 10, 2015. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/wars-andwarfare/twenty-fifth-anniversary-gulf-war/p36954 Council on Foreign Relations. Timeline: The Iraq War. 2016. Accessed December 17, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/iraq/timeline-iraq-war/p18876 Duelfer, Charles WMD elimination in Iraq: 2003. The Nonproliferation Review 23, (2016): 163-184. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2016.1179431 Encyclopedia Britannica. Iran-Iraq War. September 2008. Accessed December 20, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/event/iran-iraq-war Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses. November 2002. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_human_rights_dossi er_on_iraq/pdf/iraq_human_rights.pdf Hamish Gordon. Remembering Halabja Chemical Attack. Al Jazeera March 16, 2016. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/remembering-halabjachemical-attack-160316061221074.html

Keylor, William. A World of Nations: The International Order Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Leffler, Melvin. The Foreign Policy of the George W. Bush Administration: memoirs, History, Legacy. Diplomatic History 37 (2013): 190-216. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 47-70. August 21, 2004. https://9-11commission.gov/report/ The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 47-70. August 21, 2004. https://9-11commission.gov/report/ Otterman, Sharon. IRAQ: Iraq s Pre-War Military Capabilities. Council on Foreign Relations April 24, 2003. Accessed December 7, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-iraqs-prewar-military-capabilities/p7695 Reiff, David. Were Sanctions Right? New York Times July 23, 2003. Accessed December 14, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/magazine/were-sanctionsright.html Taylor, Peter. Iraq war: the greatest intelligence failure in living memory. The Telegraph March 18, 2013. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9937516/iraqwar-the-greatest-intelligence-failure-in-living-memory.html UNSCOM. United nations Special Commission. 1999. Accessed December 21, 2016. http://www.un.org/depts/unscom/general/basicfacts.html United Nations Security Council. Resolution 687, (1991). April 3, 1991. Accessed December 12, 2016. http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf