Radiological Terrorism: Introduction

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Transcription:

Radiological Terrorism: Introduction The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism Acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon Crude nuclear weapon or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Attack against or sabotage of a nuclear power plant or other nuclear facility Radiological dispersal device (RDD) or dirty bomb 1

Modern time weapons Nuclear WMD First used in WWII Nuclear weapons testing, Bikini Atoll, 7/24/46 U.S. Department of Energy photograph. 2

Nuclear WMD Modern time weapons First used in WWII Replicas of atom ic bom bs dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in 1945. National Atomic Museum photograph 3

Military-Style Backpack, similar to one carrying the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park Bomb, could deliver a dirty bomb Federal Bureau of Investigation photograph Advantages: Pros / Cons Highly disruptive 4

Pros / Cons Advantages: Highly disruptive High fear / terror factor Pros / Cons Advantages: Highly disruptive High fear / terror factor Significant media profile 5

Pros / Cons Advantages: Highly disruptive High fear / terror factor Significant media profile Nuclear bombs also have: Advantages: Pros / Cons Highly disruptive High fear / terror factor Significant media profile Nuclear bombs also have: Vast destructive power (destroys infrastructure) 6

Advantages: Pros / Cons Highly disruptive High fear / terror factor Significant media profile Nuclear bombs also have: Vast destructive power (destroys infrastructure) Effect (death and destruction) is immediate Nuclear weapons testing, Operation Greenhouse, May 8, 1951 at Enewetak. U.S. Department of Energy photograph. 7

Disadvantages: Pros / Cons Expensive to obtain/maintain Disadvantages: Pros / Cons Expensive to obtain/maintain Relatively short shelf life (~7 years) 8

Disadvantages: Pros / Cons Expensive to obtain/maintain Relatively short shelf life (~7 years) Low level of control and containment Disadvantages: Pros / Cons Expensive to obtain/maintain Relatively short shelf life (~7 years) Low level of control and containment Destroys infrastructure 9

Disadvantages: Pros / Cons Expensive to obtain/maintain Relatively short shelf life (~7 years) Low level of control and containment Destroys infrastructure High risk of detection A U.S. Customs Inspector checks seaport containers coming into the United States. U.S. Department of Homeland Security photo by James Tourtellotte 10

Disadvantages: Pros / Cons Relatively short shelf life (~7 years) Low level of control and containment Destroys infrastructure High risk of detection Radiation signature helps pinpoint source Destructivity WMD far exceeds that of conventional, chemical, or biologic weapons 11

Destructivity WMD far exceeds that of conventional, chemical, or biologic weapons Dirty bombs lack real destructive power Destructivity WMD far exceeds that of conventional, chemical, or biologic weapons Dirty bombs lack real destructive power Goal of the terrorist Harassment vs. death 12

Lethality Nuclear blast potential Lethality Nuclear blast potential Kill tens of thousands of people 13

Lethality Nuclear blast potential Kill tens of thousands of people Small target area Lethality Nuclear blast potential Kill tens of thousands of people Small target area Dirty bomb potential 14

Lethality Nuclear blast potential Kill tens of thousands of people Small target area Dirty bomb potential Few deaths Lethality Weapon Fuel-air explosives Mustard gas Grams 320 million 3.2 million Sarin nerve gas 800,000 A "crude" nuclear weapon 5,000 Type A botulinal toxin 80 Anthrax spores 8 15

CIA Reports on Former Soviet Union Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Availability Nuclear proliferation is a problem 16

Availability Nuclear proliferation is a problem Rogue nations may provide terrorist groups with both weapons and technical knowledge Availability Nuclear proliferation is a problem Rogue nations may provide terrorist groups with both weapons and technical knowledge Fall of the Soviet Union left many unaccounted nuclear devices 17

Availability Nuclear proliferation is a problem Rogue nations may provide terrorist groups with both weapons and technical knowledge Fall of the Soviet Union left many unaccounted nuclear devices For sale on the black market Availability Terrorist groups performing own research and development of nuclear weapons 18

Availability Terrorist groups performing own research and development of nuclear weapons Industry use of radiological materials provides the isotopes for dirty bombs Availability Terrorist groups performing own research and development of nuclear weapons Industry use of radiological materials provides the isotopes for dirty bombs Power plant sabotage could produce massive dirty bombs 19

Vulnerable To Terrorist Activity Nuclear weapons storage facility Nuclear power plants Government facilities Hospital/medical facilities Research and educational facilities Industrial manufacturing facilities In transit. LOCATION OF RADIOLOGICAL MATERIAL Nuclear weapons storage facilities Nuclear power plants DOD and DOE facilities Hospital and other medical facilities Industrial manufacturing facilities In transit 20

ACQUIRING MATERIALS FOR RADIOLOGICAL DISSEMINATION Hijacking shipments Acquisition through black markets Bribing personnel in key positions Theft from secure facilities Delivery Suitcase bomb easily transported by person 21

Delivery Suitcase bomb easily transported by person 10 kiloton bomb readily moved by truck or boat Delivery Suitcase bomb easily transported by person 10 kiloton bomb readily moved by truck or boat Radiation detection equipment might miss a small device 22

Underwater radiation detector U.S. Environmental Protection Agency photo The Terrorist Risk Five levels of risk: 23

The Terrorist Risk Five levels of risk: Threatened use, with no real capability to use them The Terrorist Risk Five levels of risk: Threatened use, with no real capability to use them Unsuccessful attempts to acquire NW 24

The Terrorist Risk Five levels of risk: Threatened use, with no real capability to use them Unsuccessful attempts to acquire NW Actual possession of NW The Terrorist Risk Five levels of risk: Threatened use, with no real capability to use them Unsuccessful attempts to acquire NW Actual possession of NW Unsuccessful attempts to use NW 25

The Terrorist Risk Five levels of risk: Threatened use, with no real capability to use them Unsuccessful attempts to acquire NW Actual possession of NW Unsuccessful attempts to use NW Successful use of NW The Terrorist Risk Why haven t we seen the use of NW by terrorists? 26

The Terrorist Risk Why haven t we seen the use of NW by terrorists? Fear of severe backlash The Terrorist Risk Why haven t we seen the use of NW by terrorists? Fear of severe backlash More likely reasons: 27

The Terrorist Risk Why haven t we seen the use of NW by terrorists? Fear of severe backlash More likely reasons: Difficult to acquire The Terrorist Risk Why haven t we seen the use of NW by terrorists? Fear of severe backlash More likely reasons: Difficult to acquire Expensive 28

The Terrorist Risk Why haven t we seen the use of NW by terrorists? Fear of severe backlash More likely reasons: Difficult to acquire Expensive Difficult to maintain The Terrorist Risk Why haven t we seen the use of NW by terrorists? Fear of severe backlash More likely reasons: Difficult to acquire Expensive Difficult to maintain High risk of detection 29

Defense Defensive capabilities are limited Defense Defensive capabilities are limited Best defense: 30

Defense Defensive capabilities are limited Best defense: Reduce nuclear proliferation Defense Defensive capabilities are limited Best defense: Reduce nuclear proliferation Limit access to uranium and plutonium 31

Defense Defensive capabilities are limited Best defense: Reduce nuclear proliferation Limit access to uranium and plutonium Improve surveillance and detection capabilities 32