China, Missile Defense and Implication A consulting paper for the Federation of American Scientists April 28, 2017

Similar documents
International Nonproliferation Regimes after the Cold War

SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES. for FY 2011 and beyond

China U.S. Strategic Stability

Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY. National Missile Defense: Why? And Why Now?

Arms Control Today. U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance

Why Japan Should Support No First Use

Indefensible Missile Defense

European Parliament Nov 30, 2010

Steven Pifer on the China-U.S.-Russia Triangle and Strategy on Nuclear Arms Control

CHINA S WHITE PAPER ON MILITARY STRATEGY

Nuclear Forces: Restore the Primacy of Deterrence

UNIDIR RESOURCES IDEAS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY. Practical Steps towards Transparency of Nuclear Arsenals January Introduction

PROSPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL AND CBMS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. Feroz H. Khan Naval Postgraduate School

A/56/136. General Assembly. United Nations. Missiles. Contents. Report of the Secretary-General

NATO s Ballistic Missile Defense Plans a game changer? February 22, 2011

Banning Ballistic Missiles? Missile Control for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters

Reducing the waste in nuclear weapons modernization

Role and Modernization Trends of China s Second Artillery

THE NUCLEAR WORLD IN THE EARLY 21 ST CENTURY

THAAD and the Military Balance in Asia

NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES, FY 2005-

US-Russian Nuclear Disarmament: Current Record and Possible Further Steps 1. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov

Missile Defense Program Overview For The European Union, Committee On Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee On Security And Defence

Deployment of the THAAD System to South Korea Background and Issues Osamu Koike, Research Fellow, Security Studies Department

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON. December 16, 2002

Kinetic Energy Kill for Ballistic Missile Defense: A Status Overview

Towards a European Non-Proliferation Strategy. May 23, 2003, Paris

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

Missile Defense: Time to Go Big

A/55/116. General Assembly. United Nations. General and complete disarmament: Missiles. Contents. Report of the Secretary-General

Pakistan, Russia and the Threat to the Afghan War

Remarks by President Bill Clinton On National Missile Defense

mm*. «Stag GAO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE Information on Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Other Theater Missile Defense Systems 1150%

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: THE END OF HISTORY?

Section 6. South Asia

Future Russian Strategic Challenges Mark B.Schneider

US Nuclear Policy: A Mixed Message

The Nuclear Powers and Disarmament Prospects and Possibilities 1. William F. Burns

Union of Concerned Scientists Working Paper

China s Strategic Force Modernization: Issues and Implications

Dr. M. Lucy Stojak. Institute for International Law, KULeuven 19 February 2008

Background Data: Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, and the Red Dragon Rising Game. The Atomic Bomb

The Atomic Bomb. Background Data: Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, and the Red Dragon Rising Game. Offensive and Defensive Responses

A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race

SUB Hamburg A/ Nuclear Armament. GREENHAVEN PRESS A part of Gale, Cengage Learning. GALE CENGAGE Learning-

Ballistic missile defence

1 Nuclear Weapons. Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community. Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

STATEMENT J. MICHAEL GILMORE DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: Transforming US Strategic Forces. J.D. Crouch II March 5, 2003

Dear Delegates, It is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2014 Montessori Model United Nations Conference.

Report to Congress. Theater Missile Defense. Architecture Options. for the Asia-Pacific Region

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN Steven Pifer Senior Fellow Director, Arms Control Initiative October 10, 2012

Arms Control Today. Arms Control and the 1980 Election

Postwar America ( ) Lesson 3 The Cold War Intensifies

National Security Policy: American National Security Policy 1

Montessori Model United Nations. First Committee Disarmament and International Security

Question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of weapons of mass destruction MUNISH 11

Issue 16-04B (No. 707) March 22, THAAD 2. CHINA S CORE KOREA POLICY 3. UN SANCTIONS WHICH ONE NEXT? 5.

We Produce the Future

Policy Responses to Nuclear Threats: Nuclear Posturing After the Cold War

This Minuteman III missile launch illustrates two of the reasons why boost-phase interception is often more advantageous than attempting interception

A FUTURE MARITIME CONFLICT

Disarmament and International Security: Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Threats to Peace and Prosperity

1

Reading Essentials and Study Guide

MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION

Ballistic Missile Defense Update

Methodology The assessment portion of the Index of U.S.

Asia Pacific Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities

Missile Defense: A View from Warsaw

Statement of Vice Admiral Albert H. Konetzni, Jr. USN (Retired) Before the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee

Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

SALT I TEXT. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE DEVELOPMENTS

Issue Briefs. Nuclear Weapons: Less Is More. Nuclear Weapons: Less Is More Published on Arms Control Association (

SS.7.C.4.3 Describe examples of how the United States has dealt with international conflicts.

NATO MEASURES ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Nuclear Physics 7. Current Issues

MATCHING: Match the term with its description.

International and Regional Threats Posed by the LAWS: Russian Perspective

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-4. Subject: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

Moving Beyond Missile Defense and Space Weapons (MBMDS)

Better Wait than Never: Transitioning from Bilateral to Multilateral Strategic Arms Reductions By Michael Krepon*

April 1, 2015 MANAGING CHINA S MISSILE THREAT: FUTURE OPTIONS TO PRESERVE FORWARD DEFENSE

Chinese Perceptions on Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation

Document-Based Question: In what ways did President Reagan successfully achieve nuclear arms reduction?

Americ a s Strategic Posture

Section 6. South Asia

Prepared Remarks for the Honorable Richard V. Spencer Secretary of the Navy Defense Science Board Arlington, VA 01 November 2017

National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

UNCLASSIFIED. Unclassified

Reaffirming the Utility of Nuclear Weapons

Statement and Recommendations of the Co-Chairs of the 3 rd Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA) Workshop

II. Arms transfers and tensions in North East Asia

ABM Treaty and Related Documents

Foreign Policy and Homeland Security

American Public Attitudes toward North Korea s Nuclear and Missile Programs

Transcription:

China, Missile Defense and Implication A consulting paper for the Federation of American Scientists April 28, 2017 Shen Dingli Professor and Associate Dean Institute of International Studies Fudan University [Please note that this is an unedited working paper for the FAS Project on Nuclear Dynamics in a Multipolar Strategic BMD World.] Three drivers for China s missile defense Over time, China has developed its impressive missile program, ranging from short-range battlefield-level missiles, to medium-range theater-level missiles, and to intercontinental-range strategically-orientated missiles. This assures that China, under nearly all circumstances, would have a host of options to exercise effective missile retaliation once it is attacked and decided to launch counter effort. Depending upon the type of payload, China has already acquired various options to respond in kind and to exercise its own deterrent so as to achieve crisis prevention. China has developed its missile program over time to meet its national security needs. On the one hand, it has a range of territorial disputes with nearly half of its neighbors - by now China still has territorial disputes with nine out of its twenty neighbors, on the land and at sea. On the other, China has its national unification unfulfilled, leaving it the only major power with such a challenge. Even worse, on the issue of territorial integrity, while the US acknowledges that Taiwan is a part of China, Washington has kept selling weapons to Taiwan per Taiwan Relations Act, an American public law established soon after the US switched official recognition to Beijing on January 1, 1979, so as assure that Taiwan would not be coerced under security pressure. Therefore, China s historical mission to reintegrate with Taiwan and America s domestic legal obligation to defend Taiwan could clash. For the past 45 years since Beijing and Washington normalized their relations in 1979 the two countries have managed their difference by developing certain partnership: China needs the US assistance of economic modernization, while the US collaborated with China to counter Soviet expansionism at an earlier time, and Beijing s cooperation on various global governance issues such as anti-terrorism and spread of weapons of mass destruction. However, given the respective nature of realism and China s overall rise, it is hard to conceive that China will be satisfactory with the status quo and a virtually divided China across the Taiwan Strait. While China was vehement in opposing the US missile defense at the Clinton time in the 1990s, no matter a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) or National Missile Defense (NMD), Beijing could be tempted to conceive its own missile defense system when it is able to afford it financially and technologically. Presently, it seems that the time is ripe for China to work on its own missile

defense, as it indeed is acquiring its financial capability, technological preparedness, let alone the security needs it has long faced. China s missile defense: present and future As aforementioned, China faces rivalry with some of its neighbors for territorial dispute, as well as its long-term strategic competition with America on its reunification with Taiwan. Therefore, it has needs for at least both point and area defense. Since China opened its door and renormalized relationship with the Soviet Union/Russia, Beijing has been able to access Moscow s missile defense equipment, such as S300 and S400. China may have carried out reverse engineering and now it is able to export its own version of theater missile defense gear, such as FD-2000. Turkey, a NATO member, would almost decide to order the FD-2000 system, among competition from PAC3 and S300, should the Pentagon not to intervene in 2014. It is widely understood that China first conducted its ASAT test with no announcement on January 11, 2007. Not only its strategic intent of such a program, but also the debris thus generated in space, have warranted concerns of the US and other states. Later on, China publicized its mid-course missile defense exercise on January 11, 2010, and January 27, 2013. By now, China has no intent that it is working on its own missile defense systems, which may cover major metropolitan cities, in addition to providing theater-level area defense on the land and at sea. As China goes space, a reasonable speculation is whether China will build its space component of missile defense. The technology that China developed through its ASAT test in 2007 could be surely used in missile defense program, with even more extension to laser beam as weapon, deployed on the ground or possibly in the space, against offensive missiles or space-based platform of the others. For long time, China and Russia have put forward various documents at Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, attempting to initiate negotiation toward an international institution of the Prevention of Arms Race in the Outer Space (PAROS). However, the US has been uninterested in it. Washington commits to the peace use of space but doesn t view the military R&D in the space to be prohibited. The Pentagon has been of the view that at a time of necessity, America shall cutoff all others access to the space. Such notion of American freedom of action in the space has found no acceptance in Beijing and Moscow.. It was understood that when the US was frenzy in 1980s on a Star War type of missile defense structure, China had started its own research and experiment on the technicality of such space-based reentry vehicle, though it was hindered by financial challenge. Now that its financial and technical resource is much affluent, it is mere a political decision whether to compete in the space. Therefore, no matter China uses the US unwillingness on the non-militarization of space as an excuse to justify its own space military program, or truly seeks to build up its space competence after failing to persuade America to impose self-restraint, China is catching up. This makes

cooperation on space non-weaponization too late. on curbing space militarization. But at this stage, nations still can negotiate China s missile defense: impact on the US Though both China and the US are believers of school of realism, their point of departure for missile defense is quite different. For the part of US, it aspires to build so-called absolute security under the banner of Pax Americana. Despite the fact that China has also enjoyed its Chinese exceptionism complex, it has not developed nuclear weapons to reestablish a Chinese dominion in East Asia. Rather, China was expelled to develop nuclear weapons under multiple nuclear threats from the US in 1950s. So Beijing has conceived the legitimacy of its nuclear strategy due to its defensive nature. Similarly, it views its present limited missile defense in the same light defensive solely to assure the effectiveness of its strategic retaliation. If China will construct a truly limited missile defense for its political and population center, as well as for theater military purpose, Washington shall have no reason not to understand and accept. After all, all nations shall deserve limited missile defense at the missile age. But to avoid any offensive missile race, it will be desirable for China and the US to engage in strategic dialogue, so as not to enter Thucydides trap due to security dilemma. At a time of China s rise and the US President Donald Trump s push to make America great again, the two countries have to be sensible for respective strategic sensitivity. The THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) deployment in South Korea just offers an opposite case for such sensitivity. The China side insists that the THAAD radar detection has been excessive, which undermines strategic trust between China and the US as well as South Korea, playing into the hand of North Korea. Accordingly, China s ongoing missile defense program shall be carried out within a reasonable range, taking care of security balance across the Pacific. China s missile defense: impact on Russia Despite Russia s decline vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union s defense might, Moscow still enjoys a tremendous amount of strategic superiority over Beijing in terms of nuclear missile offense and defense. Given their current strategic partnership to balance the world, it is inconceivable that Russia would think that China s missile defense buildup has presented a challenge to Moscow s security interest already. Beijing and Moscow partnered in Geneva in 1990s and 2000s on the notion of PAROS. The Kremlin is averse of the persistent US missile defense in Central Europe, and now in South Korea, as these systems undercut Russia s ballistic missile prowess. Therefore, for the sake of regional and global balance, China and Russia have been often on the same wavelength. While Russia could understand China s rationale of limited missile defense, China still needs to manage its program with certain restraint, for instance, not to set up long-range radar facing

Russia, especially with no powerful interception missiles coupled. As they have completely resolved their territorial dispute, they shall enjoy their stable strategic partnership for long time. China s missile defense: impact on India India views China and Pakistan as its primary regional competitors. China s capacity rise doesn t bode well for realists in New Delhi. In its perspective, the nuclear and missile axis between Beijing and Islamabad projects shadow on India s future security. The ongoing China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship of Chinese President Xi s Belt-and-Road Initiative, is much perceived as an intrusion into India s legitimate interest, as the Pakistan-controlled-Kashmir is where the CPEC has to cut through. Strategically, as India has to develop nuclear weapons as a hedge, there is no reason why it would welcome China s missile defense, especially if such system will be deployed at its doorstep, or be introduced into Pakistan. Should that happen, a missile defense race might be unavoidable in that part of the world, which in turn will drive Pakistan to catch up. India has already developed its medium and intermediate range of ballistic missile, with no rationale vis-à-vis the US and Pakistan. However, to place Beijing and Shanghai under its deterrence could be the only plausible justification. With China s development and deployment of missile defense, India shall build up its missile offense through more strategic systems and better platforms, as well as refined penetration aid. Finance and technology permitting, it may push its own missile defense. Given their increased mutual suspicion since Modi and Xi came to power, their strategic rivalry due to Chinese missile defense buildup would only enhance. China s missile defense: impact on Pakistan As China s all weather strategic partner, Islamabad benefits from Beijing s rise. China s missile transfer to Pakistan in 1990s beefed up the latter s defense capacity, while downgrading China s own relations with the US. In fact, it is absolutely unlikely that China would refuse Pakistan s request for missile defense technology, since Beijing was willing to bid for such sale to Turkey. Reportedly China has assisted Pakistan with air defense, after the episode that the US SEALs broke into Pakistan to arrest (and kill) Osama ben Laden, in 2011. China has transferred destroyers to Pakistan, equipped with ship-based limited missile defense. There is a full reason such defense partnership will continue in the years to come. Then, probably India and Pakistan will not only engage in missile race, but missile defense race, though the latter is quite expensive and could be relatively easily neutralized. It looks that such a new form of zero-sum game will emerge, as various previous forms have unfolded. As played before, the US and/or Russia could be involved in a certain way, by offering their missile defense system to India or Pakistan, somehow with a new role to play. To sum, at a time of missile spread, it is inconceivable that China would not engage in missile

defense buildup, especially when it is rising. Such buildup will bring about readjustment and realignment of relationship among major powers and project regional impact, in particular as far as China is concerned.